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Abstract 
 
This study investigates motivations for Corporate Social Reporting (CSR). Considering 
that CSR remains a largely unregulated phenomenon, calls for normative and empirical 
research contributing to its theorisation are increasing. However, most frequently single 
theoretical interpretations are offered, which ignore the potential variety of explanations 
for the practice in diverse contexts. Concerns are also often expressed over the use of 
Content Analysis (CA) in CSR research. Although authors generally agree on the 
decisions with regard to sampling, they do not agree on the measurement units, and there 
is also a lack of studies reviewing issues pertaining to the context in CA. 
 
Thus, this study aims to contribute to the CSR literature by (a) introducing a framework 
that synthesises the relationships between the theoretical explanations for the 
phenomenon, and (b) reviewing the use of CA in CSR research, with a focus on CA 
decisions regarding sampling, recording and context. In pursue of the theoretical 
objective (a), a number of frequently employed theoretical explanations are reviewed 
and amalgamated in a revisited legitimacy theory framework, which identified three 
prime potential drivers for CSR. These include an ethics-focus approach, where 
legitimacy is achieved by discharging accountability to all identified stakeholders, and 
two image-focus approaches, where organisations are either interested in maintaining 
their legitimacy by retaining a positive image, or in opportunistically extending their 
legitimacy and image. 
 
To investigate the applicability of these suggestions, a case study design is adopted, 
whereby the reactions of five aviation organisations to major legitimacy threats in the 
form of air crashes are examined. The organisations considered are British Airways, Air 
France, American Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Scandinavian Airlines. Considering 
the methodological objective (b) of the study and the fact that the nature of the research, 
thus, requires measuring the levels of CSR, a mixed-method CA is employed, which 
(building on a systematic review of the literature) considers not only the variations in the 
 ii
measured levels of CSR prior to, and following, the accidents, but also what is actually 
stated in the disclosures.  
 
The study finds little support for the ethics-focus approach. The majority of the 
quantitative and qualitative evidence indicates instead that CSR is most often externally 
driven. Organisations appear to primarily engage with it to ensure they are seen as acting 
legitimately, in order to minimise existing and potential image threats and maintain 
profitability. The study, contrary to the literature, also finds that the recording units 
employed were not consistent in their findings and thus suggests that future studies 
should consider a variety of recording units. As regards the context, the organisations 
appear to adopt a ‘pecking order’ disclosure approach with regard to their reporting 
media, reporting their substantive positive CSR news via the AR to their most ‘critical 
stakeholders’, whilst disclosing their substantive negative CSR news in the more 
‘ephemeral’ stand-alone reports, which potentially have smaller audience. 
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PART I INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Ithaca. 
As you set out for Ithaca 
pray your road is a long one. 
Full of adventure, full of discovery. 
Laistrygonians, Cyclops,  
angry Poseidon - don't be afraid of them: 
you'll never find things like that on your way 
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high, 
as long as a rare excitement 
stirs your spirit and your body. 
Laistrygonians, Cyclops, 
wild Poseidon - you won't encounter them 
unless you bring them along inside your soul, 
unless your soul sets them up in front of you  
...
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
1.1 Introduction   
 
The last twenty years have seen a dramatic growth in the number of companies 
engaging with Corporate Social Reporting (CSR) and in the amount of information 
being reported. Since CSR remains a largely unregulated phenomenon, CSR research 
frequently focuses on identifying the possible motivations behind managers’ 
decisions to take such action. However, most frequently single theoretical 
interpretations are offered, and to date there seems to be a lack of agreed theoretical 
perspectives to drive systematic research. Concerns are also often expressed over the 
use of Content Analysis (CA) in CSR research. Although authors generally agree on 
the decisions with regard to sampling, they do not agree on the measurement units, 
and there is also a lack of studies reviewing issues pertaining to the context in CA.  
 
Thus, this study investigates motivations for CSR and will contribute to the relevant 
literature by (a) introducing a framework that synthesises the relationships between 
the theoretical explanations for the phenomenon, and (b) reviewing the use of CA in 
CSR research, with a focus on CA decisions regarding sampling, recording and 
context.  Section 1.2 provides a background to the research. The following section 
presents the rational and aims of the research. The next section, on the research 
approach, is more substantial as it outlines the theoretical and methodological 
approach of the study and provides a rationale for the selection of the aviation 
industry. The penultimate section provides a guide to the structure of the thesis 
followed by a summary of the chapter. 
 
1.2 Background to the research 
 
Corporations, nowadays, operating in capitalistic economic systems, appear to be 
constantly increasing their power. A frequently quoted statistic, for example, is that 
1 
the annual turnover of General Motors exceeds that of the GNP of the forty poorest 
nations in the world. Such organisations indisputably have consistently been a source 
of economic benefit to the local communities they are operating in (Gray et al., 
1996). However, as O’Dwyer (1999) notes, in an unpublished PhD thesis,  
 
in many instances, the sheer scale of these economic benefits and the 
accompanying dependence on them by many communities/nations has meant 
that much of their decision making has been left free from any control or 
influence by governments and workers (p. 4). 
 
It, indeed, seems that capitalism generates many negative externalities, “that make its 
justification as a desirable form of economic system a contentious subject” (Jones, 
1996, p. 7). Examples of how the increased freedoms of large corporations often 
appear to be a restraint on all the other participants in the wider society seem to 
abound (Unerman et al., 2007a): mistreatment of workers; minors working 12-hour 
days; intensive lobbying of governments to weaken workers’ rights; interference in 
the decisions of government and employment discrimination (Reich, 1998; O’Dwyer, 
1999). Particularly capitalism’s environmental externalities (e.g. catastrophic oil 
spills, destruction of habitats and the ozone layer, acid rain) negatively affect 
individuals, communities, nations and whole species of life (Gray et al., 1996) and, 
“will almost inevitably have a future impact on the shape of society, the ecosphere 
and the economy” (Unerman et al., 2007a, p.1). Thus, it appears that, according to 
the logic of modern capitalist organisations: 
 
These organizations do not exist to solve society’s problems, or to provide 
enriching jobs for their members… or to satisfy customer needs. Employees 
are a resource to be utilized, a means to an end; society provides critical 
resources… for survival and growth, as well as a site for externalizing the 
costs of production; customers’ needs are to be met (as well as created) not as 
an end in itself, but as a means to secure profits (Jones, 1996, p. 15). 
 
However, the behaviour of corporations has never been more under the spotlight 
(McIntosh et al., 2003). Although this was not considered to be a new issue even in 
the 1960s (Drucker, 1969), or 1950s (Heald, 1957), public awareness of the 
environmental, social and economic impacts of business has increased at a dramatic 
rate over recent decades. A different role seems to now increasingly be perceived for 
organisations. A role “not only limited to the traditional pursuit of profits, innovation 
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and economic growth (within limits)…, but also encompassing the acceptance of 
(albeit not clearly specified) duties of responsibility to the wider society regardless 
of their economic consequences” (O’Dwyer, 1999, p. 6, emphasis in original).  
 
Such a condition, though, implies that organisations would provide their identified 
constituents, with some means to control and guide organisational activity in order to 
prevent adverse social impacts; such means would primarily involve the 
communication of an account of action – accountability – to enable stakeholders to 
monitor the social and environmental impacts (O’Dwyer et al., 2005a,b). 
Accounting, as “a set of socially conditioned practices which have various significant 
impacts on the operation of our society” (Bebbington, 2004, p.16), is thus called 
upon to assist in demonstrating the accountability and integrity of business actions. 
To this end, CSR has been developed. The CSR definition offered by Gray et al. 
(1987, p. ix), as: 
 
the process of communicating the social and environmental effects of 
organisations’ economic actions to particular interest groups within society 
and to society at large. As such, it involves extending the accountability of 
organisations (particularly companies), beyond the traditional role of 
providing a financial account to the owners of capital, in particular, 
shareholders. Such an extension is predicated upon the assumption that 
companies do have wider responsibilities than simply to make money for 
their shareholders 
 
seems to be favoured by many in the relevant literature. In essence, therefore, CSR 
involves reporting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSRes, hereafter) to societal 
interest groups (Woodward et al., 2001). As CSR is in principle, “at the heart of an 
examination of the role of information in organization-society dialogue” (Gray et al., 
1995a, p. 48), it can contribute to, “the normative position of a more justly organised 
and better informed democracy” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 42)1, since such reporting 
leads either to improvement or to criticism as regards the corporate behaviour 
(Moody-Stuart, 2006). There is, indeed, some encouraging evidence that CSR has 
been increasing across time, both in the number of disclosing companies and in the 
                                                 
1 As Gray et al. (1996) further note, “Seeking to change accounting seems an appropriate act for 
accountants. While accounting may not be the best place to start when seeking to change society it is 
clearly an important element for any significant change and, as accountants define and reify 
accounting, it seems reasonable to assume that accountants are an appropriate group to explore such a 
change” (p.64). 
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amount of information being reported (see, e.g. KPMG, 2005, 2008) that could be, 
arguably, interpreted as indicative of a global corporate movement towards better 
informed democracies. 
 
It appears to be the case, however, that this is not the sole, or even the main, 
corporate motivation for CSR, and that just because a company appears to be 
responsive, this does not necessarily imply that it is responsible (Deegan, 2002). 
Indeed, there is mounting empirical evidence that companies engage with CSR for a 
number of other than accountability reasons (see chapter 3 for a detailed account of 
these). However, there is a need for the alternative corporate motivations behind the 
organisational voluntary engagement with CSR to be identified, and for these 
relationships to be clarified and then synthesised in frameworks if CSR is to develop 
in a systematic way and not be, “captured and trivialised by powerful organisations” 
(Gray et al., 1997, p. 326). As the following section indicates, there is a lack of such 
agreed frameworks to drive systematic CSR research. 
 
1.3 Rationale and aims of the study 
 
In every research field there is a need for some clear and widely acceptable 
theoretical frameworks to be established; a need for some postulates/axioms, on 
which an argument of scientific discussion can be based and by which systematic 
research can be driven. These are essential to the development of any intellectual 
discipline; can be a basis for inference, a foundation for erection of any theoretical 
structure, and susceptible to challenge in the light of later advancement of knowledge 
(Mautz and Sharaf, 1997). The reasoning for generally acceptable propositions in any 
discipline can be traced back to Aristotle, around twenty-four centuries ago, when he 
stressed that “every demonstrative science must start from indemonstrable principles, 
otherwise, the steps of demonstration would be endless” (Mautz and Sharaf,, 1997, p. 
43). 
 
The development of such clear frameworks to drive systematic research appears to 
have been achieved in areas adjacent to CSR. In Corporate Finance, for example, it is 
generally agreed that regarding the capital structure choice, there is a trade-off 
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between the tax benefits of debt and the increased default expenses (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958, 1963; see also, e.g. Myers, 1984; Bayless and Diltz, 1994; Brounen, 
2001), and research now focuses on building on this theory and developing some 
complementary explanations, e.g. Pecking Order Theory (e.g. Myers and Majliuf, 
1984; Krasker, 1986; Narayanan, 1987); Agency Theory (e.g. Fama and Miller, 
1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1990) and Signalling Theory (e.g. Leland 
and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977; Masulis, 1983). Some consensus seems also to have 
been reached in fields such as Economics and Organisational Behaviour. With regard 
to CSR, though, as Gray et al. (1995a) note: 
 
there is little about CSR which is not contestable – and contested. CSR, at its 
broadest may embrace: both self-reporting by organisations and reporting 
about organisations by third parties; information in the annual report and any 
other form of communication; both public domain and private information; 
information in any medium…It is not restricted necessarily by reference to 
selected information recipients; and the information deemed to be CSR may, 
ultimately, embrace any subject (p. 47). 
 
While interest in CSR has waxed and waned as researchers have entered and left the 
field (Gray et al., 1995a), CSR has continually attracted doubts about its legitimacy 
as an area of accounting research enquiry (Deegan, 2002). Since both CSRes and 
CSR are largely unregulated, they are neither practised systematically nor able to 
claim, “either universal recognition or universal definition” (Gray et al., 1995a, p. 
47). The lack of CSR regulation indeed seems to be one of the major obstacles for 
the CSR literature to overcome to possess coherence (see, e.g. Gray et al., 1995a; 
Gray et al., 1996; Adams et al., 1998; O’Dwyer, 1999; Deegan, 2000; Clikeman, 
2004; Deegan, 2004; Turner et al., 2006, for supporting accounts).  
 
Given that, apart from some minor exceptions (see, e.g. Deegan, 2000, 2004; KPMG, 
2005), managers are not required by law to disclose CSR information, CSR research 
frequently focuses on identifying the possible motivations behind managers’ 
decisions to take such action. The majority of the literature, however, reviews single 
explanations for CSR; a small number of studies comprehensively review three or 
more theoretical explanations (most notably Mathews, 1993; Gray et al., 1995a; 
Gray et al., 1996; Buhr, 1998; Campbell, 2000; Cooper, 2004; Deegan and Unerman, 
2006; Unerman et al., 2007b); and an even smaller number provide frameworks 
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modelling the relationships of the theories (e.g. Gray et al., 1996; Laughlin, 1990; 
Woodward et al., 2001; Roberts and Chen, 2006; Spense and Gray, 2007), in spite of 
the frequent calls for “a plurality of approaches and a multiplicity of lens through 
which to observe, explain and predict CSR reporting practice” (Bebbington et al., 
2008b, pp. 372-373).  
 
Thus, it appears that, “explaining CSR reporting is a long way from ‘normal 
science’” (Bebbington et al., 2008b, p. 373) and to date there seems to be a lack of 
agreed theoretical perspectives to drive systematic research (Trotman and Bradley, 
1981; Ullmann, 1985; Gray et al., 1995a; O’Dwyer, 1999; Tilt, 2003; Parker, 2005), 
leading Parker (2005) to note that the academic pursuit for the development of such a 
framework, seems to resemble that for the Holy Grail. As Spence and Gray (2007) 
stress:  
 
If we do know little about why organisations report, we actually know 
relatively little about why some do report while many do not. Equally of 
concern… is why so very few organisations report either completely or 
reliably (p. 11). 
 
The lack of agreed theoretical perspectives and definitions has also, not surprisingly, 
undermined the way authors investigate CSR, and particularly their use of CA, the 
most frequently employed method in CSR studies (Milne and Adler, 1999) . Hence 
(as explained in more detail in chapter 5), although authors generally agree on the 
decisions with regard to sampling, they do not agree on the measurement units, and 
there is also a lack of studies reviewing issues pertaining to the context in CA. It is, 
nevertheless, important for these methodological issues to be addressed, in order to 
achieve improvements in the extensiveness, quality, quantity and comprehensiveness 
of the CSR research, and ultimately CSR itself (Adams, 2002).   
 
In response to the existence of these apparent theoretical and methodological 
vacuums, the main aims of this study are (a) to investigate motivations for CSR, and 
introduce a framework to model the relationships and synthesise most of the 
theoretical explanations for CSR; and (b) to review the use of CA in CSR research, 
with a focus on CA decisions regarding sampling, recording and context. Given that, 
as the next section explains, the study investigates motivations by particularly 
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examining corporate disclosure reactions to legitimacy threats, the overarching 
research questions can be expressed as: 
 
? How do organisations respond to a threat to their legitimacy? 
 
? Which are the most suitable context and recording units in CA?  
 
The research approach employed to investigate these questions is explained in the 
next section and in greater depth in the main body of the thesis.  
 
1.4 The research approach 
 
This section outlines the research approach of the study. Firstly, the theoretical 
approach is discussed, explaining the purpose of the subsidiary research questions 
and how the framework of the study was generated. Then a rationale for the choice 
of the aviation industry is provided. Lastly, the methodological approach is reviewed, 
considering the research design, data collection and analysis choices.   
 
1.4.1 The theoretical approach 
 
The theoretical approach of the study is reflected in the three chapters (chapters 2 to 
4) dedicated to the literature review. A number of preliminary literature reviews were 
conducted and have informed the discussion in these chapters. In the first attempt, 
the CSR literature was classified by country; in the second by potential contributing 
factor (i.e. size, industry); and in the third by motivational theory. It was at this stage 
that chapter 3 was written and the subsidiary research questions, pertaining to the 
theoretical aims of the study, emerged.  These include: 
  
? What are the object companies’ positions towards CSRes? 
  
? Is CSR a strategically or ethically motivated activity? 
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? Is CSR a product of a reactive or proactive corporate stance?  
 
? Can CSR be explained on the basis of a contractual relationship between 
organisations and society? 
 
The original aim of these subsidiary research questions was to review and compare 
the most frequently cited explanatory theories of CSR practice, in order to identify 
similarities and differences with regard to these theoretical propositions. However, 
when at a later stage it was decided to employ Legitimacy Theory (LT) as the main 
framework of the study, the questions also served as contributing ‘dimensions’ to it 
and were consequently employed, “as a template with which to compare the 
empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 1989, p. 54). Thus, as suggested in the 
literature (Tashakori and Teddlie, 1998; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Weber, 2004), the 
research questions have provided direction for designing all phases of the research 
project. 
 
The first two emergent subsidiary questions concerned whether CSR is a strategically 
or ethically motivated activity and if it is reactive or proactive. With regard to the 
first question, as briefly discussed in section 1.2, CSR may be seen as a mechanism 
for discharging accountability, contributing to “the normative position of a more 
justly organised and better informed democracy” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 42); however, 
CSR may also be employed “in a strategic manner to manage an organisation’s 
relations with the community in which it operates” (Deegan, 2000, p. 264). This 
question thus assists in originally identifying whether the considered theoretical 
explanations and collected empirical evidence signifies a moral or other than moral 
CSR orientation. It appears that a number of studies in the CSR literature have also 
considered the second question, regarding whether CSR is an internally or externally 
driven activity (see, e.g. Frederick, 1994; L’ Etant, 1994; Lindblom, 1993; Zain, 
1999; O’Dwyer, 1999; Woodward and Woodward, 2001; Woodward et al., 2001; 
O’Donovan, 2002a). 
 
It was also quickly realised that, considering that CSR is often perceived as a 
manifestation of corporate social responsibility (Gray et al., 1996; O’Dwyer, 1999), 
“CSR[es] and CSR reporting cannot be understood in isolation of each other” 
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(Adams, 2008, p.365). Thus, in order to understand motivations for CSR practice 
(and non-practice) it should be firstly sought to understand motivations behind 
CSRes. To this end, a literature review focusing on the development of CSRes was 
conducted, reflected in chapter 2, and four distinct corporate positions regarding 
CSRes were identified.  
 
Finally, the preliminary literature reviews also indicated that LT, the most frequently 
employed framework in explanatory CSR research, and its basic tenet, social contract 
theory, could be consistent with most of the reviewed arguments. These frameworks 
argue that CSR can be explained on the basis of a contractual relationship between 
organisations and society. Hence, it was decided to employ LT as the main 
theoretical framework of the study and develop a research question to check the 
compatibility of the reviewed theoretical explanations to the employed LT 
framework. 
 
The LT framework of the study is comprehensively discussed in chapter 4. As that 
chapter reveals, the corporate positions regarding CSRes identified in chapter 2 have 
also served as the foundation for the four related variants of the LT framework there 
identified. Chapter 4 also discusses how organisations manage their legitimacy and 
how this framework is most frequently assessed, by examining reactions to 
legitimacy threats. For the purposes of this research, corporate disclosure reactions to 
some major legitimacy threats in the form of aviation accidents are investigated and a 
number of related propositions are drawn (detailed in section 4.5), largely predicting 
that the organisations will increase their levels of CSR following the accident. The 
following section provides a rationale for the selection of the aviation industry. 
 
1.4.2 The aviation industry 
 
As discussed in more detail in section 5.9.1.1, the aviation industry was selected, 
because of its wide customer base and public visibility (Woodward et al., 2008). The 
industry is often criticised for being one of the greatest environmental polluters. As 
Extract 1.1 however illustrates, Health and Safety (H&S) concerns over the industry 
are also frequently brought to the fore. The recent miraculous landing of Flight 1549 
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in the Hudson River in New York revealed that the pay cuts in this highly 
competitive industry have resulted in driving more experienced pilots away from the 
cockpit, jeopardising the H&S of employees, customers and public. 
 
Most frequently, H&S concerns over the aviation industry arise following airline 
crashes. These generate a large amount of negative news coverage for the object 
organisations since, all of a sudden, hundreds of people are loosing their lives. 
Consequently, they have great negative impacts on the organisations’ overall 
reputations (Zyglidopoulos, 2001) and some smaller companies are even forced to go 
bankrupt or to change their brand name (see, e.g. Helios Airways aviation accident in 
Greece, 2005).  It was thus expected that the aviation accidents regarding the 
examined companies would constitute a major legitimacy threat for their operations. 
 
 
 
WASHINGTON – The air traffic controller 
who handled Flight 1549 thought ditching in 
the Hudson River amounted to a death 
sentence for all aboard. Now the veteran pilot 
who pulled off the feat safely says harsh pay 
cuts are driving experienced pilots from the 
cockpit… Sullenberger, a 58-year-old who 
joined a US Airways predecessor in 1980, 
and his copilot, Jeffrey B. Skiles, told the 
panel that experienced pilots are quitting 
because of deep cuts in their pay and benefits. 
Skiles said unless federal laws are revised to 
improve labor-management relations 
"experienced crews in the cockpit will be a 
thing of the past." Sullenberger added that 
without experienced pilots "we will see 
negative consequences to the flying public."  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extract 1.1 Aviation industry and relationship with employees  
(Source: Lowy and Sniffen, 2009) 
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1.4.3 The methodological approach 
 
In this study, a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods is employed to 
investigate motivations for CSR. This approach is based on the belief that there is no 
one best way to do research: “there is more than one methodology, more than one 
truth and more than one set of background assumptions: and thus more than one 
accounting reality” (Laughlin et al. 1986, p. 20).  
 
In this study, Laughlin’s (1995) ‘middle range’ philosophical arguments have been 
adopted. Laughlin accepts that, although the social world does not exist 
independently of individual subjective understandings, there are still likely to be 
some broad generalisations which can be made in many (but not necessarily all) 
situations. These broad generalisations will however usually be ‘skeletal’ and will 
normally require empirical detail to make them applicable to specific situations 
(Unerman, 2000b). Thus, this approach does not discount the inescapable, 
“perspective bias in models of understanding” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 81) and (similarly 
to e.g. Weber, 2004) considers all methods, qualitative and quantitative, to be useful, 
subject to the specific research questions of the study. 
 
The espousal of the Laughlin’s ‘middle range’ philosophical stance has allowed for a 
mixed method study to be adopted, in which qualitative and quantitative approaches 
are combined across all phases of the research process: from conceptualisation to 
data analysis and inference (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Thus, the study’s 
methods involve a longitudinal adaptation of Yin’s (2009) multi-case study, 
explanatory research design, with Annual and stand-alone Reports as data, and both 
quantitative and qualitative CA as data analysis methods.  
 
The issues pertaining to methodology are discussed in chapters 5 and 6. The main 
focus of both the chapters is on quantitative CA, considering the methodological 
aims of the study and the fact that the nature of the research and its propositions 
requires measuring the levels of CSR. Chapter 5 provides an ex ante view to 
conducting the data collection and analysis and a detailed justification of these 
techniques. To inform the CA decisions, a quasi-systematic review of the CSR 
literature was conducted, focusing on the sampling (including data collection), 
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context and recording units. The chapter also discusses the qualitative approach to 
CA, involving a number of Yin’s (2009) recommended analysis techniques (i.e. 
pattern matching, explanation building, time series, and cross-case analyses). Chapter 
6, written from an ‘ex post to the analysis angle’, provides a reflective account of the 
data collection and analysis process, and discusses the empirical methodological 
findings in respect of the research aims pertaining to the use of CA in CSR research.  
 
As discussed in section 5.9.1.2, following the relevant literature, it was decided to 
investigate overall five large company cases and for each company to check the 
Annual and stand-alone reports  two years prior to, the year of, and two years after 
the accident, in order to capture the accident effect on the level of disclosure. The 
considered organisations are British Airways, Air France, American Airlines, 
Singapore Airlines and Scandinavian Airlines and were selected due to their large 
size and also the availability of their data. All the collected evidence relates to the 
period 1999-2003. These were quite turbulent times for the whole world and 
particularly the aviation industry, primarily due to the September 11th 2001 terrorist 
attacks, and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq. As the discussion in chapters 7 and 
8 reveals, these events have been perceived as potential threats pertaining to the 
legitimacy of the whole industry and have been taken into consideration when 
interpreting the results.  
 
It could be argued that the combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques in 
the research design implies that the research draws some limitations from both 
worlds: the adoption of an overall case study design limits the study’s 
generalisability; the quantitative analysis of the surveyed Annual and stand-alone 
report information also harms the study’s prominent qualitative character and can 
possibly result in some loss of context; and, on the other hand, the employment of 
qualitative data and use of qualitative analysis techniques, increases the potential 
subjectivities  and weakens the study’s reliability2.  
 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this study, the reliability and validity definitions of Ritchie and Lewis (2003) 
have been adopted. ‘Reliability’ is generally understood to concern the replicability of research 
findings and whether or not they would be repeated if another study, using the same or similar 
methods, was undertaken. The ‘validity’ of findings or data is traditionally understood to refer to the 
'correctness' or 'precision' of a research finding. It generally refers to the approximate truth of 
propositions, inferences, or conclusions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
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However, the benefits to credibility of this approach outnumber its limitations. The 
generalisability of the findings is implicit in the multi-case study method, where 
replication logic is used (Savage et al., 2000) and, “the goal is to do a ‘generalising’ 
and not a ‘particularising’” research (Yin, 1994, p. 10): the aim is to generalise a 
particular set of results to some broader theory instead of a larger universe. The 
reliability of the findings is strengthened by the use of relevant tests, and frequently 
employed qualitative analysis techniques and frameworks, with specific procedural 
approaches to data collection and analysis (see, e.g. Huberman and Miles, 1994; 
Gray et al., 1995b; Yin, 2009). Yet, it is the validity of the findings which appears to 
be considerably strengthened, through the variety of the systematic approaches to the 
analysis (qualitative and quantitative), the longitudinal time-span of the research, and 
the triangulation of the findings, which allow for an in–depth study of the cases and, 
as a consequence, for a comprehensive explanation of the ‘causal links’ in the 
investigated phenomena to be generated (Yin, 2009). 
 
It should always be remembered, though, when explanatory CSR research is 
conducted, that CSR is a complex phenomenon, “which it is difficult to find 
explanations for” (Campbell, 2000, p. 81). As Bebbington (2004) notes, “there are a 
multitude of theoretical lenses which may be used to understand, explain and 
evaluate the [CSR] practices” (p.18). Further, “there could be several motivations 
simultaneously driving organisations to report social and environmental information” 
(Deegan, 2002, p. 291). Across all stages of this explanatory CSR research, 
therefore, from reviewing the existing empirical evidence and developing the 
theoretical framework and propositions, to collecting and analysing the evidence and 
making inferences,  
 
different theoretical perspectives… [are not] seen as competitors for 
explanation but as sources of interpretation of different factors… and enrich, 
rather than compete for, our understandings of corporate social disclosure 
practices (Gray et al., 1995a, p.67). 
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1.5 Organisation of the study 
 
The organisation of the study largely reflects Yin’s (2009) case study approach, as 
Figure 1.1 illustrates. It is organised in nine chapters and the remaining ones are as 
follows.  
 
Chapter 2 is the first of three literature review chapters; it focuses on the 
development of CSRes, identifies distinct organisational ‘positions’ that are based 
upon the motivations for CSRes behaviour, and illustrates how the motivations for 
CSRes may underpin the ones for CSR. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the most important theoretical explanations for CSR in the 
literature and directly relates them to CSRes positions identified in the preceding 
chapter and the other three research questions of the study. This will assist in 
clarifying their relationships and will provide the basis of the theoretical framework 
of the study (in which the research questions serve as ‘dimensions’) presented in the 
next chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical framework of the study. A detailed justification 
of the framework and its relationship with the theories examined in chapter 3 is 
provided. Four types of organisational stances towards CSR are identified (based on 
the identified in chapter 2 corporate positions towards CSRes) and their expected 
variations in CSR actions are considered. Chapter 4 also discusses how organisations 
manage their legitimacy and how this framework is most frequently assessed, by 
examining reactions to legitimacy threats. Based on the discussion, the propositions 
of the study are then presented. 
15 
Figure 1.1 The case study method (Yin, 2009, p.57) as reflected in the structure of the thesis  
 
 
 
  Chapter 7  Chapters 8,9  Chapters 5,6 Chapters 2,3,4 
    
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters dedicated to methodology. Written before 
conducting the data collection and analysis, it outlines the philosophical views and 
research design and more comprehensively discusses the CA approach adapted, with 
reference to both qualitative and quantitative techniques. By employing a quasi-
systematic review of the CSR literature, the decisions on the sampling (including 
data collection), context and recording units of the CA are clarified. Additionally, the 
classification schemes and qualitative analysis approach used is discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 provides a reflective account of the data collection and analysis processes. 
Written after conducting the data collection and analysis (with a particular emphasis 
on CA), it reviews these two processes, provides some reflections on, and findings 
from, the use of these methods, and identifies potential implications to the findings.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings of the study for the five case studies. Each case study 
includes a brief introduction to the company and the legitimacy threat (accident), 
followed by sub-sections on the quantitative and qualitative evidence of the analysis 
and a concluding section summarising the evidence. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the cross-case findings of the study in respect of the 
propositions, research questions and developed framework by relating them to the 
extant literature. Each contributing theory to the framework is reviewed for 
supporting, or contradicting, evidence and alternative explanations are considered. 
The implications of the findings are further discussed. 
 
Chapter 9 concludes the study. Firstly, a summary of the research is provided. The 
findings are presented in view of the research questions and the theoretical and 
methodological contributions of the study are detailed. A number of validity, 
reliability and generalisability limitations are also summarised and suggestions for 
further research are made. 
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1.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has laid the foundations for the study. It firstly provided a background 
by outlining the importance of undertaking research on motivations for CSR. Then 
the gaps in the literature in respect of the latter and the aims of the study were 
presented – the latter being, (a) to investigate motivations for CSR, and introduce a 
framework to model the relationships and synthesise most of the theoretical 
explanations for CSR; and (b) to review the use of CA in CSR research, with a focus 
on CA decisions regarding sampling, recording and context. The subsidiary research 
questions were also previewed. The research approach was then discussed, outlining 
the theoretical and methodological approach of the study and providing a rationale 
for the selection of the aviation industry. Finally, a guide to the structure of the thesis 
was provided. 
 
The following three chapters present the literature review of this study, with the next 
one to investigate the explanations for CSRes, by looking at the driving forces 
behind its development.  
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 PART II LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
…Pray your road is a long one. 
May there be many summer mornings when,  
with what pleasure, what joy,  
you enter harbours you're seeing                 
for the first time; 
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations 
to buy fine things, 
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony, 
sensual perfume of every kind - 
as many sensual perfumes as you can; 
and may you visit many Egyptian cities 
to learn and go on learning from their scholars  
... 
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Chapter 2 
In Search of Explanations for Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The overarching aim of this chapter is to ascertain if it is possible to identify distinct 
organisational ‘positions’ that are based upon the motivations for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSRes) behaviour. Understanding motivations for CSRes will assist 
in understanding motivations for CSR (presented in the next chapter), and in 
developing a framework to model the relationships and synthesise most of the 
theoretical explanations for CSR (presented in chapter 4).  
 
To this end, following some background information, a review of the development of 
CSRes is provided, with a focus on identifying the driving forces behind the 
development of the phenomenon over time. This is divided into three sections: the 
years before the 1900s; from 1900 to 1950; and from then onwards. In the last 
section describing CSRes development, a brief review of the development of CSR is 
simultaneously provided1, aiming to highlight the milestone events in its progress 
over the years, and further illustrate how the explanations for CSRes may underpin 
those for CSR. The penultimate section of the chapter discusses the identified CSRes 
positions from the review of the literature, whilst the final section provides a 
summary of the chapter.    
 
2.2 Background 
 
CSRes can be expressed as the voluntary assumption of responsibilities that go 
beyond the purely economic and legal responsibilities of business entities (McGuire, 
1963; Manne and Wallich, 1972). The exercise of social responsibility, in this view, 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that this review is not exhaustive, given that a number of focused studies 
efficiently provide comprehensive reviews of the phenomenon (see e.g. Gray et al., 1996; Matthews, 
1997; O’Dwyer, 1999; Gray, 2002; Parker, 2005; Owen, 2008) and thus any detailed attempt at 
discussion would largely result in replicating these works.  
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must allow for companies to earn a satisfactory level of profit; but it also implies a 
willingness to forego a certain measure of profit in order to achieve CSRes ends 
(Boatright, 2003). 
 
A number of attempts to define the CSRes area, nevertheless, provide ‘procedural’ 
explications of the term (e.g. Carroll, 1979; Hargreaves and Dauman, 1975; Carroll, 
1991) in that more than one level of responsibilities is identified. Hargreaves and 
Dauman (1975) identify three distinguishable levels of CSRes: the first covers “basic 
responsibilities”, referring to technical and routine obligations, such as paying taxes; 
whilst the second level, “organisational responsibilities” are intended to secure the 
well-being and needs of those under the aegis of the company, whether employees, 
suppliers or shareholders. When a company adopts “societal responsibilities” (the 
third level in the classification) it becomes involved in the wider community by 
assisting the creation of a “healthy overall environment” (Hargreaves and Dauman, 
1975, p. 19). What distinguishes societal responsibilities from the other categories is 
that it covers a wider constituency, emphasising the welfare and prosperity of society 
(Marinetto, 1998).  
 
It appears that the concept of CSRes is still a contested one, with many facets 
(Esrock and Leichty, 1998). As Votaw (1973) states:  
 
The term [social responsibility] is a brilliant one; it means something, but not 
always the same thing, to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal 
responsibility or liability; to others, it means socially responsible behavior in 
an ethical sense; to still others, the meaning transmitted is that of “responsible 
for”, in a causal mode; they may simply equate it with a charitable 
contribution; some take it to mean socially conscious; many of those who 
embrace it most fervently see it as a mere synonym for “legitimacy”, in the 
context of “belonging” or being proper or valid; a few see it as a sort of 
fiduciary duty imposing higher standards of behavior on businessmen than on 
citizens at large (p.11),  
 
and as Gray et al. (1995a) argue, CSRes’ “failure to theorise explicitly the 
organization-society relationship leaves it both flaccid and immanent” (p. 48). The 
notion of CSRes thus sparks lively debate, involving fundamental questions about 
the nature of the corporation and its role in society (Mullin, 1996) and, as discussed 
in section 1.3, it seems that the debate over CSRes is also inherited in its reporting, 
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since “there is little about CSR which is not contestable – and contested” (Gray et al., 
1995a, p.47). Considering that these phenomena cannot be understood in isolation of 
each other (Adams, 2008), the next section presents the development of CSRes (and 
in the later stages, also of CSR), with a focus on identifying the key drivers behind 
its development over the time.  
 
2.3 The development of CSRes and its Reporting 
 
It appears that the concept of CSRes has evolved gradually; thus, the full significance 
of corporate responsibility can only be appreciated in its historical context (Sheikh, 
1996). Eberstadt (1973), for example, traces its historical evolution into the classical 
period and argues that when the corporate responsibility is seen in its historical 
context, it can be understood that, “the free enterprise system as we know it” (p.77) 
is the exception, and not the rule, of Western economies. From ancient Greek times 
until the Industrial Revolution, western society imposed strict controls on business. It 
could be argued that the expressed in the last decades “corporate responsibility 
movement is an attempt to restore a 2,000-year-old Western tradition” (Eberstadt, 
1973, p. 76).  
 
Three main stages in the development of CSRes are identified: the years before 
1900s; from 1900 to 1950; and from then onwards. Given the general lack of studies 
investigating the development of the phenomena prior to the 1960s/1970s, the 
reviews of the first two stages draw heavily on the works of Eberstandt (1973) and 
Heald (1957) respectively (these were the only identified studies during the initial 
literature search to be reviewing the development of CSRes before the 1950s). In the 
last stage, a brief review of the development of CSR which emerged at the time is 
also provided, to illustrate how the explanations for CSRes may underpin those for 
CSR.   
 
2.3.1 The period up to 1900 
 
The CSRes phenomenon appears to be rooted in the classical period (ancient Greece, 
4th and 5th centuries BC). During those years, the businessman’s position in Greece 
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was “only slightly higher that the slave’s” (Eberstadt, 1973, p. 77). In the ancient 
Greek system of values, character development was imperative and the emphasis was 
on community spirit. Business was thought to promote base emotions and profit-
making activities were strongly disapproved of. Consequently, community pressure 
compelled entrepreneurs to pursue social activities (Sheikh, 1996). As Eberstadt 
(1973) has elaborated: 
 
Aristotle wrote: ‘in the best governed community… the citizen may not lead 
either the life of craftsmen or traders, for such life is devoid of nobility and 
hostile to the perfection of character’. Plato recommended the prohibition of 
money-lending and money-making because of their tendency to set the 
professional’s interests in opposition to the community’s… Business was 
expected to be of social service to the community. Ostracism was not an 
unthinkable punishment for immoral business practices, and corporal 
punishment was frequently the penalty for fraud (p. 77). 
 
Businesses, therefore, in those years appear to have been both externally and 
internally driven towards CSRes. It seems that social pressure, rather than threat of 
punishment, directed the businessman, and respect for nature seems to have 
influenced the industries’ environmental practices. However, businesses were further 
expected to be internally motivated towards CSRes, due to, for example, the owners’ 
intrinsic value systems and ethical/communal sensitivities. Nevertheless, and as 
opposed to being strictly profit-oriented, “there is no doubt in the Greek citizen’s 
mind that business existed to serve the public… The Greeks were particularly 
offended by the suggestion that material gains from business were to be used merely 
as the owner wished, without regard for the interests of the community” (Eberstadt, 
1973, pp. 77-78). 
 
In the medieval period (400-1500), the businessman and the business system were 
still distrusted, largely due to the negative ex officio perception held of them by the 
Catholic Church, which had an international structure and a monopoly on education 
at the time. The latter considered the profit motive anti-Christian and maintained that 
if business had to exist, it should be used in the public interest and, as St. Thomas 
Aquinas wrote, “for a definite purpose, namely, the good estate of the household 
(community)” (cited in Eberstadt (1973, p. 78, brackets in original). The 
businessman was thus expected to be, above all, honest and to care for his fellow 
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guild-members and for the well-being of his community (by e.g. supporting sick 
members, helping to educate the poor, encouraging local artists and engaging with 
other types of charity work). However, the businessman at this stage also started 
enjoying a high standard of living primarily by “exploiting outsiders” (p. 78), which 
was clearly not in accord with their social responsibility activities, thereby indicated 
a non-ethical motivation towards CSRes.  
 
The antithesis of focusing on profits by exploiting others whilst also engaging with 
social responsibility, was augmented in the subsequent, mercantile, period (1500-
1800). As the Church atrophied, the emerging nation states realised their national 
strength depended on their commercial and industrial production. Business leaders 
started joining the nobility and the business class was granted influence in national 
affairs. The social obligations of business also increased with the businessman’s 
status, and businesses which provided outstanding public service were given special 
privileges. A number of companies were established solely to employ the poor in 
impoverished communities and underdeveloped industries. The boost in industrial 
activity during those years, however, was based on the exploitation of foreigners; and 
“although more than three million blacks were enslaved and shipped to the New 
World, not even the most moral were aroused” (Eberstadt, 1973, p.79).   
 
In the early industrial period (19th century), the giant corporations came to dominate 
their economies. By the end of the century, the two hundred largest US 
manufacturing corporations added more to GNP than the next hundred thousand 
largest. Some corporations virtually had the power of governments, and “this 
enormous concentrated power gravitated into the hands of a few, raising up a 
corporate ruling class with almost unlimited authority” (Eberstadt, 1973, p. 80). In 
the name of deregulation and laissez-faire economy, any legally or socially 
established responsibilities of the business were aborted, and while corporate profits 
and the cost of living soared, wages actually declined, further lowering the quality of 
the average worker’s life. By the end of the century the latter were paid so poorly 
that it was impossible for many to provide for their families; industrial accidents 
occurred with appalling frequency; and “housing was so squalid that rats sometimes 
ate children alive” (Eberstadt, 1973, p. 80). Although it is to this period that the 
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earliest examples of CSR can be traced2, it was in the next century that the CSRes 
phenomenon re-emerged and CSR started to be systematically practised.   
 
2.3.2 The period from 1900 to 1950 
 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, CSRes was minimal. Ghent (1902, cited in 
Heald, 1957) as early as 1902, however, noted an increase in “conspicuous giving… 
always shrewdly disposed with an eye to the allayment of pain and the quieting of 
discontent” (Heald, 1957, p. 376). This took the form of contributions by wealthy 
businessmen (who were following Andrew Carnegie’s precepts) to hospitals, 
colleges, libraries, the construction and maintenance of model industrial 
communities, and similar philanthropies. Such gifts, Ghent attributed to a number of 
causes; outstanding among them was a fear of the growing power of the labour 
movement and a desire to forestall public criticism and regulation of business in the 
age of progressive reforms. Further, Ghent identified, as growing hand in hand with 
the power of the industrial magnates, a greater self-consciousness of authority and 
responsibility. He anticipated that this paternalistic, “seigniorial” attitude would 
ultimately be restrained by, “a sense of the latent strength of democracy” and “a 
growing sense of ethics”. He conceded that, “the principle of the ‘trusteeship of great 
wealth’ has won a number of adherents… A duty to society has been apprehended, 
and these are its first fruits. It is a duty, true enough, which is but dimly seen and 
imperfectly fulfilled” (Ghent, 1902, cited in Heald, 1957, p. 376). 
 
The pre-First World War years in the US saw an increase in interest and attention on 
the part of management towards safety and sanitary conditions in its factories, and 
payments for accidents, retirement and death. Such policies were the direct result of 
labour, public and political pressures; but they at least implied an obligation on the 
part of management for the health and welfare of those most directly affected by its 
operations. Utility companies such as Bell Systems, started realising the need for 
public relations. As the Bell management stated in its 1913 Annual Report (AR): 
                                                 
2 Flesher and Flesher (1981), examined the financial statements of large industrial firms operating in 
the Deep South prior to, and during, the Civil War. They retrieved the 1865 financial statements of 
Andrew Brown Lumber Company from the national archives and found that the company reported on 
the amount spent on food, shelter, clothing, health and general welfare of its slaves. 
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“We feel our obligation to the general public as strongly as to our investing public, or 
to our own personal interests” (cited in Heald, 1957, p. 378). As Heald (1957) noted, 
“their efforts to win social approval through wider publicity, like those of other 
managements, were undoubtedly directed more toward public persuasion than 
toward self-examination. Nevertheless, a new sensitivity to community opinion had 
begun to take form” (p. 378).  
 
It seems that two major conditions had contributed to the early introduction of the 
CSRes concept in the pre-First World War period in the US. Firstly, was “the 
emergence of an economic order based increasingly upon large-scale enterprises, 
with interests which affected an ever-widening circle of citizens. Secondly, popular 
reaction to this change and the resulting activities of state and national governments 
led business leaders to see their ultimate dependence upon a favourable social 
climate and the need for more than economic performance alone in order to maintain 
the climate” (Heald, 1957, p. 379). The advent of the First World War also imposed 
demands for massive social assistance programmes, resulting in substantial business 
contributions of leadership and funds by engaging with organised welfare activities. 
Post-war conditions seemed to bring a decline, but not an end to the acceptance of 
these new responsibilities (Williams and Croxton, 1930).  
 
Further social and economic changes pointed in the direction of new social 
relationships for management. These included the wider distribution of stock 
ownership and the accompanying increase in management’s independence from 
stockholder control. The dependence of mass production on the creation and 
maintenance of a mass market, as demonstrated by Henry Ford was sufficiently 
evident to spark a boom in management’s interest in advertising and public relations. 
This resulted in ‘service’ becoming the motto of business in the twenties (Heald, 
1957). It was in this period that the roots of what was later to be named as 
‘stakeholder theory,’ can be traced. As Rockefeller argued in 1928, “the parties to 
industry are four in number; capital, management, labor, and the community” (Heald, 
1957, p. 380), and he seemed prepared to see all four represented in the councils of 
business. At the same time, Judge Gary of US Steel saw business as an institution in 
which each of the ‘parties’ had a stake and an interest, further arguing that the 
management class stood in a ‘position of balance’ between the other claimants, and 
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must reserve to itself the final determination of their interests; this is a remarkably 
contemporary argument, considering the recent advances in corporate governance 
(see, e.g. how Woodward et al. (2004, p. 8) have adapted the Triple Bottom Line 
reporting model to include governance “as [a] kind of ‘umbrella’ that holds the other 
three dimensions [economic, social and environmental] in place”). 
 
However, in this period also the fundamental variations in the perception of CSRes 
amongst renowned individual businessmen, emphasising service to community, also 
started to become evident. Whereas for Rockefeller (1928, pp. 11-21) the purpose of 
industry was “quite as much the advancement of social well-being as the production 
of wealth” (cited in Heald, 1957, p. 380), for Henry Ford, ‘service before profit’ 
primarily meant the increase of production and productivity; this was what he 
considered to be the greatest contribution business could make to national welfare, 
which in turn, he claimed, “removes the need for philanthropy” (Heald, 1957, p. 
381).   
 
Indeed, as Heald (1957) notes, “in the twenties… most businessmen probably 
thought of public relations in terms of convincing consumers of the merit of their 
products and citizens of the correctness of their economic views and practices” (p. 
382). It thus seems that CSRes had started in these years to be opportunistically 
driven. As Peter Drucker, a well-respected establishment figure in the field of 
management (Gray et al., 1996), 50 years later notes, for that period the satisfaction 
of social needs and wants, such as “the development of the modern electrical 
industry, the telephone, the big-city newspaper and… the urban transit... were not 
satisfied because they were seen as ‘burdens’, that is, as ‘responsibilities’. They were 
satisfied because they were seen as opportunities. To seek opportunity, in other 
words, is the ethics of organization… [that] act more responsibly when they convert 
public need into their own achievements. Social awareness is organizational self-
interest” (Drucker, 1969, pp. 254-255).  
 
However, it seemed that the depression of the 1930s convinced many Americans that 
the prescriptions for business responsibility “had been largely intended for public 
consumption and ‘not to be taken internally’” (Heald, 1957, p.382). Dissatisfaction 
and disillusionment with business performance reached new levels of bitterness. This 
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resulted in stronger and deep-rooted criticism of business performance to be 
established. As a consequence, following the Depression, the corporation was once 
more seen, “as an institution which, like the government, has social obligations to 
fulfil” (Eberstandt, 1973, p. 81).  
 
It seems that these increased external pressures drove businesses in this era to also 
start reporting on their social responsibilities. Maltby (2005) reports some episodes 
of Annual General Meetings (AGMs) of UK corporations, which at the time were 
reported in detail in the local and national press, discussing government controls, the 
altered basis of taxation on profits, the relationship between employers and labour, 
and the negative public perception of business behaviour – particularly regarding 
profiteering during the war years. Companies made frequent reference to the 
relationship between employers and workers, most often stressing the excellent 
attitude of the latter. This evidence led Maltby to conclude that CSR is “not the 
product of a new ethos, but rather a continuing response to social and political 
challenges (Maltby, 2005, p. 154). Hogner (1982) and Guthrie and Parker (1989) 
also found that the published reports of US Steel and BHP in that period included 
such information as dwellings build for workers, community development, worker 
safety, mortgage assistance for employees and other employee and community issues 
(Buhr, 2007).  
 
It seems, therefore, that there were two main categories of cause that contributed to 
the development of CSRes in the first half of the 20th century. A primary role was 
played by causes associated with industrial growth, such as the further development 
of gigantic corporations, the application of mass production and the dependence of 
the markets on a widening consumer base, which led to widespread stock ownership 
and a redefinition of the role of management (Heald, 1957). Additionally, the 
traditional values of individualism, as well as idealism and a spirit of service growing 
out of wartime experience and the increasing power of labour and other stakeholder 
groups, were also of great importance. And although it is difficult to weigh the 
relative magnitude of these influences, as Heald (1957) concludes, “the record 
suggests that, in the past, external criticism…of the social consequences of business 
policies has made a vital contribution to management’s acceptance of a larger 
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concept of obligation to the community” (p. 383). External criticism also influenced 
the development of CSRes in the following period as the next section illustrates. 
 
2.3.3 The period from 1950 to 2009 
 
The modern era of CSRes is generally perceived to have begun in the 1950s. It has 
been argued that the publication by Bowen (1953) of his landmark book, Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman3, marked the beginnings of the modern period of 
literature on this subject and Carroll (1999) has subsequently called him the ‘father 
of Corporate Social Responsibility’. In 1957, “the emergence of a ‘corporate 
conscience’, a recognition on the part of management of an obligation to the society 
it serves not only for maximum economic performance but for humane and 
constructive social policies as well” was also noted (Heald, 1957, p. 375). 
 
It is nevertheless in the 1960s that CSRes started growing substantially (Gerde and 
Wokutch, 1998). The widespread social movements and social unrest at the time are 
generally perceived to have been behind the significant growth of the phenomenon in 
that decade (Gerde and Wokutch, 1998). As Drucker (1969) notes at the time, “the 
great new fact is that a society of organizations holds institutions and their executives 
not only accountable for quantities…It holds its institutions collectively accountable 
for the quality of life” (Drucker, 1969. p. 256).  
 
It appears, however, that the substantial growth in CSRes also generated a 
considerable debate over its purpose. Some arguments suggesting that CSRes could 
also be opportunistically driven started to emerge: Drucker (1969) noted that, “it is 
an ethical demand of business to convert into profitable business the satisfaction of 
social needs and wants” (p. 253); whilst Davis (1960) pointed out the positive effects 
that socially responsible business decisions can have on the business entities’ image 
and subsequent long-term economic gains. These arguments are inherently similar to 
the ones also expressed in this era by Friedman (1962), who altogether opposed the 
                                                 
3 Note that, as the title suggests, there apparently were still no businesswomen during the period, or at 
least they were not acknowledged in formal writings (Carroll, 1999).  
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CSRes phenomenon on the grounds that the corporations’ only responsibility is to 
generate profits for their owners.    
 
Meanwhile, other developments were afoot, with probably “the most important (for 
the planet and society if not for business and accounting)… [being] the emerging 
environmental movement which laid the groundwork for the environmental revival 
of the late 1980s” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 92). And it was in the late 1960s that, 
following this increased public awareness that augmented CSRes, the whole area of 
accounting standards and regulation also became a matter of debate, and for the first 
time accounting was seen both as part of, and a potential source for solving, the 
associated with CSRes problems (Gray et al., 1996). This resulted in e.g. the 
Companies Act 1967 introducing the requirement for disclosure of charitable and 
political donations, along with requirements for disclosure of directors’ emoluments 
and average number of employees. 
 
The CSRes phenomenon was further developed and expanded in the 1970s (Gerde 
and Wokutch, 1998), which were dominated by issues of corporate obligation 
(Smith, 1993). It was then widely acknowledged, “that the social contract between 
business and society was changing in substantial and important ways”, and that 
business was, “asked to assume broader responsibilities to society than ever before 
and to serve a wider range of human values” (Carroll, 1999, p. 274). In a public 
opinion survey conducted in the US at the time, it was found that two-thirds of 
respondents believed business had a moral obligation to help other major institutions 
to achieve social progress, even at the expense of profitability; whilst social 
movements with respect to the environment, worker safety, consumers and 
employees, “were poised to transition from special interest status to government 
regulation” (Carroll, 1999, p.275). A more action-oriented approach on behalf of the 
organisations was required to address the social pressures and the term ‘corporate 
social responsiveness’ was initiated in the CSRes literature (Frederick, 1994) to 
denote the emphasis on the management of a company’s relations with society, in a 
pragmatic, results oriented way, more managerial in tone and intention (O’Dywer, 
1999).    
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The aforementioned changes in the social expectations which contributed to the 
expansion of CSRes, seem to have also initiated the development of CSR at the time. 
The 1970s are generally regarded as the period when CSR, “research first became 
established as a substantial discipline in its own right” (Owen, 2008, p. 243). CSR 
appears to have first come, 
 
as a natural consequence of the debate then raging concerning the role of the 
corporation in society at a time of rising societal expectations and emerging 
environmental awareness. More perceptive managements, particularly those 
of prominent corporations in environmentally or socially sensitive sectors, 
speedily grasped the public relations benefits in producing, at least 
rudimentary, social reports which attempted to convey a picture of corporate 
responsiveness to key societal concerns (Owen, 2004, p. 24).  
 
International pressure also played an important role in the development of CSR and 
the UN proposals on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting in 1977, 
for example, highlighted the need to extend the scope of required disclosure beyond 
pure financial reporting (Zain, 1999), which favoured the publication of separate 
reports.  
 
It was in that period that the case for a wider view of accountability was put forward 
by The Corporate Report (TCR), published in 1975 (Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee, 1975). TCR identified various user groups in society, ranging from the 
equity investment group through to government and the public, and thus played an 
important part in expanding the involvement of the accounting function in the 
accountability of organisations to different groups in society (Quirke, 1996). As 
Perks (p. 36) points out, it was the first time that public accountability was seen “as 
being in addition to legal obligations and [the Report] argued that it arises from the 
custodial role played in the community by economic entities”. Although this was still 
far from considering CSR as being, “at the heart of an examination of the role of 
information in organization–society dialogue” (Gray et al., 1995a, p. 48, see also 
Parker, 2005), as Gray (2002) notes, TCR remains “the most radical re-statement, 
from the accounting profession, of how organisational disclosure needed to be 
enhanced by social and environmental accounting” (p.690).  
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Although in the US in the 1970s the dominant CSR themes were the environment 
and energy (mainly due to the renewed ‘energy crisis’ which arose from the Middle 
Eastern conflicts and the West’s dependence on oil), in Western Europe the focus of 
reporting was on social information, and particularly employee-related disclosure. In 
the UK, attention was mainly paid to community issues, which in the late 1970s and 
1980s shifted to employee-related disclosure (Zain, 1999). During the 1970s the 
value added statement also emerged and the period could generally be described as 
“the zenith of both interest in, and practice of, employee and employment reporting” 
(Gray, 2002, p.691).  
 
The 1980s and the 1990s were characterised by a greater maturity of the CSRes field 
(Gerde and Wokutch, 1998). A conceptual transition in business and society 
‘scholarship’ regarding CSRes was then identified from the action-oriented 
managerial concept of corporate responsiveness (the capacity of a corporation to 
respond to social pressure) to the one of corporate social rectitude. The latter entails 
that, “corporations should refer their policies and plans to a culture of ethics that 
embraced the most fundamental moral principles of humankind” (O’Dwyer, 1999, p. 
52). Following this transition, a considerable emphasis has been placed in the 
literature on the notion of business ethics, as Gerde and Wokutch (1998) and 
O’Dwyer (1999) identify.  
 
It does, indeed, seem that the ‘ethics’ notion holds a prominent place in arguments 
for CSRes since then. Carroll (1979) considers the ethical responsibilities of 
corporations to be, “additional behaviors and activities that are not necessarily 
codified into law but nevertheless are expected of business by society’s members” (p. 
500). These responsibilities, according to Evans (1991), “should not be reduced to a 
conservative role, namely maintaining order and constraining the disorder that results 
from criminal acts and legalised anti-social behaviour, but they should form the basis 
of a radical reordering of society itself” (p. 871), thereby suggesting a ‘total ethics’ 
objective, similar to the one of ‘total quality management’ in operations 
management. This business ethics theory, nevertheless, is not only well integrated in 
the CSRes literature, but also into that of CSR, and it could even be seen at times that 
CSR is additionally referred to as corporate social and ethical reporting (see e.g. 
Adams and Kuasirikun, 2000; Adams, 2002, McIntosh et al., 2003). 
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 This 1980s’ CSRes shift to corporate social rectitude and to ethics, was also reflected 
in CSR. In that decade, in Western Europe ethical issues such as community affairs, 
equal opportunity and socially beneficial products, came to feature on the agenda, 
due to the development of ethical investment trusts, together with the widening role 
of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Gray et al., 1996); however, by the 
end of the 1970s social reporting was fading out and until the late 1980s and early 
1990s environmental reporting predominated (Buhr, 2007), despite the fact that in 
the UK, disclosure on employment-related issues remained popular. In contrast, at 
the same time in the US, whilst environmental issues were still widely reported, 
community and human resource issues seemed to be the main CSR focus, largely due 
to the considerable increase in unemployment. 
 
The main reason for the environmental reporting focus, particularly in Europe in the 
late 1980s, appears to be that environmental concerns that had long remained 
dormant quite suddenly came to the forefront of public opinion. Concerns over the 
impact of the “greenhouse” effect, destruction of the rainforests, acid rain, and 
increasingly high levels of pollution and depletion of natural resources, received 
wide publicity (Quirke, 1996). Corporate responses towards this particular aspect of 
CSRes varied considerably. It seemed, however, that the emphasis was on defending 
and maintaining or extending profitability, rather than acknowledging responsibility 
and, at a cost, taking action to address the environmental consequences of operations. 
Thus, some companies responded defensively, to comply with the law and deflect the 
attention of green pressure groups; whereas others attempted to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the advent of the green consumer, who was willing to pay 
a premium for products that were perceived as being ‘environmentally 
friendly’(Quirke, 1996).  
 
In the 1990s, environmental reporting started again to dominate in the US orientation 
towards CSR. The Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989 prompted the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies to produce comprehensive guidelines and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) called for extensive environmental 
disclosure obligations for US companies (Zain, 1999). Environmental reporting also 
continued to be widely practised by Western European companies, particularly in 
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countries such as Germany and Sweden (see, e.g. Roberts, 1991; Adams et al, 1995), 
whilst in the UK, the 1990s saw a dramatic increase in environmental disclosure in 
comparison to the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Since then, the number of companies producing stand-alone CSR reports has further 
risen steadily and, e.g. Corporateregister.com reports that, whilst in 1993 globally 
less than 100 companies annually produced such information, by 2003 this figure 
was in excess of 1,500 reports, and by 2007 had exceeded 2,000 (Milne and Gray, 
2007). Stand-alone reporting seems to be affected by factors such as size, industry 
and country (Gray et al., 1995a) and increasing numbers of these reports are 
externally attested (Milne and Gray, 2007). Nevertheless, as Milne and Gray (2007) 
note, “while we are celebrating the 2,000 MNCs that are reporting, we need to recall 
that over 58,000 MNCs are still failing to report on social and environmental issues – 
and this excludes, for example, all the SMEs and non-profit organisations whose 
impacts are equally of concern” (p. 199).   
 
Most recently, the CSRes debate has been enriched by a considerable discussion 
concerning a perceived transition from CSRes, and corporate social rectitude, to 
corporate citizenship (McIntosh et al., 1998, 2003). This last term “involves 
corporations becoming more informed and enlightened members of society and 
understanding that they are both public and private entities” (McIntosh et al., 2003, 
p. 16). Business is a good corporate citizen and acts responsibly when it does not 
cause any damage to the environment, the employees and the citizens in general 
(Livio, 1996). As a progression of CSRes, therefore, corporate citizenship is seen as 
a fuller understanding of the role of business in society (McIntosh et al. 2003) and 
should involve more proactive corporate stances toward enhancing the stability and 
purpose of a community (Libert, 1996). Whether corporate citizenship will be better 
applicable than CSRes, though, is a doubtful matter, yet to be fully explored (Carpon 
and Gray, 2000). 
 
Thus, to some extent, it could be argued that corporate citizenship encourages 
sustainable organisational practices, whereby, as the Brundtland Report indicates, the 
needs of the present are met, “without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs” (UNWCED, 1987, p. 8 – see also discussion in section 3.5). 
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It should be noted, nevertheless, that “the meaning of sustainability itself is often 
contentious” (Adams and Narayanan, 2007, p.70), and organisations most often 
appear to interpret it in a self-interested way, to the extent of even considering it as 
primarily concerning sustaining profits (Milne and Gray, 2007), largely because the 
phenomenon is still largely unregulated (Gray et al., 1995a, Milne and Gray, 2007). 
 
This lack of regulation has also considerably affected the way CSR is perceived and 
expressed by organisations. Despite the aforementioned considerable increase in 
stand-alone reporting, particularly in the last decade, the quality of its verification 
process is questionable (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005) and, “nomenclature… remains a 
problem. Reports might be titled as sustainable development reports, corporate social 
responsibility reports, triple bottom line reports, or even simply annual reports” 
(Milne and Gray, 2007, p. 185). It seems, therefore, that since both CSRes and CSR 
are largely unregulated, they are neither practised systematically nor able to claim 
“either universal recognition or universal definition” (Gray et al., 1995a, p. 47). 
 
In an attempt to place CSR in a framework, the most prominent recent initiative 
concerned the development of the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines (GRI, 2000, as subsequently revised: 2002, 2006) (but see 
Adams and Narayanan, 2007, for a list of other ‘standardisation’ initiatives, 
including AccountAbility and International Standards Organisation [ISO]). GRI 
incorporates the active participation of corporations, NGOs, consultancies and 
accountancy bodies amongst other interest groups (Owen et al., 2001). Its principal 
aim is to: 
 
develop and disseminate globally applicable sustainability reporting guidelines 
for voluntary use by organisations reporting on the economic, environmental 
and social dimensions of their activities, products and services (GRI, 2000, p. 
1), 
 
and following its introduction, stand-alone reports are now frequently referred to as 
‘sustainability’ reports (Milne and Gray, 2007). GRI, therefore, prompts 
organisations to adopt a triple-bottom-line (TBL) approach and report, in addition to 
their economic prosperity, their environmental quality and social justice (Elkington, 
1999), by providing quantitative summaries with regard to their performance in these 
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areas over the previous year (Papmehl, 2002; Tschopp. 2003). Albeit being 
voluntary, companies that issue these reports are expected to gain from meeting 
investors’ demands, from cost savings and from building a broad-based corporate 
reputation (Dowling, 2004). However, new forms of accounting and accurate and 
credible indicators of progress in TBL terms, need to be developed to achieve the 
balance implicit in the framework; further, as Buhr (2007) notes, TBL reporting is 
not sustainability reporting and “other aspects, like justice, equity and timeframe will 
need to be incorporated before we get all the way there” (p. 61)4.  
 
To address the inherent limitations in the GRI framework and the TBL model, 
Woodward et al. (2004) have revised the TBL model by including corporate 
governance as a fourth dimension in a quadruple bottom line framework. Indeed, as 
Bebbington (2004) notes, “the frame of governmentality may be helpful in a variety 
of contexts in explaining how particular ends are pursued and especially how 
accounting and reporting techniques create the possibility to scrutinise and control 
behaviour with those ends in mind” (p.18). More participatory forms of corporate 
governance, therefore, with the development of new forms of accounting which can 
enhance levels of organisational transparency, can assist in better empowering 
stakeholders (Owen et al., 1997) and, “prevent the planet, current and future 
generations being ‘ripped off’” (Bebbington, 2004, p.18). Nevertheless, it appears 
that the history of CSR has only reached as far as TBL reporting, and whether “we 
can ever achieve a state where meaningful sustainability reporting can be produced 
remains to be seen” (Buhr, 2007, p. 61). 
 
Hence, the review of the (considerable) development of CSRes and CSR in this 
period has indeed demonstrated that the two phenomena are closely interrelated and 
should not be considered in isolation, particularly in explanatory research projects. It 
appears that, in the period surveyed the developments (and thus motivations) of 
CSRes particularly influenced the developments in CSR, whether these considered:  
 
                                                 
4 Milne and Gray (2007) in fact consider TBL reporting to be “a hopeless distraction from substantive 
sustainability, or worse, the very means to frustrate moves towards the changes that sustainability 
requires” (p.193).  
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? the social developments and the emergence of the corporate social 
responsiveness and environmental awareness in the 1960s and 1970s (which 
triggered the introduction of mandatory social disclosures, the generation of 
the first social reports and the establishment of CSR); 
? the trends towards corporate rectitude and ethics in the 1980s (which also 
brought to the CSR agenda ethical issues such as community affairs, equal 
opportunity and socially beneficial products); 
? the increased public concerns over the detrimental impacts of the 
organisational activities to the environment in the 1990s (which also 
generated an environmental reporting outbreak); or,  
? the recent debates over corporate citizenship and sustainable development 
(which further influenced the CSR regulatory and organisational practice);  
 
they all signify that CSRes and CSR are two jointly developed phenomena, with 
largely common underlying drivers.  
 
In respect of the drivers behind CSRes at the time, it appears that these were diverse. 
Social pressures and increased environmental awareness seem to be behind the 
escalation of the phenomenon in the 1960s and 1970s, although the developments in 
the last two decades may also be potentially attributed to the corporate engagement 
with business ethics and sustainability. The rise of ‘green consumerism’ in the late 
1980s and 1990s is, however, associated with opportunistic views of CSRes.    
 
Having completed the review of the development of CSRes and CSR, the next 
section identifies some distinct organisational positions, based upon the motivations 
for CSRes behaviour. These will be subsequently employed in the discussion of the 
drivers behind CSR in the next chapter. 
 
2.4 The main CSRes positions 
 
It would thus appear that there are two prime diachronic drivers behind CSRes 
development: changing public expectations and business ethics concerns. However, 
in the last decades opportunism has also emerged as a potential driver. Considering 
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that these phenomena have also over the time met strong opposition, it could be 
argued that there are four distinct corporate positions behind CSRes employment (or 
not).  
 
2.4.1 CSRes1: ‘Pristine Capitalism’ 
 
As evident, particularly in the mercantile and early industrial periods, proponents of 
CSRes met strong opposition from supporters of the view that business should 
engage in strictly profit-oriented activities. According to this ‘pristine capitalist’ 
approach to CSRes, also termed ‘fundamentalist’ (Lindblom, 1993) and ‘classical’ 
(Boatright, 2003), “it is held that the corporation exists to earn a profit for the owners 
and, in doing so, makes the appropriate contribution to society” (Lindblom, 1993, p. 
9). As Gray et al. (1996) have commented, in this view: 
 
any notion of social responsibility is dominated by the need to make money 
for shareholders, to grow, make profits and seek economic efficiency… this 
is implicit in most accounting and finance (both theory and practice) but it is 
a view which we consider both wholly untenable and highly undesirable (p. 
57). 
 
Eminent proponents of this view are Friedman (“few trends could so thoroughly 
undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate 
officials of a social responsibility other than making as much money for their 
stockholders as possible” [1962, p.133]) and Minow (“Nothing is more enduring than 
the fiction that companies have a primary responsibility to society… One thing must 
be clear. There is no such thing as a ‘good company’ that is not profitable” [1996, pp. 
15-16]). This view therefore would consider that the organisation has no other 
responsibility other that those embedded in law and should not engage in any 
voluntary CSRes. 
 
2.4.2 CSRes2: ‘Stakeholder Capitalism’ 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, as evident particularly in the classical and the 
medieval periods (as identified by Eberstadt, 1973), organisations may be ethically 
driven towards CSRes. For ethical organisations, social and environmental 
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considerations, “instead of being opposed to maximizing economic value, constitute 
the primary long-term decision parameters. Strategic objectives are predicated on 
long-term sustainability objectives rather than profitability goals” (Dillard et al., 
2005, pp. 86-87). In this approach the supporters of what Hemphill (1997) names 
‘stakeholder capitalism’ would be included. Stakeholder capitalism aims at business 
becoming a fully human institution and should be generally based on four principles: 
stakeholder co-operation; acknowledgement of the considerable complexity; 
continuous creation; and emergent competition, out of co-operation among 
stakeholders (Freeman, 2002). Thus, stakeholder capitalism, 
 
takes a firm ethical stand: that human beings are required to be at the center 
of any process of value creation; that common decency and fairness are not to 
be set aside in the name of playing the game of business and that we should 
demand the best behavior of business (Freeman, 2002, p. 115). 
 
Thus, supporters of this ethics-focus approach (which may also be referred as 
‘normative’, given that, in theory, this should be the prime motivation for CSRes) 
would support that an era of a proactive corporate sense of social responsibility will 
develop and mature (Frederick, 1994); where organisations will be judged for their 
corporate citizenship, beyond profitability or return to shareholders (Bovet, 1994). 
Organisations espousing these views would be expected to embrace Epstein’s (1987) 
definition of CSRes: 
 
Corporate social responsibility relates primarily to achieving outcomes from 
organizational decisions concerning specific issues or problems which (by 
some normative standard) have beneficial rather than adverse effects on 
pertinent corporate stakeholders. The normative correctness of the products 
of corporate action have been the main focus of corporate social 
responsibility (p. 104). 
 
2.4.3 CSRes3: ‘Ethics Pragmatism’  
 
As the previous historical review indicates, particularly in the 20th century CSRes 
activities appear to be mostly externally driven. CSRes was viewed as a pragmatic 
necessity, where organisations are wise to show they serve the general welfare as 
well as the interests of their shareholders (Badaracco, 1996; Estrock and Lechty, 
1998), in order to satisfy the public, and other relevant parties’ pressures. In this 
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perspective, the view considering that long-term economic welfare and stability can 
only be achieved by the acceptance of certain (usually minimal) wider social 
responsibilities, could be incorporated. This view emphasises that business should 
consider its social responsibilities as inseparable from its economic function and 
should focus on balancing the often conflicting values of market economy and 
political and social rights (Gray et al., 1996). Thus, organisations would remain 
concerned about survival issues and profit margins, but this should tend “to be more 
in the context of profits AND environmental sensitivity, for example, or profits… 
AND social responsibility” (Henderson, 1984, p. 170), in order to additionally satisfy 
their relevant parties’ demands. 
 
This approach is consistent with Carroll’s (1983) definition, where clearly 
profitability is prescribed as a necessary condition for organisations to further 
consider business ethics and social responsibility: 
 
In my view, CSR [CSRes] involves the conduct of a business so that it is 
economically profitable, law abiding, ethical and socially supporting. To be 
socially responsible… then means that profitability and obedience to the law 
are foremost conditions to discussing the firm’s ethics and the extent to which 
it supports the society in which it exists with contributions of money, time 
and talent (p. 604).5
 
2.4.4 CSRes4: ‘Ethics opportunism’ 
 
Also evident in the last century, though, particularly in the appearance of the ‘green 
consumerism’ in the 1980s and 1990s, is the idea that CSRes may also be 
opportunistically driven. In today’s competitive markets, even when there is an 
originally genuine and altruistic managerial motivation towards CSRes, it will most 
likely conflict with the organisation’s overarching aim of profit maximisation; 
consequently, almost any activity undertaken by (particularly larger) organisations, 
“must be, virtually by definition, in the interests of the organisation and its financial 
participants… It is in the nature of business to consider merely business cases” 
(Spence and Gray, 2007, p.17). Approaches emphasising that there is a business case 
                                                 
5 This builds on an earlier definition by Carroll (1979): “Before anything else, the business institution 
is the basic economic unit in our society. As such it has a responsibility to produce goods and services 
that society wants and to sell them at a profit. All other business roles are predicated on this 
fundamental assumption” (p. 500). 
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for CSRes can be included here, where increased profit is the prime motivation 
underlying the phenomenon.  As Drucker (1969) has suggested: 
 
Any institution has to have an impact on society in order to carry out its 
mission… [and] impacts on the local community and the natural 
environment… These impacts are necessary; we could not otherwise obtain 
the goods and services from business, the education from the schools, the 
new knowledge from the research laboratories, or the traffic control from 
local government. But they are not the purpose of the organization. They are 
incidental to it… it is the [organisation’s] duty to anticipate impact (pp. 249-
250). [However] Ideally an organization converts into opportunities for its 
own performance the satisfaction of social needs and wants, including those 
created by its own impacts. In pluralist society every organization is expected 
to be an ‘entrepreneur’ in the traditional meaning of the term, that is, the 
agent of society which shifts resources from less productive to more 
productive employment… This means, in particular, that it is an ethical 
demand of business to convert into profitable business the satisfaction of 
social needs and wants (p. 253).  
 
These ‘opportunistic’ organisations, therefore, would embrace Drucker’s (1984) 
view of CSRes: 
 
But the proper ‘social responsibility’ of business is to tame the dragon, that is 
to turn a social problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, 
into productive capacity, into human competence, into well-paid jobs, and 
into wealth (p. 62) 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a brief review of the development of CSRes and its 
reporting. The review demonstrates that CSRes is diachronically driven by three 
types of motivation: ethical (CSRes2), pragmatic (CSRes3 – the desire to maintain 
profitability) and opportunistic (CSRes4 – the desire to extend profitability).  It also 
demonstrates that CSRes has altogether been opposed by supporters of the pristine 
capitalism view (CSRes1), who consider business’ only responsibility is to make 
profits.  
 
The review further indicates that there is a strong relationship behind the driving 
force for both CSRes and CSR development. The next chapter explores these 
relationships by relating these CSRes drivers to the individual CSR drivers, with an 
aim to synthesise the theoretical arguments into a framework in chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3 
The theoretical explanations of CSR 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter reviewed the development of CSRes and identified four 
distinct organisational positions based upon the motivations for CSRes behaviour.  
 
The overarching aim of this chapter is to review the most important theoretical 
explanations for CSR in the literature and directly relate them to the CSRes positions 
identified in the preceding chapter and to the other three research questions of the 
study (Is CSR reactive or proactive? Is it strategic or ethical? Can it be explained on 
a social contract basis?). This will assist in clarifying their interrelationships and will 
provide the basis for the theoretical framework of the study (in which the research 
questions serve as ‘dimensions’) presented in the following chapter.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The frameworks drawn from 
social and political theory are initially reviewed. Some more ‘functional’ 
perspectives (to use the term of Gray et al., 1988 and O’Dwyer, 1999), drawn from 
economic and decision usefulness theories, are reviewed next. Then, some insights 
into business ethics are provided, followed by marketing arguments. The concluding 
section of this chapter summarises its findings. 
 
3.2 Social and political theory frameworks 
 
Social and political theory studies attempt to explain CSR and other features of the 
organisation-society relationship in terms other than from an exclusive economic 
perspective (O’Dwyer, 1999). As such, they allow a concentration on the role of 
CSR in the relationship(s) between organisations, the state, individuals and groups 
(Gray et al., 1996). They accept that CSR can be undertaken for reasons other than 
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the pursuit of economic self-interest (O’Dwyer, 1999) and are considered by some to 
be, “by far the more interesting and insightful” (Gray et al., 1995a, p. 52).  
 
In the literature, there are two social and political explanations that appear to be most 
prominent: Legitimacy Theory (LT) and political economy of accounting theory, 
both of which are consistent with a stakeholder theory understanding of the 
organization–society relationship (Campbell, 2000). LT is reviewed in detail in the 
next chapter, as it is of most relevance to this study. Other social and political theory 
frameworks include social contract theory and accountability theory, which are 
reviewed first. These are followed by discussions on stakeholder theory and political 
economy of accounting theory, respectively.    
 
3.2.1 Social contract theory as rationale for CSR  
 
Social contract theory is one of the most frequently used theoretical frameworks in 
CSR research, and information and explanations relating to the history of the 
development of the concept of the social contract are well covered in a number of 
publications (e.g. Shocker an Sethi, 1973; 1974; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Donaldson, 1982; Gray et al., 1988; Mathews, 1993; Lindblom, 1993; Gray et al., 
1995a; Gray et al., 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Zain, 1999; Deegan, 2000; 
Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan and Unerman, 2006; Garcia – Lacalle, 2006).  
 
The notion of social contract originated in political philosophy, and was discussed by 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). However, as Donaldson (1982) notes: 
 
The political social contract provides a clue for understanding the contract for 
business. If the political contract serves as a justification for the existence of 
the state, then the business contract by parity of reasoning should serve as the 
justification for the existence of the corporation (p. 37). 
 
In brief, this theory holds that a contractual relationship exists between organisations 
and society and, due to the existence of this contract, “business agrees to perform 
various socially desired actions in return for approval of its objectives, other rewards 
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and ultimate survival” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 344). As Shocker and Sethi 
(1974) maintain: 
 
Any social institution – and business is no exception – operates in society via 
a social contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are 
based on:  
(1) the delivery of some socially desirable ends to society in general, and, 
(2) the distinction of economic, social, or political benefits to groups from 
which it derives its power. (p. 67) 
 
As Deegan (2000) notes, “It can be argued that the requirements imposed by the law 
reflect the explicit terms of the social contract, while uncodified community 
expectations (and these will be perceived to be different by different people) 
constitute the implicit terms of the social contract” (fn 7, p. 254). A failure to fulfil 
the social contract may lead to actions by society to remove an organisation’s right to 
continued operations (Deegan and Rankin, 1997). These sanctions may take the form 
of legal restrictions imposed on its operations, limited resources (for example, 
financial capital and labour) being provided and reduced demand for its products 
(Deegan, 2000). 
 
With regard to motivations for CSR, therefore, social contract theory, would suggest 
that organisations engage with CSR because this is a community expectation and 
thus an implicit requirement (considering that CSR is largely unregulated) of the 
social contract (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Bansal and Roth, 2000). This implies 
that CSR is an externally, non-ethically motivated activity; hence, social contract 
theory seems to primarily predict that organisations act as ethics pragmatists in 
respect of CSR, engaging with the phenomenon to  satisfy the public and other 
relevant parties’ pressures. 
 
However, as explained in more detail in the next chapter, even if it is assumed that 
organisations engage with CSR for other than social contract reasons, this does not 
necessarily imply that the social contract does not exist. With regard to the pristine 
capitalists (CSRes1), for example, it can be argued that the social contract is 
embedded for them in law, while considering their only accountability is owed to 
their shareholders and assuming that maintaining or extending profitability is all 
what every possible constituent is interested in (e.g. employees for ensuring salaries, 
governments for taxes, creditors for ensuring their repayments). It would be 
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expected, therefore, from pristine capitalists to engage with CSR only to the point 
required by law. 
 
Stakeholder capitalists (CSRes2) can further be compatible with social contract 
theory. Ethically motivated organisations would acknowledge the existence of a 
social contract but, with regard to their employment of CSR, would engage with it 
because e.g. they would consider that all their stakeholders have a right to 
information, regardless of whether they feel there is an implicit social contract 
requirement for CSR or not. As opposed to the ‘pragmatic’ approach to CSR 
described above, this is an ethically and internally motivated corporate stance. 
 
Furthermore, even the ethics opportunists (CSRes4) may be compatible with Social 
Contract Theory. Organisations of this type would acknowledge the existence of a 
social contract, but they would either engage with CSR while considering that this is 
not an implicit social contract requirement, or they would disclose more CSR 
information than required from the contract to increase their economic benefits. 
These organisations would be internally motivated, similarly to the ethical approach, 
but also strategically motivated, similarly to the pragmatic perspective for CSR 
engagement.  
  
Evidently, therefore, as summary Table 3.1 illustrates, social contract theory does not 
have a definitive answer to any of the first three investigated research questions of 
the study. However, as also evident in the table, social contract theory also serves as 
question 4 and a starting point for the discussion in this chapter: each of the 
remaining theoretical explanations for CSR discussed in the chapter will be 
considered for compatibility with the theory to assist in the development of the 
framework in the next chapter.  
 
Table 3.1 Dimensions of social contract theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Social Contract 
Theory All Either Either Yes 
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3.2.2 Accountability theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Accountability theory is also frequently used in the CSR literature (see, e.g. Tricker, 
1983; Laughlin, 1990; Perks, 1993; Gray et al., 1987, 1991, 1996, 1997; Adams et 
al., 1998; Zain, 1999; O’Dwyer, 1999; Deegan, 2000; Woodward et al., 2001). Gray 
et al. (1997) indicate that accountability involves two responsibilities or duties: the 
responsibility to undertake certain actions (or forbear from taking actions) and the 
responsibility to provide an account of those actions. In the case of the shareholders 
and a company, the directors have a stewardship role; a responsibility to manage the 
resources entrusted to them by the shareholders and a responsibility to provide an 
account of this management. In this way, the AR and the financial statements can be 
seen as a “mechanism for discharging accountability” (Gray et al, 1996, p. 38).  
 
These views of accountability are based on the belief that the owners or shareholders 
are distinct from the managers and directors and that there is a need for directors to 
be accountable to shareholders. However, since the late 1960s, when social 
responsibility issues were brought to the fore, the whole area of accounting standards 
and regulation became a matter of debate (Gray et al., 1996) and wider views of 
accountability were suggested. Particularly the publication of TCR (Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee, 1975) put forward a wider view, where all significant 
economic entities have an implicit duty to report publicly, whether or not this is 
required by law or regulation. As Gray et al. (1996) infer, society can be thought of 
as a series of individual ‘social contracts’ between members of society and the 
society itself, that provides the basis for the rights of the parties in that relationship, 
including rights and responsibilities relating to information flows. 
 
Since accountability however involves taking action (in this case, providing a CSR 
account), regardless of to whom accountability is owed (i.e. only shareholders? All 
stakeholders?) it could be compatible with virtually all motivations for CSR. It is 
perhaps these considerations that provoked Gray et al’s (1995, p.70) concerns for 
accountability not being, “an especially helpful perspective for the interpretation of 
CSR practice” (see also Gray et al., 1996 and O’Dwyer, 1999, for similar 
arguments). Considering, though, the wide compatibility of accountability theory to 
the other theoretical explanations of CSR, it could be argued that the theory is at the 
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heart of corporate financial, social and environmental reporting and should not be 
excluded from an explanatory framework of CSR practice. For example, Unerman 
and O’Dwyer (2006) have identified a number of accountability variants, subject to 
whom accountability is owed. Unerman’s (2007) dual distinction of holistic, as 
opposed to strategic, accountability (also referred to by O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008, as ‘hierarchical accountability’) will be most frequently employed in the 
subsequent discussion, given its resemblance to the strategic vs. ethical research 
question of the study. 
 
According to Unerman’s (2007) holistic accountability variant, accountability is 
owed to all stakeholders affected by organisations’ actions (including future 
generations and non-humans), and in this respect CSR can be perceived as, “a key 
mechanism for social, environmental and economic sustainability” (p. 89). On the 
contrary, the ‘strategic’ variant considers that accountability is owed only to 
powerful stakeholders, implying that CSR is used to maximise organisational 
economic prosperity. From this discussion, therefore, it can be inferred that 
accountability theory, similarly to social contract theory, does not have a definitive 
answer to any of the investigated research questions of the study: it can be 
compatible with a view of a contractual relationship between organisations and 
society; it may assume either a strategic or an ethical position; it can be reactive as 
well as proactive; and it can take a normative or a strictly profit-centred orientation, 
hence potentially being consistent with all CSRes positions, as Table 3.2 
summarises. 
 
Table 3.2 Dimensions of accountability theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Accountability 
Theory All Either Either Yes 
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3.2.3 Stakeholder theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Stakeholder theory is frequently employed in the CSR literature (see, inter alia, 
Roberts, 1992; Clarkson, 1995; Gray et al., 1996; Woodward et al., 1996; Neu et al., 
1998; O’Dwyer, 1999; Woodward, 1999; Zain, 1999; Gray, 2001). Even when not 
employed directly to explain underlying phenomena, it is frequently utilised as part 
of other theoretical approaches6. Furthermore, definitions of CSR put stakeholders 
and their informational needs at the heart of their analyses (see e.g. Gray et al., 
1995a). 
 
A ‘stakeholder’ can be “any identifiable group or individual who can affect the 
achievement of an organisation’s objectives, or is affected by the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives” (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p. 91, see also Freeman, 1984). 
This implies that the organisation is likely to have many stakeholders, which will 
include, among others, employees, communities, society, the state, customers, 
competitors, suppliers, local governments, stock markets, industry bodies, the media 
or even non-human life and future generations (Gray et al., 1996). There seem to be 
two variants of stakeholder theory, a moral (normative) and a managerial version 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006). 
 
The moral perspective of stakeholder theory argues that all stakeholders have the 
right to be treated fairly by an organisation, and that issues of stakeholder power are 
not directly relevant. That is, regardless of whether stakeholder management leads to 
improved financial performance, managers should manage the organisation for the 
benefit of all stakeholders. As Hasnas (1998) states, this variant: 
 
views the firm not as a mechanism for increasing the stockholders’ financial 
returns, but as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests, and sees 
management as having a fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders, 
but to all stakeholders… This of course implies that there will be times when 
management is obliged to at least partially sacrifice the interests of 
stockholders to those of the other stakeholders (p. 23).  
                                                 
6 Legitimacy theory, for example, recognises that a contractual relationship exists between 
organisations and their stakeholders (Suchman, 1995; Watson et al., 2002). However, Guthrie and 
Parker’s (1989) and Gray et al. ‘bourgeois’ Political Economy (1996) employs the stakeholder notion; 
the former directly and the latter with reference to interest groups and their interactions with 
organisations 
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 According to this variant of stakeholder theory, therefore, CSR is a product of an 
ethical and internally motivated corporate stance and would be driven by the 
managerial desire to satisfy all stakeholders’ needs, in line with a CSRes2 position. 
Organisations would engage with CSR regardless of whether it is a social contract 
requirement or not, considering that, “those impacted by corporate activities had a 
‘right’ to know about these impacts” (O’Dwyer, Unerman and Bradley, 2005, p. 22). 
However, this would not be the case with the managerial variant of Stakeholder 
Theory.  
 
According to Gray et al. (1996) the managerial variant of Stakeholder Theory is 
more ‘organisation-centred’. As they note, 
 
Here (under this perspective), the stakeholders are identified by the 
organisation of concern, by reference to the extent to which the organisation 
believes the interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to further 
the interests of the organisation. (The interests of the organisation need not be 
restricted to conventional profit-seeking assumptions). The more important 
the stakeholder to the organisation, the more effort will be exerted in 
managing the relationship. Information is a major element that can be 
employed by the organisation to manage (or manipulate) the stakeholder in 
order to gain their support and approval, or to distract their opposition and 
disapproval (p. 45, comments in brackets in original). 
 
Indeed, empirical evidence (Neu et al., 1998), in line with Tinker’s (1983) views, 
finds stakeholder theory to be employed in a strictly organisation-centred way. In this 
case, stakeholder analysis assists in identifying, “which groups are stakeholders 
deserving or requiring management attention, and which are not” (Mitchell et al., 
1997, p.855; see also Clarkson, 1995 and Nasi et al., 1997, for similar arguments), 
and in ranking or prioritising their interests (Gray, 2001)7. For this variant, therefore, 
clearly CSR is not an ethically motivated activity. However, managerial Stakeholder 
Theory does not seem to have a clear CSRes position or a precise CSR orientation, 
with regards to whether it is an internally or externally motivated activity.  
 
When stakeholder theory is empirically linked with LT (Neu et al., 1998), it seems to 
predict reactive corporate stances towards CSR. This implies that, on the basis of an 
                                                 
7 A number of studies (Freeman, 1994; Clarkson, 1995; Mahoney, 1997) suggest that some 
stakeholders are more powerful that others and, still, “shareholders have the dominant role in external 
information provision (Gray et al, 1996, p. 47)”  
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assumed ‘contractual’ relationship between organisational stakeholders (Cooper and 
Sherer, 1984), “stakeholder analysis would enable identification of those societal 
interest groups to whom the business might be considered accountable, and therefore 
to whom an adequate account of its activities would be deemed necessary” 
(Woodward and Woodward, 2001, p.1). The findings of Neu et al. (1998) supported 
this reactive organisational stance towards CSR, when, after examining the CSR 
disclosures in a sample of Canadian companies, they concluded that, “the level and 
type of environmental disclosure contained in the annual reports is influenced 
primarily by an organisation’s relevant publics, and that the communication 
strategies adopted by the organisation are influenced by the multiplicity and power of 
these different publics” (p. 274). In this case, therefore, CSR is an externally 
motivated activity, implicitly required by a social contract and a CSRes3 ‘pragmatic’ 
position would be held. 
 
However, the fact that the disclosures of an organisation are influenced by specific 
stakeholders and their power, does not exclude the possibility of the organisation 
acting proactively. A proactive perspective towards CSR, “would suggest 
concentration by the company only on those stakeholders considered important by 
the company in its ability to control its environment, and to whom selective reporting 
might then be expected to occur” (Woodward and Woodward, 2001, p. 1). Roberts 
(1992), similarly to Neu et al. (1998), found that stakeholder power is significantly 
related to levels of corporate social disclosures but he concluded that organisational 
managers use CSR as a proactive method of managing stakeholders and their 
organisational environment. In this self-interested approach, therefore, organisations 
would consider CSR as an opportunity to manage stakeholders and control their 
environment to their own benefit, and employ it more than required by social 
contract amounts, holding what would seem to be an ‘opportunistic’ (CSRes4) 
position.  
 
Stakeholder theory, therefore, as summarised in the below table, cannot come up 
with a definitive answer regarding whether CSR is an internally or externally, and 
strategic or ethical, motivated activity neither with an answer on which is the implied 
CSRes position. Considering, though, that in all its variants it appears to be 
compatible with the social contract theory, it could be employed as a basis for the 
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development of a CSR motivational conceptual framework, similarly to, for example, 
Woodward et al. (2001). 
 
Table 3.3 Dimensions of stakeholder theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Stakeholder 
Theory CSRes2,3,4 Either Either Yes 
 
3.2.4 Political economy of accounting theory as rationale for CSR 
 
A Political Economy of accounting (PE, hereafter) perspective is generally perceived 
as the main alternative framework to LT (Buhr, 1998; Campbell, 2000; O’Donovan, 
2002a), which is discussed in the next chapter. This perspective is cited in a number 
of studies (e.g. Tinker, 1980; Tinker and Neimark, 1987; Guthrie and Parker, 1989, 
1990;  Arnold, 1990; Ader, 1993; Gray et al., 1995a; Gray et al., 1996; Buhr, 1998; 
O’Donovan, 1999, 2002a; O’Dwyer, 1999; Zain, 1999; Campbell, 2000; Woodward 
et al., 2001, Van Der Laan, 2004; Deegan and Unerman, 2006). However, whereas a 
general coherence is observed on how each of the main interpretations reviewed in 
this chapter can explain CSR, this is not apparent in the PE framework, since 
variations are revealed on most of the studies regarding its very meaning8. 
 
The origins of the Political Economy notion can be traced back to ancient Greece. 
Originally the term seemed to mean the careful management of finances. In the 
classic economists’ work (Steuart, 1767; Smith, 1776) the term Political Economy 
seemed to incorporate economic science and policy notions (Woodward and 
Woodward, 2001). However, Robbins (1937) made a distinction between Economics 
and Political Economy, considering that the latter focuses on the realisation of aims 
whose formulation lay outside the economic discipline, such as the principles of 
public economic policy.   
 
                                                 
8 These variations are product of the wider and diachronic political economy debate. The discipline of 
political economy never seemed to obtain a solid theorisation and appeared to have a changing nature 
over the centuries, since it was often considered as a synonym to the term ‘economics’. As 
Schumpeter noted (1954, p.21, cited in Woodward and Woodward, 2001, p.5), “political economy 
meant different things to different writers”. 
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It is in the last three decades that this notion has been employed in the investigation 
of accounting phenomena, originally by authors such as Tinker (1980). There are 
four main approaches to PE which can be applied in CSR research: the one evident in 
the work of Gray and colleagues (see Gray et al., 1995, 1996; Campbell, 2000; Gray, 
2001); the one by Tinker (1980) and other ‘critical theorists’ (e.g. Boczko, 2000; 
Cooper and Sherer, 1984; and Marston, 1984); the one stemming largely from the 
work of Guthrie and Parker (1989, 1990, supported by e.g. Woodward et al., 2001; 
Woodward and Woodward, 2001); and the one variation on the ‘critical theory’ 
approach, suggested by Buhr (1998, see also O’Donovan, 2002a). These approaches, 
despite having some similarities9, differ inter alia in the way they view the 
relationship between PE and social contract theory.  
 
Gray et al., (1996), view PE to be, “the social, political and economic framework 
within which human life takes place” (p. 47); therefore it includes LT and 
stakeholder theory. According to Gray et al. (1995a,b) and others (e.g. Gray et al., 
1996; Adams et al., 1998, Deegan, et al., 2002), PE can be viewed as either 
‘classical’ or ‘bourgeois’, with the difference between the two lying in the 
importance placed on structural conflict within society. 
 
Classical Political Economy [PE1] traces its origins to the work of Carl Marx and is 
most frequently associated to the work of Tinker (1980) and other ‘critical theorists’. 
This approach “places class relations at the forefront of the analysis… concerned 
with the effects of accounting information and corporate reporting on the distribution 
of income, wealth and power” (Tinker and Neimark, 1987, p. 72). Accounting 
reports and disclosures, such as CSR, are perceived as a means of maintaining the 
favoured position of those who control scarce resources and as a means of 
undermining the position of those without scarce capital (Deegan and Unerman, 
2006). Thus, it is argued that CSR distracts attention from more fundamental 
structural issues, leading to the extension of power, and is therefore viewed as being 
essentially captured by powerful vested interests (O’Dwyer, 1999). Hence, this 
variant would suggest a proactive and strategic CSR stance and, therefore, it is not 
                                                 
9 These approaches appear to agree that PEA “emphasises the fundamental interrelationship between 
political and economic forces in society” (Miller, 1994, p.16): “that society, politics, and economics 
are inseparable so that issues, such as economic issues, cannot be considered in isolation from social 
and environmental issues” (Blomquist and Deegan, 2000, p.7).  
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consistent with Social Contract Theory: organisations would be expected to hold 
pristine capitalism and opportunistic positions, by only engaging with social 
responsibility activities to the extent that it would be of economic benefit.   
 
Bourgeois Political Economy [PE2] is rooted in the work of John Stuart Mill and is 
associated with the work of Gray and colleagues (see e.g. Gray et al., 1995, 1996; 
Campbell, 2000; Gray, 2001). A researcher adopting this approach, “tends to take 
these things [structural conflict, inequality] as given and thus excludes them from the 
analysis” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 48) and takes a more pluralist perception of society, 
in that he/she implicitly assumes that, “many classes of stakeholders have the power 
to influence various decisions by corporations, government and other entities” 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2006, fn 5, p. 301). It is this variant from which LT and 
stakeholder theory are perceived to derive.  
 
However, the nebulous nature of this explanation (Campbell, 2000) does not allow 
for a conclusion to be reached on whether it assumes CSR to be internally or 
externally driven activity (who is more powerful, the classes of stakeholders or the 
organisations?); or on whether it may incorporate potential ethical motivations with 
regard to CSR employment; or, on the identification of the CSRes position of 
organisations (Pragmatic? Opportunistic? Ethical?). Considering, though, that, 
according to PE2, PE allegedly incorporates LT, this implies that PE2 accepts the 
existence of a Social Contract; however, it is questionable whether there is a way for 
this theoretical perspective to contribute in the development of an explanatory CSR 
framework.  
 
The third approach to PE [PE3] stemming largely from the work of Guthrie and 
Parker (1989, 1990, undated, supported by e.g. Woodward et al., 2001; Woodward 
and Woodward, 2001; see also supportive evidence from Galbraith, 1957; Neimark 
and Tinker, 1986; Benson, 1982; Gray et al., 1996; Freedman and Patten, 2004) 
appears to contribute more to understanding motivations for CSR. The full Guthrie 
and Parker definition (unpublished, as cited in Woodward et al., 2001, p. 361) of a 
political economy of accounting is: 
 
Political economy of accounting theory… suggests that corporate disclosure 
is proactive in that information provided is from a managerial perception and 
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designed to set and shape the agenda, mediate, mystify and shape the world. 
It is one where private interests prevail, conflict and classes are ‘in focus’… 
(the approach) portray(s) corporate reporting as involving the use by social 
actors of accounting information and corporate annual reports to mediate, 
suppress, mystify and transform social conflict (Guthrie and Parker, undated, 
pp. 5-6) 
 
Thus this approach, similarly to PE1, places conflict and classes ‘in focus’; however, 
while in PE1 (Tinker’s approach) power is perceived to rest primarily with the state 
and only secondly with corporate executives, for Guthrie and Parker the latter is the 
locus of control in the modern corporation (Woodward and Woodward, 2001). 
Further, Guthrie and Parker (1989; 1990) consider PE as an alternative framework to 
LT and do not consider that LT is incorporated within it. However, with regard to the 
research questions of this study, PE3, similarly to PE1, does not appear to be 
consistent with Social Contract; assumes proactive and strategic corporate stances 
towards CSR; and implies organisations holding pristine capitalism and opportunistic 
positions. 
 
The fourth approach to PE [PE4] comes from Buhr (1998, see also O’Donovan, 
2002a). Buhr (1998) also seems to adopt a largely PE1 view in that she emphasises 
the role to the oppressive organisational world of “dysfunctional structural 
relationships… [which] create a power élite that controls resources, broadly defined” 
and where “accounting systems act as mechanisms used to create, distribute and 
mystify power” (p. 165). However, she also interestingly notes that PE and LT: 
 
are all means to organisational legitimacy… the distinction between 
legitimacy theory and political economy theory is on a micro level rather than 
a macro level. They both serve to legitimate, but means and motivation are 
viewed differently. It is in the interpretation of disclosure choice that the 
differences between the social constructionist perspective (… legitimacy 
theory) and the hegemonic perspective (… political economy theory) are 
played out (pp. 165-166). 
 
Even Guthrie and Parker’s (1990) argument that CSR may, “serve as a tool for 
constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic and political arrangements, 
institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation’s private 
interests” (p. 166), may be considered consistent with Buhr’s (1998) arguments. 
Thus, from all PE variants, PE4 appears to be the only one with a clear orientation 
with regards to a CSRes position (pristine capitalism and/or opportunism) and CSR 
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motivation (internally and strategically oriented), and which is further consistent with 
social contract, since it is generally perceived to be incorporated into a wider LT 
framework. Thus, it can contribute further to the development of the relevant social 
contract-based, CSR framework, discussed in the next chapter. Table 3.4 summarises 
the discussion in this section: 
 
Table 3.4 Dimensions of political economy of accounting theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Political Economy 
of Accounting 
Theory 
CSRes1,4 Proactive Strategic PE1,,3 No; PE2,4 Yes 
 
3.3 Extensions of Legitimacy Theory 
 
A number of theoretical frameworks, drawn from social and political theory, reactive 
in nature, have been employed in the literature to explain motivations for CSR, and 
these are based on LT and thus on social contract theory (LT is reviewed in detail in 
the next chapter as it is of most relevance to this study). These include media agenda 
setting theory, public pressure perspectives and institutional theory, all of which 
provide useful insights into the legitimacy framework. 
 
3.4.1 Media agenda setting theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Media Agenda Setting Theory (MAST) has received considerable attention in the 
social and environmental accounting literature (see e.g. Brown and Deegan, 1998; 
Esrock and Leichty, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan et al., 2002; Patten, 2002a; 
Tilling, 2004), where it is argued that a relationship exists between the relative 
emphasis given by the media to various topics and the degree of importance these 
topics have for the general public (Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990; Ader, 1995):  
 
Increased media attention is believed to lead to increased community concern 
for a particular issue … the media are not seen as mirroring public priorities; 
rather, they are seen as shaping them (Brown and Deegan, 1998, p. 25). 
 
MAST, therefore, considers media to be the single most important stakeholder to set 
the agenda in the organisation-society interplay. It can be considered to be a ‘hand in 
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glove’ compatriot with Legitimacy Theory (Woodward et al., 2001). Organisations, 
whenever they feel that their legitimacy is threatened from the increased media 
attention, are expected to respond with increased social and environmental 
disclosures; MAST, hence, advances a reactive, externally driven and not ethical 
corporate stance towards CSR, implying that organisations are ‘pragmatically’ 
(CSRes3) driven towards CSRes.  
 
Despite the significant empirical evidence supporting this view (see e.g. Ader, 1993; 
Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan et al., 2002; Patten, 2002a) though, its main 
disadvantage is that it disregards the importance of other key-players in shaping 
public concern and, consequently, their effect on CSR. As Brown and Deegan (1998) 
admit, “the media is not as effective in some industries as others in shaping 
community expectations…also, there is a possibility that dominant players in some 
industries had strategically planned the timing and format of their environmental 
disclosures in a bid to manipulate or shape community perceptions and 
concerns…rather than simply reacting to changes in community concerns” (p. 33). 
This suggests that a PE perspective may apply. Furthermore, Patten (2002a) also 
acknowledges a number of caveats in his analysis, most notably that, “it is always 
possible that the relations noted in this study are due not to the variable of interest, 
but rather to an omitted, related factor” (p.169) – a problem that most sophisticated 
quantitative analyses face. Table 3.5 summarises the framework’s position towards 
the research questions of the study. 
 
Table 3.5 Dimensions of MAST 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Media Agenda 
Setting Theory CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
 
3.3.2 Public pressure theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Closely related to MAST and to LT are external (or public) pressure perspectives 
evident in a number of studies (see e.g. Walden and Schwartz, 1997; Neu et al., 
1998; Adams, 2002; Patten, 2002b) attempting to explain CSR. These are wider than 
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the MAST perspectives and suggest that the extent of CSR disclosure is a function of 
exposure to public pressure in the social and political environment: “companies 
facing greater exposures…would be expected to provide more extensive 
environmental disclosures” (Patten, 2002b, p.763). Public pressure can arise due to 
concerns of the general population, political bodies, or regulatory (or legal) agencies 
(Boulding, 1978; Patten, 2002b).  
 
These perspectives, in essence, incorporate MAST and are consistent with LT: 
organisations, whenever they realise that their legitimacy is threatened by increased, 
for one reason or another, public pressure, react by increasing their levels of CSR. 
Thus, similarly to MAST, CSR is seen as a pragmatic (CSRes3), externally and not 
ethically driven activity – by definition then consistent with social contract theory 
and LT. Despite not being as restrictive as MAST and having been empirically 
validated (see e.g. Adams, 2002; Patten, 2002a,b), since these perspectives consider 
organisations accountable to the public, they are almost identical to the legitimacy 
theory perceptions and, therefore, cannot contribute further to this theoretical review 
of CSR. Table 3.6 summarises the framework’s position towards the study’s research 
questions: 
 
Table 3.6 Dimensions of public pressure theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Public Pressure 
Theory CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
 
3.3.3 Institutional theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Another LT-based theoretical perspective (Suchman, 1995) that has been employed 
to explain CSR is institutional theory (at times referred to as institutional legitimacy 
theory) (see e.g. Jones, 1996; Milne and Patten, 2002; Rahaman et al., 2004). 
Institutionalists: 
 
downplay both managerial agency and manager-stakeholder conflict. In a 
strong and constraining symbolic environment, a manager’s decisions often 
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are constructed by the same belief systems that determine audience reactions. 
Consequently, rather than examining the strategic legitimation efforts of 
specific focal organizations, institutionalists tend to emphasize the collective 
structuration (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) of entire fields or sectors of 
organizational life (Suchman, 1995, p. 576).  
 
Institutional theory considers that much management behaviour, including attempts 
to legitimate, may be controlled not by managers but rather by institutional pressures 
that create tendencies towards isomorphism within the organisational field 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). From this perspective, legitimacy is gained by the 
organisation becoming isomorphic with its environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Milne and Patten, 2002) to reduce these pressures. Accounting is generally perceived 
to represent one form of institutionalised practice within organisations; according to 
Covaleski et al. (1996, p.11) accounting in the form of an institution may represent 
“a ceremonial means for symbolically demonstrating an organisation’s commitment 
to a rational course of action” (see section 4.4.2 of the next chapter for a 
comprehensive discussion on symbolic legitimation). CSR in this context, as a record 
of institutionalised practices (such as social and environmental activities, and as an 
extension to financial reporting) that managers provide to external constituencies, 
can assist companies enhance their legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Arndt and 
Bigelow, 2000). 
 
Institutional theory, therefore, can potentially make a significant contribution to the 
CSR conceptual framework. Empirically, it is verified by a number of research 
works showing that companies tend to imitate each other (particularly, smaller ones 
emulate the practices of bigger ones – see e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Bansal 
and Roth, 2000; Milne and Paten, 2002; Rahaman et al., 2004; Woodward et al., 
2004). This reveals a reactive, externally driven and not ethical corporate stance 
towards CSR, where disclosing information of this type would be seen as a 
pragmatic necessity to conform to institutionalised pressures, in order to maintain 
legitimacy (CSRes3), as Table 3.7 shows.  
 
However, it should be noted that companies, under this perspective, do not seem to 
be accountable to their stakeholders but to institutionalised structures. If these 
structures are determined by society or government then it could be expected that all 
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companies would try to conform; however, it may be that these structures and 
practices (as CSR) are determined by the larger, dominant companies in their 
markets (e.g. a larger company sets increased CSR levels). In this case, smaller 
companies may react (e.g. with increased disclosures), to maintain or enhance their 
legitimacy, but a different theoretical explanation should be sought to reveal the 
reasons behind the proactive, internally motivated stance of the larger companies 
(such as a PE, or even holistic accountability, perspective). A similar explanation 
should be sought for organisations attempting to alter institutionalised practices 
(Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Lindblom, 1993). In this case, therefore, it seems that a 
definitive conclusion cannot be reached with regard to the ethical/strategic CSR 
orientation of the internally motivated larger companies. 
 
Table 3.7 Dimensions of institutional theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Institutional 
Theory CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
 
3.4 Decision usefulness and economic perspectives 
 
In this section what Gray et al. (1996) and O’Dwyer (1999) call functional 
perspectives are presented: that is, the decision usefulness and economic theories that 
have been used to explain CSR. These two types of study fit into a functionalist 
paradigm (Mathews, 1993; Tilt, 1994) and are based in neo-classical economic 
theory. Gray et al. (1988) and Gray et al. (1996) view social accounting researchers 
using these perspectives as emanating from the extreme right-wing of politics (see, 
e.g. Friedman, 1962, 1970) and relate these perspectives to the pristine capitalist 
(CSRes1) arguments, presented in section 2.4.1. The relevant arguments reviewed 
include decision usefulness theory, signalling theory, positive accounting theory and 
agency theory. Most of these perspectives generally appear to put forward a case for 
more proactive, and not ethically motivated, corporate management of CSR 
disclosures, implying an ethics opportunist position towards their social and 
environmental responsibilities. 
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 3.4.1 Decision usefulness theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Decision usefulness studies concentrate on the end user of any social information 
that is being disclosed and argue that companies undertake CSR because traditional 
user groups (investors and creditors) find it useful for their investment decision 
making (see Spicer, 1978; Belkaoui, 1984; Dierkes and Antal, 1985). Using this 
perspective, CSR is only seen as useful if it can be used to enhance a company’s 
corporate image or reputation (Gray et al., 1988).  
 
Decision making has always been the main thrust for accounting development (Zain, 
1999) and according to the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (1978), “the 
objective of financial reporting is to provide information useful to present and 
potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, 
credit, and similar decisions” (cited in Zain, 1999, p. 87). Gray et al. (1995a) identify 
two forms of study from this perspective: “ranking” studies, and the investigation of 
the information effects of CSR on share price behaviour. The first type of study tends 
to assess whether bankers and others perceive social information (as one form of 
accounting information) as being of any importance (see e.g. Campbell and Slack, 
2006a,b). The second type of study attempts to assess the stock market reaction to 
disclosing companies in order to determine if social disclosure is used by stock 
market participants as a source of information (see e.g. Pava and Krausz, 1996).  
 
Research on decision usefulness studies of corporate social disclosures seemed to be 
popular in the late 1970s and 1980s (see Bowman, 1973; Benjamin and Stanga, 
1977; Belkaoui, 1980, 1984; Aupperle, 1984), but see also White (1996), 
Blacconiere and Northcut (1997), Gago (2002), Freedman and Patten (2004), 
Lorraine, Collison and Power (2004), Campbell and Slack (2006a,b), for a recent re-
emergence of these approaches. The empirical evidence provided from these studies, 
however, appears to be inconclusive (Matthews, 1987; Owen et al., 1987; Gray et al., 
1996). For example, some empirical evidence suggests that company performance is 
positively associated with social disclosure (Abbot and Monsen, 1979; Anderson and 
Frankle, 1980) while others indicate a negative association, concluding tentatively 
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that “it pays to be good but not too good” (Mahapatra, 1983, p. 10, see also Bowman 
and Haire, 1976, O’Dwyer, 1999). Mathews (1993) suggested that even though the 
findings are conflicting, it may be argued that the overall weight lies towards the 
view that disclosure of non-traditional information does have utility for shareholders 
and the security market because information content is established regardless of the 
direction in which the share prices move.  
 
On the contrary, Deegan (2004) argues that if market studies of CSR indicate no 
market reaction, “then a view might be promoted that the environmental and social 
disclosures have no relevance… the failure to find associated changes in market 
prices has the potential to be used to support arguments against regulating or 
mandating a particular disclosure given that ‘the market’ does not seem to need or 
respond to the data” (p. 88). This stems from the ‘shareholder primacy’ approach to 
CSR regulation. Deegan (2004) further notes that, “While shareholders and their 
information demands are important (and these information demands are often 
considered to relate more to information about financial information), shareholders 
are only part of the community and a more holistic perspective of information 
demand (and related accountabilities) is arguably warranted” (p. 90). 
 
CSR in this context has been viewed as essentially an extension of financial reporting 
to satisfy profit seeking investors, implying a rather internally motivated, not ethical 
but rather opportunistic approach to corporate responsibility (CSRes4). However, 
corporate information is not only useful to capital providers but also to a wider 
audience (see e.g. above arguments of social and political frameworks). The re-
emergence of Socially Responsible Investment – SRI (Miller, 1992, has traced social 
investment origins from the Victorian era) provides major implications for both CSR 
and CSRes (Gray et al., 1996; Zain, 1999; Verschoor, 2005). These investors are 
interested in the social and economic performance of business from moral and social 
criteria rather than solely from an economic perspective10. Even though these 
investors are new players in the field, and the amount of funds invested is moderate, 
their high profile and new investment philosophy has attracted a wider institutional 
                                                 
10 But see Clikeman’s, 2004, argument that this CSR engagement may also benefit companies in 
achieving stock price performance, attracting ‘patient’ shareholders and enhancing the firm’s 
reputation and brand value, indicative of the potential strategic and ‘opportunistic’ motivation behind 
this corporate trend 
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response (Zain, 1999). As Verschoor (2005, p. 17) notes, “more than one in every 
nine dollars under professional investment management is involved with SRI”. 
 
Does anyone, apart from socially responsible investors, however, use such 
information for decision making? In reality, studies have suggested that the financial 
community finds CSR as better than useless but rank it as only ‘moderately 
important’ (see Benjamin and Stanga, 1977; Firth, 1979, 1984; Belkaoui, 1984). 
Deegan and Rankin (1997) further concluded that stockbrokers were found to give 
relatively little weight to environmental performance information relative to financial 
performance information. These findings are consistent with the findings in Business 
in the Environment (1994) and the more recent ones from Campbell and Slack 
(2006a,b), in which the evidence indicates that British analysts consider 
environmental issues to be largely irrelevant. 
 
However Deegan (2004, p. 93) also cites a report from the University of Cambridge 
(2003, p. 5), based on a survey of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from the Global 
Fortune 500 (world’s largest companies by revenue) which shows that “despite 
recent financial scandals (Enron, WorldCom, etc.) CEOs predict that in the near 
future social credibility will be as important as financial credibility, and 
environmental credibility will only be marginally less important”. Furthermore 
Deegan (2004) suggests that the limited research on this CSR field may be because 
“for philosophical reasons, many researchers in the social and environmental area do 
not care to embrace capital market research” (p. 90), since, as he comments earlier on 
the same page, “markets promote unsustainable growth–rewarding companies for 
continuous profit growth (the bigger the profits the better) but [are] penalising them 
for profit downturns”.  
 
Further research, therefore, is deemed necessary to further clarify the inconsistencies 
in the reported empirical evidence. Table 3.8 summarises the discussion. Overall, it 
can be tentatively concluded that this perspective assumes an internally and not 
ethically driven corporate stance with regards to CSD, consistent with a CSRes1 (in 
case of non-disclosure) and CSRes4 (in case of disclosure) view of corporate 
responsibility; and, although not directly drawing from it, further consistent with 
Social Contract Theory, as explained above. 
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 Table 3.8 Dimensions of decision usefulness theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Decision 
Usefulness Theory CSRes1,4 Proactive Strategic Yes 
 
3.4.2 Signalling theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Signalling theory is frequently cited in capital markets research (see, e.g. Ross, 1977; 
Downes and Heikel, 1982; Masulis, 1983; Miller and Rock, 1985; Masulis and 
Korwar, 1986; Noe, 1988; Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Giner and Reverte, 2003) 
and is based on the information asymmetry premise, which claims that firm 
managers or insiders are assumed to possess superior private information about the 
firm than outsiders, such as investors, shareholders and other interested groups, do 
not have (see, e.g. Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Asquith and Mullins, 1996). According to signalling theory, in this context of 
information asymmetry the choice of a determined financial structure may be 
considered as a signal which conveys private information to the market. For 
example, a number of studies empirically derive a positive correlation between 
leverage (an increase of which is perceived to ‘signal’ to the outsiders of possible 
increased capital returns) and share value, in a cross section of otherwise similar 
firms (see e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977; Heinkel, 1982; Blazenko, 1987; John, 1987; 
Poitevin, 1989; Ravid and Sarig, 1989). 
 
Considering the theory’s wide employment in financial markets research, however, it 
is surprising that this theory has not yet been explicitly employed in a similar way in 
CSR research. In fact, it seems that this perspective is hardly employed even in 
broader accounting research (for some notable exceptions, see Morris, 1987, for a 
general normative statement on how signalling, along with agency, theory can be 
employed in accounting research; and Watson et al., 2002, for an employment of the 
theory to explain the voluntary disclosure of companies’ financial ratios). 
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However, these arguments could be found useful in explanatory CSR research. It 
could be argued, for example, that organisations signal their compliance to the social 
contract requirements/legitimacy to selected stakeholders by disclosing specific 
related information in their ARs, indicating a ‘pragmatic’, reactive, not ethically 
motivated corporate stance towards CSR. Alternatively, they could signal their 
potentially ‘excess’ ethicality, to gain a competitive advantage and subsequent 
economic benefits, indicating an ‘opportunistic’, internally, not ethically motivated 
CSR stance, that could still be consistent with social contract theory, though, as 
discussed in section 3.2.1. It could even be argued that companies signal to all their 
interested parties their espousal of holistic accountability, by disclosing a lot of CSR 
information, of even negative in addition to positive form (see discussion in section 
4.4.3), in an attempt to ask for active support from their constituents to increase 
pressures on other organisations, in order to raise the overall benefit and stability of 
the community they are part of (internally, ethically motivated, CSRes2, stance).  
 
Further normative and empirical works are therefore needed to clarify the theory’s 
potential contribution in explaining current CSR practice. Further normative work, 
for example, could consider the relationships in the general organisational theory 
context of the verbs ‘signal’ and ‘show’ or ‘communicate’. Considering that CSR 
involves, “communicating the social and environmental effects of organisations’ 
economic actions to particular interest groups” (Gray et al., 1987, p. ix), and since 
organisations produce a CSR record to show – project - communicate it to 
somebody, then potentially all CSR activity (not to say all voluntary business activity 
involving communication, for example advertisements and press releases) can be 
potentially perceived to be a signal to some targeted groups, a rather flaccid, and of 
limited potential utility to organisational theory, argument. Evidently, further 
normative work could also consider the potential relationship of signalling theory 
with marketing theory, since, in the same vein, it could be argued that all voluntary 
organisational activity that involves communication is related to marketing 
arguments. Table 3.9 summarises the discussion. 
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Table 3.9 Dimensions of signalling theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Signalling Theory CSRes2,3,4 Either Either Yes 
 
3.4.3 Positive accounting theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Several empirical studies (e.g., Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Ness and Mirza, 1991; 
Lemon and Cahan, 1997; Milne, 2001) have sought to establish evidence for Positive 
Accounting theory (PA) as an explanation for firms’ social disclosures. Drawn from 
the financial reporting field, PA (at times referred to as the political cost hypothesis), 
is based on the work of Watts and Zimmerman (1986). More specifically, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) argue that: 
 
managers have greater incentives to choose accounting standards which 
report lower earnings (thereby increasing cash flows, firm value, and their 
welfare) due to tax, political, and regulatory considerations than to choose 
accounting standards which report higher earnings and, thereby, increase their 
incentive compensation (p. 18). 
 
They view, therefore, CSRes as a means of minimising earnings and political costs: 
 
Corporations employ a number of devices, such as social responsibility 
campaigns in the media, government lobbying and selection of accounting 
procedures to minimize reported earnings. By avoiding the attention that 
“high” profits draw because of the public’s association of high reported 
profits and monopoly rents, management can reduce the likelihood of adverse 
political actions and, thereby, reduce its expected costs (p. 115). 
 
PA, therefore, predicts a proactive, internally and strategically motivated corporate 
stance towards CSR, where companies’ managers attempt to ‘set the agenda’ to 
opportunistically increase their welfare. This perspective can further be consistent 
with Social Contract Theory, in that PA motivated organisations could engage with 
CSR and CSRes in excess to what is required by the implicit contract, to increase 
their welfare. In fact, as Deegan (2000) reports, it has been suggested that these 
arguments are similar to some predictions of Legitimacy Theory, in that “Annual 
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Report disclosure practices can be used in a strategic manner to manage an 
organisation’s relations with the community in which it operates” (p. 264). Despite 
that, LT, in contrast to PA, makes no assumptions about the efficiency of the 
markets, such as the capital market and the market for managers (Deegan, 2000). As 
Deegan (2002) in a later study argues, PA is as well a systems approach, albeit 
involving fewer stakeholders, and could also be considered consistent with more 
strategic approaches to legitimacy, as the subsequent chapter illustrates.  
 
However, more normative and empirical research is needed to further clarify these 
arguments. It could be argued, for example, contrary to PA predictions, that 
managers generally employ tax and stock evaluation policies to maximise reported 
earnings and increase their compensations, through also increasing reserves, potential 
future investments and attracting more investors; CSR could be then additionally 
employed to further increase their welfare by e.g. projecting ethicality and gaining 
competitive advantage. It could be acknowledged, though, that even in this case, 
CSR is internally and strategically motivated, in an ‘opportunistic’ (CSRes4) 
manner, as Table 3.10 illustrates. 
 
Table 3.10 Dimensions of PA 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Positive 
Accounting 
Theory 
CSRes4 Reactive Strategic Yes 
 
 
3.4.4 Agency theory as rationale for CSR 
 
Agency Theory has been employed in a number of studies to explain why managers 
voluntarily disclose information (see e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et 
al., 1994; Watson et al., 2002). In the case where managers are the agent and 
shareholders the principal, where managers hold less than 100 per cent of the firm’s 
residual claims, managers capture only a part of the entire gain from their activities 
that may help enhance the profit, but they will suffer the entire cost of these activities 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers, in the knowledge that shareholders will 
seek to control their behaviour through bonding and monitoring activities, may 
employ disclosures (such as CSR) to try and convince shareholders they are acting 
optimally (Watson et al., 2002). Such an approach therefore, albeit not excluding the 
existence of an implied Social Contract, denotes an internally motivated, strategic 
and ‘opportunistic’ (CSRes4) corporate stance towards CSR. 
 
When viewed in this narrow context, agency theory resembles PA in that both entail 
a proactive corporate stance towards CSR, where CSR is a tool that managers use at 
their own disposal, either to avoid adverse political actions or to reduce agency costs. 
In this case, though, there seems to be a fundamental difference between the two 
theories. In PA, managers and shareholders’ interests appear to coincide and 
managers in essence sacrifice the yields that an increased earnings policy would 
generate for them, for the greater common benefit that a lower earnings policy 
entails. When agency theory, though, is applied per se, by definition managers and 
shareholders interests are in conflict and managers may employ CSR to convince 
business owners that they act optimally.  
 
However, agency theory has also been employed in a wider context in the CSR 
literature (see Laughlin, 1990; Arrow, 1991; Gray et al., 1991, 1996; Woodward et 
al., 2001). According to these perspectives, the principal, to which management is 
accountable, could be considered to be not only the shareholders of the business but, 
rather, society at large, and the agent is the company rather than the managers. Thus, 
similarly to the managers-stakeholders relationship, organisations are accountable to 
society at large, with often conflicting interests. In this case, agency theory can 
explain both a reactive and a proactive corporate stance towards CSR. A reactive, 
externally motivated (consistent with CSRes3 ‘pragmatic’ position) scenario, where 
the principal’s interests predominate, would suggest that the principal (society) has 
the ability to command appropriate actions from the agent (company). On the 
contrary, a proactive, internally motivated corporate stance (consistent with the 
‘opportunistic’ CSRes4 position) is revealed when one considers the information 
provided by a company as a product of managerial perceptions of what is required to 
influence societal opinion of the organisation and dictate the agenda (Woodward et 
al., 2001).      
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 Gray et al., (1995a) disregard these approaches, concluding that the “‘economic 
theory’ in the pristine sense in which it normally is applied in accounting research 
has little or nothing to offer as a basis for the development of CSR”11 (p.51). Causal 
observation, though, reveals that PA explanations rely on empirical evidence largely 
identical to that used in support of other explanations (such as LT) of CSR12 (Milne, 
2001). Furthermore, empirical evidence has revealed that agency theory can be found 
useful in explaining CSR, particularly when employed in a wider context (see e.g. 
Woodward et al., 2001).  
 
Table 3.11 Dimensions of agency theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Agency Theory CSRes3,4 Either Strategic Yes 
 
 
3.5 Business ethics frameworks as rationales for CSR 
 
Business ethics frameworks hold a prominent place in the arguments for CSRes and 
CSR. This is evident in Boatright’s (2003, p. 373) definition of social responsibility, 
which is considered to be, “the selection of corporate goals and the evaluation of 
outcomes not solely by the criteria of profitability and organisational well-being but 
by ethical standards or judgments of social desirability”. The exercise of social 
responsibility, in this view, must allow for companies to earn a satisfactory level of 
profit but it also implies a willingness to forgo a certain measure of profit in order to 
achieve CSRes ends. Business ethics frameworks, therefore, imply a corporate 
CSRes2 approach to social and environmental responsibility, consistent with social 
                                                 
11 Gray et al., (1995, p. 52, fn. 11) go on to admit, however, having been persuaded by many of the 
critiques, that they have not seriously engaged this literature because they believe it to be “virtual 
rubbish” and prefer their position as “heretics” (Milne, 2001).  
12 Lemon and Cahan (1997, p.79) suggest that, “Patten finds that the public pressure variables [firm 
size, and industry classification] are significant while the profitability variables [ROA, ROE] were 
not. Patten interprets these results as supporting legitimacy theory, where a firm must satisfy an 
implied contract with the society it operates in. To the contrary, as firm size is commonly used to 
represent a firm’s political visibility, we interpret Patten’s results as consistent with the political cost 
hypothesis”. 
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contract theory, where organisations are ethically and internally motivated towards 
CSR, and, further consistent with the ‘moral’ variant of Stakeholder Theory, where 
organisations holistically acknowledge their accountabilities to all their stakeholders 
and forgo some profits to satisfy them. 
 
Attributing ethical and general altruistic motives automatically assumes that 
organisations are capable of perceiving and assuming responsibility, as well as being 
able to hold values and make moral choices (Kusku and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004). 
Despite the fact that this assumption has been debated for centuries (Laufer, 1996), 
both theoretical and empirical support has been provided to the assumption of 
corporate-human equivalence (Laufer, 1996, Kusku and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004). 
Thus, corporations have been described as moral agents acting in the pursuit of their 
convictions, embodied in their codes of practice and expressed in corporate cultures, 
following ethical principles and displaying the virtue of ‘corporate integrity’ (Kusku 
and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004). It has been further argued that organisations not only are 
capable of moral judgement, but that they are progressing through stages of moral 
development, similar to those of human cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 
1976, 1981; Logsdon and Yuthas, 1997; Kushu and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004). 
 
Ethics-oriented companies would be expected to be committed to sustainable 
development. As Clikeman (2004) notes, sustainability “is a philosophy that weights 
the current economic benefits of activities against the effects of those activities on 
future generations” (p. 24). For these organisations, social and environmental 
considerations, “instead of being opposed to maximizing economic value, constitute 
the primary long-term decision parameters. Strategic objectives are predicated on 
long-term sustainability objectives rather than profitability goals” (Dillard et al., 
2005, pp. 86-87). These companies, for example, would attempt to create and 
produce products and services that are consistent with the long-term generative 
capacities of renewable resources and absorptive capabilities of the ecosystem 
(Gladwin, 1993; Kiuchi and Shireman, 2002; McDonough and Braungart, 2002; 
Dillard et al., 2005). However, as Deegan (2002) acknowledges, “unfortunately, it is 
unlikely that this view would be the dominant view in most business organisations 
operating within the capitalist system” (p. 290).  
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In a similar way to Deegan (2002), Jones (1996) has criticised the practicality of this 
moral perspective of business ethics theory. He claimed that the ethical arguments 
(see Donaldson, 1982; Evan and Freeman, 1988; Swanson, 1997) contended that 
firms should behave in a socially responsible manner as it was the morally correct 
thing to do, despite the fact that it may in some cases involve unproductive 
expenditure on the part of the organisation. Jones (1996) further criticised these 
moral arguments from the perspective that telling a manager to behave in a socially 
responsible manner for moral reasons, despite the fact that it may be 
counterproductive to his/her career, was not realistic “in a world that is increasingly 
commodified, rationalized and secular” (p. 28). He also maintained that organisation 
theory would suggest that even if a manager wanted to act in a socially responsible 
manner, there would be control systems in place to ensure that he or she acted in 
accordance with the organisation’s interests. These interests normally accorded with 
those of top management involving the appeasement of the financial markets, and 
acting against them would lead to dismissal (O’Dwyer, 1999; see also Mintzberg, 
1983, and Mander, 1992, for similar arguments).  
 
To realistically address these arguments, Henderson (1984) has offered a ‘spectrum 
of ethicality’ to enable corporate executives to clarify and defend the postures they 
select. In this, he identifies three major spectra of legal and ethical compliance. 
Organisations in the first spectrum, that of minimum compliance, would meet the 
minimum of legal and ethical requirements, and would be strongly profit oriented. 
Organisations in the second spectrum, maximum compliance, would remain 
concerned about survival issues and profit margins, but this would tend, “to be more 
in the context of profits AND environmental sensitivity, for example, or profits AND 
affirmative and profits AND social responsibility” (Henderson, 1984, p. 170, 
emphasis in original). Organisations in the third spectrum, innovative compliance, 
possibly anticipating new legislation and ethical expectations and being in an 
industry where the profit is either very secure or guaranteed, would be oriented 
towards social goals and put profit making into second place. These arguments are 
graphically represented in Figure 3.1 and have also been considered in the 
development of the theoretical framework of the study, presented in the next chapter.  
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 Figure 3.1 A spectrum of ethicality (Henderson, 1984, p. 169).  
 
As the discussion in section 3.2.1 has illustrated, all these approaches could be 
related to social contract theory. In any case, ethics-motivated organisations would 
be expected to be proactive and voluntarily adopt sustainability initiatives and even 
contribute in their further development by providing suggestions for improvement. 
Table 3.12 summarises these arguments.  
 
Table 3.12 Dimensions of business ethics theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Business Ethics 
Theory CSRes2 Proactive Ethical Yes 
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3.6 Marketing theory as rationale for CSR 
 
The extent to which marketing theory has been employed to explain CSR practice 
has been a matter of a recent debate (see Adams, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2008a,b; 
Unerman, 2008). This is largely due the fact that, although CSR authors often 
incorporate marketing theory-based notions, such as image or reputation, in their 
arguments or findings (see, e.g. Trotman, 1979; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; Adams et al., 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Woodward et al., 2001; 
Adams, 2002), they rarely consider an ‘Image’ or ‘Reputation’ theory as the sole 
focus of their research. This complementary role of marketing theory (usually to LT-
based arguments) has led Unerman (2008) to note that, “Although common in 
practitioner discourse… [the] reputation risk management (RRM) motive has not yet 
explicitly been addressed to any great extent in the academic CSR reporting 
literature” (p. 362). 
 
A marketing theory–based explanation of CSR could perceive it as an organisational 
attempt to respond and capitalise on ethical consumerism. As Pruzan (2001, p. 51) 
stresses, “Ethical consumerism can be interpreted as an expression of the heightened 
awareness of the role played by the individual consumer in his or her interplay with 
the business community. Ethical consumers react positively or negatively in their 
purchasing behaviour to what they consider to be ethical or unethical behavior of 
business … to satisfy their conscience, to send a signal to both the corporate world 
and the politicians, and, indirectly, to supplement the workings of democracy”. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Kotler (2003), in acknowledging the importance of social and 
environmental issues, concludes that:  
 
the future holds a wealth of opportunities for companies. Technological 
advances … promise to change the world as we know it. At the same time, 
forces in the socioeconomic, cultural and natural environments will impose 
new limits on marketing and business practices. Companies that are able to 
innovate new solutions and values in a socially responsible way are the most 
likely to succeed (p. 702). 
 
In addition to satisfying ethical consumer needs, it could be argued that, by 
improving corporate image, CSR could be employed to address a wider array of 
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stakeholders. These views are empirically supported by the findings of Adams 
(2002), who revealed that “the main motivation for corporate ethical reporting 
according to the interviewees is to enhance corporate image and credibility with 
stakeholders” (pp. 244-245). Further support comes from Deegan et al. (2000, 
p.127), who suggest “these results highlight the strategic nature of voluntary social 
disclosures and are consistent with a view that management considers that annual 
report social disclosures are a useful device to reduce the effects upon a corporation 
of events that are perceived to be unfavourable to a corporation’s image”. Such 
organisations, therefore, would be primarily externally and strategically driven 
towards CSR and would adopt a ‘pragmatic’ stance towards CSRes (CSRes3), in an 
attempt to reduce the likelihood of being sanctioned for not complying with the 
social contract.  
 
However, a proactive perspective may also explain organisational efforts to improve 
their image.  Since there has been a “shift in attention away from the physical aspects 
and functional benefits of products to their symbolic associations and 
expressiveness” (Poiesz, 1989, p.461), companies may increase their CSR levels to 
improve their image and, for example, mystify consumers’ perceptions of the firm 
and the actual value of their products (as a PE perspective would involve). This 
perspective is supported empirically by Woodward et al. (2001, p. 387), who 
identified that “the companies interviewed are very concerned with ‘image 
building’”; Adams et al. (1998, p. 17), who noted that, “UK companies use… the 
[Annual] report as a means of advertising their social responsibility”; and the recent 
KPMG (2008) CSR survey, which finds that 55% of their 2,200 surveyed 
corporations around the world considered improving brand and reputation as a prime 
motivation for CSR. These organisations would be internally and strategically driven 
towards CSR; they would disclose more CSR than that required from the social 
contract and thus adopt an ‘opportunistic’ stance towards CSRes, in an attempt to 
increase economic benefits.  
 
The foregoing discussion reveals that marketing arguments support both internally 
and externally motivated arguments for CSR. Corporate image perspectives seem to 
be also consistent with social contract theory and CSRes3 and CSRes4 positions and 
they generally seem to involve strategic corporate CSR stances. The next chapter 
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attempts to incorporate these arguments in an LT-based framework. These arguments 
are summarised in Table 3.13.  
 
Table 3.13 Dimensions of marketing theory 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Marketing Theory CSRes3,4 Either Strategic Yes 
 
3.7 Other rationales for CSR 
 
 A number of other explanations for CSR, mainly pragmatic and opportunistic, are 
cited in the literature and their position as regards the study’s research questions are 
summarised in Table 3.14. These arguments are not as frequently employed as the 
ones discussed so far and are largely self-explanatory. The opportunistic arguments 
consider that CSR can be used to improve the organisational market and economic 
position (Hart, 1995; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Dillard et al., 2005), by, for example, 
gaining additional market share, competitive advantage and/or increasing market size 
(Porter and Van Der Linde, 1995a; Adams et al., 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; 
Woodward et al., 2001; Adams, 2002; Hart and Milstein, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2004; 
Dillard et al., 2005). Additionally, it has been suggested that CSR can assist in 
influencing regulation (Adams et al., 1998; O’Dwyer et al., 2005) and in achieving 
business efficiencies, improving perceptions and benefiting staff moral, development 
and trust (Spence and Gray, 2007).  
 
Most of these arguments can be also perceived as pragmatic, when the focus is on 
‘maintaining’ as opposed to ‘improving’ (i.e. maintaining market size or existing 
perceptions and staff moral). Some additional pragmatic arguments to engage with 
CSR may include pressures from employees, peer pressure to conform to the ‘best 
practice’, market drivers (i.e. pressure form markets and investment ratings) and 
regulation compliance (Spence and Gray, 2007). Campbell (2000), nevertheless, has 
also demonstrated that CSR may be further influenced by the individual Chair person 
(or the Board, as Spence and Gray, 2007, also note) in office and their personal value 
systems (for similar evidence pertaining to CSRes see O’Dwyer, 1999). These 
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explanations, similarly to the PE1,3 arguments presented earlier, appear to be 
alternative explanations to social contract theory and whether the motivation has, for 
example, ethical or strategic character would be subject to the individual value 
system of those in charge. The above arguments are summarised in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.14 Dimensions of other rationales for CSR 
Theoretical Framework CSRes Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR 
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Competitive advantage/ 
increasing market size 
CSRes4 Proactive Strategic Yes 
Improving perceptions, 
staff moral, 
development and trust 
Csres4 Proactive Strategic Yes 
Influencing  
regulation 
CSRes4 Proactive Strategic Yes 
Pressures 
from employees 
CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
Peer 
pressure 
CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
Regulation  
compliance 
CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
Chair’s / Board 
value systems 
Subject to the individual value systems No 
 
3.8 Summary   
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide the foundation for the development 
of the theoretical framework of the study (presented in the next chapter), by 
reviewing the most frequently cited theoretical approaches in the extant CSR 
literature and relating them to the main research questions of this study. A summary 
of these findings is provided in Table 3.15. 
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Table 3.15 Dimensions of the CSR theoretical perspectives 
Theoretical 
Framework 
CSRes 
Position 
Reactive vs. 
Proactive CSR 
Strategic vs. 
Ethical CSR  
Social Contract 
Acceptance 
Social contract 
theory All Either Either Yes 
Accountability 
theory All Either Either Yes 
Stakeholder theory CSRes2,3,4 Either Either Yes 
Political economy 
of accounting  CSRes1,4 Proactive Strategic 
PE1,3 No       
PE2,4 Yes 
MAST CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
Public, employees, 
peer pressures CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
Institutional theory  CSRes3 Reactive Strategic Yes 
Decision 
usefulness theory CSRes1,4 Proactive Strategic Yes 
Signalling theory CSRes2,3,4 Either Either Yes 
Positive 
accounting theory CSRes4 Proactive Strategic  Yes 
Agency theory CSRes3,4 Either Strategic Yes 
Business ethics CSRes2 Proactive Ethical Yes 
Marketing theory CSRes3,4 Either Strategic Yes 
Competitive 
advantage CSRes4 Proactive Strategic  Yes 
Improving 
perceptions & staff 
moral, trust & 
development 
CSRes4 Proactive Strategic  Yes 
Influencing 
regulation CSRes4 Proactive Strategic  Yes 
Chairmen/Board 
value systems Subject to the individual value systems No 
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Frameworks, such as social contract theory, stakeholder theory, agency theory and 
marketing perspectives, explain CSR practices but do not conclude in a clear 
proactive/internally driven or reactive/externally driven CSR orientation. The 
discussion revealed that mainly legitimacy based perspectives (institutional theory, 
MAST, public pressure theories) consider organisations accountable to their 
powerful relevant stakeholders and prompt them to react to the latter expectations, to 
comply with the requirements of the social contract.  In contrast, mainly PE, PA and 
decision usefulness perspectives consider organisations now to be too powerful and 
thus able to dictate the agenda. 
 
The review of the theories also supported that a proactive CSR stance does not 
necessarily reflect a profit-oriented, strategically behaving organisation nor does a 
reactive CSR stance necessarily reflect an ethically-oriented one. Proactive corporate 
stances may denote a Marxian conflict-based confirmation (companies shape the 
agenda, use CSR to publicise their responsibility, aim at specific stakeholders and 
manipulate consciousness to survive); however, a proactive stance may also be a 
signal of a reflective perspective, where firms are acting responsibly for ethical and 
possibly Accountability reasons. Likewise, reactive disclosures may be a sign of a 
sensitive corporate stance, interested in stakeholders’ expectations; but, it may also 
be that organisations are interested only in their private interests and react just to 
maintain their legitimacy and survive (in a sense, confirming Marx), or because it has 
become an institutionalised practice. 
 
Considering the nature of this research, which focuses on investigating motivations 
for CSR, the strategic vs. ethical distinction seems to be more useful. The review 
revealed that most of the perspectives seem to involve a strategic stance, whether this 
implies a dependence on external pressures or a self-interested approach to CSR. 
With regard to CSRes position, all four distinct CSRes positions discussed in the 
preceding chapter (section 2.4) were identified in the review of the theories. Finally, 
the majority of the theories were found to be compatible, to a lesser or greater extent, 
with a social contract view.  
 
Based on these findings, three main implications for the development of the 
framework can be identified. Firstly, most of the arguments are compatible with a 
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social contract view and could be included in an LT framework. Secondly, the 
strategic vs. ethical distinction seems to be more useful as a dimension/classification 
of the theories to use in such a framework. And thirdly, considering that all the 
‘ethical’ arguments are compatible with stakeholder capitalism (CSRes2) position 
and the strategic ones are either compatible with a pragmatic (CSRes3) or 
opportunistic (CSRes4) position, this suggests that these distinctions may also be 
useful in a CSR framework. 
 
Having clarified these relationships, the theoretical framework of the study based on 
Legitimacy Theory can be reviewed. 
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Chapter 4 
 Legitimacy Theory framework  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter reviewed the most frequently employed theoretical 
explanations of CSR in the literature and clarified their relationships in respect of the 
research questions of the study. The chapter concluded that most of the reviewed 
theoretical explanations are compatible with social contract theory, a tenet of LT; and 
that the corporate positions identified in chapter 2 regarding CSRes may also provide 
a useful base for an explanatory CSR framework. 
 
The overarching aim of this chapter is, by building on these findings, to introduce the 
LT theoretical framework of this study. Firstly, some background information on the 
theory is provided. Next, the legitimacy notion is revisited, three organisational 
legitimacy types are suggested (profit, image and ethics) and these are related to the 
corporate positions identified in chapter 2 towards CSRes and to the theoretical 
frameworks discussed in chapter 3. Then, the management of organisational 
legitimacy is considered, with regard to whether it is substantive or symbolic, 
positive or negative and whether it is part of an attempt to extend, maintain or defend 
legitimacy. This is followed by a discussion on the empirical evidence on legitimacy 
threats and a summary of the legitimacy management section. The penultimate 
section of this chapter introduces the propositions of the study, and the concluding 
one provides a synopsis of the chapter. 
 
4.2 Background 
 
Drawing from the foundational work of Parsons (1956a,b, 1960) and Weber (1978), 
LT has been made by researchers, “into an anchor-point of vastly expanded 
theoretical apparatus addressing the normative and cognitive forces that constrain, 
construct, and empower organizational actors” (Suchman, 1995, p. 571). LT has been 
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employed widely in the last decades by researchers seeking to examine social and 
environmental accounting practice and is probably the most cited theory in the CSR 
field (see e.g. Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992, 2002; 
Woodward et al., 1996; Pava and Krausz, 1997; Adams and Harte, 1998; Brown and 
Deegan, 1998; Neu et al., 1998; O’Donovan, 1999; O’Dwyer, 1999; Campbell, 2000; 
Deegan et al., 2000, Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Woodward et al., 2001; Deegan, 
2002, 2007; Deegan et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2003; Crowther, 2004; Tilling, 
2004).  
  
LT is centred on the notion of a social contract (see section 3.2.1), whereby “business 
agrees to perform various socially desired actions in return for approval of its 
objectives, other rewards and ultimate survival” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 344). 
Proponents of the use of LT in CSR thus argue that a corporation can (and does) 
legitimise itself in the eyes of the public by voluntarily disclosing information about 
its social activities in the AR (O’Donovan, 1999). Consistent with this view, 
Richardson (1987, p. 352) asserts accounting is a legitimating institution, and 
provides a “means by which social values are linked to economic actions”. 
 
Failure to comply with societal expectations (in essence, to comply with the terms of 
the social contract) may lead to sanctions being imposed by society (Deegan and 
Unerman, 2006). As Lindblom (1993, p.3) notes: 
 
To the extent corporate performance does not reflect the expectations of the 
relevant publics a legitimacy gap exists… [This] will fluctuate without any 
changes in action on the part of the corporation… the corporation must make 
changes or the legitimacy gap will grow as the level of conflict increases and 
the levels of positive and passive support decrease… the resulting penalty for 
any perceived legitimacy gap will come in the form available and deemed 
appropriate by the particular person or persons. 
 
These sanctions may take an economic form (such as limited provision of financial 
capital, reduced demand of products, boycotts of output, strikes), a legal form (e.g. 
lawsuits, other legislative action) or social action (limited labour capital, publicity 
campaigns, information picketing [Lindblom, 1993; Deegan, 2000, 2002; Aguilera et 
al., 2004]). It is in this expected legitimacy gap, incurred after a threat to legitimacy, 
that is found the basis of the propositions of this study (see sections 4.4 and 4.5). 
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 However, despite the theory’s wide application, few researchers define the notion 
when they employ it and “Legitimacy and related concepts unfortunately have 
been… both abstract and indefinite” (Hybels, 1995, p. 241). Further, “most 
treatments cover only a limited aspect of the phenomenon as a whole and devote 
little attention to systematizing alternative perspectives or to developing a vocabulary 
for describing divergent approaches… [Hence] research on organizational legitimacy 
threatens to degenerate into a chorus of dissonant voices” (Suchman, 1995, p. 572). 
Concerns have also been expressed for the use of LT within the CSR field and as 
Deegan (2002, p. 298) admits, “While legitimacy theory might provide useful 
insights, it can still be considered to be an under-developed theory. There are many 
‘gaps’ in the literature which embraces legitimacy theory”13.  
 
Perhaps one of the most typical ‘gaps’ occurring in the literature centres on whether 
LT implies a reactive or proactive organisational stance towards CSR. LT is most 
frequently considered to posit that CSR practices are reactive to 
social/environmental, political and economic pressures (see e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 
1989, undated; O’Dwyer, 1999, Woodward et al., 2001); however, as Lindblom 
(1993) has noted: “the corporate decision that it is necessary or appropriate to 
undertake a legitimation strategy may be reactive or proactive in nature” (p. 17). A 
reactive legitimation strategy may be initiated as a reaction to a possible legitimacy 
threat, whereas, a proactive legitimacy strategy, “is aimed at preventing a legitimacy 
gap as opposed to attempting to narrow such a gap” (p. 18). This approach to 
legitimacy management is further espoused by a number of studies (Perrow, 1970; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Preston and Post, 1975; Parker, 1986; Buhr, 1998; 
O’Donovan, 2002a; Patten and Crampton, 2004) and will be discussed in more detail 
in what follows. 
 
                                                 
13 Deegan (2002) quotes a number of examples to elaborate on this view: “do legitimising activities 
actually work, and if so, which forms of disclosure media are more successful in changing community 
views about an organisation… there is still a general lack of knowledge whether particular groups in 
society are relatively more influenced by legitimising disclosures than others…how do managers most 
effectively become aware of … the terms of the ‘social contract’? How do managers determine which 
segments of society … are conferring the much-needed legitimacy?” (pp. 298-299). See also Deegan 
(2007) for a summary of these arguments.   
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4.3 The types of legitimacy 
 
In an attempt to clarify the ambiguous legitimacy notion, Lindblom (1993) adopts 
from the seminal work of Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) the following definition: 
 
Legitimacy is a condition or a status which exists when an entity’s value 
system is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of 
which the entity is a part (Lindblom, 1993, p. 2). 
 
This definition is consistent with the view that legitimacy is an operational resource 
that organisations extract – often competitively – from their cultural environments 
and that they employ in pursuit of their goals; a view, as Suchman (1995) notes, 
associated with the work of Pfeffer and his colleagues (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; see also Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990 and 
Jones, 1996, for similar arguments). This view is in contrast with to the arguments 
depicting legitimacy “not as an operational resource, but as a set of constitutive 
beliefs”, where “cultural definitions determine how the organization is built, how it is 
run, and, simultaneously, how it is understood and evaluated” and where “legitimacy 
and institutionalisation are virtually synonymous” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576, emphasis 
in original).  
 
LT, therefore, appears to have at least two main variants (Gray et al., 1996). The first 
one, consistent with Lindblom’s (1993) definition, tends to be concerned with the 
legitimacy of individual organisations – Organisational Legitimacy (OL) – and is the 
focus of this study. The second variant takes a wider perspective and is principally 
informed by Marxian thinking; thus, it raises questions about the legitimacy of the 
system as a whole (i.e. capitalism, see works of Weber, 1966 and Habermas, 1973) 
and would encompass some PE interpretations discussed in the preceding chapter 
(particularly PE1 and PE3). As Tilling (2004), nevertheless, notes with regard to 
these approaches to legitimacy, “Normally, given the nature of accounting research, 
and the questions being considered, the current business environment, including the 
capital structure, democratic government, etc. can be taken as a given, a static 
context within which the research is situated” (p. 3). Reference to this alternative 
view to legitimacy theory is nevertheless made in this study, when it is deemed 
necessary. 
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 However, Woodward et al. (1996), citing Luthans (1985), have also discerned some 
types of legitimacy which “tend to attach to individuals”, in which case legitimacy 
“may flow from one’s being designated as the agent or representative of a powerful 
person or group” (p. 330). Major and Schmader (2001) note concerning the 
‘individual legitimacy’ as considering, “whether an individual perceives his or her 
own outcomes as just or unjust” (p. 180). This LT variant therefore would encompass 
Campbell’s (2000) arguments concerning CSR as being influenced by those in 
charge of the organisation. Nevertheless, it is OL which will principally inform the 
discussion, particularly with regard to the legitimacy of the corporation (similarly to 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Lindblom, 1993), as opposed 
to that of political institutions (organisations of a governmental nature), where 
Lindblom (1993, p. 2) considers that, “the concept of legitimacy was originally 
defined”. 
 
Considering that legitimacy is a resource upon which an organisation is dependent 
for survival, then all surviving organisations should, to a greater or lesser extent, 
posses it. Thus, in an attempt to relate organisational legitimacy with, “the context of 
social performance and the disclosure of such performance” (p. 1), and despite 
Mathews’ (1993) and Lindblom’s (1993) efforts to counteract arguments which 
relate legitimacy to economic success and the law, it could be argued that even 
organisations which do not engage with CSR meet this vital condition. As 
Woodward et al. (1996) contend, at least in some cases, ‘to be economically viable is 
to be legitimate, at least so far as the owners of the business are concerned” (p. 332).  
 
Indeed, as KPMG (2008) has revealed, 20% of the largest 250 members of the 
Global Fortune 500 and the top 100 companies in the 22 surveyed countries 
(including the UK, the USA, Japan, Germany, France and Australia) do not publish 
separate CSR reports nor include any CSR information in their ARs14. Clearly, there 
are (still?) organisations which do not need to engage with CSR, to ensure their 
                                                 
14 As the present author has documented elsewhere (Vourvachis, 2005), only 2% of the articles 
published in the top ten in quality accounting journals (as determined by the Lowe and Locke, 2002, 
perception study), in the period 2000-2004, negotiate CSR issues. This confirms Mathews’ (1997) 
acknowledgment of “the lack of acceptance of social and environmental accounting by the accounting 
profession and by mainstream researchers” (p. 502).  
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survival and, therefore, they seem to possess sufficient amounts of the legitimacy 
resource. These organisations, though, need to be considered in a LT framework 
explaining organisational CSR practice (and non practice). 
 
However, as Deegan (2000) notes, “public expectations have undergone significant 
change in recent decades” and “profit maximisation was perceived to be the optimal 
measure of corporate performance” (p. 254, emphasis in original). Society now 
expects business to “make outlays to repair or prevent damage to the physical 
environment, to ensure the health and safety of consumers, employees, and those 
who reside in the communities where products are manufactured and wastes are 
dumped” (Tinker and Neimark, 1987, p. 84, see also O’Dwyer, 1999). As Deegan 
(2000) concluded, “companies with a poor social and environmental performance 
record may increasingly find it difficult to obtain the necessary resources and support 
to continue operations” (p. 254), and thus “organizations that take their legitimacy 
for granted do so at their own peril” (Perrow, 1970, cited by Asfhorth and Gibbs, 
1990, p. 177). 
 
Hence, an increasing number of companies now employ CSR practices. KPMG 
(2008) has illustrated that in 2008, 79% of the 2,200 surveyed businesses around the 
world published a stand-alone CSR report, compared to 52% in 2005 and 23% in 
2002. However, as O’Donovan (1999) notes, “It is logical to suggest that voluntary 
environmental disclosures, financial or non-financial, would only be included if 
management deemed they were of some benefit to the organisation” (p. 64). As 
Deegan et al. further (2002) contend:  
 
Disclosure decisions driven by the desire to be legitimate are not the same as 
disclosure policies driven by a management view that the community has a 
right-to-know about certain aspects of an organisation’s operations. One 
motivation relates to survival, whereas the other motivation relates to 
responsibility. Arguably, companies that simply react to community concerns 
are not truly embracing a notion of accountability (p. 334).  
 
Indeed, organisations themselves seem to admit that ethical reasons (for example, 
doing the right thing and satisfying the stakeholders’ need for a report on the 
company social and environmental performance) are not the only factors behind the 
decision to voluntarily engage with CSR: as the KPMG (2008) survey documents, 
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concerning the business drivers behind corporate responsibility, almost 68% of 
companies also state that there are economic reasons, compared to 69% that give 
ethical reasons. The economic reasons include reputation or brand (55%), risk 
management (35%), increased shareholder value (29%), improvement in market 
position (22%) and cost savings (17%). 
 
Two distinct approaches with regard to how OL is perceived among companies 
which engage with CSR, could therefore be initially identified: the one related to 
business ethics theories, where organisations are oriented towards social goals, and 
are even willing to sacrifice some profits and genuinely employ CSR, to satisfy their 
stakeholders’ informational needs and ensure legitimacy for their operations (see, 
e.g. Carroll, 1979; Hemphill, 1997; Boatright, 2003); and the one where 
organisations are primarily profit-oriented and view legitimacy as a necessary 
resource, but which they can strategically impact upon and/or manipulate 
(Woodward et al., 2001; Deegan, 2002) and, thus, employ CSR to secure, or even 
improve, their market and economic position by, e.g. improving reputation, gaining 
additional market share, and/or increasing market size. 
 
These arguments are graphically represented in Figure 4.1. Firstly, three prime 
‘types’ of legitimacy have been identified, according to whether each pertains to 
organisations (OL), individuals or the system. Naturally, these types are inter-related. 
For example, people who reject the idea that the existing social system is just and fair 
might also be more likely to believe that the social position of their 
group/organisation is unfair, especially if the latter is disadvantaged. They might also 
be more likely to question the legitimacy of their individual outcomes, “particularly 
if those outcomes are negative and there are reasons for suspicion” (Major and 
Schmader, 2001, p.300). Similarly, people who have had personal experiences with 
unjust treatment may generalise from this experience and come to doubt the 
legitimacy of their organisation’s treatment as well as the legitimacy of the social 
system more broadly (Major and Schmader, 2001). 
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Figure 4.1  
Types of legitimacy  
 Then, within OL, three further spectra may be identified with regards to their 
relationship with CSR17. In the ‘profit’ circle, strongly profit-oriented organisations 
may be included, which may ensure legitimacy for their operations without having to 
engage with CSR (‘pristine capitalists’); whereas, in the ‘ethics’ circle, principally 
ethics-oriented organisations may be included, that would employ CSR to satisfy the 
informational needs of all their identified stakeholders and discharge their holistic 
accountabilities (‘stakeholder capitalists’). 
 
In the third circle, some mixed organisational approaches with regard to OL and CSR 
may be embraced. Here primarily profit-oriented organisations may be included, 
which would engage with CSR to meet their most powerful stakeholders’ needs 
(‘ethics pragmatists’), and/or transform their legitimacy requirements into business 
opportunities and support their economic position (‘ethics opportunists’). 
Considering that these organisations do not primarily employ CSR to be legitimate 
(in ethical terms) but to show they are acting legitimately, this profit in disguise area 
could be described as the ‘image’ circle.  
 
The “intuitive appeal” (Bebbington et al., 2008, p.338) of the image-centred 
arguments and the similarities of those with LT have led a number of researchers to 
incorporate this notion when investigating LT propositions and sometimes even to 
use the terms ‘image’ and ‘legitimacy’ interchangeably (see, e.g. Deegan and 
Rankin, 1996; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000; Adams, 2002; 
Deegan, 2002).  Positive image is viewed as a means for firms to defend or maintain 
their legitimacy and, “social responsibility reporting may contribute to public image 
and this in turn may lead to greater public acceptance, more identification and 
avoidance of confrontation such as strikes and boycotts… by reporting social 
responsibility information companies are showing that they are acting responsibly 
and that there is no need for further legislation to force them to do so” (Trotman, 
1979, p.27). However, the apparent lack of studies attempting to theorise the 
relationship between LT and image has also recently led Bebbington et al. (2008) to 
research this area. Figure 4.2 summarises their arguments. 
                                                 
17 Note that because of this tri-nature of OL its circle is in dotted lines.  
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Figure 4.2 CSR, reputation and legitimacy according to Bebbington et al. (2008, p. 
345) 
 
 
Bebbington et al.’s (2008) arguments are similar to the ones discussed in this 
chapter. Although they do not discuss the tri-nature of OL as presented here, they 
implicitly acknowledge the existence of the ‘profit’ circle by asserting that, perhaps 
more frequently, organisations are granted legitimacy based on an assessment of 
their financial performance, whilst CSR “has a second order impact on the legitimacy 
of the organisation” (p. 345). Additionally, Bebbington et al. appear to identify a link 
between CSR reputation and financial performance, by explaining that “CSR… 
could be conceived as both an outcome of and part of reputation risk management” 
(p. 338), and thus acknowledge the possibility of some organisations attempting to 
capitalise on the increased public demand for CSR. By drawing on Deephouse and 
Carter (2005), they further stress that image and legitimacy should not be used 
interchangeably: organisations may take action to improve image in a way that 
would not relate to legitimacy (e.g. in the aviation industry they could modernise the 
suits for the air-hostesses); likewise, (e.g. ethics of profit-focused) organisations may 
be legitimate without necessarily having to be seen as acting legitimately. 
Bebbington et al. nevertheless do not appear to consider that ethics motivations could 
be compatible with an LT framework; since they focus on OL, they do not refer to 
the potential existence of systemic or individual factors that could influence OL; and 
by focusing on reputation management, they do not consider its compatibility with 
other  theoretical arguments in the CSR literature (apart from stakeholder theory), 
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which are summarised in Table 4.1 (the section where each theory is discussed in 
chapter 3 is shown in brackets). 
 
The four OL variants (and their compatibility with the theoretical explanations 
presented in Table 4.1) are discussed in more detail next. It should be noted that 
these arguments are not clear-cut: there may be situations where, e.g. pristine 
capitalists engage with CSR to further extend their profitability (but they still do not 
consider any part of their disclosure as being essential to maintain legitimacy as the 
image variants would do); or even where stakeholder capitalists are not disclosing 
CSR, perhaps due to a lower resolution of legitimacy (e.g. size, industry). 
Additionally, the existence of some organisations operating in the borders or under 
two or three of these circles (e.g. charities) should be acknowledged. Organisations 
may also adopt a fluid position and may move between or occupy more than one 
position an any time (McIntosh et al., 2003). These legitimacy conceptions have 
informed the following discussion on the OL variants18.  
 
                                                 
18 To paraphrase Woodward et al.’s (2001, fn 12) acknowledgment, it would have also been possible 
to present the concepts contained in the above figure as a simple continuum, moving from 
‘exclusively profit oriented’ at one end to ‘exclusively ethics oriented’ at the other, thereby suggesting 
that organisational actions towards CSR need not be driven entirely by any of these explanations, and 
that companies’ behaviour towards CSR is not static. 
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Table 4.1 The compatibility of the extant theoretical motivations in the literature with 
the OL framework 
Organisational Legitimacy 
Profit Circle Image circle Ethics circle 
Pristine 
Capitalism 
Ethics 
Opportunism 
Ethics 
Pragmatism 
Stakeholder 
Capitalism 
Social contract 
theory (3.2.1) 
Social contract 
theory (3.2.1) 
Social contract 
theory (3.2.1) 
Social contract 
theory (3.2.1) 
Accountability 
theory (3.2.2) 
Accountability 
theory (3.2.2) 
Accountability 
theory (3.2.2) 
Accountability 
theory (3.2.2) 
Political economy 
of accounting 
(PE3) (3.2.4) 
Stakeholder theory 
(3.2.3) 
Stakeholder theory 
(3.2.3) 
Stakeholder 
theory (3.2.3) 
Decision 
usefulness theory 
(3.4.1) 
Political economy of 
accounting (PE4) 
(3.2.4) 
MAST (3.3.1) Signalling theory (3.4.2) 
 Decision usefulness theory (3.4.1) 
Public pressure 
Theory (3.3.2) 
Business ethics 
theory (3.5) 
 Signalling theory (3.4.2) 
Institutional theory 
(3.3.3) 
Social- 
environmental 
concern (3.5) 
 Improved perceptions (3.7) 
Signalling theory 
(3.4.2) 
Transparency 
(3.5) 
 Agency theory (3.4.4) 
Agency theory 
(3.4.4)   
 Marketing theory 
(3.6) 
Marketing theory 
(3.6)  
 Competitive advantage (3.7) 
Mimetic motivations 
(best practice, peer 
pressure) (3.7) 
 
 Positive accounting 
Theory (3.4.3) 
Pressure from 
employees (3.7)  
 Influence regulation 
(3.7) 
Regulation 
compliance (3.7)  
 
Benefits in staff 
moral and 
development and in 
trust (3.7) 
Market drivers 
(pressure from 
markets, investment 
ratings ) (3.7 
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4.3.1 Profit-centred approaches: the ‘pristine capitalist’ 
 
Organisations within the profit circle of LT, “would meet the minimum legal and 
ethical requirements only… are likely to be strongly profit oriented, perhaps to the 
exclusion of all other considerations… [and would] conform to the letter of the law, 
but no more” (Henderson, 1984, p.168). These organisations would not consider 
CSR as a necessary condition for their survival and, in this sense, they take 
legitimacy for granted, considering that the social contract would be embedded in 
law (Zain, 1999). As discussed in section 2.4.1 in respect of CSRes, these 
organisations may be called pristine capitalists.  
 
For pristine capitalists, accountability is owed only to shareholders, and they would 
assume that maintaining or extending profitability is all that every possible 
constituent is interested in. Lindblom (1993) terms this, the ‘fundamentalist 
approach’, where “it is held that the corporation exists to earn a profit for the owners 
and, in doing so, makes the appropriate contribution to society” (p. 9). Thus, with 
regard to their constituents’ potential CSR concerns, organisations in this circle 
would only seek what Suchman (1995) terms, ‘passive acquiescence’ from their 
stakeholders for their insignificant employment of CSR and would project their 
secured profitability to satisfy primarily their existing shareholders and potential 
investors. As Suchman (1995, p. 575) elaborates: 
 
A[n] … underacknowledged distinction in studies of legitimacy centers on 
whether the organization seeks active support or merely passive 
acquiescence. If an organization simply wants a particular audience to leave it 
alone, the threshold of legitimation may be quite low. Usually, the 
organization need only comport with some unproblematic category of social 
activity (e.g., ‘doing business’). If in contrast, an organization seeks 
protracted audience intervention (particularly against other entities with 
competing cadres), the legitimacy demands may be stringent indeed19.  
 
Considering the principally voluntary nature of CSR and that this study primarily 
attempts to explore why, as opposed to why not organisations engage with it – that is, 
motivations as opposed to de-motivations – it could have been argued that the 
                                                 
19 This active support view seems to be consistent with Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) views on 
extending legitimacy, where “legitimation activities are apt to be intense and proactive as management 
attempts to win the confidence and support of wary potential constituents” (p. 182). 
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pristine capitalist approach cannot contribute significantly further in the analysis. 
However, there may be significant insights into motivations for CSR to be gained 
when it is attempted to consider the why still not parameter of this pristine capitalist 
approach (i.e. what would motivate them to engage with CSR); this is particularly 
interesting, considering the significant recent developments in the CSR field (which 
according to KPMG [2008] survey findings, have made it seem more as an 
established mainstream organisational approach, particularly between the more 
sizeable operations).  
 
Such de-motivations for CSR may include, according to Gray et al. (1993), absence 
of any demand for information; absence of a legal requirement; the problem that the 
cost would outweigh the benefits; and the possibility that the organization had never 
considered it. In their survey, Solomon and Lewis (2002) additionally identify as 
reasons reluctance to report sensitive information; avoidance of providing 
information to competitors and regulators; possible damage to companies’ 
reputation; general lack of awareness of environmental issues; inability to gather 
information; lack of awareness of competitive advantage; companies belief that they, 
for example, have no impact on the environment; insufficient response/feedback 
from stakeholders; and concern that users may not understand the information. 
 
The lack of regulation as a de-motivator for CSR is particularly evident in the case of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). SMEs tend to view direct legislative action 
as the only way to ensure that businesses change their orientation towards 
environmental issues (Baylis et al., 1998; Hillary, 1995; Tilley, 2000; Revell and 
Blackburn, 2007). Owner-managers typically feel that it is up to the government to 
take the lead on environmental issues by creating a ‘level playing field’ via 
regulation. This perception of parity helps business owners to feel they are 
safeguarded against ‘free riders’, who might avoid costly environmental measures 
and thus gain competitive advantage (Revell and Blackburn, 2007). Hunt (2000) has 
further found that small firms see regulation as providing a clear signal of what their 
environmental responsibilities are. As Revel and Blackburn (2007) conclude, “In 
fact, if it is not regulated, then owner-managers often assume that there is no 
environmental problem” (p.408). 
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4.3.2. Ethics-centred approaches: the ‘stakeholder capitalist’ 
 
Within the ethics circle organisations are principally ethics-oriented and are expected 
to employ CSR in large amounts to satisfy all their identified stakeholders’ 
informational needs, taking a holistic accountability approach. This variant is closely 
related to business ethics perspectives, as discussed above under heading 3.5. As the 
KPMG (2008) survey reports, 69% of the surveyed companies reported that their 
responsibility behaviour is motivated by ethics, values and codes of conduct guiding 
their business operations. However, as the following section on the ‘image’ centred 
approaches illustrates, corporations’ reported ethics orientations may not reflect their 
actual motivations.  
 
It would be expected from ethics-oriented companies to be committed to sustainable 
development. Considering that these organisations would presume that being 
transparent and operating in a socially and environmentally responsible way  would 
be the necessary means to insure their long-term preservation (Gladwin et al., 1995), 
then providing an account of their social and environmental performance to all their 
constituents, may thus be considered a prerequisite for securing sufficient quantities 
of the legitimacy resource; this contradicts the arguments for profit maximisation as 
being the sole legitimacy criterion, as the pristine capitalist approach, prescribed in 
the preceding section, would propose. 
 
At this point, it should be clarified that not all of the organisations engaging with 
CSR because it is the ‘right thing to do’ also perceive this to be a necessary condition 
for their legitimacy. That is, ethically motivated organisations would not necessarily 
consider reporting on all their social and environmental responsibilities a necessary 
requirement of the social contract, as it stands, although some of them would. Such 
organisations would be internally motivated towards CSR but would also be 
responsive to their constituents’ needs. In an attempt to ‘do the right thing’ and 
discharge their wider accountabilities, these organisations would be expected to 
provide increased  and substantive CSR information year after year, and thus attempt 
to extend their legitimacy and ask for ‘active support’ (Suchman, 1995) from their 
constituents, in order to increase pressures on other organisations and raise the 
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overall benefit and stability of the community of which they are part (Bovet, 1994; 
Libert, 1996; Matten and Crane, 2005; Moon et al., 2005).  
 
Organisations in this circle are therefore expected to embrace Epstein’s (1987) 
definition of CSRes (reviewed in section 2.4.2) and could be also referred to as 
‘stakeholder capitalists’. 
 
4.3.3 Image-centred approaches: the ‘ethics pragmatist’  
 
As Deegan and Unerman (2006, fn 9, p. 302) have noted, “managing legitimacy is 
very much about managing the perceptions of others” (see also e.g. Bowman, 1976; 
Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Buhr, 1998). Two types of organisational approaches 
with regards to strategic (non-ethical) employment of CSR can be identified: ethics 
pragmatists and ethics opportunists. This section discusses the ethics pragmatist 
approach; the ethics opportunist approach is the focus of discussion in the following 
section. 
 
Ethics pragmatists would be primarily concerned with image building (see section 
3.6 for image-supporting evidence), but only to the degree of ensuring that they 
possess adequate supplies of the legitimacy resource, to maintain profitability and 
long term survival (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Aguilera et al., 2004; Bansal, 2005). 
Their objective would be to maintain their position in the industry and the referent 
community and they would employ legitimation strategies in order for the 
environmental-related actions not to negatively affect the firm’s operations (Dillard 
et al., 2005). Therefore, their primary focus would be in preserving their legal and 
social licence to practice by meeting regulatory requirements and providing no 
compelling socially or environmentally related reasons to deny the firm operating 
rights (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Bansal and Roth, 2000).  
 
Considering that organisations of this type do not have an ethical motivation towards 
CSR, they may possibly attempt to “manipulate perceptions and disguise the truth” 
(Lindblom, 1993, p 19), and they may “prefer to offer symbolic assurances rather 
than substantive action” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 182) to their critical 
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stakeholders. However, in this type of approach the companies’ primary concern 
would be to balance their diverse primary stakeholders’ needs to maintain legitimacy 
for their operations; thus, these organisations would be driven from the external 
pressures of their stakeholders towards CSR (and would adopt a ‘pull’ strategy 
towards corporate citizenship, according to the arguments espoused by Parkel, 1991 
and Mirvis and Googins, 2006).  
 
Ethics pragmatists would remain concerned about survival issues and profit margins, 
but they would project to their constituents that this is, “more in the context of profits 
AND environmental sensitivity”20 (Henderson, 1984, p. 170). Therefore, and 
similarly to the pristine capitalist approach, ethics pragmatists would also seek 
‘passive acquiescence’, as Suchman (1995) defines it, from their constituents with 
regard to CSR, implying that the organisation would just want the “particular 
audience to leave it alone” (Suchman, 1995, p. 575) rather than seeking active 
support.  
 
However, as discussed in chapter 3 and illustrated in Table 4.1, the ethics pragmatist 
organisational behaviour towards CSR is also consistent with all the theoretical 
frameworks employed to explain CSR practice that were found to be compatible with 
a social contract view of the organisations-society relationship, and implies an 
organisational CSRes3 position. Evidently public pressure theory and image theory 
are directly involved in these arguments; MAST may also be applicable as a factor 
shaping stakeholders’ expectations (Brown and Deegan, 1998) or even as a 
stakeholder itself. And institutional theory arguments are also consistent with this 
variant of the framework, in the sense that organisations would perceive CSR as a 
pragmatic necessity to conform to institutionalised pressures and maintain 
legitimacy.  
 
 
                                                 
20 But, note that this would be more of a projected rather than actual interest. In practice, all corporate 
organisations, including the stakeholder capitalists, should be interested in seeking at least enough 
profit to maintain their survival and satisfy their owners; however, only stakeholder capitalists would 
be actually interested in satisfying all their stakeholders’ needs.  
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4.3.4 Image-centred approaches: the ‘ethics opportunist’ 
 
Having considered the ethics pragmatists, this section discusses the second type of 
organisational approach with regards to the strategic (non-ethical) employment of 
CSR: the ethics opportunists21.  Whilst for ethics pragmatists CSR is expected to 
contribute towards maintaining legitimacy, ethics opportunists, having secured 
sufficient legitimacy to maintain operations, employ CSR in an attempt to extend 
their legitimacy to improve their market and economic position (Hart, 1995; Bansal 
and Roth, 2000; Dillard et al., 2005)22. Ethics opportunists would still be concerned 
with image building; would still acknowledge the necessity of providing an account 
to their primary stakeholders, when deemed necessary, to maintain legitimacy; and 
would still tend to offer symbolic assurances rather than substantive action (Pfeffer, 
1981). However, compared to the ethics pragmatists, the opportunists would be more 
likely to attempt to manipulate selected stakeholders perceptions’ (Lindblom, 1993) 
and use ARs “as a means of advertising their social responsibility” (Adams et al., 
1998, p. 17) with the main purpose being to extend their legitimacy and improve 
their economic position (Hart, 1995; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Dillard et al., 2005; 
Vogel, 2005). Organisations adopting ethics opportunist approaches to CSR, would 
thus be expected to embrace CSRes4 and Drucker’s (1984) view on CSRes, 
discussed in section 2.3, whereby the organisational focus is on turning social 
problems into economic opportunities and benefits. 
 
Ethics opportunists would, further, be internally driven towards CSRes and CSR. 
Rather than seeking passive acquiescence, ethics opportunists would be expected to 
seek active support from their constituents, with regard to their legitimacy and CSR 
(Suchman, 1995), and adopt intense legitimation activities (thus, employing CSR in 
                                                 
21 This pragmatism vs. opportunism ethics distinction is largely consistent with the ritualism vs. 
opportunism distinction with regard to corporate financial disclosure proposed by Gibbins et al. 
(1990). For these authors, “The ritualistic dimension of the firm’s disclosure position is described as a 
propensity toward uncritical adherence to prescribed norms for the measurement and disclosure of 
financial information… [whereas] In contrast to ritualism, the opportunistic dimension of a firm’s 
disclosure position is the propensity to seek firm specific advantage in the disclosure of financial 
information. Like ritualism, opportunism is a managerial predisposition to behave in a particular way, 
but through active stances in which disclosures are seen as opportunities to reap specific benefits by 
managing the disclosure process” (p.130, emphasis added). 
22 See also Mirvis and Googins’ (2006) similar arguments on how in corporate citizenship approaches 
the intent may vary from obtaining a ‘license to operate’ in an engagement stage, to making a 
‘business case’ and ‘market creation’ (p. 108), in more innovative stages. 
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more than the required amounts from the social contract) “to win the confidence and 
support of wary potential constituents” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 182). A further 
example of such an activity (i.e. apart from intense CSR employment), may also be 
engagement with strategic philanthropy23 (Hemphill, 1999, 2004). These activities 
may in turn assist companies, as Clikeman (2004) notes, in “attracting ‘patient’ 
shareholders and enhancing the firm’s reputation and brand value… reduce stock 
price volatility… make… a brand name and affect share prices… enhance their 
reputations, which leads to greater financial value” (p. 25), and further, “Implement a 
competitive advantage environmental strategy…[which is] a tool for improving 
profitability… establish new markets, gain additional market share, and/or increase 
market size though… increased customer loyalty” (Dillard et al., 2005, p. 86; see 
also Smith, 2003; Kusku and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004; Mirvis and Googins, 2006, for 
similar arguments). Indeed, as one of O’Dwyer’s (1999) interviewees commented, 
and unintentionally summarised these arguments: “Companies do have social 
responsibilities, but they have to be managed in order to benefit the company” (p. 
320).   
 
It should be noted that organisational size appears to be a major factor influencing 
these arguments. SMEs, for example, appear to have a negative perception of the 
‘business case’ for sustainability, with one of the major potential barriers being the 
perception that environmental measures are a drain on profits (Revell and Blackburn, 
2007). In contrast, KPMG (2008) find that 68% of large corporations engage with 
CSR for the perceived associated economic benefits. Even within SMEs, though, it 
appears that environmental measures are better perceived from, for example, medium 
sized as opposed to small firms (Revell and Blackburn, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, this ‘ethics opportunist’ legitimacy variant may also incorporate the 
theoretical arguments that were found to be compatible with social contract theory 
and were implying an organisational opportunistic position towards CSRes. Thus, 
                                                 
23 As Hemphill (2004) notes, strategic philanthropy by definition “involves corporate giving that 
serves a dual purpose: contributing needed funds and other resources to charitable causes needed in 
the community (often involving employees) while simultaneously benefiting the firm’s bottom line” 
(pp. 340 – 341). Hemphill (2004) goes on to note that “Often funding for these initiatives not only 
emanates from philanthropy budgets but also from business units, such as marketing and human 
resources” and that “strategic philanthropy, has evolved into an integral part of a firm’s competitive 
strategy” (p. 341). 
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from a PE4 perspective, CSR may “serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and 
legitimizing economic and political arrangements, institutions, and ideological 
themes which contribute to the corporation’s private interests” (Guthrie and Parker, 
1990, p. 166); similarly, from a decision making theory perspective, CSR would be 
an opportunistic attempt to enhance corporate image or reputation (Gray et al., 1988) 
and ultimately profitability; and from a PA perspective, CSR may also be seen as an 
opportunistic attempt by an organisation “to minimize reported earnings… reduce 
the likelihood of adverse political actions and, thereby, reduce its expected costs” 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 115). Additionally, this variant would encompass 
arguments perceiving CSR as an attempt to gain competitive advantage, achieve 
business efficiencies and influence regulation, as Table 4.1 demonstrates. 
 
4.4 Organisational legitimacy management 
 
Following the presentation of the OL variants, the discussion now moves on to 
reviewing how organisations manage their legitimacy. Companies try to manage 
their legitimacy because it: 
 
helps to ensure the continued inflow of capital, labour and customers 
necessary for viability… It also forestalls regulatory activities by the state 
that might occur in the absence of legitimacy… and pre-empts product 
boycotts or other disruptive actions by external parties… By mitigating these 
potential problems, organisational legitimacy provides managers with a 
degree of autonomy to decide how and where business will be conducted 
(Neu et al., 1998, p. 265, emphasis in original). 
 
The above position presumes that organisations operate in an environment in which 
they are continually monitored by a number of relevant publics and are sensitive to 
their demands. As Lindblom (1993) notes: 
 
Failure to do so could, at an extreme, result in a breakdown of the consensus 
they must maintain to continue to operate in their current environment. 
Corporations will, therefore, engage in legitimation strategies when they 
perceive a significant legitimacy gap exits (p. 18). 
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Thus organisations also engage in legitimation strategies to forestall negative impacts 
on their activities from potential legitimacy threats. Probably, the most frequently 
cited definition of legitimacy threat comes from Dowling and Pfeffer (1975). As 
these authors contend, organisations seek to establish congruence between their own 
activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which 
they are a part:  
 
Insofar as these two value systems are congruent we can speak of 
organizational legitimacy. When an actual or potential disparity exists 
between the two value systems, there will exist a threat to organizational 
legitimacy (p. 122). 
 
Thus, following the existence of a threat, organisations are expected, “in the interests 
of ongoing operations [to] undertake corrective action” (Deegan et al., 2000, p. 105) 
and employ CSR as part of a strategy to defend their legitimacy. This section focuses 
on the course of action that companies may take to manage their legitimacy and 
forestall potential threats. Firstly, a review of the legitimation strategies that ethics or 
image-oriented organisations may adopt is provided. This is followed by discussions 
on the symbolic vs. substantive and positive vs. negative distinctions of CSR and 
their potential employment in legitimation strategies. Then, the discussion moves to 
reviewing the extant literature on legitimacy threats. Finally, a summary of the 
potential legitimation strategies with regard to each OL variant is provided and the 
propositions of the study are presented.  
 
4.4.1 Legitimation strategies 
 
As discussed above, companies may employ a number of legitimation strategies, in 
an attempt to ensure adequate levels of the legitimacy resource for their operations. 
Parsons (1960, p. 175) defines legitimation as, “appraisal of action in terms of shared 
or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social 
system”. In a more organisational-centred attempt, Maurer (1971, p. 361) defines 
legitimation as, “the process whereby an organisation justifies to a peer or 
superordinate system its right to exist”.  
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The legitimation strategies that companies employ may be either strategically 
(opportunistic or pragmatic) or ethically-oriented. Patten (1992), for example, has 
argued that companies will exercise their power in the public policy arena by 
attempting to influence social concern via disclosure. This proactive, more strategic 
and potentially opportunistic stance, suggests that if corporations can influence 
policy then they may possess an undemocratic concentration of power and influence 
(Zain, 1999). Guthrie and Parker (1989), on the other hand, suggest the 
organisations’ aim is to demonstrate congruence between the social values inherent 
(or implied) in their activities and societal norms, and thus, if a company reacts to 
demand for disclosure, it can be perceived as having less power or influence than that 
held by the public policy arena. This reveals a more pragmatic and potentially ethical 
organisational approach to LT and CSR.  
 
Thus the aim of this section is to review the legitimation strategies in the extant 
literature and relate those to the preceding discussion and the identified LT variants. 
More specifically, the studies by Lindblom (1993), Perrow (1970) and O’Donovan 
(2002a) are discussed. Lindblom (1993) in her seminal and strangely unpublished 
paper (Parker, 2005), has offered four legitimation strategies: 
 
1. Bridging the output, methods, and goals into conformity with popular views 
of what is appropriate. “Under this alternative the corporation is making 
internal adjustments to close the legitimacy gap” (Lindblom, 1993, p. 13). 
2. Making no adjustment in organisational output, methods and goals but, 
rather, attempting to change perceptions. Thus, the organisation may attempt, 
“to demonstrate the appropriateness of the output, methods, and goals to the 
public through education and information” (p. 14). 
3. Distract attention away from the issue of concern: “Identifying organizational 
output, methods, and goals with the popular perception of what is appropriate 
without any attempt at actual conformity. Under this alternative business 
performance does not change nor do societal expectations. Instead the 
corporation attempts to associate itself with symbols having high legitimate 
status” (p. 15). 
4. “Not making an internal adjustment to close the legitimacy gap but, rather, 
seeks an adjustment in societal expectations. In this situation corporate social 
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disclosure would be directed toward bridging the relevant publics’ 
expectations in line with corporate output, methods, or goals” (p. 16).  
 
As Lindblom (1993) concluded when presenting these strategies: “Corporate social 
disclosure may be intended to inform and educate - it also may be intended to 
manipulate perceptions and disguise the truth” (p. 19). Clearly, an organisation with 
a stakeholder capitalism orientation would only employ strategy 1, whereas the 
image-oriented variants would be inclined to employ strategies 2-4, either because 
they are powerful enough to do so, or because it will be cheaper for them to engage 
with these strategies than to change their actual performance. However, even these 
organisations may engage with strategy 1 if they have difficulties in employing any 
(or all) of strategies 2-4 (e.g. their relevant publics are not easily ‘educated’ or their 
attention cannot be easily distracted from the issue of concern, perhaps because of 
the latter’s magnitude); or if they realise that employing strategies 2 to 4 is simply 
not enough for them in order to achieve the required legitimacy levels.  
 
Perrow (1970) was one of the first to point out that legitimacy is problematic for 
organisations, and it is likely that organisations take actions to ensure their continued 
legitimacy. He offered three legitimation strategies, most of which have evidently 
informed Lindblom’s (1993) discussion: 
 
1. The organisation can adapt its output, goals and methods of operation to 
conform to prevailing definitions of legitimacy 
2. The organisation can attempt, through, communication, to alter the definition 
of social legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s present practices, 
output and values 
3. The organisation can attempt, again through communication, to become 
identified with symbols, values, or institutions which have a strong base of 
social legitimacy 
  
Clearly Perrow’s (1970) strategy 1 is identical to Lindblom’s (1993) strategy 1, and 
it is what one would expect mostly from ethics-oriented organisations. Perrow’s 
strategy 2 is similar to strategy 4 of Lindblom, where organisations, instead of 
changing actual performance, attempt to change societal expectations, a strategy 
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which possibly implies quite powerful organisations. Perrow’s strategy 3 is similar to 
Lindblom’s 3, where organisations attempt to distract attention away from the issue 
of concern and, “the use of CSD is oriented toward manipulating the perceptions of 
the relevant publics rather than toward educating and informing them” (Lindblom, 
1993, p. 15); this strategy seems to be also closely related to institutional theory and 
the expectation for isomorphism. 
 
O’Donovan (2002a) has also offered some legitimation strategies. These appear to be 
heavily reliant upon Lindblom’s (or Perrow’s) earlier formulation (Woodward et al., 
2008) and appear to have more clearly illustrated the main alternatives in 
legitimation strategies that organisations may adopt; these are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Possible response/ tactics to legitimacy threats  
Response/tactic Sample tactics: oil company involved in a significant oil spill causing environmental damage 
A. Avoid 
(a) Do not enter public debate on the effects or aftermath of 
the oil spill; 
(b) Do not publicise what may be perceived as negative 
information 
B. Attempt to alter 
social values 
Educate the public on the risks associated with transporting 
oil and the positive uses of oil with respect to standard of 
living measures 
C. Attempt to shape  
perceptions of the 
organisation 
(a) Reiterate past social and environmental achievements of 
the company; 
(b) Indicate the company did not breach any current 
legislative guidelines for transporting oil 
D. Conform to 
conferring publics’ 
values 
Announce an immediate inquiry into the cause of the spill 
and assure the public than any measures necessary to ensure 
this type of accident does not happen again will be 
undertaken. 
Source: O’Donovan (2002a, p. 348) 
 
Again, O’Donovan’s (2002a) strategy D is similar to strategies 1 of both Lindblom 
(1993) and Perrow (1970) and the same holds for his strategy B (equivalent to 
Lindblom’s 4 and Perrow’ 2). O’Donovan’s strategy C seems to be more closely 
related to Lindblom’s no 2 strategy, although one could possibly argue that it is also 
related to Lindblom’s and Perrow’s 3 strategies; in the end, organisations’ attempts 
 
100
to associate themselves with symbols, without changing performance, seem also to 
be a ‘perceptions’ game’ (see e.g. Deegan and Unerman, 2006). O’Donovan’s 
interesting contribution is his strategy A. Such a strategy would only be expected 
from either powerful organisations, that have saved enough quantities of the 
legitimacy source and may occasionally take this course of action; or by 
organisations that, simply, feel that they do not need, for example, CSR to maintain 
operations. This may, at first sight, be a sign of a pristine capitalist approach; 
however, this strategy may also be employed by stakeholder capitalists that engage 
with CSR because the feel it is the right thing to do but they do not find this to be a 
condition for their legitimacy. O’Donovan’s strategies thus, seem to have 
summarised all the main organisational alternatives to legitimation strategies. Having 
discussed these, the discussion can now move on to the types of CSR, symbolic or 
substantive and positive or negative, that organisation may employ as part of their 
strategies.  
 
4.4.2 Substantive or symbolic CSR  
 
The distinction between substantive vs. symbolic legitimation has been brought 
forward by Pfeffer and colleagues (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981, see 
also Richardson, 1985; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) but has not been employed widely 
in a CSR context (but see Savage et al., 2000; Day and Woodward, 2004).  
Substantive legitimation is evident in the works of Rousseau and Habermas and 
involves, “real, material change to organizational goals, structures and processes, or 
in socially institutionalized practices” (Savage et al., 2000, p. 48). Symbolic 
legitimation, on the other hand, traces its roots to the work of Marx and Weber; it 
involves, “the symbolic transformation of the identity or meaning of acts to conform 
to social values” and is predicated on the proposal that “the acceptance of authority 
resides in the belief in the legitimacy of the order independently of the validity of that 
order” (Richardson, 1985, p. 143, emphasis in original). 
 
In symbolic legitimation, “rather than actually change its ways, the organization 
might simply portray – or symbolically manage – them to appear consistent with 
social values and expectations. Symbolic management, in short, transforms the 
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meaning of acts” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 180, emphasis in original). For 
example, organisations may formulate and publicise ethics policies, but not establish 
procedures for monitoring compliance or imposing sanctions (Bowman and Haire, 
1976; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Moscowitz and Byrne, 1985). 
 
Organisations may prefer symbolic legitimation and not ‘real, material change’ 
because of their general desire to avoid assessments. As Pfeffer (1981), providing 
some supportive evidence for Meyer and Rowan (1977), has stated: “One of the 
interesting aspects of many organizations is the efforts undertaken to systematically 
avoid assessment, especially of outcomes that are of potential interest to various 
groups or individuals in contact with the organization” (p. 29). Weisul (2002) has 
further noted that companies do not like hard-and-fast standards; she concluded that 
reporting such as GRI sets expectations and such reports can hold companies 
accountable, which some may fear. 
 
However, organisations may also prefer symbolic legitimation because it is just 
much cheaper than the substantive alternative and because, therefore, “the former 
usually preserves flexibility and resources” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 182). As 
Neu et al. (1998) point out, “it is often easier to manage one’s image through 
communication than through changing one’s output, goals and methods of 
operations” (p. 267, emphasis in original). Resource dependence theory would 
suggest that, generally, the greater the power, motivation, and political skill of the 
constituent, and the more consistent the constituent’s preferences are with those of 
other key constituents and with management’s own agenda, the more likely 
management is to offer a substantive rather than symbolic response (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
 
Clearly, symbolic legitimation is consistent with Lindblom’s (1993) and Perrow’s 
(1970) strategies 3 and, largely, O’Donovan’s (2002) strategy C, and should be 
expected mainly from the image-centred variants (pragmatists and opportunists); 
whereas ethics-oriented organisations would be expected to be willing to bear the 
costs and employ substantive legitimation. However, in case of a major legitimacy 
threat, even the image-centred variants would be expected to (possibly) take some 
 
102
substantive legitimation action if it is deemed necessary to strengthen their weak 
image or even in an attempt to alter social values (O’Donovan’s strategy B). 
 
4.4.3 Positive or negative CSR  
 
A number of large-sample studies have revealed that managers “attribute negative 
organizational outcomes to uncontrollable environmental causes and positive 
outcomes to their own actions” (Abrahamson and Park, 1994, p. 1302, a justification 
supported by Bowman, 1976; Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983; Salancik 
and Meindl, 1984). Pfeffer (1981) suggests organisations would be expected to adopt 
strategies involving “the selective release of information which is… defined along 
criteria more favorable to the organization… measured along criteria which are more 
readily controlled by the organization, and… acceptable to those interested in the 
organization” (p. 30).  
 
Indeed, there seem to be a number of CSR studies that have shown that companies 
predominantly disclose information of a positive nature (see, e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 
1989; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Brown and Deegan, 
1998; Deegan et al., 2000; 2002; Woodward et al., 2008). Further, companies have 
also been found to conceal from the public information of negative nature; for 
example, Abrahamson and Park’s (1994) evidence supports the contention that 
negative outcomes “concealment by officers and... [their] toleration by outside 
directors may be intentional” (p. 1302). Pfeffer (1981) further claimed that corporate 
officers can avoid assessments by, “keeping secret the information that might be 
necessary or useful for evaluating organizational results” (p. 30), whereas, Whetten 
(1980) stated that, “in some cases business managers deliberately hide negative 
financial data so as not to alarm stockholders and bankers” (p. 162) (this may also be 
attributed to information asymmetry and signalling theories). 
 
Therefore, a number of image-oriented organisations would be expected to employ 
positive CSR to improve their image; however, these organisations may also employ 
negative CSR by, for example, offering apologies and admitting guilt, to create the 
impression of honesty. Further, ethics-oriented organisations are also expected to 
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increasingly disclose positive CSR, by simply offering accounts of their (as expected, 
positive) actions with regard to CSRes. There seem to be, therefore, a number of 
drawbacks when one attempts to employ the positive-negative CSD distinction per se 
in CSR analysis. 
 
Some of these limitations seem to be resolved when CSR authors employ this 
distinction when investigating legitimacy threats (see e.g. Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
Deegan et al., 2000; Woodward et al., 2008). Deegan and Gordon (1996), for 
example, have concluded that their results, “provide strong support for the contention 
that firms will disclose ‘positive’ news, but will suppress ‘negative’ news” (p. 190). 
Attempts, for example, at denial and concealment are clear signs of a more image – 
rather than ethics – oriented approach, and managers may prefer to adopt this 
strategy if they consider that, “the benefits from appearing to be objective are more 
than offset by potential negative effects that may result from the disclosure of 
negative information” (Deegan and Gordon, 1996, p. 190). It should be 
acknowledged, though, that negative CSD can still not be easily attributed to image- 
or ethics- oriented variants. 
 
4.4.4 Extending, maintaining or defending legitimacy 
 
The intensity and mix of legitimation practices, “are likely to vary according to 
whether management is attempting to extend, maintain, or defend the organization’s 
legitimacy” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 182). The specific ‘mode’ into which 
organisations fit, is subject to how they (implicitly) perceive their legitimacy (Tilling, 
2004). Table 4.3 highlights the key differences of those ‘modes’: 
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Table 4.3 Key differences in legitimation as function of the purpose of legitimation 
 
Purpose of Legitimation  
To Extend 
Legitimacy 
To Maintain 
Legitimacy  
To Defend 
Legitimacy  
Legitimacy Problematic Non-problematic Problematic 
Constituent 
scrutiny High Low High 
Intensity of 
legitimation 
activities 
High Low High 
Mix of legitimation 
activities 
Proactive:  
Substantive and 
symbolic 
Routinized: 
Substantive and 
symbolic 
Reactive: 
Primarily symbolic 
(at least in short-
run) 
Source: Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 182. 
 
Attempts to extend legitimacy would be generally expected to occur when the 
organisations are becoming established, or are entering a new domain or activity, or 
are utilising new structures or processes (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). When 
establishing legitimacy, organisations must be extremely conscious of potential 
conflicts with the expectations of significant stakeholders (Tilling, 2004); in respect 
to CSR, it would also be expected that the required levels would be heavily reliant on 
the industry, the size of the organisation, the specific characteristics of the labour 
force and the local communities, etc. Even when organisations wish to enter new 
markets or change the way they relate to their current market, though, this can give 
rise to extend legitimacy, which would require specific management (Tilling, 2004).  
 
Considering they can manipulate the legitimacy resource though (Deegan, 2002), as 
discussed earlier in section 4.3.4, ethics opportunists may also attempt to extend their 
legitimacy to improve their market and economic position (Aguilera et al., 2004; 
Dillard et al., 2005). In this case, organisations would tend to offer more symbolic 
assurances rather than substantive action (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990); however, 
organisations may also employ some substantive strategies (primarily role 
performance – for example, measure their social and environmental performance and 
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take action to improve it), if they consider that this can contribute towards extending 
their legitimacy and, subsequently, their economic benefits, “to win the confidence 
and support of wary potential constituents” (p. 182). Moreover, stakeholder 
capitalists would also be expected to take proactive CSR stances and attempt to 
extend their legitimacy, in order to raise the overall benefit and stability of the 
community of which they are part (Libert, 1996). 
 
Attempts to maintain legitimacy occur, “when the organization has attained a 
threshold of endorsement sufficient for ongoing activity” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, 
p. 183). This is the mode that most organisations would generally expect to be 
operating in, where their activities would mainly include on-going role performance 
and attempts to anticipate and prevent, or forestall, potential challenges to legitimacy 
(Tilling, 2004). This is also the mode that the pristine capitalists and the ethics 
pragmatists would be expected to operate in; the ethics pragmatists would attempt to 
monitor the expectations of their critical stakeholders and the pristine capitalists 
would be aiming at maintaining profitability, their only CSRes. Organisations in this 
mode would be expected to engage with a number of substantive and symbolic 
strategies and increasingly routinised ‘business-as-usual’ activities (Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990); this may involve letters to shareholders, institutional advertising, 
charitable donations, plant openings and other ‘warm signals’ (p.183) and potentially 
stakeholder dialogue.  
 
However, the maintenance of legitimacy is not as easy as it may at first appear, 
considering that legitimacy is a dynamic construct and often challenges can occur 
(Tilling, 2004). Organisations then would be expected to operate in a defending 
legitimacy mode. In general, “attempts to defend occur when the organization’s 
extant legitimacy is threatened of challenged. Legitimation activities tend to be 
intense and reactive as management attempts to counter the threat” (Ashforth and 
Gibbs, p. 183). 
 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) further note that, “compared to the extension of 
legitimacy, where the intensity of activity is also high, the defence of legitimacy is 
apt to involve a greater proportion of symbolic activities” (p. 183), due to that, for 
example, “the challenge catches management off-guard, it leaves little time to plan 
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and execute a substantive response” (p. 184). Earlier discussion (section 4.3.2), 
though, supported the view that this should only be the case for the image-oriented 
variants and that, on the contrary, stakeholder capitalists would be expected to 
engage in substantive activities; this would assist in satisfying their stakeholders and 
avoiding exacerbating the threat, as the adoption of purely symbolic responses would 
entail – what has been referred to as ‘the double edge of legitimation’ (Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990). 
 
Nevertheless, even the ethical variants would be expected, in response to a threat, to 
increase their symbolic legitimation activities, albeit to a lesser extent than the 
image-oriented ones: for example, in the case of an accident, rather than offering 
accounts and apologies and engaging in ceremonial conformity (symbolic action, 
expected from image-oriented variants), stakeholder capitalists would conduct an 
investigation and realise what was wrong on the part of the organisation (substantive 
action); then admit guilt and develop new policies (symbolic action); and then invest 
in new safety mechanisms (substantive action).   
 
It is this last mode that has tended to be the main focus of accounting researchers, 
since it also offers a clear opportunity to examine the crucial link between legitimacy 
and resources (Tilling, 2004). The present research also focuses on investigating 
legitimacy threats and their potential effect on the organisational levels of CSR. 
However, considering the study’s longitudinal time-span, the rest of the modes are 
considered as well.  
 
4.4.5 Investigating legitimacy threats 
 
For the purposes of this research, corporate disclosure reactions to some major 
legitimacy threats in the form of accidents are investigated. Accidents can be defined 
as, “discrete one-time undesirable or unfortunate events that happen unexpectedly in 
the life of a corporation and cause damage to any number or kind of stakeholders” 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001, p. 420). In a world characterised by what Kiely (1983, p. xi, 
cited in Zyglidopoulos, 2001, p. 421) called ‘the instant and photographic reporting 
of calamity’, some accidents can receive such an extensive amount of media 
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coverage that they could become landmarks in the history of a particular industry 
(p.421). This is expected to particularly be the case with accidents in the transport 
industry (Woodward et al., 2008), because ‘they provide the permanently starved 
news media with graphic photographs that can improve their ratings’ (Zyglidopoulos, 
2001, p. 421).  
 
Despite the fact that CSR has been a topic of interest within the accounting 
profession for a number of years (Tilt, 2003), few studies have examined how such 
external events impact upon the provision of such disclosures (but see Patten, 1992; 
Walden and Schwartz, 1997, Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000; 
Woodward et al., 2008; Cho, 2009), even though these types of research may be 
‘very productive in terms of adding insight into the role of legitimation strategies’ 
(Lindblom, 1993, p. 20). All these studies have employed an LT-based perspective, 
which would be more closely associated to the arguments identified here as ‘ethics 
pragmatism’. The Patten (1992) and Walden and Schwartz (1997) studies both 
examined the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on environmental disclosure in the 
ARs of selected American industries: the oil industry for Patten (1992); and oil, 
consumer products, chemical, and forest products industries for Walden and 
Schwartz (1997), and they both found that the levels of environmental disclosure 
increased significantly in the year following the accident.  
 
On the other hand, Deegan and Rankin (1996), Deegan et al. (2000),  Woodward et 
al. (2008) and Cho (2009), have all attempted to examine the reactions of specific 
companies to legitimacy threats to which they were directly exposed: Deegan and 
Ranking (1996) examined the variations on the AR environmental disclosures of 20 
Australian companies that had breached the environmental law; Deegan et al. (2000) 
examined the variations in the AR levels of CSR of five Australian companies in 
response to some major incidents that related to them, such as oil spills and mine and 
plant disasters; Cho (2009) examined variations in the levels of environmental 
disclosure in a single company’s (the French Total) Annual and stand-alone reports, 
following involvement in an oil spill and a subsequent gas explosion, and also 
conducted interviews; and in a study more relevant to the present one, Woodward et 
al. (2008) examined the CSR reaction of companies involved in three major transport 
accidents in the UK: the King Cross Underground fire in 1987; the Paddington Rail 
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disaster of 1999; and the Concorde crash outside Paris in 2000.  All these studies 
findings’ lend support to the ‘pragmatic’ LT arguments that the corporations sought 
to address the legitimacy threat by increasing their disclosure of environmental 
and/or CSR information. 
 
There are, however, a number of limitations to the existing research evidence 
examining legitimacy threats. Studies seem to have focused on examining companies 
operating within a single country (USA, Australia and UK) and mostly the oil 
industry (with the exception of Woodward et al.); on employing only ARs for 
primary data; and on utilising only CA to analyse their collected data (with the 
exception of Cho); on considering only the positive/negative CSD distinction; and on 
employing strictly LT to interpret their findings, without considering alternative 
frameworks. Thus, there seems to be an absence of a study, to date, investigating 
companies from more than one country and in an alternative to the oil industry; 
utilising also stand-alone reports; examining longitudinal cases, with companies with 
possibly more than one legitimacy threat; considering alternative theoretical 
frameworks; and also employing qualitative analysis, in addition to quantitative CA. 
And as the next chapter illustrates, the present study attempts to contribute to this 
literature. Firstly however, the potential role of the media in these threats needs to be 
clarified. 
 
4.4.6 Summary 
 
Legitimacy management views of each identified OL variant are summarised and 
presented in table 4.4 below. In general, pristine capitalists are expected to have a 
clear profit orientation and only disclose as much CSR as is required by law. 
However, following a threat, this variant may also consider disclosing some 
information on their CSRes. Alternatively, they may move straight to the ethics 
opportunism position and start employing CSR to increase their profitability through 
securing more supplies of the legitimacy resource. These organisations would 
primarily be interested in satisfying their investors and seeking passive acquiescence 
from the rest of the parties potentially interested in their CSRes; would thus be 
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oriented towards maintaining their legitimacy; and adopt more reactive stances with 
regard to CSR.  
 
On the contrary, stakeholder capitalists would be ethics-oriented; internally 
motivated; proactive; would employ CSR in large amounts; in primarily substantive 
and both positive and negative forms; and would aim to extend their legitimacy, with 
regard to CSR, in order to raise the overall benefit and stability of the community of 
which they are part. Similarly to this category, ethics opportunists would also be 
internally motivated; proactive; would employ CSR in large quantities; and would 
aim to extend their legitimacy. However, they would be principally profit-oriented 
and would be disclosing primarily symbolic (and positive) CSD – most likely not in 
a steadily increasing mode over time. 
 
Ethics pragmatists, on the other hand, would be profit-oriented; externally motivated; 
would seek passive acquiescence from their constituents with regard to their CSR 
policies; would attempt to maintain legitimacy; and would seem to adopt reactive 
stances over time; with minor increases to their generally moderate levels of CSR – 
the type of which would be expected to be primarily symbolic and positive. 
 
Evidently, it is primarily the stakeholder capitalists and the pristine capitalists, who 
appear to have most differences in their CSR approaches. On the other hand, it seems 
that the pristine capitalists do appear to have a number of similarities in their 
approach with the ethics pragmatists; and this seems even more to be the case with 
the ethics opportunists and the stakeholder capitalists. And, while in the pristine 
capitalism-ethics pragmatism pairing, the identification of each organisational variant 
is eased by the fact that the pristine capitalists would only be expected to disclose 
what CSR is required by law, this is clearly not the case with the ethics opportunism- 
stakeholder capitalism pairing.  
 
The identified characteristics of the CSR approaches of each organisational variant 
have informed the propositions of the study, discussed next.  
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Table 4.4 Organisational approaches with regard to CSR and legitimacy sought 
 Pristine 
Capitalism 
Ethics 
Opportunism 
Ethics 
Pragmatism 
Stakeholder 
Capitalism 
CSRes position CSRes1 CSRes4 CSRes3 CSRes2 
Orientation Profit Profit Profit Ethics 
Internal vs. 
external CSR 
motivation 
None 
(potential for 
both) 
Internal  External  Internal  
Type of support 
sought from 
constituents 
Passive 
acquiescence
Active support  Passive 
acquiescence 
Active support 
Legitimacy 
orientation 
Maintain 
(establish if 
necessary) 
Extend  
(defend if 
threatened) 
Maintain 
(defend if 
threatened) 
Extend  
(defend if 
threatened) 
Proactive- 
reactive stance 
across time 
Either  Proactive  Reactive Proactive  
Amount of CSR Negligible Large Moderate 
(large if 
necessary) 
Large 
CSR across time Negligible 
increase 
Significant but 
not steady 
increase 
Negligible 
increase  
Significant  
and steady 
increase 
Type of CSD 
 
Minimal  Primarily  
symbolic (and 
positive) 
Primarily 
symbolic (and 
positive) 
Primarily 
substantive 
(and both +/-) 
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4.5 Propositions 
 
A number of propositions are drawn from the above theoretical discussion.  
 
1. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD will show a notable increase 
2. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of Health and Safety (H&S) CSD will 
show a notable increase 
 
These are the central propositions of this study and are expected to hold for all three 
legitimacy based types of organisations engaging with CSR (although, the increased 
public pressure may even compel the pristine capitalists to start disclosing some 
voluntary CSD information).  A possible ‘no response strategy’ (O’Donovan, 2002) 
or even a decline in the levels of CSD following the threat would clearly signify that 
organisations do not perceive CSR to be part of the requirements of an implicit social 
contract with their constituents and other theoretical explanations would need to be 
sought (such as PE1). It is expected that this would be particularly the case for the 
H&S disclosures, since in this study some aviation accidents have been selected as 
threats to the organisation’s legitimacy, as discussed in chapter 6. 
 
3. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD will show a notable 
increase 
4. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of negative CSD will show a notable 
increase  
 
All organisations employing CSR under each identified LT variant would be 
expected, following the threat to their legitimacy, to increase the levels of positive 
CSD in their reports, with the possible exception of the stakeholder capitalists, who 
would be expected to do so to a lesser extent. These ethics-oriented approaches, 
though, would be also expected to admit guilt and not conceal the negative impacts 
on their operations, thus also increase the levels of negative CSD in their reports, 
following the threat. Even the image-oriented organisations, may increase their 
negative CSD following the legitimacy threat, “in an attempt to diffuse the situation 
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by creating the impression … of honesty” (Savage et al., 2000, p. 50). Hence, a need 
arises for additional characteristics of CSD to be considered. 
 
5. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD will show a notable 
increase 
6. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable 
increase  
 
Organisations with an ethics-oriented approach would be expected to be generally 
willing to bear the higher costs and provide more concrete, substantive information 
to their constituents; whereas, companies adopting an image-centred approach would 
tend to favour symbolic approaches, “since they are more economical and flexible 
that substantive actions” (Savage et al., 2000, p. 48).  One could still argue, though, 
that following a major legitimacy threat, even image-oriented organisations may be 
expected to respond with some substantive CSD in an attempt, for example, to show 
that they conform to the higher performance expectations of their constituents or to 
alter the societal definition of legitimacy.  
 
As the discussion of the propositions has indicated, focusing on identifying the 
changes in the levels of CSR between prior to, and following, the accident, may be 
useful towards examining whether CSR is part of the requirements of an implicit 
social contract; however, such a focus does not appear to be particularly useful 
towards identifying which specific (out of the four identified) approaches towards 
CSR the organisations would hold. Consequently, the need to consider alternative 
research approaches that would focus less on the quantity, and more on the quality, 
of the reviewed CSR information, and examine over a number of years the disclosure 
patterns of organisations, is revealed as necessary to better understand their 
motivations for CSR. These issues are negotiated in the next chapter of the study, 
focusing on the justification and presentation of the study’s methods. 
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4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework of the study. More specifically, 
in an attempt to present the LT framework, three ‘types’ of legitimacy were 
identified, according to whether this pertains to organisations (Organisational 
Legitimacy – OL), individuals or the system. Then in respect of OL, it was explained 
that a resource-based view was adopted, whereby the legitimacy is a resource upon 
which organisations are dependent for survival. On this condition, four distinct OL 
variants, building on the corporate positions regarding CSRes identified in chapter 2, 
were identified and comprehensively discussed and their relationship with the 
theoretical frameworks discussed in the preceding chapter was indicated.  
 
This was followed by a discussion on how organisations manage their legitimacy. 
Specific legitimation strategies were identified and the types of CSR (symbolic or 
substantive and positive or negative) that organisations may employ as part of these 
strategies, and how these vary subject to the legitimacy ‘mode’ (extending, 
maintaining or defending legitimacy) was also discussed. Considering that for the 
purposes of this research, corporate disclosure reactions to some major legitimacy 
threats in the form of accidents are investigated, some empirical evidence on 
investigating legitimacy threats was then reviewed. The legitimacy management 
discussion finally informed the arguments behind the propositions of the study, 
presented in the penultimate section of the chapter. 
 
Having completed the literature review and presented the theoretical approach of the 
study, the discussion moves on to the methodology; this is discussed over the next 
two chapters.  
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PART III METHODOLOGY 
 
 
...Keep Ithaca always in your mind. 
Arriving there is what you're destined for. 
But don't hurry the journey at all. 
Better if it lasts for years, 
so you're old by the time you reach the island, 
wealthy with all you've gained on the way, 
not expecting Ithaca to make you rich                
... 
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Chapter 5  
Research methodology and methods  
5.1 Introduction 
 
The three preceding chapters presented the theoretical approach to the study: chapter 
2 identified some distinct organisational positions based upon the motivations for 
CSRes behaviour; chapter 3 reviewed the explanations of CSR most frequently 
employed in the literature, clarified their relationships in respect of the research 
questions of the study and concluded that the CSRes positions may also provide a 
useful base for an explanatory CSR framework; and chapter 4 incorporated these 
arguments in the LT framework and subsequently presented the propositions of the 
study. 
 
This chapter is the first of two dedicated to methodology. Written from a position ex 
ante to conducting the data collection and analysis, its overarching aim is to present, 
and provide a justification of the methods employed. The focus of the chapter is on 
quantitative Content Analysis (CA), given the nature of the research and its 
propositions (requiring measuring the levels of CSR); however a qualitative 
approach to CA is also suggested and the chapter briefly, therefore, additionally 
outlines the debates behind both the philosophy and the research design employed.  
 
To this end, some background information is first provided, followed by discussion 
on the philosophical stance and research design adopted in the study. Then, a 
discussion on the study’s approach to CA commences. The theoretical arguments 
favouring a strictly quantitative vs. wider qualitative CA approach are reviewed first, 
in an attempt to broadly situate CSR empirical research into the CA theoretical 
literature. This is followed by a discussion on the index vs. amount/volume CA 
‘distinction’. Subsequently, the sampling, context and recording of CA units are 
respectively discussed. This is followed by a discussion on ways to conduct CA, with 
divisions regarding categorical and thematic distinctions. Finally, a summary of the 
chapter and some conclusions are provided.  
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5.2 Background 
 
Overall, authors looking for explanations of CSR (and despite their similar research 
questions) have employed a variety of methodological approaches to conduct their 
research: this being from case studies (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001; Deegan et al., 2002) and interviews (e.g. Woodward et al., 2001; 
O’Donovan, 2002a; O’Dwyer, 2002); to surveys using questionnaires (e.g. Deegan 
and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Dunk, 2002); CA (e.g. Walden and 
Schwartz, 1997; Adams et al., 1998; Patten, 2002); longitudinal studies (e.g. Guthrie 
and Parker, 1989; O’Dwyer and Gray, 1998; Deegan et al., 2002); or theoretical 
investigations (e.g. Laughlin, 1990; 1991; Gray et al., 1995a; Gray et al., 1996; 
Woodward and Woodward, 2001; Dillard et al., 2005).  
 
However, methodological concerns have been expressed by a number of researchers 
investigating CSR motivations. The suitability of CA to explore corporate 
motivations has been challenged and concerns have also been expressed over the 
amount of information that can be provided through, most frequently, only the 
inclusion of ARs in the analysis (e.g. Unerman, 2000; Woodward et al., 1996; 
Woodward et al., 2001; O’Dwyer, 2002). Others have acknowledged that 
conclusions drawn from case studies, or from studies employing interviews, can only 
be tentative due to the small sample size involved (e.g. Cormier and Gordon, 2001; 
O’Dwyer, 2002; Adams, 2002). Methods involving statistical analysis have also been 
questioned, for example, for the possibility of excluding important factors from the 
analysis (e.g. Patten, 2002; Adams, 2002; Toms, 2002; Jones and Xiao, 2003; 
Deegan, 2004). As Adams (2002) stresses, there is a need of these methodological 
issues, among others, to be addressed, “if improvements in the extensiveness, 
quality, quantity and comprehensiveness of reporting are to be achieved” (p. 246). 
 
Yet, methodological research in CSR, and despite the explicit need for it, has been 
sporadic; a number of rather outdated published papers reviewing methodological 
issues on general organisational theory and financial reporting (e.g. Ball and Foster, 
1982; Jensen, 1983; Thompson and Smith, 1991) have identified methodological 
limitations and have suggested possible improvements in the CSR research agenda. 
Recent literature seems to be mainly focusing on reviewing the use of specific 
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methods, such as CA (e.g. Gray et al., 1995b, Milne and Adler, 1999; Unerman, 
2000), ethnographies (e.g. Dey, 2002) or narratives (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004). 
Consequently, there seems to be a lack of studies published to date, providing 
comprehensive comparative accounts of methodologies that have been (or could 
have been) employed in CSR research. 
 
In response to this apparent vacuum, and in an attempt to assist in the methodological 
choice of this doctoral study, the present author conducted two systematic reviews of 
the CSR literature (Vourvachis, 2005; 2007), in order to identify suitable 
methodologies to investigate motivations for CSR and thus assist in his doctoral 
research. The findings of these studies inform the discussion on the methods 
subsequently employed. Firstly, however, the author’s philosophical assumptions are 
clarified. 
 
5.3 Research paradigm 
 
Before commencing the discussion on the research methods to be presently 
employed, the author’s philosophical assumptions (his ‘paradigm’) should be made 
clear. As Easterby-Smith et al., (2002) stress, this decision is very important:  
 
a number of factors beyond the technicalities of research design, or the use of 
particular methods, assume considerable importance. These start with the 
philosophical issues underlying management research, because the worldview 
of the researcher can influence both the selection of the methods and judgments 
about the quality and value of outcomes (p. xi). 
 
Thus, deciding on a paradigm seems to provide direction for designing all phases of a 
research study (Creswell, 1994; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). This has resulted in a 
number of research methods’ authors prompting researchers, before starting even 
thinking of the topic of their research project, to decide on a paradigm (see, e.g. 
Mason, 1998, Collis and Hussey, 2003; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Some researchers, 
though (see e.g. Tashakori and Teddlie, 1998; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Weber, 
2004), have argued that it is the research questions that should be providing direction 
for all phases of a research project. These arguments, along with the researcher’s 
philosophical assumptions, are discussed in detail under following section 5.3.2. 
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Firstly, however, a review of the two main philosophical perspectives, being 
positivism and interpretivism, is provided. 
 
5.3.1 A review of the two main philosophical perspectives 
 
Paradigms refer to,  “accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples 
which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – [which] 
provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific 
research” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 10). Since Socrates epoch (5th century BC) several 
philosophical perspectives have emerged, reflecting rather contradictory assumptions 
about the nature of the world; the interaction of the researcher with it; and the way 
one should undertake the object research.  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have initially identified two major stances: the ‘objective’ 
(also referred to in the literature as positivist, scientific, quantitative and deductive) 
and the ‘subjective’ (also referred as interpretivist, phenomenological, qualitative or 
inductive)24. Most importantly, the ‘positivist’ paradigm underlies quantitative 
methods, while the ‘interpretivist’ paradigm underlies qualitative methods (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). Table 5.1 summarises the key features of these paradigms. 
 
The objectivist philosophy, reflected in the works of most ancient Greek 
philosophers (particularly Parmenides), assumes a world external and objective, 
where things ‘exist and act independently of human activity’ (Bhaskar, 1989, p.13), 
and calls the researcher to focus on facts, look for causality, and adopt a hypothetico-
deductive formulation to test his/her suggestions. Measured concepts and large 
samples are employed to serve this purpose and, consequently, quantitative 
techniques are favoured. Such techniques have the advantage of producing reliable 
and generalisable data, due to the specific statistical techniques employed and the 
large samples, and additionally offer simple analysis and interpretation of the data 
                                                 
24 It is interesting to note that theorists, delineating between positivism and interpretivism, typically do 
not include pragmatism as a third point of comparison (e.g. Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Smith and 
Heshusius, 1986), even though those two initially espoused competing points of view do not exhaust 
the paradigmatic possibilities (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). As Howe (1988) notes, “This seems to 
be a serious omission, for pragmatists were largely responsible for bringing down positivism and 
would clearly reject the forced choice between the interpretivist and positivist paradigms” (p. 13) 
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(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). However, quantitative studies give little attention to 
context, tend to deal less well with the processual aspects of organizational reality, 
and appear to lack validity for beliefs/feelings when, for example, structured 
questionnaires are used (Bryman, 1989; Malhotra and Birks, 2003). 
 
Table 5.1 Positivist and interpretivist paradigms: key features 
 Positivism 
 
Interpretivism 
 
Ontology Person (researcher) and reality 
are separate  
Person (researcher) and reality 
are inseparable 
The world External and objective Socially constructed and 
subjective 
Epistemology Objective reality exists beyond 
the human mind 
Knowledge of the world is 
intentionally constituted through 
a person’s lived experience 
The observer Must be independent Is part of what is being observed 
Theory of Truth Correspondence theory of truth: 
one-to-one mapping between 
research statements and reality 
Truth as intentional fulfilment: 
interpretations of research 
object match lived experience of 
object 
Method Statistics, content analysis Hermeneutics, phenomenology 
Research progresses 
through 
Hypotheses and deductions Gathering rich data from which 
ideas are induced 
Science  Value free Driven by human interests 
Generalisation 
through 
Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires Large numbers selected 
randomly 
Small numbers of cases chosen 
for specific reasons 
Validity Certainty: data measures reality Defensible knowledge claims 
Reliability Replicability: research results 
can be reproduced 
Interpretive awareness: 
researchers recognise and 
address implications of their 
subjectivity 
Source: Adapted from Easterby – Smith et al. (2002) and Weber (2004, p. iv) 
 
On the contrary, the ‘subjectivist’ philosophical stance assumes that the world is 
socially constructed (i.e. where the observer is part of what is observed), thus 
prompting the researcher to try to understand what is happening and to select small 
samples – investigated in depth – to develop ideas through the induction of data 
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(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Thus, this philosophical approach favours the adoption 
of qualitative techniques, which place emphasis on interpretation and tend to give 
more attention to the context of what is observed (Bryman, 1989). These techniques, 
therefore, seem to be more suitable to investigate complex phenomena and result in 
gaining a comprehensive and complete picture of the whole context in which the 
phenomena of interest occur (Malhotra and Birks, 2000). However, qualitative 
techniques are often criticised for their lack of rigour, since the direction of the 
findings and conclusions can be easily influenced (Yin, 1994; Saunders et al., 2003), 
and also for the fact that they provide little basis for scientific generalisation (see, 
e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Deegan et al., 2002). 
 
Since they are based on opposite assumptions, these stances might be expected to be 
mutually exclusive (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Burrell, undated). However, this 
expected ‘incommensurability’ of the espoused philosophical stances has raised a 
significant debate in the field of social sciences and particularly in organisational 
theory (see, e.g. Donaldson, 1985; Reed, 1985) and a significant amount of research 
supports the contention that objectivist and subjectivist methodologies should be 
combined, and should be selected subject to the research questions’ focus, such as to 
achieve ‘better’ results (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Weber, 2004).   
 
It is argued here that philosophical perspectives act as lenses through which one can 
view the social world. In the real world, an appropriate lens should be selected, 
subject to the needs of each person. Likewise, the research methodologies should be 
subject to the orientation of the research questions. These arguments are similar to 
those expressed by Laughlin (1995) and by researchers adopting pragmatism, such as 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), as argued in the next section. 
 
5.3.2 The adopted paradigm: Laughlin’s ‘middle range thinking’ 
 
In this study, Laughlin’s (1995) ‘middle range’ philosophical arguments have been 
adopted. Laughlin (1995) rejects the simple ‘positivism’ vs. ‘interpretivism’ 
dichotomy and argues that a middle position on the ontological and epistemological 
 
121
dimensions preserves the benefits of both paradigms, while avoiding their absurdities 
(Unerman, 2000b).  
 
Laughlin’s position partly accepts the ‘interpretivist’ ontology that individuals have 
different perceptions of what is ‘true’ or ‘real’ in this world; thus this approach does 
not discount the inescapable, “perspective bias in models of understanding” 
(Laughlin, 1995, p. 81) in order to investigate ‘truth’. However, the approach also 
accepts (in a partly ‘positivistic’ manner) that there are likely to be broad 
generalisations which can be made in many (but not necessarily all) situations; these 
broad generalisations will however usually be ‘skeletal’ and will normally require 
empirical detail to make them applicable to specific situations (Unerman, 2000b). 
 
Laughlin’s (1995) ‘middle range’ position is thus closely related with that of 
pragmatism, the key features of which are summarised in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 Pragmatism: key features 
Ontology Person (researcher) and reality can 
only be separated to some extent 
 
Epistemology Both objective and subjective points 
of view 
Logic Deductive and Inductive 
Methodology Quantitative and Qualitative 
Axiology Values play a large role in 
interpreting results 
 
Causal Linkages There may be causal relationships, 
but we will never be able to pin 
them down 
 
Source: Adapted from Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 23) 
 
It is difficult to describe pragmatism as a school of philosophy, “since the term is 
used to refer to a variety of different epistemological positions…there are as many 
pragmatisms as there are pragmatists” (Johnson and Duberley, 2000, p. 158). Rorty 
(1979), for example, associates pragmatism exclusively with social construction, and 
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pragmatism is also closely related to critical realism25. In general, nevertheless, 
pragmatism, similarly to Laughlin’s approach, is also perceived to accept that 
researchers and reality can only to some extent be separated and that any 
generalisations to wider populations can only be tentative and will require increased 
empirical detail. 
 
Importantly, both Laughlin and pragmatism accept that a researcher’s subjectivity 
plays an important creative role in the research process, but that there should be some 
prior definition in the research methods employed. Hence, specific research 
procedures should be adopted, which however should allow for some creative 
flexibility, as the empirical study progresses (Unerman, 2000b). Methodologically 
(and in contrast to the adoption of a pure positivist or interpretivist approach, which 
would only support the employment of quantitative or qualitative methods 
respectively) this entails that all methods, qualitative and quantitative are useful, and 
decisions on the relevant method should depend upon the research question as it is 
currently posed (whether it is set a priori or it is building on some findings - see also 
Ritchie and Lewis, 2003 and Weber, 2004, for similar arguments). As Tashakkori 
and Teddlie (1998) contend: 
 
research should be done with a clear intention to answer a question, solve a 
problem, or evaluate a programme. We stress the importance and 
predominance of the research question over the paradigm, and we encourage 
researchers to use appropriate methods from both approaches to answer their 
research question (p. v) 
 
The espousal of Laughlin’s (1995) ‘middle range’ stance allows, therefore, for mixed 
method studies to be adopted, where qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
combined across all phases of the research process, from conceptualisation to data 
analysis and inference (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998); and where defined methods 
are employed, which however allow for flexibility in application and for 
interpretation in light of the on-going findings. This is particularly important for this 
study, since as the discussion of the propositions (section 4.5) has indicated, the 
                                                 
25 The main difference of the two is with regard to causality: critical realism (e.g. Bhaskar, 1989) 
considers social theory and social reality to be causally interdependent whereas pragmatism (e.g. 
Sayer, 1992), although considering that the world can only be understood by social theory, it stresses 
that the latter does not determine the structure of the world itself (Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  
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focus on quantitative CA, cannot significantly contribute towards identifying which 
specific approach out of the four identified towards CSR the organisations would 
hold.  
 
Having clarified these philosophical assumptions, the methodological choices of the 
study, so as to serve better the set questions and propositions, can be discussed. 
Firstly the decisions regarding the research design are considered.  
 
5.4 Research design 
5.4.1 A review of the research designs used in CSR research 
 
Three main types of research strategy appear to be frequently employed in CSR 
research: surveys, case studies and experiments (Vourvachis, 2005). The main 
characteristic of the survey design approach is that it involves the use of large 
samples, with consequent benefits in the generalisability of the findings. When 
combined with documentary data and quantitative analysis (as in the case, e.g. of 
Gray et al., 2001; Patten, 2002; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Tilt, 2001; 
Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000), survey works appear to pay less attention to the full 
context of the documents surveyed and general phenomena investigated. Specific 
measures and types of quantitative analysis are employed, with subsequent benefits 
in the reliability of the findings, but with some potential flaws in the studies’ validity 
(factors explaining the findings may be omitted; examined variables may be selected 
subjectively; and when relationships are identified, the direction of causality is quite 
difficult to determine). In fact, Bryman (1989) notes that, “survey research is usually 
less adept at generating definitive causal relationships than experimental designs, 
because of the latter’s greater internal validity” (p. 134). 
 
Bryman (1989) mostly attributes the specific problems in investigating causal 
relationships of the various survey designs to the usual employment of data collected 
at a single juncture. However, in a number of longitudinal CSR surveys (e.g. Gray et 
al., 2001; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Richardson and Welker, 2001) it is evident 
that, even when statistical correlations and regressions are employed, the generated 
models do not seem to be able to explain all the evidence. As Gray et al. (2001) 
 
124
conclude in their survey, “it is worth emphasising that the amount of variability in 
disclosure explained by the present characteristics remains relatively small. Other 
factors are clearly at work here” (p. 350). 
 
However, survey designs may also employ qualitative data and analysis, as in the 
cases of O’Dwyer (2002; 2003). In these cases (i.e. cross-sectional studies, 
employing interviews and qualitative analysis based on Huberman and Miles, 1994), 
it seems that the concerns over the reliability and validity of the findings are 
reversed, compared to the more quantitative survey efforts. It is, therefore, the 
reliability of the findings that is put into question, considering the qualitative, and 
hence ‘soft’ nature of both the collected data and the (inevitably, to a lesser or greater 
extent) subjective qualitative analysis. Hence, more attention to the context of the 
phenomena studied seems to be paid, and more valid (reflective of the situation 
under investigation) findings, seem to be generated from the interviews and the 
qualitative analyses undertaken. It seems, therefore, that there are no general 
conclusions to be made regarding the credibility of the survey designs. Although the 
generalisability benefits should be acknowledged, these are also subject to how 
representative the employed sample is. Hence, the specific for every survey research 
credibility considerations, are largely subject to the data collection and data analysis 
methods used.  
 
Experimental studies have, as well, been used at times in CSR research (see, e.g. 
Milne and Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002a). The main benefits of these studies 
seems to be that the factors under examination can be isolated, thereby enhancing the 
studies’ validity. When large samples, questionnaires and statistical analysis are 
involved (as in the case of Milne and Patten, 2002), the reliability and 
generalisability of the findings is enhanced; but, when smaller samples, interviews 
and qualitative analysis are employed (as in O’Donovan, 2002a), and despite the 
potential threats to the reliability of the finding, more attention is paid to the context 
and more light can be shed on the complex social phenomena involved. 
 
However, as Denscombe (2003) notes, “In the case of social research, there are 
certain limitations on the extent to which circumstances can be manipulated… a 
researcher can do things to chemicals and plants that cannot be contemplated with 
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fellow human beings” (p. 65). Participants in the experiments are not making real 
world decisions; further, “reactivity is likely to occur because of subjects’ awareness 
that they are participants in an experiment” (Bryman, 1989, p. 88). Therefore, the 
generalisability of the findings is put into question. Moreover, it is difficult to 
establish (under an experimental design) the representativeness of the research 
subjects. It is questionable, therefore, whether the benefits of experimental research 
outnumber its disadvantages and this may be one of the reasons why experimental 
designs do not seem to be frequently employed in CSR research. 
 
However, this reservation does not seem to be the case in case study designs. 
Overall, and similarly to surveys (despite being generally perceived as qualitative 
approaches), case study designs may also take a quantitative character. As 
Denscombe (2003) points out, “the decision to use a case study approach is a 
strategic decision that relates to the scale and scope of an investigation, and it does 
not, at least in principle, dictate which method or methods must be used” (p. 32). 
Indeed, it seems that in CSR a number of studies adopting case study designs, 
involve the use of either qualitative analysis or quantitative (content or statistical) 
analysis. Despite the fact that, under any analysis conditions, there is a general 
concern over the case studies’ basis for generalisation (see, e.g. the concerns 
expressed by Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Deegan et al., 2002), “case studies, like 
experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes… the goal is to do a ‘generalising’ and not a particularising” (Yin, 1994, 
p.10). The generalisability of the findings is enhanced when multi-case study 
methods are employed; where replication logic is used (Savage et al., 2000); such 
that “the analysis is likely to be easier and the findings likely to be more robust than 
having only a single case” (Yin, 2009, p.156).  
 
The main benefit with qualitative case study approaches (such as Adams, 2002; 
2004; Larrinaga- Gonzalez et al., 2001), and despite any subsequent reliability and 
generalisability shortcomings, is that the focus on one, or a few, instances allows the 
researcher, “to deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations” 
(Denscombe, 2003, p. 38). Case studies “explain the causal links in real-life 
interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies” (Yin, 
1994, p. 15). Therefore, largely qualitative case study approaches, seem to be a 
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suitable methodological approach for research on motivations for CSR, since this 
appears to be, “the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1).  
 
On the other hand, when more quantitative case study approaches are adopted (as in 
the case of Campbell et al., 2003; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Deegan et al., 2002), it 
seems that the authors’ main concern is to be objective, thereby ensuring the 
reliability of the results and providing measurable and statistically valid findings. 
This still allows for an in-depth investigation of the cases and for generalisations to 
theoretical propositions, although it will (more often than qualitative approaches) 
result in not explaining all the evidence presented. 
 
5.4.2 The adopted design: longitudinal multi-case study  
 
Considering the above discussion and the explanatory nature of this research, a case 
study strategy is adopted. This will allow for an in-depth investigation of the 
propositions to be conducted and will further assist in dealing with the intricacies of 
complex social situations (Denscombe, 2003) as well as “explain the causal links in 
real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies” 
(Yin, 1994, p. 15). Hence, the adoption of a case study design seems to be a suitable 
methodological approach for this CSR explanation research, particularly since in 
order to investigate the propositions identified, companies that have faced major 
legitimacy threats need to be examined and both a detailed and longitudinal analysis 
of their CSR disclosing patterns, involving varied approaches to data analysis, needs 
to be conducted. 
 
More specifically, Yin’s (1989, 2003) multi-case research design is employed to 
investigate the propositions of the study. According to Colbert and Spicer (1995) and 
Savage et al. (2000), Yin provides the most coherent and comprehensive approach to 
multi-case explanatory research. Yin’s (2009) primary objective is to provide 
analytical evidence about the empirical validity of the underlying theory, by 
matching case evidence back to theory. By using a multitude of (mainly, qualitative) 
 
127
analysis techniques, Yin employs the pre-specified theory as a template, with which 
to compare the empirical results of the study. Thus, by adopting Yin’s (2009) 
approach, the emphasis is not on explaining most of the variance of the data, but on 
explaining all the data; if the outcome of a case is not as predicted, the theory must 
by modified, and theory development then takes place. Importantly, the case study 
approach will allow for a more in depth investigation, encompassing mixed 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to CA, to be employed, as deemed necessary 
by the discussion of the propositions of the study in section 4.5.  
 
Having considered the research design of the study, the CA approach used can be 
discussed. 
 
5.5 Introducing Content Analysis (CA) 
 
CA appears to be, “the research method that is most commonly used to assess 
organisations’ social and environmental disclosures” (Milne and Adler, 1999, p. 
237), and it is most often viewed in CSR as, “a technique for gathering data that 
consists of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and literary form into 
categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity” 
(Abbot and Monsen, p. 504). It is generally employed in studies investigating the 
level and quality of the CSR information provided (e.g. Benschop and Meihuizen, 
2002; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Freedman and Stagliano, 2002). However, CA is 
also employed to answer questions with regard to the potential relation of CSR to 
specific factors (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2001; Patten, 2002; Richardson 
and Welker, 2001), or to investigate motivations for CSR (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Deegan et al., 2002; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). CA has been employed in the 
present research as it is best suited for investigating the study’s propositions, which 
require some coding and measurement of CSR. 
 
Considering the wide employment of the technique and its idiosyncratic approach to 
analysis (by transforming, by and large, ‘qualitative’ to ‘quantitative’ data), a number 
of methodological concerns have been expressed over its use in CSR research. These 
concerns can be generally classified as concerning: the sampling and measurement 
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units of the analysis; the ways of ‘defining’ those units (a term that Krippendorff, 
2004, employs to refer to investigating the contextual aspects of CA); and the 
instrument’s reliability. As Adams (2002) stresses, there is a need for these 
methodological issues to be addressed, “if improvements in the extensiveness, 
quality, quantity and comprehensiveness of reporting are to be achieved” (p. 246). 
 
A number of studies discuss methodological issues in CSR with a focus on CA, most 
notably Guthrie and Mathews (1985), Gray et al. (1995b), Hackston and Milne 
(1996), Milne and Adler (1999), Unerman (2000a) and Guthrie et al. (2008) (see also 
Guthrie et al., 2004 and Beattie and Thomson, 2007, for discussions on the use of 
CA in the related field of intellectual capital reporting). Whilst Milne and Adler 
(1999) and Unerman (2000a) comprehensively discuss the reliability of the CA and 
the inclusiveness of sampling units, respectively, there still seems to be a debate over 
the measurement unit to be employed. Thus Milne and Adler suggest different 
measurement units from Unerman; there also seems to be a lack of studies offering 
alternative approaches to defining the CA units ( but see Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; 
Gray et al., 1995b; and Milne and Adler, 1999, for some brief accounts).  
 
The objective of the remainder of the chapter, therefore, is to revisit the debate on the 
CA units (i.e. sampling, context and recording units) and, by offering a discussion on 
a variety of approaches to employing CA in CSR, to justify the approach selected in 
this study. To satisfy this objective, a number of theoretical CA and empirical CSR 
sources have been reviewed.  
 
5.6 The systematic review of the CA literature 
 
The research strategy of the literature review informing this chapter is a theoretical 
investigation/literature survey, which “involves the use of survey principles applied 
to documents on the topic of research” and  where “the idea is to encompass as much 
as possible of the existing material – equivalent to getting the panoramic view of the 
landscape” (Denscombe, 2003, p. 10). A number of CSR studies employ theoretical 
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investigation as a research strategy26 and this was probably the only pragmatically 
available strategy to meet the purposes of this research.   
 
The collection and review of the relevant papers employing CA was quasi-
systematic. Systematic reviews of the literature seem not to have been employed in 
the CSR research to date (for a potentially related study, see only Marr et al., 2003 in 
the field of Intellectual Capital Reporting); however, this approach is well 
established in the health care research (e.g. Egger et al., 2001; Jefferson et al., 2003; 
Price et al., 2004). The purpose of a systematic literature review “is to evaluate and 
interpret all available research evidence relevant to a particular question” (Glasziou 
et al., 2001, p. 1), and with regards to data collection this either involves detailed 
keyword searches (as in Marr et al., 2003) or exhaustive reviews of selected 
publications, as in the present paper. In either case, a completed review should 
consolidate what is known and identify any gaps in current knowledge leading to a 
more reliable and accurate picture of the current state of the field literature (Price et 
al., 2004). 
 
The quasi-systematic review had three stages. First, a systematic review of all the 
volumes to the time this chapter is written (April 2007) of three of the most 
prominent interdisciplinary journals in Accounting according to both Lowe and 
Locke (2005) and Tinker’s (2006) journal assessment studies (being Accounting, 
Organizations and Society [1976-], Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
[1988-] and Critical Perspectives on Accounting [1990-], was conducted.  
 
In the second stage of data collection, the reference lists of previous methodological 
reviews of CA in CSR (Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Gray et al. 1995b; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler, 1999 and Unerman, 2000) were scrutinised and 
                                                 
26 Theoretical investigations are employed in CSR to introduce frameworks (Laughlin, 1990; 1991; 
Woodward and Woodward, 2001; Dillard et al., 2005), to review the development of the field 
(Mathews, 1997; Carroll, 1999; Elkington, 1999; Bebbington, 2001; Gray, 2001; 2002; Line et al., 
2002; Norman and McDonald, 2004; O’Dwyer, 2005), to provide general explanatory accounts (Gray 
et al., 1997; Bebbington and Gray, 2000; Ramirez, 2001),  to review specific theories (Gray et al., 
1995a; Deegan, 2002), or offer some international perspectives (Capron and Gray, 2000; Bebbington 
et al., 2000; Aaronson, 2003), and proposals for the development of the field (Adams and Harte, 2000; 
Lehman, 2004). Most of the authors implicitly seem to consider their methodological choice self-
explanatory and some describe how the literature relevant to their purposes is identified and 
segmented (Gray et al., 1997; Mathews, 1997). 
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all the publicly available CA studies referenced were collected and reviewed. Finally, 
to further increase validity, some additional well-referenced CSR papers were 
collected, until it was realised that saturation in contributions was reached, when the 
review of more sources was not adding to understanding but only to the paper’s 
reference list.   
 
The data collection resulted in over a hundred papers to be reviewed. A summary of 
these is presented in Table 5.3, and was generated after identifying their CA 
approach (some sources employ more than one approach). Considering that a general 
major weakness of theoretical investigations regards the credibility of the collected 
documental sources (Denscombe, 2003; Yin, 2003), it was expected that the review 
of such well-referenced sources would add to the validity of the research; it is 
nevertheless acknowledged that, particularly in the final stage in data collection, 
where the additional sources were not collected according to specifically determined 
criteria, some original, less frequently referenced contributions, published in other 
sources may have been omitted. 
 
The data analysis was based on the approach suggested by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) which is discussed in more detail later in the chapter, but in brief involves 
firstly the review, coding and synthesis of the raw data, subsequently the 
identification of key dimensions and development of classifications and typologies, 
and finally, building explanations for the identified patterns and making inference to 
the research questions. The first two stages took place simultaneously: the methods’ 
sections of the papers were reviewed and detailed notes for each paper kept of the 
precise approach to CA; the implicit or explicit benefits and limitations identified; 
and the references employed for the appropriate justification (the development of 
coding schemes was not deemed necessary). These notes assisted in directly 
developing the explanatory accounts of the research, addressing the main set 
objectives. The succeeding sections discuss these findings. 
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Table 5.3 The reviewed CSR papers approaches to recording units  
Characters  Davey, 1982; Tinker and Neimark, 1987 
Words 
Brown and Deegan, 1998; Campbell, 2000; 2004; Campbell et al., 2003; 2006; 
Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gao et al., 2005; Neu et 
al., 1998; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990 
Lines 
Bowman and Haire, 1975, 1976; Patten, 2002b; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; 
Wiseman, 1982 
Sentences 
Buhr, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; 2002; Guthrie et al., 2008; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Milne and Adler, 1999; Patten, 2002a; 
Tilling, 2003; Tilt, 2001; Tilt and Symes, 1999; Tsang, 1998; Walden and 
Schwartz, 1997; Williams, 1999; Woodward et al., 2008 
Themes Burritt and Welch, 1997 
Standardised
proportion of 
pages 
Adams, 2004; Adams et al., 1995; 1998; Andrew et al., 1989; Buhr, 1994; Gray 
et al., 1995a,b; 2001; Guthrie, 1983; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 1990; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Murray et al., 2006; Newson 
and Deegan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 1999; Savage et al., 2000; Unerman, 2000   
V
ol
um
et
ric
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
s 
Page size 
(and % of 
total CSD) 
Bowman and Haire, 1975, 1976; Dierkes, 1979; Gibson and Guthrie, 1995;  
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Patten, 1992; Salama, 2003; 
Trotman, 1979; Trotman and Bradley, 1981 
Binary 
coding  
Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Adams and Frost, 2004; Adams and Harte, 1998; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Andrew et al., 1989; Barth et al., 1997; Bebbington and 
Larrinaga, 2007; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Benschop and Meihuizen, 2002; 
Beresford and Cowen, 1979; Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Buhr, 2001; Campbell 
et al., 2006; Chan, 1979; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Cowen et al., 1987; Day 
and Woodward, 2004; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Dierkes, 1979; Ernst 
and Ernst, 1978 (as cited in Deegan et al., 2000, p. 118); Esrock and Leichty, 
1998; Freedman and Stagliano, 2002; Guthrie et al. 2007; Harte and Owen, 
1987; Ingram, 1978; Kelly, 1981; Mobus, 2005; Moneva and Llena, 2000; 
Niskala and Pretes, 1995; Nurhayati et al., 2006; O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; 
Patten, 2002b; Patten and Crampton, 2004; Richardson and Welker, 2001; 
Roberts, 1991; Simmons and Neu, 1996; Tilt, 1994; Turner et al., 2006; 
Ullmann, 1979; Unerman and Bennet, 2004; Yamagami and Kokubu, 1991    
In
de
x 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 
Weighted 
coding  
Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Freedman and Jaggi, 1986; 1988; Freedman and 
Wasley, 1990; Hughes et al., 2001; Kolk, 1999; Wiseman, 1982 
Qualitative 
approaches 
Adams, 2002; Bebbington and Gray, 2000; Jones, 2006; O’Donovan, 1999; 
2002; O’Dwyer, 1999, 2002, 2003; Owen et al. 2000; Roslender and Fincham, 
2004; Savage et al., 2000; Unerman, 2003; Woodward et al. 2001 
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5.7 Quantity vs. quality in CA 
 
A major debate in CA which originated in the late 1940s and 1950s (see, e.g. Janis, 
1949; Lasswell, 1949; Berelson, 1952; George, 1959; Osgood, 1959) and is still 
evident (see, e.g. Boyatzis, 1998; Neuendorf, 2002; Berg, 2004; Krippendorff, 2004) 
considers whether CA is a strictly quantitative technique or it should (or indeed 
could) further take a qualitative form. For example, Berelson (1952) has defined CA 
as, “a technique for objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication” (p. 18) whilst Krippendorff (1969a) considers it 
to be, “the use of replicable and valid methods for making specific inferences from 
text to other states or properties of its source” (p. 11) 27. It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to reject or endorse any of these approaches; it should be noted, however, 
that this is in essence a pseudo-dilemma, given that by definition CA is both a 
qualitative and a quantitative technique, employing qualitative data which are 
subsequently quantified, and concentration on either approach may lead researchers 
to overlook the challenges arising from the method’s multifaceted character 
(Gephart, 2004). A brief review of these arguments, therefore, helps to identify broad 
CA types and general issues and provide a basic reference point for the subsequent 
discussion.   
  
Proponents of the more restricted view of CA (such as Lasswell, 1949; Berelson, 
1952; Deese, 1969; Neuendorf, 2002, see also e.g. Kassarjian, 1977 and Gibson and 
Guthrie, 1995, in the CSR field) emphasise that it should be systematic, objective 
and generalisable and that quantification is essential. To ensure that these criteria are 
met, these theorists further argue for a focus of CA on the manifest (the ‘surface’) 
rather than the latent (deeper) meaning of the text and to the syntactic (combinations 
of signs without regard for meaning) and semantic (meaning of signs) dimensions of 
communication, rather than the pragmatic one (the relationship between the 
communication symbol and its user) (Morris, 1946; Berelson, 1952; George, 1959; 
Stone et al., 1966). However, within this stream of the literature a further major 
distinction could be made among the ‘classical’ researchers supporting the use of 
objective standard categories, “to facilitate comparative and cumulative research” 
                                                 
27 Rosengren (1981) assigns these views to the ‘Anglo-American’ vs. the ‘Continental’ and Sepstrup 
(1981) to the ‘positivistic’ vs. the ‘Marxist/critical’ research traditions, respectively. 
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(Holsti, 1969b, p. 114) and the ‘pragmatists’, endorsing the use of categories drawing 
on the theory and the research questions and specifically developed for the data and 
problem at hand (Marsden, 1965; Stone, 1969; Sepstrup, 1981; Weber, 1985). Other, 
more restrictive distinctions within this view have also been suggested, mainly based 
on the degree of quantification or the specific field characteristics (Marsden, 1965; 
Deese, 1969; Holsti, 1969a). All these approaches however, have been criticised as 
being too narrow, producing potentially misleading inferences (Stone et al., 1966). 
  
On the contrary, proponents of the broader view (such as e.g. Goldhamer, 1969; 
Hays, 1969; Krippendorff, 1969a,b; Paisley, 1969 and Easterby-Smith et al., 2002,  
although see also, e.g. Unerman, 2003; Day and Woodward, 2004 and Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005) consider that qualitative-oriented approaches are more valid, 
since, “one can draw more meaningful inferences by non-quantitative methods” 
(Holsti, 1969a, p. 10). These theorists argue for a focus on the latent meaning of text 
and the pragmatic and semantic dimensions of communication and further support 
the development of inductive categories based on some type of thematic analysis of 
the text (as in Boyatzis, 1998). However, and in addition to being accused of being 
more subjective and unreliable (Lasswell, 1949; Sepstrup, 1981), a further major 
limitation of such a wide approach is that it is difficult to develop a definition for it 
(Barcus, 1969) and identify conditions that differentiate it from other systematic 
forms of qualitative analysis without considering it as a ‘universal’ qualitative 
technique of message analysis, encompassing all the rest28. 
 
Evidently, however, all these arguments are associated with the wider debates of 
positivism vs. interpretivism and quantitative vs. qualitative methods and in many 
respects are not incompatible (see e.g. Weber, 2004). Indeed, a number of prominent 
CA theorists acknowledge that, “approaches and methodologies are never good per 
se; they are good for something” (Rosengren, 1981, p. 14, emphasis in original), 
                                                 
28 For example, Krippendorff (2004) seems to consider discourse analysis, social constructivist 
analysis, rhetorical analysis, ethnographic content analysis and conversation analysis some kind of 
forms of qualitative CA. Furthermore, methods such as linguistic analysis (Marsden, 1965), narrative 
analysis, semiotic analysis, hermeneutics and grounded theory (as defined and illustrated by 
Schwandt, 2001 and Lewis-Beck et al., 2004) would also comply with these broader definitions of 
CA. Such an approach however, would further add to the existing confusion over the meaning of the 
method, as illustrated in a reply of an English academic to Barcus’ (1969) CA survey: “I am so old-
fashioned that I haven’t any idea what you mean by content analysis. If it means to you what it means 
to me, then every course I have ever taught involves analysis of content” (p. 549). 
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reject this rigid dichotomy and conclude by recommending the use of mixed methods 
and abductive logic for more complete inferences (see e.g. Berelson, 1952; Pool, 
1959; Holsti, 1969a;b; Krippendorff, 1969a,b; 2004, Rosengren, 1981, and also 
Sepstrup, 1981; Boyatzis, 1998; Berg, 2004; Franzosi, 2004a,b); such mixed 
approaches may, for example, include the generation of inductive categories with 
subsequent quantified coding (what Tashakkori and Teddlie [1998] term ‘mixed-
method’ approaches) or the parallel conduct of CA approaches focusing on the 
manifest and the latent content of the text, for triangulation purposes (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie’s ‘mixed-model’ approaches).  
 
Table 5.4 A framework for CA 
Quantitative  
Classical Pragmatic 
Mixed Qualitative 
Categories Standard Customised Inductive Inductive 
Content Manifest Manifest 
Manifest and 
Latent 
Latent 
Communication 
aspect 
Syntactic and 
semantic 
Syntactic and 
semantic 
All 
Pragmatic 
and semantic 
 
Although CA theorists comprehensively discuss specific aspects of (what they 
perceive to be) CA, they rarely attempt to identify a ‘CA framework’, incorporating 
all possible types of CA; and when they do so (as in e.g. the cases of Janis, 1949 and 
Deese, 1969), they only distinguish among more restricted types of the method. 
Table 5.4 synthesises their arguments and attempts to provide a wider framework, 
identifying all major types of CA. Naturally, the distinctions are not clear cut (e.g. in 
qualitative approaches some manifest content is also considered in an attempt to 
investigate the latent) and some further sub-divisions of the four main approaches 
may be identified (see e.g. Janis, 1949; Marsden, 1965; Deese, 1969, for types of 
quantitative CA and Krippendorff, 2004 for types of qualitative). Due to the 
primarily quantitative orientation of CA in CSR research, the lack of mixed CSR 
studies29 and the apparent vagueness in defining the broader view, this chapter 
                                                 
29 This particularly refers to the lack of ‘mixed-method’ studies. There are some examples of ‘mixed-
model’ studies in the CSR literature, where evidence from CA of Annual Reports is coupled with 
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primarily focuses on studies subscribing to the more restrictive view of the method. 
However, some exclusively qualitative approaches have also been considered, when 
these do not subscribe to an alternative rigidly specified qualitative analysis approach 
and can take a quantitative form. Considering, further, that the bulk of the 
approaches subscribing to the more restrictive view could be deemed pragmatic due 
to the lack of ‘standard’ CSR classifications, an alternative, frequently employed 
classification, the index vs. volumetric CA is reviewed and discussed in more detail 
next. 
 
5.8 Index vs. amount/volume approaches 
 
An alternative distinction within the quantitative, more restrictive CA studies, 
regards the one between ‘index’ studies and ‘amount-volume’ studies. Index studies 
generally check for the presence or absence of specific items of information (what 
Stone et al, 1966 and Holsti, 1969a describe as ‘contingency analysis’) whereas 
volumetric ones check for the overall volume of disclosure, most frequently by 
counting words, sentences or proportions of an A4 page30. 
   
Index studies appear to have been the most popular approach to CA up to the early 
1990s (Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990), and in fact, in a 
number of studies, it is this approach that is most commonly labelled as ‘CA’, as 
opposed to the ‘line’, ‘sentence’ or ‘page counts’ terms generally attributed to the 
volumetric approaches (see e.g. Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Wiseman, 1982; Guthrie 
and Mathews, 1985, and more recently, Moneva and Llena, 2000; Patten and 
Crampton, 2004). As Table 5.3 illustrates, frequently a simple binary coding scheme 
is used, where a score of 1 or 0 in the presence of absence of the item is respectively 
attributed. At times, the aggregated frequency of the presence of these items is 
further estimated (Cowen et al., 1987; Campbell et al., 2006; Bebbington and 
                                                                                                                                          
evidence from interviews (see e.g. O’Dwyer, 1999; Zain, 1999) or questionnaires (see e.g. Wilmshurst 
and Frost, 2000; Turner et al, 2006); this is, not surprisingly, mostly common in PhD works, where 
research efforts take a wider scope.  
30 Note that the distinction between standardised vs. customised CA may still be applicable if one e.g. 
considers the categories frequently employed in the literature developed by Gray et al. (1995b), 
drawing on Ernst and Ernst (1978), as standard with regards to the volumetric studies, and e.g. the 
GRI (2002) guidelines as a potential standard index for contingency studies.  
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Larrinaga, 2007; Guthrie et al. 2007). Index studies, though, may further incorporate 
ordinal measures, to allow for the quality of the specific disclosure to be assessed 
(Beattie et al., 2004), with Wiseman (1982) and Freedman and Wasley (1990) 
employing a four-level index (quantitative Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD)=3, 
non-quantitative=2, general=1, absent=0) (see Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et 
al., 2004, for more thorough discussions on types of index studies). 
 
Although Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 195) assert that index scores, “can give a 
measure of the extent of the disclosure but not necessarily the quality of the 
disclosure”, it is arguable how useful for evaluating extent of disclosure these 
measures are, since as Abbot and Monsen (1979) concede, “The only meaning that 
may be attributed to the scale is that it reflects the variety of social involvement 
activities. It does not measure the intensity of each activity” (p. 507, emphasis in 
original). Further, as Milne and Adler (1999) note, although “from a coding 
perspective, the Ernst and Ernst [index] approach is likely to be more reliable than 
Gray et al.’s [1995a,b] and Hackston and Milne’s [1996, volumetric ones] because 
each coder has far fewer possible choices for each coding decision, and 
consequently, far fewer possibilities for disagreeing”, this increased reliability, “is 
gained at the expense of potential refinements to the understanding of social and 
environmental disclosure” (p. 242). In addition, although this approach appears to 
have the advantage over the volumetric ones that the scores are not affected by 
repetition of information or grammar, this might also be misleading, since it might 
treat a company making one environmental disclosure as equal to one that makes 50 
of the same type (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
 
In volumetric approaches, on the other hand, it is assumed that the extent of 
disclosure can be taken as some indication of the importance of an issue to the 
reporting entity (Krippendorff, 1980; Campbell et al., 2003). Although clearly not all 
the measured information would be of the same type or quality (Guthrie and 
Mathews, 1985, Gray et al., 1995b), this can be assessed by applying a wide range of 
distinctions (Krippendorff, 2004 – a more detailed account of these is provided later 
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in the discussion)31. Considering the evidence that CSR has been increasing across 
time, both in number of disclosing companies and in the amount of information 
being reported (KPMG, 2005, 2008), particularly over the last 15 years (Erusalimsky 
et al., 2006), and given the limitations of index studies, it seems reasonable that, as 
also evident in Table 5.3,  the majority of CSR researchers are now employing 
volumetric approaches to CA in order to get a proxy for the emphasis given to 
particular content categories (Milne and Adler, 1999) rather than simply checking for 
the presence or absence of specific CSD. 
 
It should be noted though, that this is not to say that index approaches to CA are 
necessarily less useful than volumetric ones. It is arguable, for example, whether 
volumetric studies would have been more useful in identifying general compliance to 
the GRI guidelines (as in Turner et al., 2006, and Clarkson et al., 2008) or comparing 
the variety of CSR information across ARs and corporate internet sites (as in Patten 
and Crampton, 2004). The suitability of each approach, therefore, as in most research 
efforts, depends on the research question (Tashakori and Teddlie, 1998; Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003; Weber, 2004). Nevertheless, when Patten (2002b) and Patten and 
Crampton (2004) employed both index and volumetric measures and examined the 
correlations with lines and sentences, in both cases quite high coefficients were 
noted, indicating that even with regard to determining the extent of CSR both 
approaches may be equally valid.   
 
5.9 Units of analysis 
 
In this section the units employed in CA are reviewed. For Krippendorff (2004), 
“units are wholes that analysts distinguish and treat as independent elements” (p. 97). 
As he further points out, “In content analysis, three kinds of units deserve distinction: 
                                                 
31 A colourful novelistic commentary on the constant biases arising from these volumetric arguments 
is given by Stern (1960): “The obituaries were Poppa Hondorp’s measure of human worth. ‘There’s 
little they can add or subtract from you then’, was his view. Poppa’s eye had sharpened over the years 
so that he could weigh a two-and-a-half inch column of ex-alderman against three-and-a-quarter 
inches of inorganic chemist and know at a glance their comparative worth. When his son had one day 
suggested that the exigencies of the printer and makeup man might in part account for the amount of 
space accorded the deceased, Poppa Hondorp had shivered with… rage…the obituaries were 
sacrosanct; The Times issued from an immaculate source” (p. 24, cited in Webb and Roberts, 1969, p. 
320). 
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sampling units, recording/coding units, and context units”. Given that Unerman 
(2000a) and Guthrie et al. (2008) have thoroughly discussed the choice of the 
sampling unit and that researchers seem to generally agree (not necessarily on the 
terminology but) on the actual use of context unit, more emphasis is paid in the 
present discussion to the recording/coding unit, which seems to generate a more 
lively debate.  
 
In natural order, decisions on definitions/context precede those on the sample and 
measurement, as in, for example, the Gray et al. (1995b) review. However, in line 
with Krippendorff (2004) the sampling units are reviewed first, to allow for a more 
direct comparison and discussion on the often conflated choices of context and 
recording units.  
 
5.9.1 Sampling units 
 
According to Krippendorff (2004) sampling units, “are units that are distinguished 
for selective inclusion in an analysis… Content analysts must define sampling units 
so that (a) connections across sampling units, if they exist, do not bias the analysis; 
and (b) all relevant information is contained in individual sampling units, or, if it is 
not, the omissions do not impoverish the analysis” (pp. 98-99). One of the first 
decisions to be made, therefore, when undertaking CA is that of the sampling units. 
 
It seems that “the majority of studies into CSR worldwide… have used corporate 
annual reports as the exclusive sampling unit” (O’Dwyer, 1999, p. 227) and a 
number of reasons for this have been put forward in the CSR literature. The AR is, 
“the most widely distributed of all public documents produced by a company” and it 
“can be accepted as an appropriate source of a company’s attitudes towards social 
reporting” (Campbell, 2000, pp. 84-85; see also similar arguments by Gray et al, 
1995b, Woodward et al., 2008). It has also been argued that ARs are the single most 
important source of information on corporate activities (Adams et al., 1998). Further, 
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from an accounting perspective, explanations are most frequently being sought for 
voluntary CSD in the ARs (Savage et al., 2000)32.  
 
It has been argued, however, that the focus on the employment of ARs may result in 
an incomplete representation of the quantum of CSR (Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990) 
since these are not the only medium through which companies report their socially 
responsible behaviour, a view empirically supported by Unerman (2000a), Frost et 
al. (2005) and Guthrie et al. (2008). Erusalimsky et al’s (2006) affirmation that, “in 
the years since 1990… the rise in the number of voluntary standalone reports has 
been astonishing” (p. 12) and Guthrie et al’s (2008) finding that, “companies may 
use the annual report and corporate website for reporting different types of 
information” (p. 40) gives further support to Unerman’s (2000) conclusion that, 
“future studies focusing exclusively on annual reports might not produce particularly 
relevant results” (p. 674). 
 
As a consequence, a number of CA studies now increasingly employ CSR sources in 
addition to, or other than, the ARs as their sampling unit. Quite frequently stand-
alone reports are employed (see e.g. Laine, 2005; Jones, 2006; Turner et al., 2006; 
Bebbington and Larrinaga, 2007), although concerns have been expressed for the use 
in their analysis of the same protocols employed in the ARs (Erusalimsky et al., 
2006). A number of studies also employ information from the Internet (e.g. Esrock 
and Leichty, 1998; Adams and Frost, 2004; Patten and Crampton, 2004; Unerman 
and Bennett, 2004; Turner et al., 2006; Guthrie et al. 2008). The Internet represents a 
data source easier to be captured by index rather than volumetric approaches to CA, 
given its volatile nature (but note that Patten and Crampton, 2004, printed all the 
environmental disclosures identified and also applied a volumetric approach). 
Notably Zéghal and Ahmed (1990), Tilt (1994) and Unerman (2000a) have 
employed a much wider array of CSR sources as the sampling unit, including, e.g. 
brochures and advertisements and several internally circulated bulletins and other ad 
hoc documents published in each year (see also Lewis et al., 1984, for a study 
considering publications to employees).  
                                                 
32But note that, “the exclusive focus on the corporate annual report has been accused of being self-
sustaining given that its exclusive choice is often justified in the literature on the grounds that this is 
what most other studies have done” (O’Dwyer, 1999, p. 229, a justification supported by Unerman, 
1998).  
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 Ultimately, the sampling unit for each study depends on the research objectives set 
(Unerman, 2000) and also on the adopted definition/context for CSR that determine 
the ‘population’ regarding which inferences are to be made. Considering that, in this 
study, a multi-case study research design has been employed and the emphasis is an 
in-depth investigation of the cases so as to develop explanations, a wider array of 
documents than for example, the sole focus on the AR, should be used. Nevertheless, 
as Unerman (2000a) points out, “a limit must be set to the range of documents 
included in any research study… [due to the risk of] a researcher being overwhelmed 
by the number of documents… [and of it not being] possible to ensure completeness 
of data” (p. 671. See also Campbell, 2004, for an account of feasibility factors that 
might also be at play). Further, it is almost impossible to identify all corporate 
communications that could possibly contain CSR information (O’Dwyer, 1999; 
Guthrie et al., 2004) and it thus seems impossible to identify all the CSR activities of 
organisations. The use, therefore, of Annual and stand-alone reports as the sampling 
units in the present study can be justified, as these are (most often) publicly available 
and it might well be assumed that they contain the bulk of the disclosed CSR 
information. This is particularly so given that Internet resources could not be 
considered, due to the longitudinal and ‘archival’ character of this research (as 
section 5.9.1.2 indicates). The term Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) is 
nevertheless preferred when referring to the findings of CA in the next chapters (i.e. 
to refer to the identified disclosure), so as to denote the possibility that not all CSR 
information has been identified. 
  
Having considered the decisions on the documents to be employed in CA, the 
decisions on the industry and on the cases to be examined, which also pertain to 
sampling, are clarified. 
 
5.9.1.1 Deciding on the industry 
 
In this study the aviation industry was selected, because of its wide customer base 
and public visibility (Woodward et al., 2008). Internationally, as the evidence from 
the KPMG (2005, 2008) triennial survey has indicated, the industry is among the 
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most prolific disclosers of CSD. In addition, aviation accidents generally create a 
large amount of negative news coverage for the object organisations since, all of a 
sudden, hundreds of people are losing their lives: the arguments are more ‘news 
worthy’, with a greater impact on the organisations’ overall reputation 
(Zyglidopoulos, 2001).  
 
While the odds of being in a plane crash are nowadays distinctly low compared to 
other means of transportation, the chances of dying in such a disaster are notably 
higher (Weir, 1999). As Hutton (2000), following the Concorde crash, noted: 
 
The interest in the emotional and the intimate has been steadily rising for 
years, and a disaster meets this mood as almost the perfect public event. It 
legitimises our individualistic society’s need to feel, and to do so, however 
shallowly, together. Of course, a plane crash is a more complete disaster than 
almost any other. Nobody settling into the cocoon of a plane journey does so 
without for an instant thinking about a crash. 
 
It seems that W. Buffet’s argument that ‘it takes twenty years to build a reputation 
and five minutes to destroy it’ is particularly applicable in the aviation industry 
(Rowell, 2003). Aviation disasters appear to have a considerable negative impact on 
shareholder value and in credit ratings (Knight and Pretty, 1996). Such is the 
magnitude of these accidents that, following the increased public pressure, most 
airlines retire the number of their flight after the crash (Grossman, 2005). A number 
of major airlines, including Pan American - at one time the de facto flag-carrier of 
the United States – “have failed to recover from prolonged periods of crisis which 
were either precipitated, or worsened, by a badly-managed response to an aircraft 
accident” (Bailey, 2004), whilst some smaller aviation companies, may be even 
forced to go bankrupt or change their brand name (see e.g. Helios Airways aviation 
accident in Greece, 2005). Indeed, both Boeing and Airbus (the two major 
manufacturers of heavy passenger aircraft) have placed huge emphasis on the use of 
aviation safety equipment - now a billion-dollar industry in its own right - and made 
safety a major selling point, realising that a poor safety record in the aviation 
industry is a threat to corporate survival (Weir, 1999). As Deegan et al. (2002) note, 
“when significant events such as major environmental [or, in this case, social] 
disasters occur, or when there is a sustained mass media interest, then it is reasonable 
to assume that most managers would perceive that the organisation’s ongoing 
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legitimacy is threatened”. It is thus expected that aviation accidents constitute a 
major legitimacy threat and, therefore, their employment in this study is justifiable.  
 
With regard to the decision on the time, as the discussion in chapter 2 has 
documented, the recent history of CSR is usually assumed to have started in the early 
1970s (Gray et al., 1996); early empirical studies in the period 1970-1980 were not 
specific in focus, and the specialist accounting journals which encourage research in 
this area were set up in the decade beginning in 1980 (Matthews, 1997). It is only 
over the mid-1990s that there has been major growth in related research (Deegan, 
2002) and, as Gray (2002) further notes, it is from then that the “social accounting 
project is beginning to gain a maturity, depth and direction it has lacked for most of 
its history” (p. 696). Thus, the decision to examine companies’ CSR practices in the 
last decade can be justified in this sense.  
 
The next section further explains that all the collected evidence relates to the period 
1999-2003. These were quite turbulent times for the whole world and particularly the 
aviation industry, primarily due to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
subsequent US invasion in Iraq. As Scandinavian Airlines (2003AR, p. 25) notes 
regarding the September 11th events: 
 
According to estimates by the UN International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), passenger and cargo air traffic declined by 6% in 2001 compared 
with 2000. By comparison, the previous forecast was an increase of approx. 
5%. 2001 thus saw the greatest decrease in global airline business since 
World War II. During the Gulf War, air traffic fell by 3%. Several airlines, 
which even before the attack were struggling financially, suffered acute 
problems resulting in shutdowns and bankruptcies. Many carriers have 
revised their forecasts, laid off thousands of employees and grounded a large 
number of aircraft (2001ER, p.20).   
 
These events may thus be perceived as a ‘macro’-legitimacy threat, since they pertain 
to the legitimacy of the whole industry (and, to some extent, also of the system, 
considering that for the security at the airports primarily responsible are the states 
and not the airlines) and have thus been taken into consideration when interpreting 
the results.  
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5.9.1.2 Deciding on the cases to be examined 
 
In order to decide on the cases to be examined, a number of criteria were considered. 
Given a) the availability of the companies’ reports (checked against the records of 
the British Library, the companies’ own websites, CSEAR’s database and 
CorporateRegister.com), b) the intention to get the widest possible geographic 
coverage, c) the estimated time that each case would take to be analysed and 
reported, and d) the fact that, as Patten (1992) has suggested, larger firms face greater 
calls to legitimise themselves, it was decided to investigate overall five large 
company cases and in each case to check the Annual and standalone reports two 
years prior and after and for the year of the accident, to better capture the accident 
effect on the level of CSD.  
 
Deegan et al. (2000) acknowledged that the selection of four (as in their case) or five 
(as in this study) reports around the incident is somewhat arbitrary. However, it is 
expected that “this should be sufficient to establish any variations in the extent of 
disclosure before and after an incident” and that this ‘narrow window’ will help “to 
reduce the possibility of other extraneous events influencing the disclosures” 
(Deegan et al., 2000, p.117). 
 
Consequently, the sample of the study includes the following organisations: 
 
? British Airways - BA (examining the impact of the Concorde accident of 
their co-operator, Air France, 2000) 
? Air France (Concorde accident, 2000, flight 4590, 114 fatalities) 
? American Airlines - AA (2001, September 11th attacks and Flight 587, 
November 12th, 265 fatalities) 
? Singapore Airlines - SIA (2000, Flight 006, 83 fatalities), and, 
? Scandinavian Airlines - SAS (2001, Flight 686, 114 fatalities) 
 
The rationale for this selection is that Air France, BA and SAS were in the top 4 
largest airlines in Europe in terms of passengers as Figure 5.1 illustrates. Considering 
that the organisations were based in different countries (and SIA and AA were from 
non-European countries - Singapore and USA respectively), some tentative national 
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effects could also be researched. It should be noted, nevertheless, the major role in 
the selection of the cases played by the (un)availability of the data (which didn’t 
allow for, e.g. TWA and Air China original choices to be investigated).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Extract from SAS (2002AR, p.13) 
 
Deegan et al.’s (2000) assertion that, “an important point to note, when considering a 
corporation’s reaction to an incident in the annual report, is the timing of the incident 
in relation to the release of the annual report” (p. 116), is further considered in this 
study. Thus, since “there is generally between two and three months between balance 
date and the date the reports are finalised” (Brown and Deegan, 1998, p. 28), the 
potential for an accident to occur between the company’s end of financial year (e.g. 
31st of March for BA) and the release of the ARs (e.g. around June for BA) will be 
considered. Further, it will also be taken into consideration the fact that, while the 
appropriate authority investigations for the causes of the accident take place, 
organisations are not permitted to disclose any information with regard to the 
accident. Following an examination of the cases, most accidents (with the exception 
of Air France) were found to have occurred after the companies’ release of the ARs, 
in the next fiscal year, and well before the new balance date: for those, it is expected 
that the timing of the accidents has not impaired the undertaking of the research in 
this way. For Air France, the fact that the ARs was released at a time very near to the 
accident has been taken into consideration when interpreting the findings. 
 
Having completed the review of the sampling units, the discussion moves on to the 
context units. 
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5.9.2 Context units 
 
Context units are defined by Berelson (1952) as, “the largest body of content that 
may be examined in characterizing a recording unit” (p. 135). As Krippendorff 
(2004) elaborates:  
 
the meaning of a word typically depends on its syntactical role within a 
sentence. To identify which meaning applies to a word from a list of 
dictionary entries, one must examine the sentence in which the word occurs. 
How else would one know, for example, whether the word go is meant to 
denote a game, an action, or a command? Here, the sentence is the context 
unit and the word is the recording unit (p. 101). 
 
Unlike sampling units, which appear to be a widely accepted and undisputed term, 
“much of the discussion on the ‘unit of analysis’ confuses the issues of what should 
form the basis for coding with what should form the basis for measuring or counting 
the amount of disclosure” (Milne and Adler, 1999, p. 243, see e.g. Gray et al.’s, 
1995b, assertion that, “Sentences are to be preferred if one is seeking to infer 
meaning… [but] Pragmatically, pages are… [an] easier… unit to measure by hand”, 
p. 84; see also Guthrie et al., 2008 for similar arguments). Part of this confusion may 
be generated from the use of different, and at times opposite, terms from researchers 
(e.g. Milne and Adler’s, 1999, coding units are what Krippendorff, 2004, describes 
as context units and Neuendorf, 2002, as analysis units, whilst Milne and Adler’s 
measurement units are Krippendorff’s recording/coding units and Neuendorf’s data 
collection units, although see also Walden and Schwartz, 1997; Unerman, 1998, as 
cited by O’Dwyer, 1999, pp. 229-232 and O’Dwyer, 1999, for alternative 
interpretations). In this study, Krippendorff’s (2004) terminology is adopted, which 
is in accordance with a number of other prominent CA theorists (Grey et al. 1949; 
Berelson, 1952; Osgood, 1959; Stone et al., 1966; Weber, 1985; 1990).  
  
Most of the CA studies refer to a single unit of analysis, that being most frequently 
the recording unit for the volumetric studies and the context unit for the index ones. 
This is not surprising given that in the index studies, where most frequently the 
recording unit is the presence or absence of specific information, the unit that usually 
needs attention is the context one (see, e.g. Patten and Crampton, 2004, pp. 39-40, 
for an illustrative account on how sentences were used as a basis for coding in their 
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index). In contrast, for volumetric studies the recording units seem to be of more 
importance, whilst for the context units, since unlike sampling and recording ones 
they “are not counted, need not be independent of each other, can overlap, and may 
be consulted in the description of several recording units” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 
101), researchers do not often explicitly discuss their choices (but see Zéghal and 
Ahmed, 1990), and meaning is coded perhaps by section heading, phrase or sentence 
(Buhr, 1994; Campbell, 2004).  
 
There seems to be no logical limit on the size of the context units: as Krippendorff 
(2004) notes, “sentences are the minimal context units for individual words, but 
sentences may not be enough” (p. 101), and at times, when, for example, decisions 
on a positive or negative context of a commentary are made, “analysts might need to 
examine even larger context units, such as a paragraph or a whole speech.... The best 
content analyses define their context units as large as is meaningful (adding to their 
validity) and as small as feasible (adding to their reliability)” (pp. 101-102). With 
regard to this, Milne and Adler (1999) argue that, “sentences are far more reliable 
than any other unit of analysis” (p. 243) and further assert that, “Most social and 
environmental content analyses in fact use sentences as the basis for coding 
decisions” (p.243). 
 
Naturally, researchers need to clearly define their context units before commencing 
recording them. Abbot and Monsen (1979) seem to consider a prominent type of 
error in CA to be, “the formulation of categories that do not reflect all the issues 
actually contained in the report that are of... interest” (p. 506). As Holsti (1969a) 
points out, “categories should reflect the purposes of the research, be exhaustive, be 
mutually exclusive, independent, and be derived from a single classification 
principle” (p. 95, emphasis in original). As Milne and Adler (1999) empirically attest 
for inter-rater reliability, “by far the greatest proportion of disagreements concerned 
whether a particular sentence was or was not a social disclosure regardless of the 
coder. If coders had agreed to a sentence being a social disclosure (regardless of 
which theme) they were relatively unlikely to disagree over which theme, what sort 
of evidence and what type of news characteristics the sentence contained” (p. 252). 
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It thus seems particularly useful in CSR research to establish clear rules as to what 
consists CSR and what does not, a problem largely stemming from the variety of 
definitions of the field, that are “generally too exclusive… or too all-embracing” 
(Gray et al., 1995b, fn4, p. 89). This variety of definitions is also reflected in the 
number of alternative terms that at times have been offered to even name the field, 
including: Corporate Social Reporting (Gray et al., 1988; 1995a); Social Accounting 
(Gray, 2002; Gray et al., 1997); Social and Environmental Accounting (Mathews, 
1997; Gray, 2006); Social and Environmental Accounting and Auditing (Owen, 
2004); Social and Environmental Accountability (Parker, 2005); Social 
Responsibility Disclosure (Trotman, 1979; Neu et al., 1998); Corporate Social and 
Ethical Reporting (Adams, 2002); Ethical Reporting (Adams, 2004). Despite that 
these are all terms to refer to (what is here defined as) CSR, and that the adoption of 
a specific term for CSR may sufficiently serve the short-term needs of a 
‘pragmatically–oriented’ research paper, it should be noted that this also adds to the 
long-term confusion over the terminology and the (much sought [Parker, 2005]) 
conceptual framework of the area. Naturally, the adoption of different definitions and 
resulted context categories further prohibits meaningful comparative analyses of the 
findings of the papers. 
 
In the literature four major ‘themes’ (what Holsti, 1969a refers to as manifest subject 
of information, not inductively generated) for CSR are employed: marketplace 
(consumers, creditors), workplace (employees), community, and environment, but 
there will always be a need for a development of an ‘other’ category (Gray et al., 
1995b). This classification was also largely employed in the coding spreadsheet of 
the study, although the sub-categories and decision rules were customised to better 
reflect the study’s objectives, which for illustration purposes is depicted in Figure 
5.2. In the development of the spreadsheet, the CSR classifications of Ernst and Ernst 
(1978) and Gray et al. (1995b) CSR were taken into consideration, as well as those 
of the GRI (2002), which Erusalimsky et al. (2006) consider, along with AA1000, to 
“perhaps represent the very base, the entry-level for analysing reporting in an even 
vaguely serious manner” (p. 19).   
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Figure 5.2 The coding spreadsheet of the study  
 Evidently this was a multiple classification protocol, in that each coding unit was 
classified into more than one category, based on the condition that each entry may have 
more than one attribute. It should be noted, though, that the gain from the adoption of 
this multiple classification in semantic precision does not outweigh the potential losses 
from logical distinctiveness and exclusiveness since, “not all entries need have the same 
attribute to the same extent” (Weber, 1990). This is particularly the case when latent, 
rather than manifest, classification schemes are examined, as further discussed in section 
5.10 
 
Further, it seems reasonable to take a more ‘pragmatic’ rather than ‘classical’ approach 
and suggest that the categories of each study should also reflect the research objectives: 
in the present study the categories reflect the focus on the CSD effects of aviation 
accidents and subsequently the Health and Safety disclosures, whilst for Deegan et al. 
(2002) the categories reflect their focus on Human Resources. Holsti (1969a) considers 
“reflect[ing] the investigator’s research question… [is] the most important requirement 
of categories” (p. 95) and warns that, “Unless theory and technique are intimately 
related, even the minimal requirements of validity cannot be met” (p. 94). This, 
however, should not necessarily be the case for general CSR surveys, where the 
adoption of a more ‘standardised’ approach may increase comparability and cumulative 
research (Berelson, 1952). 
 
As indicated in Figure 5.2, when reviewing and deciding on the context units, all the 
alternative ways to define CSD need to be set and clearly defined. For this study further 
distinctions of the type of disclosure (positive or negative); and the possible underlying 
corporate strategy (3 substantive and 3 symbolic); as well as on whether CSD was 
mandatory or voluntary; and narrative or non-narrative, were developed (by synthesising 
earlier similar attempts in the literature and customising them to better reflect the study’s 
objectives) and included. This resulted in overall (19 choices of theme) x (7 choices of 
strategy) x (3 choices of type) x (2 mandatory/voluntary) x (2 narrative/non-narrative) = 
1,596 possible choices for coding each individual CSD.  
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These distinctions are often called ‘categorical’, where units are defined, “by their 
membership in a class or category – by their having something in common” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 105), and are by far those most frequently employed in CSR 
research. Common characteristics of these are that they can all be quantified; that, to a 
certain extent, they mostly focus on the manifest rather than the latent content and the 
syntactic and semantic dimensions of communication, and that they are all deductively 
defined (and thus, as opposed to subject categories, all relate to a theoretical framework 
[Stone et al. 1966]). Clearly, however, these approaches are not equally useful in 
contributing to CSR research. As Table 5.5 illustrates four types of categorical 
distinctions were identified in the review of the literature, one of them regarding the type 
of CSD (positive, negative and neutral) and three regarding the quality (monetary vs. 
non monetary; general vs. specific, and substantive vs. symbolic). Two of these are 
employed in all cases analysed in the study (positive vs. negative and substantive vs. 
symbolic) and are discussed  in more detail next; an additional one, the mandatory vs. 
voluntary CSD, was employed for one case study and later aborted, as discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6.  
 
Table 5.5 The CSR categorical CA distinctions  
 
Positive vs. 
negative 
Bettman and Weitz, 1983;  Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000; 2002; Patten and 
Crampton, 2004;  Woodward et al., 2008  
Monetary vs. 
non monetary 
Adams et al., 1995; 1998;  Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Andrew et al., 1989; 
Beresford and Cowen, 1979; Burritt and Welch, 1997; Chan, 1979;  Davey, 
1982; Ernst and Ernst, 1978;  Gibson and Guthrie, 1995; Gray et al.,1995b; 
Guthrie, 1983;  Guthrie and Parker, 1990;  Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Ingram, 1978;   Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Milne and Adler, 1999;  Niskala 
and Pretes, 1995;  Patten, 2002b; Trotman, 1979; Ingram and Frazier, 1980;  
Walden and Schwartz, 1997; Wiseman, 1982; Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990 
General vs. 
specific 
De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006  
C
at
eg
or
ic
al
 d
is
tin
ct
io
ns
 
Substantive 
vs. symbolic 
Day and Woodward, 2004; Savage et al., 2000  
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5.9.2.1 Positive vs. negative disclosure 
 
As also discussed earlier under section 4.4.3, a number of CSR studies have often 
employed the positive vs. negative distinction for CSD, which is one of the earliest CA 
distinctions dating back to the 1640s and some studies of censorship (Stone et al., 1966; 
Rosengren, 1981). There are, however, some ‘theoretical’ and practical limitations 
encountered when using this approach. In theory, for example, organisations may 
disclose a significant quantity of positive information to satisfy targeted stakeholders 
(Pfeffer, 1981) indicating a more opportunistic organisational stance towards CSR 
(Gibbins et al., 1990), but they may also do so because this simply reflects their reported 
actions. And when conducting CA it is often difficult to, e.g. differentiate between 
positive and neutral disclosure and achieve consistency and comparability across studies. 
In these cases, as Weber (1990) underlines, “perhaps the best practical strategy is to 
classify each word, sentence or phrase in the category where it most clearly belongs” (p. 
36). 
 
It seems, therefore that positive or negative CSD when considered per se cannot 
contribute significantly to CSR analysis. On the contrary, more sustainable arguments 
seem to be built when the positive or negative CSD is related to similarly classified 
evidence from, e.g. news papers or periodicals, related to community concern (Guthrie 
and Parker, 1989; Deegan et al., 2002), or when, as in the present study, the changes in 
this type of reporting are considered as potential reaction to major social accidents.  
 
Following the discussion in section 4.4.3, and in order to empirically investigate 
propositions 3 and 4 (predicting that organisations will increase their positive and 
negative CSD following the accident), CSD was further classified as ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’ or ‘neutral’, similarly to a number of other CSR studies (see Table 6.3). The 
definitions applicable to the categories of ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘neutral’ 
environmental disclosure are similar to the ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ definitions 
chosen by Hogner (1982), Deegan and Gordon (1996), Deegan and Rankin (1996), and 
Brown and Deegan, and are as follows: 
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 ? Positive: refers to information about corporate social and environmental 
activities which have a positive or beneficial impact upon society. 
? Negative: refers to information about corporate social and environmental 
activities, which have a negative or deleterious impact upon society. 
? Neutral: refers to information about corporate social and environmental 
activities, which neither have a positive/beneficial not a negative/deleterious 
impact upon society. 
 
Although the definitions of these categories were adopted from the aforementioned 
studies, the decision rules (provided in Appendix C) were customised, to better reflect 
the study’s objectives and the choice of the aviation industry (ex post details of the 
employment of this distinction are provided in section 6.5.3). Naturally, this distinction 
is even more useful when viewed in relation to an approximation to CSD quality, as 
discussed below.   
 
5.9.2.2 Substantive vs. symbolic disclosure 
 
Often researchers attempt to assess the quality/evidence of the disclosure. Hammond and 
Miles (2004) offer a comprehensive account on quality assessment of CSR and note that 
what is most frequently regarded as quality disclosure is quantitative disclosure, third 
party verification and the adoption of reporting guidelines and standards. Most 
frequently CA index studies on the basis of disclosure/ non disclosure have been 
employed to assist in both third party verification (Ball et al., 2000; O’Dwyer and Owen, 
2005) and adoption of reporting guidelines (Jones, 2006; Moneva et al., 2006; Turner et 
al., 2006). This type of assessment, though, is limited “as this precludes assessment on 
scope, coverage, completeness, relevance, reliability, and other such desirable qualities 
of external financial statements” (Hammond and Miles, 2004, p. 64).  
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Whilst both third party verification and adoption of reporting guidelines are relatively 
new CSR research fields, CA studies employing the basic distinction of quantitative vs. 
qualitative have a long history and are frequently identified in the CSR literature. Behind 
this evidence, there is the intent of researchers to identify whether companies disclose 
hard-fact, substantial information or not. However, a major limitation of this distinction 
is that it is not normatively rooted; as Erusalimsky et al. (2006) note, “Content analysis 
got us so far but more substantive, explicitly normative templates would seem to be 
essential to guide future work” (p. 19). With regard to this distinction, it is uncertain 
whether all the quantitative information that companies disclose is of relevance (since, 
e.g. they may disclose some industry CSR data) or that all declarative statements are of 
less importance (e.g. description of policies adopted providing specific examples). 
Likewise, it is unlikely that the general vs. specific distinction that was also identified in 
the literature (De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006) would be of particular usefulness to 
CSR, considering that it brings some relatively limited benefits in context (by focusing 
on more normatively oriented, latent information) comparing to the limitations in 
validity (in the case of an index approach being employed, as in De Villers and Van 
Staden, 2006) or reliability (from the otherwise possibly vague definitions). 
 
A more useful CA distinction, based on LT, appears to be the substantive vs. symbolic 
distinction. This distinction was suggested by Pfeffer and colleagues (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981, see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Richardson, 1985; 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Weisul, 2002 for related arguments) and has 
not been employed widely in the CSR context (but see Savage et al., 2000; Day and 
Woodward, 2004, for exceptions). As discussed earlier in section 4.4.2, substantive 
legitimation involves, “real, material change to organizational goals, structures and 
processes, or in socially institutionalized practices” (Savage et al., 2000, p. 48); whereas, 
symbolic legitimation on the other hand involves, “the symbolic transformation of the 
identity or meaning of acts to conform to social values” and is predicated on, “the 
acceptance of authority resides in the belief in the legitimacy of the order independently 
of the validity of that order” (Richardson, 1985, p. 143, emphasis in original).  
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Drawing on organisational theory and their own research, Savage et al. (2000) have 
offered 12 legitimation strategies (three substantive and nine symbolic) which could also 
incorporate Perrow’s (1970), Lindblom (1993) and O’Donovan (2002) approaches and 
are presented in Appendix D (I). However, when it was attempted to apply this 
framework as such in the present study it was quickly realised that some of the symbolic 
strategies were easily conflated and it was decided to merge some categories, adopt a 
more ‘pragmatic’ approach, and customise it to reflect the research questions, focusing 
on the impacts on CSR of detrimental activities. This resulted in the employment of six 
legitimation strategies, as depicted in Appendix D (II). The new categories were thus 
less ambiguous, although it should be noted that two categories, those of role 
performance and the identification of symbols, ended up being used more often as will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (section 6.5.4 - arguably, there is no way 
out of this unless complicated, exhaustive and time-consuming decision rules are 
established allowing for the use of more detailed categorisations). Appendix D (III) 
offers some examples on how these strategies are employed in the study. 
 
The main benefit of this distinction, albeit categorical, is that it assists in identifying 
latent characteristics of the data. Further, since parts of these arguments may also lend 
support to other theoretical frameworks (such as institutional theory, business ethics 
theory, resource dependence theory and even image and competitive advantage 
arguments), the categories may also identify relationships between these theories and 
synthesise theoretical arguments underpinning CSR research (as in, e.g. Roberts and 
Chen, 2006). However, as in the case of positive vs. negative CSD, some theoretical 
inconsistencies may also arise from the adoption of this approach and, e.g. even more 
‘ethics’-oriented organisations, following a major legitimacy threat, may disclose 
increased symbolic, rather than substantive, CSD through admitting guilt and offering 
apologies. As also pointed out earlier, therefore, when this categorical approach is 
complemented with a clearly inductive one, in a mixed CA design as in the present 
study, this further brings some triangulation benefits to the analysis. The discussion of 
the qualitative CA of the study follows the one of the recording units of the quantitative 
CA, which is provided next. 
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 5.9.3 Recording units 
 
Recording/coding units are defined by Holsti (1969a) as, “the specific segment of 
content that is characterized by placing it in a given category” (p. 116). As Krippendorff 
(2004) elaborates:  
 
Whereas sampling units are distinguished for inclusion in or exclusion from an 
analysis, ideally in a way that acknowledges natural boundaries, recording units 
are distinguished to be separately described or categorized. Thus recording units 
are typically contained in sampling units, at most coinciding with them, but 
never exceeding them (pp. 99-100). 
 
Whilst for the basis for coding researchers seem to concede that, “Sentences are to be 
preferred if one is seeking to infer meaning” (Gray et al., 1995b, p. 84, see also Milne 
and Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000), with regard to the basis for measuring, “once the 
content has been coded… quantification may be done in a number of ways” (Milne and 
Adler, 1999, p. 243). Indeed, researchers have at times employed a variety of different 
approaches to measurement, often justifying their choice on the considerable empirical 
evidence (Grey et al., 1949; Patten, 1992; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and 
Rankin, 1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Williams, 1999; Campbell, 2000), which 
gives support to the suggestion “that measurement error between various quantification 
techniques is likely to be quite negligible” (Milne and Adler, 1999, p. 243). However, as 
now illustrated, each unit has its distinct advantages and disadvantages that need to be 
considered when selecting units and interpreting results.  
  
The four types of recording units considered here are words, sentences, proportion of 
pages and page size data33. A summary of a number of issues of concern, drawn from 
                                                 
33 Wiseman (1982) and Patten (2002b) also counted lines, in a complementary manner to an ‘index’ CA. 
Lines have also been employed by, e.g. Bowman and Haire (1975; 1976) and Trotman and Bradley 
(1981), but in order to estimate the proportion of the total discussion on all issues. Davey (1982, cited in 
Guthrie and Mathews, 1985, pp. 258-259) interestingly determined the volume of disclosures by 
calculating words as composed of five characters and a one character space (six characters in total), in 
essence a character-based quantification, similar to the one adopted by Tinker and Neimark (1987). 
Although it should be acknowledged that, particularly characters, could possibly bring extra precision in 
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the literature regarding these units, is provided in Table 5.6 and are discussed in more 
detail in the next sections, dedicated to the review of these recording units. 
 
Table 5.6 Recording units’ consideration of an array of issues of concern 
 
Words Sentences 
% of 
pages 
Page size 
data 
Inclusion of 
images/graphs, 
Large typeface 
within report 
    
Subjective 
measurements and 
internet   
  
Report physical 
size and font size; 
margins and blank 
pages; pdf and 
microfiche forms 
    
Detail in 
measurements     
Ease, errors in 
measurements      
Inclusion of tables 
    
Is
su
es
 o
f c
on
ce
rn
 
Grammar and 
repetition      
                                                                                                                                                
measurements, as Milne and Adler (1999) note for words, this “seems unlikely to add to understanding” 
(p. 243). It is further assumed that the arguments behind the potential use of these units are subsumed in 
the discussion of e.g. words or sentences. Further, Burritt and Welch (1997) counted passages/thematic 
units – an approach to measurement, however, highly contested, given that equal sovereignty was granted 
to issues discussed in one sentence with others in whole paragraphs, where further reliability is very 
difficult to be attained (Holsti, 1969). 
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5.9.3.1 Words, sentences and proportion of pages 
 
As previously illustrated in Table 5.3, a number of CSR studies have employed words or 
sentences as the recording unit. As further illustrated in Table 5.6, these two approaches 
share a number of benefits and limitations and their interrelation has been empirically 
validated as early as 1947 (Dollard and Mower, 1947). Both approaches do not account 
for differences in typeface within the document (Hackston and Milne, 1996) or for 
repetitions in the information (Patten, 2002a). However, both approaches are also not 
affected by variations in the general font size of different documents (Tilt and Symes, 
1999) or by the presence of margins or blank pages (Gray et al., 1995b), nor yet by 
whether the sources are in an electronic (particularly Internet or .pdf files) or in 
microfiche form (Campbell, 2004). They generally seem to “lend themselves to a more 
controllable analysis” (Gao et al., 2005). 
 
Compared to sentences, words seem to have the advantage of being, “the smallest unit of 
measurement for analysis and can be expected to provide the maximum robustness in 
assessing the quantity of disclosure” (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000, p. 16). As 
Krippendorff (2004) similarly argues, “To ensure agreement among different analysts in 
describing the coding/recording units of a content analysis, it is desirable to define these 
units of description as the smallest units that bear all the information needed in the 
analysis, words being perhaps the smallest meaningful units of text… and the safest 
recording unit for written documents” (pp. 100, 104). Further, words as the recording 
unit may also assist by allowing the inclusion of tables in the analysis (but see Hackston 
and Milne’s, 1996, approximation for one table line to equal one sentence, which allows 
tables also to be captured when using sentences as the recording unit).  
 
A number of studies, though, have questioned the usefulness of the additional detail in 
measurements from employing words rather than sentences. Researchers note that the 
“tedious exactitude” (Patterson and Woodward, 2006, pp. 21-22) of words “seems 
unlikely to add to understanding” (Milne and Adler, 1999, p. 243) and put forward 
arguments for the use of sentences, since these are also, “easily recognizable 
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syntactically defined units of text” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 105); they may be quantified 
with greater measurement accuracy (Unerman, 2000); they are thus subject to less inter-
coder variation (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Deegan et al., 2002); and overall seem to be 
able, “to provide complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis” (Milne and 
Adler, 1999, p. 243).  
 
A strong argument, however against employing either words or sentences as recording 
units, “is that this will result in any non-narrative CSR disclosures (such as photographs 
or charts) being ignored” (Unerman, 2000, pp. 675). As Beattie and Jones (1997) have 
argued particularly with regards to graphs, approximately 80% of leading US and UK 
companies use them in their ARs; these are more user-friendly than tables; and graphs, 
especially in colour, attract the reader’s attention; additionally “the reader’s ability to 
remember visual information is normally superior to that for remembering numerical or 
textual information” (Beattie and Jones, 1997, p. 34, a justification supported by 
Leivian, 1980). Photographs have also been used to present and highlight what 
companies wish to portray (Preston et al., 1996) and it seems that the role of graphic 
representation in corporate external financial reporting is being recognised increasingly 
by a number of national regulatory bodies, such as the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (Beattie and Jones, 1997).  It is thus evident that this information needs not 
to be excluded from CA studies (see also similar arguments by Berelson, 1952; Stone et 
al., 1966). 
 
In an attempt to capture this valuable non-narrative information, a number of researchers 
employ proportions of a page as the recording unit. Researchers frequently lay an A4 
grid with twenty-five rows of equal height and four columns of equal width (but see, e.g. 
the different A4 grids of Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Hackston and Milne, 1996; and 
Newson and Deegan, 2002) across each CSR disclosure, “with volume being counted as 
the number of cells on the grid taken up by a disclosure” (Unerman, 2000, p. 676). The 
main benefit of this approach, other than capturing the information provided in a 
pictorial, tabular, graphic or large typeface form, is that it generates detailed 
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measurements and comparable findings across reports of the same and different 
companies.  
  
The proportions of a page approach, however, has been also criticised for a number of 
reasons, mainly because it takes as data only dictated attributes of the content 
(statements about the content made by the analyst or participants in the research) and not 
the content itself, which results in arbitrarily created visual recording units (Ekman et 
al., 1969; Paisley, 1969). Further, given that “it is difficult to place an objective measure 
on pictures and diagrams” (Deegan et al., 2000, p. 118) researchers often find it difficult 
to decide on whether this information is CSR or not, and then on how to classify it. As 
Newson and Deegan (2002) note, “in a number of cases, the expert coder regarded 
photographic evidence referring to employees in a work environment as less relevant 
than photographic evidence highlighting employees celebrating acts of achievement” (p. 
193). In addition, as Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) note, although arguably pictures may 
be worth a thousand words (but which words?), “to include them in a measure based 
upon an unweighted word count is highly subjective” (p. 17).   
 
Further limitations of the proportions of a page approach include that it is affected by 
different font and page sizes (Tilt and Symes, 1999; Woodward et al., 2008); that an 
additional area of subjectivity is introduced with regard to the treatment of margins and 
blank pages (Gray et al., 1995b; Unerman, 2000); that the approach is as similarly 
affected as words and sentences by the differences in grammar and repetition34 (Patten, 
2002a); that the additional thoroughness and effort required in the use of the grid for 
recording increases the possibility for measurement errors (Milne and Adler, 1999); and 
that it is impossible to directly record data in an electronic (e.g. Internet or pdf) or 
microfiche form (Campbell, 2004). It should be noted that, even if it is attempted to print 
(as Patten and Crampton, 2004, did) or type (as Ingram and Frazier, 1980, did) data in 
one of these forms, this would still result in some distortion to the size and context (e.g. 
margins, font and page sizes are often affected). Thus, the inherent limitations of this 
                                                 
34 Although Unerman (2000a) points out the possible limitations arising from differences in the use of 
grammar when he discusses sentences, it should be noted that grammar and repetition are context issues 
and thus affect all recording methods.  
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approach lend support to researchers to reject it and, albeit acknowledging the losses 
from the exclusion of pictorial or graphical evidence, to adopt words or sentences as 
recording units.  
 
5.9.3.2 Page size approach  
 
In an attempt to employ an alternative and more valid method for CSR measurements, a 
number of studies adopt, implicitly or explicitly, a page size approach (where “the 
written and pictorial part of a page… [is] considered to be the page itself”, Gray et al., 
1995b, fn16, p. 90). The basic tenet of this analysis is that when measuring the extent of 
disclosures, the collected data should be considered in conjunction with the physical 
source from which they are extracted. Most frequently researchers attempt to estimate 
CSD as proportional to the whole discussion in the report, often on a line-by-line 
(Bowman and Haire, 1975; 1976; Trotman and Bradley, 1981) or on a sentence-by-
sentence (Salama, 2003; Hasseldine et al., 2005) basis. However, even when authors 
such as Dierkes (1979) report that they measure the extent of CSD in number of pages of 
each report (or as quarters of a page of each report, as in Gibson and Guthrie, 1995), this 
implies that a page size, rather than a standardised proportions of an A4 page approach, 
was adopted. Major limitations of this approach are that researchers do not seem to 
include pictures when employing it and, even more importantly, that it would have been 
meaningless to adopt it in a research examining stand-alone CSR reports, where it has 
been suggested (Buhr, 1994) that coding should commence on the assumption that 
everything should be considered CSD apart from some pre-specified information.  
 
Hackston and Milne’s (1996) study is a potentially more credible adaptation of a page 
size approach. The authors originally sentence-coded and measured their data sets and 
then constructed an approximation to page measurement from these data: firstly, “the 
average number of sentences per page of the chairman’s report for each AR was 
calculated. The average for each report was then divided into the total number of social 
disclosure sentences for that report to produce a derived page measurement for each 
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company” (p. 86). Despite their acknowledged crudeness of this measure, when some 
refinements are made to it (more sentences from pages containing non-pictorial 
information are included in the estimation of the average and a detailed page-adjusted 
grid is also employed to account for the space of non-narrative disclosure) 35 it may 
provide more valid results than the proportion of page approach.   
 
As illustrated in Table 5.6, this approach is not affected by the report or font sizes, 
neither by the margins and blank pages, and although it provides less detailed 
measurements, it is easier to measure and further is not affected by a possible 
pdf/microfiche form of the text (even if printing affects the documents’ size, it still has 
no effect on page size measurements). It thus seems to capture the information identified 
as CSR in a more valid way than the proportion of page approach (particularly given its 
triangulation benefits from the additional use of sentences) and to further generate more 
reliable results. However, given that the generated data are in a page size and not in a 
standardised A4 page form, this implies that the derived measure (similarly to the 
proportions of the report one) could provide meaningful average CSD approximations, 
but crude aggregate figures unless the average sentences per report of all added derived 
measures is known and adjustments are made; thus for the purposes of a database such 
as the one of the Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR), 
the employment of standardised proportions of A4 pages is deemed more suitable to 
avoid tedious adjustments. 
 
The present study utilises a refinement to Hackston and Milne’s (1996) page size 
approach. To further increase the validity of their instrument, all pages containing solely 
narrative information were considered for the calculation of the number of sentences per 
page (i.e. to get an accurate approximation of how many images of that report would 
‘fit’ in the same space). Further, for the reports in hard copy, as illustrated in Figure 5.3, 
a clear plastic A4 acetate was employed to draw a page-size grid with eight rows of 
equal height and five columns of equal width and the proportions were estimated to the 
                                                 
35 Tinker and Neimark (1987) in an attempt to develop an aggregate textual and pictorial character 
measure of CSD “by counting the number of textual characters that would fit into the photographs that 
address the subject” (p. 80) seem to employ a similar measurement approach. 
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nearest 1% of a page (for the documents in electronic form a specialised .pdf reader 
software, incorporating a detailed 25x35 cell ‘grid’ view, was employed)36. Despite the 
fact that the page grid employed for the data in printed form was not as detailed as the 
ones employed by Gray et al. (1995b) or Unerman (2000a), (but was still significantly 
more detailed than quantifications on the basis of the nearest tenth or even quarter of a 
page [e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989] that seem to have been employed in a number of 
earlier studies [Hackston and Milne, 1996]) – since only tables, images and narratives in 
large typeface were recorded in this manner – it was considered that the use of a more 
detailed grid would add more to the possibility of measurement errors rather than to the 
validity of the findings.  
 
By thus additionally considering the pictorial information and by employing multiple 
approaches to measurement (sentences, pages and proportions of AR), it was expected to 
better measure the identified CSR information and improve the validity of the 
inferences. This was essential given the propositions of the study, focusing on measuring 
the change in the levels of CSR following the relevant accident.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Note that a number of practicalities may arise when it is attempted to estimate the ‘average’ page size, 
both in terms of sentences and in terms of written and pictorial space of the report: e.g. in BA (2000) there 
seem to be two main types of page, including on average either 24 or 44 sentences, in which case a 
weighted average number of sentences per page was estimated. A similar approach was employed to 
estimate the average page size grid of the report to measure the pictorial space. 
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Figure 5.3. An illustration of the employment of a 6X8 grid on a BA (2002, p. 11) report 
page to estimate page size data 
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 5.10 Thematic distinctions 
 
Although Boyatzis (1998) considers that, “a theme may be identified at the manifest 
level or at the latent level”, Berelson (1952), Holsti (1969a) and Krippendorff (2004) 
seem to agree that thematic distinctions, as opposed to the categorical distinction of the 
‘theme’ (the subject) of the disclosure described in CA protocols, such as the one 
depicted in Figure 5.2, refer to “unitizing freely generated narratives thematically” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 107). Two such approaches were identified in the literature, 
being those of Miles and Huberman (1994) and Bebbington and Gray (2000). Both did 
not take a quantitative form, therefore may consist of a CA in the broader view (i.e. 
encompassing both quantitative and qualitative approaches to analysis), as defined by 
Stone et al. (1966), Holsti (1969a,b) and Krippendorff (1969). 
 
This section focuses on the qualitative analysis of the study, which is principally 
informed by these two approaches. A review of the ‘quantising’ approach by Huberman 
and Miles is provided first. Then, Bebbington and Gray’s (2000) approach, building on 
Huberman and Miles, is introduced, and the way it informs the qualitative analysis of the 
present study is explained. 
 
5.10.1 ‘Quantising’ by Miles and Huberman (1994) 
 
In this project, the approach to data analysis suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), 
and which Ritchie and Lewis (2003) have adapted and graphically represented as an 
analytical hierarchy of the stages and processes in qualitative analysis (see Appendix A), 
has been largely adopted. This ‘quantising’ approach of Miles and Huberman (1994), 
similarly to the works of King (1998) and Lillis (1999), involves primarily three forms 
of activity: data management in which the raw data are reviewed, labelled-coded, sorted 
and synthesised; descriptive accounts in which the analyst makes use of the ordered data 
to identify key dimensions, map the range and diversity of each phenomenon and 
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develop classifications and typologies; and explanatory accounts in which the analyst 
builds explanations about why the data take the forms that are found and presented 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  
 
CSR authors have adopted this analytical perspective with variations regarding the 
precision with which they conducted each stage of the analysis. Owen et al. (2000), 
Woodward et al. (2001), Adams (2002) and  Roslender and Fincham (2004) presented 
their findings by set preposition, or under interest topic, implying at least the use of the 
identification of initial themes and sorting data by theme or concepts steps of the 
hierarchy, and then moved straight to develop explanations. O’Donovan (2002) 
identified themes and patterns, detected cross patterns with his quantitative data set and 
moved to develop explanations, applying rather loosely the analytical hierarchy, 
although he followed a systematic approach to combine the qualitative with the 
quantitative data in the analysis stage. O’Dwyer (1999; 2002; 2003; 2004) on the other 
hand, explicitly adopted the Miles and Huberman’s (1994) approach by identifying 
underlying themes, developing a coding scheme, summarising and synthesising data, 
identifying cross-case patterns in the data and detecting regularities and developing 
explanations for the evidence collected. He was also cautious in the last-generalisation-
step to avoid presenting a, “smoothed set of generalisations that may not apply to a 
single ‘interview’” (Huberman and Miles, 1994, p. 435) and made efforts to preserve the 
uniqueness of certain individual interviews (see particularly O’Dwyer, 2004, for a more 
detailed and focused description of his approach).  
 
The distinct benefits of this approach include that it offers a simple, grounded and 
therefore, quite valid approach to qualitative analysis, which allows for all variation in 
themes and topics to be revealed and captured. This is particularly useful when 
exploratory research is conducted and the widest possible variety of themes is sought. 
Further, although this method of data analysis is primarily qualitative, as Easterby-Smith 
et al. (2002) note, “it is still possible to introduce some element of quantification into the 
process” (p. 119), particularly when employing some computer-aided qualitative 
analysis software. Despite how valuable Huberman and Miles’ (1994) approach had 
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been for the studies utilising it, though, it is not adopted, as such, in the present study. 
The three forms of activity identified by Huberman and Miles (1994) (data management; 
descriptive accounts; and, explanatory accounts development) are employed here; 
further, their approach has principally informed the undertaking of the development of 
descriptive accounts and explanatory accounts activities; however, their more 
‘grounded’ approach to data management, where data are reviewed to identify themes 
and topics to develop codes, is not shared in this study. 
 
As discussed in detail earlier under section 5.4.2, Yin’s (2009) approach to multi-case 
study explanatory analysis has been adopted. The primary objective of this approach is, 
“to provide analytical evidence about the empirical validity of the underlying theory” 
(Savage et al., 2000, p. 51), and, to use the pre-specified theory “as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 1989, p. 38), rather than 
to take a completely grounded approach and attempt to build a theory, as Huberman and 
Miles’ (1994) approach to data management would entail. Although it could be argued 
that this decision possibly threatens the validity of the analysis’ findings, as further 
explained below, the emphasis is still on explaining all the data: if the outcome of a case 
is not as predicted, then the theory must be modified and theory development takes 
place. As the discussion below illustrates, Yin’s (2009) approach to qualitative analysis 
used in this study is closely related to the one used by Bebbington and Gray (2000). 
 
5.10.2 The variation of Bebbington and Gray (2000) 
 
The purpose of Bebbington and Gray (2000) study was, “to explore how the concept of 
sustainable development has been written about by United Kingdom corporations in 
their environmental reports” (p. 2). Drawing upon the social constructionism literature, 
the authors employ a so-called ‘semiotic analysis’, in an “attempt to categorise and 
explain disclosures regarding sustainable development”; and “four areas are focused on 
in order to dissect the nature of the accounts constructed” (p.2). 
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Bebbington and Gray’s (2000) methodological approach was similar to Huberman and 
Miles’ (1994) in a number of ways: all three forms of activity identified by Huberman 
and Miles (1994) were undertaken; following data management, some descriptive 
categories were created; and, following the synthesis of the data, explanatory accounts 
were developed. With regard to data management, though, Bebbington and Gray (2000) 
seemed to have implicitly followed Yin’s (1989) approach. 
 
Bebbington and Gray (2000) follow a three-step approach to data management: The 
authors firstly describe their research questions and explain what data need to be 
collected to address them: e.g. for their research question relevant to ‘who appears to be 
educating corporations about sustainable development’, the authors explain that this 
issue “is addressed by examining the various definitions of sustainability which are used 
by corporations and by studying which organisations are influencing companies’ 
understanding of sustainable development (p. 20). Then, the so-called ‘semiotic’ 
categories are developed, based on the research questions and the literature: e.g. with 
regard to the above research question, various sustainability definitions are drawn from 
major organisations that possibly influence the examined companies’ stance. 
Subsequently: 
 
an examination of the disclosures using these categories was then undertaken and 
an initial identification and classification of these disclosures attempted. These 
initial categories, however did not prove sufficient for analysis… as a result, the 
categories were further refined drawing again from the relevant literature… [and] 
were also added inductively from the analysis of the environmental reports 
themselves (pp. 21-20).  
 
Thus, the data management approach adopted in Bebbington and Gray’s study is in 
accord to both ‘pattern matching’ and ‘explanation building’ qualitative analysis 
techniques, dictated by Yin (2009) for multi-case explanatory research designs. Pattern- 
matching was implicitly employed by Bebbington and Gray as a final step for their 
analysis. According to this technique, an empirical pattern is compared with a predicted 
pattern, following the theoretical propositions of the framework. In explanatory studies, 
the patterns may be related to the dependent (i.e. social and environmental disclosures in 
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the form of legitimation strategies) and independent (i.e. adverse news media reports and 
legitimacy gaps) variables. If the patterns coincide, the validity of the study is 
strengthened (Yin, 2009). 
 
Yin’s (1989; 2009) approach to ‘explanation building’, also adopted by Savage et al. 
(2000), seems to have further been implicitly employed in Bebbington and Gray’s 
analysis. The explanation building technique is suitable for explanatory case studies and 
the objective is to build a general explanation that fits each of the individual cases, even 
though the details of the individual cases may vary (Yin, 2009). Evidently, following 
‘pattern-matching”, by noticing that some data could not have been explained by their 
initial categories, Bebbington and Gray (2000) re-visited those, and thus, modified their 
theory, in an attempt to explain all the data, in accord with Yin’s (2009) ‘explanation 
building’ suggestions.   
 
In contrast to Miles and Huberman (1994), Bebbington and Gray’s approach employs 
originally theory-driven ‘pragmatic’ codes and thus, despite the subsequent attempts to 
explain all text, this still damages the method’s qualitative orientation. Further, it should 
be noted that undertaking this analysis is time consuming, albeit considerably more time 
efficient than the Miles and Huberman approach. An additional limitation may be that 
this approach is not as easily quantified as that of Miles and Huberman, since usually a 
smaller number of codes is generated. Still, this approach is in accord with Holsti’s 
(1969b) suggestion for, “continual moving back and forth between data and theory” (p. 
116) and even when not coupled with quantitative analysis, it can still provide the 
research with a particularly useful qualitative perspective. Most importantly, since 
‘pragmatic’ categories are employed, this approach addresses the concerns over the 
propositions of the study not being particularly useful, in identifying the specific OL 
variants towards CSR, since in this complementary analysis the OL variants can be 
utilised as ‘pragmatic’ codes and the whole text can be scanned for supporting or 
otherwise evidence.  
 
 
169
Consequently, Bebbington and Gray’s (2000) approach to qualitative analysis has been 
adopted in this study, considering its suitability to the purposes of this explanatory 
research (and also for the reasons of being a more ‘pragmatic’ and time-economic 
approach than that of Miles and Huberman), within Yin’s multi-case explanatory 
research design. The Annual and stand-alone reports employed for the quantitative CA 
of the study are also employed at this stage. Firstly, the ‘pattern-matching’ categories are 
developed, based on the four OL variants of the developed framework in chapter 4. 
Then, the ‘pattern-matching’ activity is undertaken as many times as necessary in order 
to refine the categories so as to explain all the data. Subsequently, the descriptive 
accounts of the study are generated, synthesising all the collected evidence under the 
developed categories; and finally, the explanatory accounts are generated from the 
descriptive ones and inferences to the OL framework are made.  
 
Nevertheless, in addition to adopting Bebbington and Gray’s approach (and thus their 
‘pattern matching’ and ‘explanation building’ techniques), two more of Yin’s (2009) 
analytic techniques inherent in the longitudinal, multi-case research design of the study 
have been employed: time-series analysis and cross case synthesis37. Time-series 
analysis allows tracing changes in variables over time and is evidently primarily used in 
quantitative CA to investigate the propositions; however, this technique is also used in 
qualitative CA in conjunction with the ‘pattern matching’ activity, to trace these changes 
over time and further inform the findings. Considering that five cases are investigated, 
cross-case synthesis of the findings from each case is also necessary and further 
improves the robustness of the inferences (Yin, 2009). The cross-case analysis of the 
study is presented in chapter 8 and, following Yin’s suggestion, this is based on, “the 
creation of word [in addition to the numerical] tables that display the data from the 
individual cases according to some uniform framework” (p.156). It was thus expected 
that adopting a variety of analysis techniques from the study with the most coherent and 
comprehensive approaches to multi-case explanatory research (i.e. Yin’s study, as 
                                                 
37 Yin (2009) in total recommends five analytic techniques. The only one not employed here is the ‘logic 
models’ which largely resemble experiments and is thus not particularly suitable to this research, as also 
discussed in session 5.4.1. 
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suggested by Colbert and Spicer, 1995 and Savage et al., 2000), would allow for a more 
in-depth investigation of the cases and more valid inferences via the framework. 
 
5.11 Summary  
 
This chapter has provided an ex ante review of the adapted CA approach and has 
discussed in more detail the research design, data collection and analysis methods of the 
study. The study’s methods involve a longitudinal adaptation of Yin’s (2009) multi-case 
study, explanatory research design, with Annual and stand-alone reports as data, and 
both quantitative and qualitative CA as data analysis methods. The findings of a 
systematic review on the employment of CA in CSR literature, conducted for the 
purposes of this study were primarily discussed. The conclusions that may be drawn 
from this review are related to three areas of concern.  
 
Firstly, with regard to the index vs. amount/volume approaches, it seems that nowadays, 
with so much CSR information disclosed, volumetric studies may contribute more to the 
analysis than index ones. Index measures, however, do have some distinct advantages 
over volumetric ones in that, to the extent that the presence or absence of specific 
information is sought, particularly when, “what is not disclosed [is] seen as important as 
that which is” (Adams and Harte, 1998, p. 783), they are not significantly affected by 
contextual issues, such as repetition or grammar; and since they, further, have clearly 
defined measurement units they are more reliable. Nevertheless, a volumetric approach 
to CA has been adopted in this study, given the nature of its propositions. 
 
Secondly, with regard to the units of analysis, then similarly to Unerman (2000a), it 
should be noted that the selective use of information, relative to both the sampling units 
(e.g. exclusive use of ARs) and the recording units (e.g. exclusive consideration of 
narrative CSD), limits significantly the validity of the findings. With regard to the 
sampling units, issues such as the choice on the industry (aviation), the timescale (five 
years), and the companies to be investigated (BA, AF, AA, SIA and SAS) were clarified 
in the chapter. Further, as regard to volumetric recording units, it seems that, at least in 
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theory, page size data are superior to proportion of page data (particularly considering 
that the former count the narrative information in some textual unit, whilst the latter 
measure it in essence, in terms of square centimetres) and this approach (following a 
refinement to the one originally suggested by Hackston and Milne, 1996) has been 
consequently primarily employed in this study. In addition to page size data, sentences 
and proportions of the AR are also employed as measurement units to increase the 
validity of the findings.  
 
Thirdly, with regard to the ways to define CA units, two ‘categorical’ distinctions have 
been adopted throughout the study, one of the regarding the type of CSD (positive vs. 
negative) and the other regarding the quality (substantive vs. symbolic). The thematic 
approach by Bebbington and Gray (2000) is also adopted along with a number of Yin’s 
(2009) recommended analysis techniques (i.e. pattern matching, explanation building, 
time series, and cross-case analyses). It generally seems that traditional distinctions, 
such as monetary vs. declarative, or even positive vs. negative, need to be complemented 
with more meaningful approaches. These can either take the form of explicitly 
normative templates that could be included in a CA protocol and be quantified (e.g. 
substantive vs. symbolic distinction) or take a more qualitative form, of a varying degree 
of structure, such as the two thematic approaches (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Bebbington and Gray, 2000) reviewed. In either case, when conducting qualitative CA it 
is equally important to follow a clearly justified and specified approach to the analysis, 
to enhance both validity and reliability of the findings. 
 
Having presented and justified the methods of the study, the discussion can proceed to 
the next chapter. This is written from an ex post angle to the analysis and provides a 
reflective account of the data collection and analysis process, including some 
methodological findings.  
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Chapter 6 
The employment of the methods-reflections and 
findings 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter, written from an ex ante perspective, provided a justification 
and overview of the study’s methods. This chapter, written from an ex post angle, 
provides some reflections on, and findings from, the use of these methods, with 
particular emphasis on CA, considering the research aims pertaining to the use of CA 
in CSR. Understanding how the analysis was conducted needs to be taken into 
consideration when considering the theoretical findings of the study in the 
subsequent chapters.  
 
Firstly, some reflections and findings on the research design and the sampling units 
(data collection) are provided. The subsequent section considers the recording units. 
Then the discussion moves on to the study’s context units, with reference to: 
reliability and validity; the theme of the disclosure; the positive/negative, 
substantive/symbolic and mandatory/voluntary distinctions; and the thematic 
analysis. Finally a summary of the chapter is provided. 
 
6.2 Reflections on the research design 
 
A couple of issues regarding the research design of the study may be discussed. 
These are the number of the case studies and the number of years involved. With 
regard to the former, it was felt that theoretical saturation had been reached whilst 
conducting and then completing the fourth case study. This concerned both the 
reviewed quantitative and qualitative evidence and, to some extent, is reflected in the 
findings. Therefore, and despite the undisputable unique attributes that each potential 
case contributes to the discussion, it was decided that the benefits derived from 
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investigating the additional case studies would be marginal and thus five cases rather 
than the six originally intended form the basis of this thesis.  
 
The examination of five reporting periods, being two prior to, the year of, and two 
after the accident, is also an issue worthy of attention. Particularly with regard to the 
quantitative analysis it could be argued that Deegan et al’s. (2000) approach 
(investigating two reporting years either side of the accident to also limit the 
possibility of “extraneous events influencing the disclosures” [p.117]) would be 
equally valid. The inclusion of a fifth year, however, allowed for the examination of 
the impact of the September 11th events (which for most of the companies took place 
during the third reporting period) on the companies’ CSR and further contributed 
considerably in the qualitative analysis. 
 
6.3 Reflections on the sampling units 
 
With regard to data collection, the main issue of concern was data availability. This 
related to both the lack of comparative data to use as ‘secondary’ resources and the 
lack of data to be employed as ‘primary’ in the analysis. It should firstly be 
acknowledged the lack of comparative data to be employed, “as a form of control” 
(Deegan et al., 2000, p.115) to exclude the possibility that the (expected) increase in 
the disclosure was a result of e.g. a general upward trend in the industry at the time. 
CSR surveys (such as KPMG, 2005, 2008) seem to conduct ‘index’, as opposed to 
volumetric studies and the only such database that could be employed (the one of 
CSEAR in St. Andrews) does not include data beyond 1999. This lack of 
comparative data was further confirmed, following conversations at conferences, by 
leading academics in the field, including Rob Gray.  
 
To address this issue, Walden and Schwartz (1997) and Deegan et al. (2000) 
undertook some comparative industry analyses. Both these studies, however, 
employed considerably less detailed quantitative CA approaches (e.g. Walden and 
Schwartz only employed a singe categorical distinction and ‘themes’ as recording 
units, whilst Deegan et al. used two categorical distinctions and sentences as 
recording units) and did not conduct complementary qualitative analyses. Primarily 
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due to the considerable investment in time, therefore, that undertaking such analyses 
would entail, given the detailed nature of the study’s coding protocols, they haven’t 
been employed in this research, similarly to Patten (1992) and Woodward et al. 
(2008), and the findings are hence subject to this limitation. Although the extended 
five year span of the study, as discussed in the pervious section, has strengthened the 
comparability of the year-to-year findings and addresses this concern to some extent, 
it is acknowledged that the findings from the quantitative CA can only provide 
tentative evidence and thus not fully confirm, or reject the propositions. This is, 
nevertheless, consistent with the adopted ‘middle-range thinking’ philosophical 
approach of the study, where the primary concern is to generalise the results from the 
mixed methods used to the theoretical framework and not to a larger universe.  
 
Primary data collection also posed problems and the data (un)availability even 
determined the choice on some of the case studies. It was quickly realised that, 
although companies usually keep an online record of their financial statements that 
goes back to the relevant period, they do not necessarily do so for their stand-alone 
CSR documents. And despite that several libraries in London (British Library, 
London Business School) and in Scotland (CSEAR in the University of St Andrews 
and the University of Strathclyde38) were visited, and attempts were made to contact 
the companies directly, some responded by sending the missing documentation (SIA) 
and some others did not (notably Air France, which was the only case study to 
exclusively consider ARs for the analysis despite it was also publishing stand-alone 
CSR reports throughout this period. SIA’s first environmental report was also not 
considered due to its unavailability).  
 
Whilst conducting the analysis, one of the limitations of the decision not to consider 
alternative resources other than the Annual and stand-alone reports became evident, 
when it was discovered that AA had removed some sections from their AR, 
previously dedicated to employees, to post them instead on the Internet: 
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38 It should be noted that one of the reasons to visit the library of the University of Strathclyde was 
that the ARs of that period that SIA had filed with the Companies House (and were obtained upon 
request in microfiche format) were abbreviated versions of their actually published Accounts, as 
available in hard copy in the aforementioned library. The ARs that BA had filed with the Companies 
House were nevertheless the same with their online versions.  
 
You can read more about our efforts during 2000 in the Chairman’s Letter on 
the opposite page. You can get a multi-media view of them on the CD-ROM 
that accompanies the annual report. And on our Web site... you will find the 
information that we traditionally have included in the shareholder, customer 
and employee essays of our printed annual report (2000AR, p.ii). 
 
In studies such as the present one, the inability to include this information in the 
measurements is a limitation to the validity of the relevant inferences. However, this 
raises one more issue of general concern in CA: repetition. Indeed, in a number of 
cases it was found that companies repeated information across reporting media (e.g. 
the CSR information that both BA and SAS present in their ARs often summarises 
the relevant information in their stand-alone reports). And although for the purposes 
of this research a volumetric approach would still be more suitable (and where such 
repetitions were evident, they were interpreted and coded as ‘symbolic’ attempts to 
increase the amount of available information – see Appendix D and section 6.5.4), it 
could be argued that an index approach (as discussed in section 5.8) could better 
address this issue and generally provide a superior assessment for the quality and the 
breadth (but not the extent) of the reported information. 
  
How important it is, nevertheless, not to limit the focus of CSR research by 
exclusively considering ARs, particularly when stand-alone CSR information is also 
publicly available, is evident when the Table 6.1 is considered.  
 
Table 6.1 Source of CSD (in pages) in proportions 
Case study   
BA AF AA SIA SAS Total 
AR  7% 100% 70% 100% 37% 43% 
Social/ 
Environmental  
58% - 30% - 58% 43% 
Supplementary 
Data 
35% - - - 5% 14% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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During the five-year period the CSD in, e.g. BA’s ARs (a company that published 
stand-alone CSR information throughout the five-year period, as is nowadays the 
norm for most larger organisations – KPMG, 2008), accounted for an average of only 
7% of the Company’s total identified CSD, whilst the Social/Environmental report 
accounted for over half. In the other cases, AR accounted for proportionately more 
CSD, but that was because companies were either not publishing stand-alone reports 
in the period (SIA), or for unavailability (AF) and discontinuity (AA, SAS) reasons.  
 
These findings further support Unerman’s (2000a) empirically verified conclusion 
that “future studies focusing exclusively on annual reports might not produce 
particularly relevant results” (p. 674). In general it seems that the stand-alone reports 
(and particularly the Supplementary Data ones, where all the information is in tabular 
or graphic form) operate as appendices to the ARs, and where frequent references to 
the former are made. 
 
More discussion on how each reported medium was employed in respect of the 
context units is provided later in the discussion, following the section on the 
recording units, which is provided next. 
 
6.4 Reflections on the recording units 
 
Assigning codes and recording (measuring) the information took place 
simultaneously. Since it was difficult to record the information directly into the 
coding spreadsheet (Figure 5.2), a four-page recording sheet was developed and 
employed (shown in Appendix G). For each document (AR, social/environmental or 
supplementary data report) firstly the page-size information was calculated (the 
space in cells that the written and pictorial part of a page was covering and the 
average sentences per page – see Appendix F for details on the recording 
information) and then the relevant spreadsheets were prepared: one to record the 
number of sentences; a second to calculate the narrative information in pages; a third 
to record the pictorial information in pages; a fourth to calculate the total pages per 
report; and a fifth (for ARs only) to estimate the proportion per report. 
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Then the recording process followed. Firstly the pictorial information (including 
tables, graphs and images) was assigned a code and was measured using the .pdf grid 
(for the electronic) or the clear plastic grid (for the hard copies) and the results up to 
two decimals of a page were recorded at the bottom of each relevant box in the 
recording sheet. This was followed by assigning codes and recording the narrative 
information in sentences which involved using tallies of five, recorded at the top of 
each relevant coding sheet box. At the same time the collection of the qualitative 
evidence took place and when relevant information was identified it was copied into 
a dedicated word file. This activity provided a welcome break into the, other than 
that, quite time-consuming and rather tedious quantitative CA procedure, whereby 
four different coding decisions were made for each CSR sentence or pictorial piece 
of information in the examined documents39. 
 
The recording process confirmed concerns of researchers regarding the ‘crudeness’ 
of CA. For example, and in spite of the fact that detailed categorical distinctions 
were employed,  a sentence of the type “[AA was] placed second out of 300 
companies in the Gay and Lesbian Values Index, a ranking of the top companies for 
gays and lesbians seeking jobs and investment opportunities” (AA, 2001ER, p.24) 
would be worth the same with one of the 22 sentences (AA, 2001ER, p.21) detailing 
the various diversity employee groups (they would both be coded as equal 
opportunities, positive, substantive and voluntary). Additionally, it was found 
particularly challenging to develop a reliable measurement rule for recording 
information in bullet points since their length varied considerably (ultimately an 
arbitrary decision was taken to record them subject to their length compared to the 
average length of the sentences in the same page). The detailed approach made it 
possible to control for longer or shorter sentences (since the average sentences per 
page ratio was calculated) and for whether the information was included in the 
Annual or a stand-alone report (since the information was recorded in separate 
spreadsheets).  
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39 For comparison purposes, e.g. Buhr and Reiter (2006) for a (to some extent) similar qualitative 
analysis of six stand-alone reports (130 pages in total), involving ‘scanning’ the whole text and 
identifying and classifying the relevant information to (an, albeit, greater than here number of) 
‘frames’, recruited one more researcher to assist in undertaking the recording part of the analysis. 
 
One of the further benefits of the CA approach was that it also considered pictorial, 
in addition to narrative, CSR information. Table 6.2 reveals how important it is to do 
so and lends support to Berelson (1952), Beattie and Jones (1997) and Unerman’s 
(2000a) arguments. Pictorial information accounted for approximately half of the 
recorded disclosure across the three media. The information in the ARs appears to be 
equally balanced, whereas social/environmental reports contained proportionately 
more narrative information. Supplementary data consisted of only pictorial 
information (tables and graphs). 
  
Table 6.2 The narrative vs. pictorial distinction per reporting medium 
Reporting Medium 
Type of 
CSD 
AR 
Social/ 
Environmental 
Supplementary 
Data 
Total 
Narrative 53.9% 62.0% 0% 50.2% 
Pictorial 46.1% 38.0% 100% 49.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
It should be noted that there are great differences among the sample companies in 
respect of this distinction. For example, and contrary to the average, the pictorial 
CSD in all SAS’ social/environmental reports exceeds the narrative one. Likewise, 
AA appear to be the only company to consistently disclose considerably more 
pictorial, compared to narrative, CSD in their ARs. Whether this variation is due to 
factors such as, e.g. company policies or host country is unknown; however, the 
finding lends further support to the argument for all types of CSD to be considered, 
to allow for meaningful comparisons across companies or industries.  
 
Although it was expected that these findings would have an effect on the relationship 
among the recording units that took into account the pictorial CSD (pages and 
percentage of AR) and those that did not (sentences), this was not supported by the 
findings shown in Table 6.3, reporting the correlation among the three recording 
units of the study. These statistics should be interpreted with caution though, 
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particularly since the three recording units (in the way employed here), are not 
independent of each other (i.e. both pages and then % of AR are calculated based, to 
a greater or lesser extent, on the number of sentences). 
 
Table 6.3 Pearson correlation and the recording units 
 
Sentences Pages 
 
Pages Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.813**
.000 
29  
 
 
% of AR Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.441*
.017 
29 
.804** 
.000 
29 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
All recording units are significantly positively correlated (albeit to a lesser extent 
than, e.g. Hackston and Milne’s, 1996, reported correlations – which, however, did 
not consider pictorial information), indicating that when companies tend to increase 
their CSD in sentences, they also tend to do so in pages and in percentage of AR. 
Pages are found to be considerably highly correlated with sentences (r=.813, p<.01), 
despite that, for their calculation, the pictorial evidence and the average number of 
sentences per report are also considered. Pages, as expected, are further considerably 
highly correlated with the percentage of AR (r=.804, p<.01), since only the number 
of pages in the AR is additionally taken into consideration when determining the 
percentage of AR, which does not vary very much. Sentences are also positively 
correlated with the percentage of AR, although at a medium level (r=.441, p<.05), 
the difference potentially being attributed to all the above adjustments being taken 
into account when calculating the percentage of AR. As Table 6.4 illustrates, the 
high correlation between sentences and pages is mainly due to the high correlation 
between the narrative and pictorial CSD. 
 
 
180
 
Table 6.4 Pearson correlation and the narrative vs. pictorial distinction 
 Pictorial 
 
Narrative Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.640**
.000 
38  
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
This finding suggests that when companies increase their narrative CSD they also 
tend to increase that which is pictorial. Coupled with the evidence from Table 6.3, 
this could tentatively further suggest that year-to-year change (as in this study) could 
be measured by only considering narrative CSD.  But this high correlation is illusive. 
Indeed, as Table 6.5 indicates, the three reporting units were not consistent in their 
direction (i.e. whether there is an increase or decrease in disclosure) in a number of 
year-to-year changes. 
 
Table 6.5 Agreement on the direction of change in total CSD among the three 
recording units 
Agreement (or not) on the direction 
Recording 
units   
% 
Sentences/   
Pages 
15 5 75% 
Sentences / 
% of AR 
13 7 65% 
Pages /  
% of AR 
16 4 80% 
All three 
recording units 
12 8 60% 
          Note: total 20 = 5 case studies x 4 year to year changes per case 
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Table 6.5 largely reflects those results depicted in Table 6.3 in that, e.g. sentences-
with-pages and pages-with-percentage of AR agree more often on the direction of the 
year-to-year change in CSD than sentences-with-percentage of AR. Importantly 
though, the table further reveals that, despite not being independent from each other 
and being highly correlated, in practice all three recording units agreed in only 60% 
(let alone the magnitude) of the year-to-year changes. At times the discrepancies 
were considerable: as the later discussion on the findings illustrates, in one reporting 
year AF’s CSD in sentences decreased by 32% whilst in pages and in percentage of 
AR increased by over 20%. It seems reasonable, therefore, to recommend that future 
studies should employ a variety of recording units, as opposed to solely focusing on a 
single one, to ensure that they attain a more complete view of the data and are in a 
better position to evaluate and thus explain the variations in disclosure. 
 
6.5 Reflections on the context units 
 
This section provides some reflections on the application of the study’s categorical 
(positive vs. negative; substantive vs. symbolic and mandatory vs. voluntary) and 
thematic distinctions. Firstly, however, some considerations about the reliability and 
validity of the coding procedures are provided. 
  
6.5.1 Considering reliability and validity  
 
The reliability and validity of the coding procedures have been considered in a 
number of ways. Weber (1990) and Krippendorff (2004) identify three types of 
reliability in CA: stability, reproducibility and accuracy. These are distinguished not 
by how agreement is measured but by the way the reliability data are obtained, as 
Table 6.6, adopted from Krippendorff (2004), illustrates. 
 
Stability is the degree to which a process is unchanging over time and, “it is 
measured as the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on 
repeated trials” (Krippendorff, 2004, p.215). It is generally perceived to be the 
weakest of reliability tests since it only looks at intra-observer inconsistencies; 
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hence, the focus of the reliability tests of the study is on testing reproducibility, 
which also takes into consideration intra-observer inconsistencies as the below Table 
6. 6 illustrates.  
 
 Table 6.6 Types of reliability in CA 
Reliability Designs Causes of disagreement Strength  
Stability Test-retest Intra-observer inconsistencies Weakest 
Reproducibility Test-test 
Intra-observer inconsistencies 
+inter-observer disagreements 
Medium 
Accuracy Test-standard 
Intra-observer inconsistencies 
+inter-observer disagreements 
+ deviations from standard 
Strongest 
   Source: Krippendorff (2004, p.215) 
 
To examine whether stability was achieved across the coding process, three reports 
(an Annual, an environmental and a supplementary data one) that were originally 
coded at an early stage of the analysis, were re-analysed at a stage towards the end of 
the latter. To assess stability, Pearson’s correlation coefficient (following Patten, 
1992, and Milne and Adler, 1999) and Cronbach’s Alpha were calculated. Although 
as both Lombard et al. (2002) and Krippendorff (2004) note, these two techniques 
only examine covariation (the degree to which two measures vary together) and not 
whether the same sentences are coded in the same way, they can still provide insights 
into how any potential un-reliability encountered in the data will affect the findings 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). The detailed findings of the tests are provided in Appendix 
H and summarised in Table 6.7 and they further inform the following discussion on 
the categorical distinctions. The average correlation coefficient of 0.995, 
nevertheless, compares favourably to Patten’s (1992) 0.987, whilst the average 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.998 as well exceeds Aerts and Cormier’s (2009) 0.803 and 
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the literature’s benchmark of 0.7 (Field, 2005; Pallant, 2005) – findings that indicate 
considerable stability of coding40. 
 
Reproducibility, also called inter-coder or inter-judge reliability, refers to the extent 
to which the same results are achieved by independent coders (Krippendorff, 2004). 
A number of techniques have been developed to test the reproducibility of CA, with 
the simplest being the percent agreement, which is, however, considered to be overly 
liberal, since it fails to account for agreement that would occur simply by chance 
(Lombard et al., 2002). To account for this possibility, more complex techniques 
have been developed, such as Scott’s (1955) Pi, Cohen’s (1960) Kappa, Fleiss’ 
(1971) revisited Kappa and Krippendorff’s (1980) Alpha, but with the literature, 
nevertheless, not reaching a consensus on a single, ‘best’  index (e.g. Dewey, 1983, 
recommends Cohen’s Kappa, whilst Lombard et al,2002, consider Krippendorff’s 
Alpha more attractive). Hence, by employing related software41, in this study all five 
of these tests have been employed, in an attempt to ensure a more complete and 
accurate reliability assessment.  
 
To assess reproducibility five independent ‘judges’ in the form of three PhD students 
and two lecturers at Kingston and Essex Business Schools were recruited and trained 
for 40 minutes. Four of the judges either had, or were studying for, a PhD in 
Accounting and Finance whilst the fifth one was a Law PhD student. The coders 
used the same coding protocols, recording instructions and grid to the ones employed 
in this study, to code and record the CSR content of a sample of extracted pages from 
the Annual and stand-alone reports (approximately 150 sentences to decide on the 
theme and type [positive vs. negative; substantive vs. symbolic and mandatory vs. 
voluntary] of CSD; on the whole comprising over 600 coding decisions for each 
coder). 
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40 Note however that Cronbach Alpha values are quite sensitive to the number of items in the scale 
(Field, 2005; Pallant, 2005) and since large numbers have been employed in the calculations, the 
coefficients may have been favourably affected to some extent.  
41 Since SPSS can only calculate Cohen’s Kappa, online software developed at the University of 
Washington, Seattle, recommended by Lombard et al. (2002), which further calculates the percent (or 
coefficient of) agreement, Scott’s Pi, Fleiss’ Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha was employed 
(available from: http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/).  
 
Table 6.7 summarises the findings of the reproducibility tests, presented in more 
detail in Appendix I and further discussed in the subsequent sections. When 
attempting to interpret these results, it should be noted that there are no established 
standards in determining an acceptable level of reliability. Neuendorf (2002) 
considers that, “coefficients of .90 or greater would be acceptable to all, .80 or 
greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below that, there exists great 
disagreement” (p.145); however, as Lombard et al. (2002, p.593) note, “lower 
criteria are usually used for the indices known to be more conservative”, such as the 
ones (other than the percentage agreement) examined here.  
 
Table 6.7 Summary of the reliability tests 
 CSD 
Theme
Positive/ 
negative
Substantive/ 
symbolic 
Mandatory/ 
voluntary 
Total 
Pearson’s 
Correlation 
.997 .993 .989 .998 .995 
St
ab
ili
ty
 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
.998 .997 .994 .999 .997 
Average % 
Agreement 
98.4% 94.6% 91.8% 99.1% 96% 
Fleiss’ 
Kappa 
0.979 0.84 0.738 0.966 0.941 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
0.979 0.842 0.729 0.967 0.941 
Scott’s  
Pi 
0.979 0.842 0.726 0.967 0.941 R
ep
ro
du
ci
bi
lit
y 
Krippendorff’s 
Alpha 
0.979 0.841 0.738 0.966 0.941 
 
Nevertheless, there are two things to note at this stage when observing the table: first, 
the overall agreement among the 6 coders (in the ‘total’ column) is above .90 for all 
tests and the CA thus meets the reproducibility criterion. Secondly, regardless of the 
long debate over the ‘optimum’ technique to test reproducibility, the four most 
popular, ‘complex’ tests show almost no difference in their calculations and it would 
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appear that they could be employed interchangeably in most CA studies (but see 
Lombard et al., 2002, for discussions on the tests’ fine differences). 
 
Accuracy is generally perceived to be the strongest reliability test, since in addition 
to assessing intra- and inter-observer discrepancies, it also takes into account 
deviations from the standard. However, as the discussion in the preceding chapter 
indicated, such a widely accepted standard in CSR does not exist. The CSR 
categories employed in the study are nevertheless based on GRI, Gray et al. (1995b) 
and other popular classification schemes. In order to ensure accuracy, several 
meetings were held with the research supervisor at Kingston Business School. In the 
first meetings, general guidelines in the development and application of the coding 
protocols were discussed. Once the coding strategy was finalised, the meetings 
focused on how to address more complex coding decisions. The coding of a sample 
of extracts from Annual and standalone reports was further cross checked and this 
process elicited the few differences identified. 
 
Validity is a somewhat neglected area in CA, particularly since it is difficult to 
produce quantitative assessments of it. As Krippendorff (2004) notes, “a content 
analysis is valid if the inferences drawn from the available texts withstand the tests of 
independently available evidence, of new observations, or competing theories or 
interpretations, or of being able to inform successful actions” (p.313). Weber (1990) 
asserts that this involves the following two main issues: 
 
? The validity of the concepts, variables, methods, data being investigated and 
the validity of the classification scheme or variables derived from it.  
? The validity of the interpretation and relating content variables to their causes 
or consequences.   
 
With regard to the former type of validity, this is satisfied through a thorough review 
of the relevant CSR literature (see particularly chapters 4 and 6), which culminated 
in the development of coding typologies based on the work of renowned authors in 
the field. In addition, in this study this validity is increased through the efforts 
demonstrated in the preceding chapter to ensure adequate understanding of the 
method and the procedures involved in coding by reviewing specialised CA reviews 
published throughout the last century by some of the method’s most prominent 
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theorists. With regard to the latter type of validity, it should be acknowledged that it 
is quite difficult to be attested to; however, the employment of a qualitative form of 
CA, in addition to the quantitative one, and the further employment of techniques 
such as ‘pattern-matching’ and ‘explanation-building’ within case-study contexts, 
provide confidence in the validity of the results.  
 
6.5.2 The theme of the disclosure 
 
As in Milne and Adler (1999), the most difficult coding decision involved deciding 
whether a disclosure was CSR or not. Once this condition was satisfied, deciding on 
the theme of the disclosure was rather straightforward, compared to the more 
challenging positive vs. negative and substantive vs. symbolic distinctions. This is 
also reflected in Table 6.7, indicating that deciding on the theme was the most 
reliable distinction in terms of reproducibility and only second to the mandatory vs. 
voluntary CSD in terms of stability. Table 6.8 presents the findings in respect of this 
distinction across reporting media.  
 
Table 6.8 The theme of CSD per reporting medium 
Reporting Medium 
Theme of 
disclosure 
AR 
Social/ 
Environmental 
Supplementary 
Data 
Total 
H&S 13.6% 12.0% 25.0% 15.7% 
Marketplace 14.7% 6.4% 11.7% 9.2% 
Workplace 44.5% 8.7% 1.1% 12.9% 
Community 3.5% 5.1% 0% 3.8% 
Environment 16.7% 54.2% 60.4% 49.4% 
Other 6.9% 13.7% 1.9% 9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The evidence provides support to Guthrie et al’s (2008) conclusion that organisations 
employ different sources for different reporting purposes: in this study, organisations 
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use the AR to communicate (in addition to their shareholders) with their customers42 
and employees and the stand-alone publications to report on their environmental 
endeavours. Community and H&S CSD are relatively similarly represented across 
reporting media (but note that, with regards to the latter, the findings in the 
subsequent chapter reveal some great discrepancies in terms of year-on-year change).  
 
A number of further comments can be made with regard to the specific themes and 
their categories. Some themes (i.e. human rights) were systematically not used by 
most of the companies, possibly because they were based on GRI, which has only 
recently been widely used. Other themes were popular with some companies and less 
popular with others (i.e. aesthetics and Value Added Statement were only popular 
with BA), possibly due to country influences. Some extra decision rules had to be 
created for the ‘consumer’ theme, to clarify when the relevant information was CSR 
or not (see relevant ‘checklist’ in Appendix Bi). Deciding on how much of the 
detailed ‘corporate governance’ sections could be CSR was equally challenging. 
These checklists were found to be very useful, particularly in the early stages of the 
analysis. 
 
On the whole, it appears that the use of 19 coding themes was superfluous in the 
study and consequently, despite all of them having been utilised in the coding, the 
findings are presented in an abbreviated way, per disclosing category as in Table 6.8. 
It could be thus recommended that future studies sharing the objective of measuring 
year-on-year change of CSD should only focus on these customised categories (as in 
e.g. Cho, 2009). When conducting general CSR surveys, nevertheless, it seems more 
reasonable to adhere to Laswell (1949) and recommend using standardised categories 
to enhance the comparability of the findings to those of other studies. 
 
6.5.3 The positive/negative distinction  
 
When deciding on whether a piece of CSD information was positive, negative or 
neutral was not very straightforward, albeit it still met the set reliability benchmarks 
for all the taken tests. As Table 6.7 indicates, this distinction had the second lowest 
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42 Note that the information pertaining to customers in the investigated media is considerably higher 
but only a fraction of it has met the CSR inclusion criteria. 
 
scores behind the substantive/symbolic distinction in all stability and reproducibility 
tests.  
 
There were a number of difficulties in deciding whether a disclosure was positive, 
negative or neutral. For example, often in paragraphs discussing a topic the first 
sentence was positive or negative and the rest, explaining this news, if taken in 
isolation, were neutral. In these cases, in line with Patten and Crampton (2004), the 
sentences were coded in the same way with the first sentence of the paragraph (the 
nature of the news discussed throughout the paragraph). At times it was also difficult 
to distinguish between positive/negative impacts on the environment and society (as 
the set definitions entail) and the organisational performance. For example some CA 
‘judges’ raised the issue that symbolic disclosures of the type “the company places 
considerable emphasis on internal communication” (BA, 2002AR, p.12), do not have 
positive impact on society unless accompanied by evidence. These discrepancies 
were nevertheless resolved when detailed decision rules were put in place, such as 
the examples in Appendix C. Table 6.9 provides a summary of the findings for this 
classification per reporting medium. 
 
Table 6.9 The positive vs. negative distinction per reporting medium 
Reporting Medium 
Type of CSD AR 
Social/ 
Environmental 
Supplementary 
Data 
Total 
Positive 64.8% 62.7% 28.2% 53.9% 
Negative 12.6% 20.2% 61.0% 29.7% 
Neutral 22.7% 17.1% 10.8% 16.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
It should be noted that the increased proportions of negative disclosure (almost 30% 
in total) comparing to most of the literature (e.g. Deegan and Rankin, 1996, and 
Woodward et al., 2008) reflect the strict decision rules developed and employed in 
the study (see Appendix C). For example, disclosures about reduced emissions were 
considered to be half positive-half negative, since organisations were still polluting 
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the atmosphere. The same approach was followed with regard to e.g. energy, noise 
and waste.  
 
Nevertheless, more interesting than the ‘total’ findings in this table, are the ones for 
each reporting medium, particularly regarding the negative disclosure: only 12.6% of 
the information in AR is of a negative nature, comparing to 20.2% in the social/ 
environmental reports and 61% in the supplementary data. When this is seen along 
with Campbell et al’s (2003) finding that companies prefer to disclose negative 
information on their website as opposed to their AR, it lends support to Gray et al’s 
(1995b, p.83) suggestion that the AR is, “the most important document in terms of 
the organisation’s construction of its own social imagery”. Thus, organisations 
attempt to strengthen their image by disclosing in a sort of ‘pecking order’ their 
positive social and environmental endeavours in the AR and their negative impacts in 
the ‘appendix’ (Social/ Environmental report) or in the supplement to the ‘appendix’ 
(supplementary data). They possibly do so by also considering that their customers 
and employees would be focusing on reading the AR, which, as seen above, mainly 
discusses issues pertaining to them. This ‘pecking order’ of disclosure is also 
reflected in the meticulousness with which they prepare the documents (where, as 
discussed in section 7.2, BA at times doesn’t even do a proofreading of the 
supplementary data prior to their publication) and to some extent is also supported by 
the findings of the substantive vs. symbolic distinction, as discussed next.  
 
6.5.4 The substantive/ symbolic distinction 
 
Deciding on whether a disclosure was substantive or symbolic proved to be quite 
challenging. As Table 6.7 indicates, this distinction had the lowest scores in all 
stability and reproducibility tests. The condition still meets the reliability thresholds 
for stability and the average percentage of agreement, but appears to fall short of the 
stricter reproducibility tests’ benchmarks – although, as Lombard et al. (2002) note, 
even these results would still be usually accepted in most situations. As the 
discussion of the findings in the subsequent chapters nevertheless reveals, despite the 
reduced reliability, the classification pays more attention to the context and adds 
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more to understanding than other, more reliable, quality assessments (such as, e.g. 
quantitative vs. qualitative disclosure).  
 
The main benefit of the substantive vs. symbolic classification is that it is rooted in 
LT and incorporates the strategies offered by Perrow (1970), Lindblom (1993) and 
O’Donovan (2002), as earlier discussion (in sections 4.4.2 and 5.9.2.2), and as the 
examples in the Appendix D reveal. Since, nevertheless, the distinction is 
theoretically rooted and more complex (compared, e.g. to the positive vs. negative or 
quantitative vs. qualitative distinctions), and given it focuses on the latent as opposed 
to the manifest meaning of the content, it was more difficult to develop detailed 
decision rules and reliably assess it in a quantitative way. This is also evident in the 
extract from a SAS report (Figure 6.1). Although most of the information could 
generally be perceived as ‘symbolic 3’ (offering accounts and apologies), it is 
evident that, since an attempt is being made to classify the latent content, alternative 
interpretations are possible.  
   
 
Figure 6.1 Extract from SAS (2001AR, p.109). 
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It thus seems that a qualitative approach focusing on the discourse (similar to the 
‘pattern matching’ activity described in section 5.10.2), would have been particularly 
useful. And indeed, initially some qualitative evidence supportive of each strategy 
was collected in a ‘pattern matching’ way. However, this attempt was aborted when 
it was realised that the evidence could not effectively assist in investigating the 
applicability of the developed theoretical framework and its supporting theories, 
since the identified substantive and symbolic strategies could be employed to some 
extent by all identified OL variants. As Adams (2008) comments on a similar 
attempt by Bebbington et al. (2008): 
 
 Benoit’s (1995) typology presented in a neat table with strategies, sub-
strategies, dot points, boxes, explanations and examples from the Shell report, 
is appealing. It provides researchers with a framework to analyse (“cut and 
paste”) quotes from reports and put them in boxes. They are almost certain to 
find some of Benoit’s “image restoration strategies” employed in other 
organizations’ sustainability reports… Whilst an “analysis” of this nature 
using Benoit’s typology allows us to clearly demonstrate what we already 
know, i.e. that organisations are concerned with their reputations, it has little 
potential to add to our broader understanding of why companies report what 
they do or don’t, and how they use the information reported, in order that we 
can facilitate change. It may in fact hinder it and I would urge researchers 
interested in this area to consider the “So what?” question (Adams, 2008, pp. 
366-367). 
 
Consequently, it was decided a) to mainly employ this distinction in a quantitative 
manner and make inferences to the framework by looking at the year-to-year change 
per case, and b) to focus the qualitative analysis in directly relating the evidence to 
the potential motivations under each variant-‘pattern’ of the framework (as discussed 
in the next section). By doing so, it is believed that the study addresses Adams’ 
(2008) ‘so what’ concerns. Additionally, some qualitative inferences regarding this 
typology are also made in the discussion of the findings in Chapter 8. Even so, some 
of the limitations of employing this distinction in a quantitative manner are evident in 
Table 6.10.  
 
As the table reveals, a number of strategies were particularly difficult to detect. With 
regard to the substantive strategies 2 and 3, it was quite difficult to determine what 
the existing institutionalised practice was,  in order to later assess whether 
organisations attempt to conform to it (strategy 2) or change it (strategy 3). Such an 
attempt would require collecting detailed industry data, which exceeds the scope of 
this study.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that a) lots of similarities between the 
organisations were identified, particularly in the way they questioned existing 
regulations, and b) these extra large organisations potentially have the “ability of 
high status actors to deviate from group norms without penalty” (Deephouse and 
Carter, 2005, p. 333), which makes it thus increasingly difficult to detect whether 
they conform to, or shape their, institutionalised practice. Consequently, no 
disclosure was coded and recorded as ‘coercive isomorphism’ (substantive 2), whilst 
as regards ‘altering institutionalised practice’ (substantive 3) some explicit attempts 
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to influence regulation were recorded (what Parsons, 1960, terms ‘regulatory’ 
legitimacy, as opposed to the ‘moral’ one which reflects the consistency of 
organisational action with social norms and values). 
 
Table 6.10 The substantive vs. symbolic distinction per reporting medium 
Reporting Medium 
 
AR 
Social/ 
Environmental 
Supplementary 
Data 
Total 
1. Role 
Performance 
61.5% 48.1% 89.7% 61.5% 
2. Coercive 
Isomorphism 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
3. Altering 
Institutionali-
sed practices 
0.1% 0.4% 0% 0.2% 
Su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
C
SD
 
Total 
Substantive 
61.6% 48.5% 89.7% 61.7% 
1. Espousing 
goals/symbols 
29.2% 33.7% 3.4% 24.9% 
2. Denial and 
trivialisation 
0.5% 1.0% 0.3% 0.7% 
3. Offering 
accounts 
1.9% 5.4% 1.5% 3.7% 
Sy
m
bo
lic
 C
SD
 
Total 
Symbolic 
31.6% 40.1% 5.2% 29.3% 
Other 6.8% 11.4% 5.1% 8.9% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The employment of the symbolic strategies 2 and 3 also appeared to some extent to 
be problematic. It was originally decided, given that this research examines 
legitimacy threats, to distinguish these two groups of strategies focusing on 
detrimental activities from whether organisations would attempt to downgrade the 
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event (symbolic 2) or their role towards these activities (symbolic 3). However, 
given that a quantitative approach to examining this distinction was preferred, it was 
later realised that the relevant disclosure was minimal and could not assist in deriving 
meaningful inferences. It thus seems reasonable to recommend that future studies 
employing this distinction in a quantitative way should focus on the simple 
substantive/symbolic/other distinction, which would further enhance the reliability of 
the findings.   
 
Table 6.10 nevertheless provides some support to the organisational ‘pecking order’ 
disclosure approach with regard to their reporting media. Evidently, the information 
in AR aimed at customers and employees is mainly substantive (and positive) whilst 
the information in its ‘appendix’, the Social/Environmental Report, is increasingly 
symbolic (and narrative) and in the supplementary data (consisting of tables and 
graphs) is mainly substantive (and negative). This finding is also supportive of the 
resource dependence theory, suggesting that the greater the power of the constituent, 
the more likely management is to offer substantive than symbolic accounts (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
 
To summarise, the organisations in this study appear to report their substantive, 
positive CSR news via the AR to specific groups (i.e. customers and employees) 
whilst attempting to disclose their substantive negative CSR news in documents of a 
more ‘ephemeral’ (Campbell et al., 2003, p.567) nature and with the potential least 
readability (when the organisations examined here do not publish supplementary data 
reports, they do so in their social/environmental report). Additionally, the 
organisations attempt to communicate with their (perhaps, less critical) groups via 
these ‘ephemeral’ documents in an increasingly symbolic way. Although intuitively 
appealing, this is the first study known to the author empirically documenting this 
organisational CSR practice.    
 
To further look into these findings, the correlation between the positive vs. negative 
and the substantive vs. symbolic distinctions was calculated and the findings are 
reported in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 Pearson Correlation and the substantive/symbolic vs. the positive/ 
negative distinctions 
TYPE OF CSD Positive Negative 
 
Substantive Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.698**
.000 
44 
  .902** 
.000 
44 
 
Symbolic Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 
.949**
.000 
44 
                  .359* 
.017 
44 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
All distinctions are significantly positive correlated, indicating that when companies 
increase, e.g. their substantive disclosure, they also tend to do so for their symbolic, 
positive and negative ones. However, as the table reveals, when the symbolic 
disclosure increases, it is more likely that the positive disclosure will increase at a 
greater rate than the negative. Likewise, when the negative disclosure increases, it is 
more likely that the substantive disclosure will increase at a considerably greater rate 
than the symbolic. These findings lend support to Ashforth and Gibbs’ (1990) 
arguments for symbolic legitimation primarily involving (implicitly positive) 
attempts to appear consistent with social values; and to Pfeffer’s (1981) and 
Abrahamson and Park’s (1994) arguments about organisations selectively releasing 
positive information and only disclosing negative when the latter cannot be 
concealed (and is thus implicitly substantive).   
 
6.5.5 The Mandatory/voluntary distinction  
 
The mandatory vs. voluntary CSD distinction was originally utilised in the BA case 
study but was later aborted (see Appendix E for a list of UK mandatory CSD). As 
Table 6.7 demonstrates, this distinction is considerably reliable (the most reliable in 
terms of stability and only second to the theme of CSD in terms of reproducibility). 
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This increased reliability can be attributed to the very limited CSR that is regulated, 
as the Appendix shows. 
  
The mandatory vs. voluntary CSD distinction was aborted primarily due to 
unavailability of the relevant legislation outside the UK. However, as Table 6.12 
illustrates, in the case of BA, generally mandatory CSD remained minimal and did 
not vary very much throughout the examined period (from 1.87 pages in 1999, 
accounting for 3% of total CSD to 2.78 pages and 10% in 2003). It is not expected, 
therefore, that not using this distinction for the remaining case studies has greatly 
affected the results, particularly since what is primarily investigated is not how much 
voluntary CSD is reported per se, but the change in reporting across the specified 
time periods. And as Table 6.13 reveals, primarily due to the small proportion of the 
mandatory CSD, voluntary CSD follows almost identical change patterns as total 
CSD.  
 
Table 6.12 BA mandatory vs. voluntary CSD (pages): proportions of total CSD  
Pre-accident Post-accident 
CSD 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1.87 1.77 2.27 2.24 2.78 
Mandatory 
3% 3% 3% 5% 10% 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
Voluntary 
97% 97% 97% 95% 90% 
62.46 63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 6.13 BA mandatory vs. voluntary CSD (pages): % of year-to-year change 
Pre-accident Post-accident 
CSD 
1999→2000 2000→2001 2001→2002 2002→2003 
Mandatory (5%) 28% (1%) 24% 
Voluntary 2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
Total 2% 8% (28%) (38%) 
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It should be noted, nevertheless, that when this distinction was employed, all stand-
alone reports’ information was considered to be voluntary CSD, considering that 
most mandatory requirements pertain to the AR. An additional limitation of the 
approach that was revealed when analysing BA’s ARs was that it was often difficult 
to decide which portion of a disclosure was mandatory and which voluntary. BA 
(2003AR), e.g. devotes six pages to discussing the emoluments of the directors, as 
opposed to one page in BA (1999AR). This was at a time where regulation didn’t 
change. How much of this (if indeed, any) is CSR? To ensure that the results 
wouldn’t be distorted (particularly since the focus of the quantitative CA was on 
investigating year-to-year change in disclosure), a decision was made, albeit quite 
arbitrarily, to consider for every year an equal amount of mandatory disclosure 
pertaining to this category (i.e. the minimum relevant CSD identified over the five-
year period), and the remaining part was considered a voluntary one (e.g. 1 page 
mandatory and the remaining voluntary CSD). Similar difficulty in coding was faced 
when, e.g. considering statutory action with respect to informing and consulting 
employees; it is difficult to tell in the text where the mandatory discussion finishes 
and where the voluntary one commences. Again, in order to ensure that the results 
wouldn’t be distorted, a similar decision to the one above regarding directors’ 
emoluments was taken.  
 
6.5.6 The thematic analysis 
 
The thematic analysis proved to be more useful than quantitative CA for 
investigating the research questions and particularly the applicability of the 
framework, since “the emphasis on discourse” allowed “for a more fine-grained 
analysis in empirical settings” (Bebbington et al., 2008, p.339). It took place in two 
stages. Firstly, the ‘pattern matching’ activity was undertaken, simultaneously with 
the quantitative CA, whereby the whole text was scanned for relevant information, 
supportive or not, of the theoretical variants and was recorded in a dedicated Word 
file. During this stage, some initial informal comments on the findings were made, to 
later assist in the discussion, as Appendix I illustrates. In the second stage, the 
‘explanation building’ activity took place, where an explanation for each case was 
developed by critically examining all the evidence, including that which did not fit in 
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any of the predetermined patterns. This was complemented by the findings of the 
(quantitative) time series and the cross case analyses.  
 
The ‘pattern matching’ activity was originally primarily intended to identify 
evidence pertaining to the identified four OL variants and the organisational 
motivations behind CSR. Most of the collected evidence, nevertheless, concerned 
motivations behind CSRes. Organisations appear to discuss in their reports to a far 
greater extent their CSRes, rather than their CSR, practice. Although the motivations 
behind CSRes also gave insights into the motivations behind CSR (as the findings 
chapters reveal), since the latter are often perceived as a manifestation of the former, 
it is acknowledged that an interview approach, similarly to the one adopted by 
O’Dwyer (1999), would have generated more proportionately ‘balanced’ evidence.  
 
The strictly qualitative thematic approach employed did not allow for a subsequent 
quantification of the arguments to provide some numerical indication of their relative 
importance as the adoption of a mixed CA, as recommended by Lasswell (1949), 
would entail. It is, however, unlikely that the latter would contribute significantly to 
the analysis. This is because it could be argued that, e.g. some arguments overlap 
with others and also that a quantified CA is already employed and, therefore, it 
would be more suitable for this to be complemented with a pure qualitative approach. 
Nevertheless, similarly to Buhr and Reiter (2006), in the summary tables of the 
‘pattern matching’ activity some indication was given of the extent to which 
organisations were employing each identified tactic (of the type, e.g. ‘reference’, 
‘explicit reference’, ‘significant emphasis’).  
 
It should be noted that the ‘other evidence’ category in the ‘pattern-matching’ 
activity often included evidence that could be explained by more than one 
predetermined variant, as opposed to evidence that could not be explained by any of 
these. Nevertheless the evidence assisted in refining the theoretical arguments (e.g. 
before conducting the qualitative analysis, the ‘profits AND responsibility’ 
arguments were originally considered to be pragmatically, as opposed to 
opportunistically, focused). The further inclusion of the ‘other evidence’ category 
increased the ‘grounded’ character of the study; although, as discussed under section 
5.10.2, the thematic analysis, as employed here, is more suitable than more grounded 
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approaches, given the time efficiency and the pragmatic character of the research 
design, and the adopted (Yin’s, 2009) case study approach.   
 
6.7 Summary 
 
This chapter, written from an ex post angle, has provided some reflections on, and 
findings from, the use of the study’s methods, with particular emphasis on CA, in an 
attempt to address the research aims pertaining to the use of CA in CSR. A number 
of reflecting comments on the research design and the sampling units (data 
collection) were made over issues such as unavailability of the data and repetition. It 
was also found that the CSR in the AR may account for as little as 7% (for BA) of 
the total CSR discussion, indicating the need for studies to consider CSR sources 
additional to the AR.  
 
With regard to the recording units, it was firstly found that pictorial information 
(including tables, graphs and images) may account for as much as 46% of total CSD, 
indicating the need to employ recording units that could consider it (such as page 
size or percentage of page). High correlations among all three employed recording 
units were identified, which could suggest that there are negligible inconsistencies 
across the findings of each recording unit. However, later discussion indicated that 
the three recording units used (sentences, pages and % of AR) only agreed in 60% as 
regards the direction (increase/decrease) of the year-to-year changes, indicating the 
need for future studies to consider a variety of recording units. 
 
In respect of the context units, some reliability and validity considerations were 
provided initially. Particularly with regard to reliability (consisting of stability, 
reproducibility and accuracy), all the tests taken indicated that the analysis was 
reliable. In fact, the four most popular reproducibility tests showed almost no 
difference in their calculations, indicating that they could be employed 
interchangeably in most CA studies. The theme of the disclosure, and the mandatory 
vs. voluntary, distinctions were found to be more reliable than the positive vs. 
negative, and the substantive vs. symbolic, distinctions. 
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The discussion on the context units further revealed that organisations adopt a 
‘pecking order’ disclosure approach with regard to their reporting media. They 
appear to report their substantive positive CSR news via the AR to specific groups 
(i.e. customers and employees, in addition to shareholders) whilst attempting to 
disclose their substantive negative CSR news in documents of a more ‘ephemeral’ 
nature and with the potential least readability (when the organisations examined here 
do not publish supplementary data reports, they do so in their social/environmental 
report). Additionally, the organisations attempt to communicate with their (perhaps, 
less critical) groups via these ‘ephemeral’ documents in an increasingly symbolic 
way.  
 
Particularly, the findings on the substantive vs. symbolic distinction lent support to 
the resource dependence theory, suggesting that the greater the power of the 
constituent, the more likely management is to offer substantive than symbolic 
accounts. When the findings on the positive vs. negative distinction are also 
considered, they further support arguments for symbolic legitimation primarily 
involving (implicitly positive) attempts to appear consistent with social values and 
for organisations to selectively release positive information, and only disclose 
negative information when the latter cannot be concealed (and is thus implicitly 
substantive). With regard to the mandatory vs. voluntary distinction, the findings 
suggest that the voluntary disclosure follows almost identical year-to-year change 
patterns as does the total disclosure – primarily due to the small proportion of 
mandatory CSD; thus, the sole focus on total CSD seems justifiable for most studies. 
 
It was the thematic analysis that was nevertheless found more useful towards 
investigating the research questions and the applicability of the study’s framework. 
Although it was noted that most of the collected evidence pertained to motivations 
for CSRes as opposed to CSR, this still gave insights into the motivations for CSR, 
since the latter is often perceived as a manifestation of the former. The further 
employment of a number of Yin’s (2009) recommended analysis techniques (i.e. 
pattern matching, explanation building, time series, and cross-case analyses) allowed 
for more in-depth examinations of the cases and more valid inferences to the 
framework to be made.  
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Having considered these reflections and findings in respect of the employment of the 
methods, the theoretical findings of the study can be discussed.  
201
 
 PART IV FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
…Ithaca gave you the marvellous journey. 
Without her you wouldn't have set out. 
She has nothing left to give you now. 
And if you find her poor,                          
Ithaca has not deceived you. 
... 
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Chapter 7 
Findings 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Following the discussion of the methodology, this section presents the findings of 
each case. These are subsequently synthesised in the next chapter, providing a cross-
case analysis and discussion of the findings in respect of the propositions, research 
questions and developed framework.  
 
Each case study includes a brief introduction to the company and the relevant 
legitimacy threat (accident), followed by sub-sections on the quantitative and 
qualitative evidence of the analysis and a concluding section summarising that 
evidence. The cases of BA and AF, which are affected by the same legitimacy threat 
(i.e. the Concorde accident), are presented first, being followed by the cases of AA, 
SIA and SAS. A brief summary is provided at the end of the chapter. 
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7.2 The case of British Airways (BA)  
7.2.1 Introduction  
 
BA is the UK’s national carrier. The BA Group was formed in September 1974 
through nationalisation and was privatised and floated on the London Stock 
Exchange in February 1987. Since then BA has emerged as one of the world’s largest 
airlines. At the time of the Concorde accident, which is the ‘legitimacy threat’ that is 
the focus of this case, BA was Europe’s third largest airline in terms of passenger 
numbers (SAS, 2002AR) and the fifth largest in the world in terms of passenger 
kilometres travelled (BA, 2003SER).  
 
Although the Concorde accident did not directly involve BA, the Concorde was BA’s 
flagship aircraft and it was thus expected that it would constitute a legitimacy threat 
for both companies. The next section introduces the accident; the following one the 
quantitative evidence and the penultimate the qualitative. The concluding section 
summarises the case’s findings. 
 
7.2.2 The accident  
 
Following its departure from Paris’ Charles de Gaulle Airport on an Air France, non-
scheduled service to New York City, on 25 July 2000, the Concorde suffered is first 
fatal accident in this fiery crash 10 miles (15km) north-east of Paris, after nearly a 
quarter of a century of providing the world’s only sustained supersonic passenger 
service (Gero, 2006). All 109 persons abroad, including the nine members of its 
crew, plus 4 others on the ground perished in the disaster, and an additional 6 persons 
suffered injuries.  
 
Chartered by  a German tour company and carrying passengers who were to cap their 
transatlantic trip with a Caribbean cruise, the Air France Concorde  began its take-off 
from Runway 26-Right. After reaching a speed of around 200 mph (320Kmh) a tyre 
ran over a strip of metal lying on the runway, which caused a fire on the left side of 
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the aircraft. Lifting off, the jetliner was airborne for about a minute and unable to 
maintain either speed or altitude, before striking a hotel and exploding 3.3 miles 
(5.5km) from the end of the runway (Gero, 2006). As Woodward et al. (2008) note: 
 
Only the previous day, safety issues had emerged as BA was forced to admit 
that all seven of its Concorde fleet had hairline cracks in their wings. Taken 
together, these two events led to a serious concern for safety amongst both 
the general public and the aviation industry (p. 9).  
 
As a consequence, both the French and the British Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) 
revoked Concorde’s certificate of airworthiness. Although some modifications were 
made and Concorde re-entered into regular service in November 2001, in the spring 
of 2003 its only two operators, Air France and British Airways, announced that due 
to low passenger loads, high maintenance cost and the general slowdown in the 
airline industry, they would terminate its service by the end of the year, withdrawing 
from use the rest of the aircraft (Gero, 2006).    
  
The Concorde crash posed a considerable legitimacy threat at the time for both AF 
and BA, since it attracted a lot of negative publicity (CNN.com, 2001), making it the 
most famous air crash in the aviation history (other than the September 11 attacks – 
Gero, 2006). As Bunting (2000), the day after the disaster, noted:  
 
There’s an appetite for catastrophe and over the last 24 hours, the mass media 
have sought to satiate it. The Independent clears its entire front page, and all 
the papers devoted yards of coverage, relegating other major stories (such as 
the collapse of the Middle East peace talks) to a few paragraphs; the BBC 
Today programme even flies one of its presenters to the Paris scene… The 
saturation coverage of Concorde’s nemesis is not driven by our desire for 
knowledge…We want to acclimatise ourselves to this new fact: that 
Concorde, the emblem like no other of the power of technology, has failed us. 
 
Concorde was indeed the ‘flagship’ plane for both AF and BA. As a BA spokesman 
said, following its withdrawal from service, “the plane is synonymous with British 
Airways. It is almost a symbol of the airline” (Rowell, 2003). For many years prior 
to the crash the two companies continued to operate it, despite the considerable 
operating costs, “in the hope that the positive image of these planes will flow through 
to their normal operations” (Rowell, 2003). With one accident after only 80,000 
flights, however, the Concorde was not as nearly as safe compared to other 
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commercial aircrafts. And the negative publicity associated with the deaths of all 
passengers and crew brought a sharp decline in ticket sales, resulting in the two 
companies’ decision to finally withdraw it (Rowell, 2003). 
 
7.2.3 The quantitative CA evidence  
 
Propositions 1 and 2: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD and 
particularly the level of H&S CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 (see also Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix Ji) summarise the variations 
of the total and H&S voluntary CSD per measurement method over the selected 
period. 
 
Figure 7.1 Total voluntary CSD per measurement unit
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With regard to the total CSD it could be seen that: 
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? All measurement units increased in Y1 (this is 2001, the first post-accident 
year), ranging from 3% (sentences) to 30% (% of AR), lending some support 
to proposition 143 
? Y1 represented a peak in the disclosure over the five year period for most 
measurement units (with the marginal exception of % of AR)  
? For all measures the disclosure decreased in the post-accident years and goes 
below the Y-2 levels in Y3, indicating that the Y1 peak could be a result of an 
attempt to address the threat. 
Figure 7.2 H&S voluntary CSD per measurement unit
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This support is comparatively greater for proposition 2, where the H&S voluntary 
CSD increase in the year of the accident ranged from 51% (sentences) to 80% 
(proportion of AR). For all measures the disclosure largely returned to the Y-2 levels 
in Y3, lending some further support to proposition 2.  
                                                 
43 It is acknowledged that by referring to (the reports published in) the year immediately preceding the 
accident as Y-1 and to (the reports published in) the year immediately after the accident (and therefore 
also the first ones to report it) as Y1, it may be implied that from Y-1 to Y1 comprises 24 months. To 
address this concern, Woodward et al. (2008) refer to (the reports published in) the first year after the 
accident as Y0. However, considering that the accident incurred at an instant in time, in essence what 
the study is investigating is the last two (Annual and standalone) reports published  prior to, and the 
first three (Annual and standalone) reports published after the accident and thus the adopted 
connotation is considered to be more appropriate (as also adopted by Deegan et al., 2000).  
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Figure 7.3 (see also Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix Ji) breaks down the variance of total 
voluntary CSD in terms of type of reporting. These are only presented in pages, the 
prime recording unit of the study (see section 5.9.3), for simplicity reasons. 
Evidently: 
 
? Most types of reporting increased their CSD levels in Y1 (with the marginal 
exception of the  social and environmental report) 
? The disclosure fell notably in the post-accident years in all types of reporting 
and went below the Y-2 levels in Y3, indicating that the Y1 peak  could be a 
result of an organisational attempt to address the threat 
Figure 7.3 Source of voluntary CSD 
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The 8% increase in total CSD following the accident was mainly due to the 25% 
increase in the supplementary data. It should be noted, however, that in this kind of 
reporting in the post-accident period, often BA seemed to provide information just 
for the sake of increasing the published CSD (particularly given that this type of data 
are only available on-line and are exclusively in tabular form, they are thus a cheap 
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way to do so). For example, in the Supplementary Data 2001 it provided a table of 
the conservation organisations assisted in 1999/2000 and then, with the intermission 
of one table, it provided an additional table with the conservation organisations 
assisted in 2000/2001, with exactly the same organisations in. Indeed, in other cases, 
e.g. Supplementary Data 2001, pp. 22-23, it provided separate tables to discuss its 
noise impacts at Heathrow and Gatwick and then subsequently, joined the two tables 
to form a third for comparison, and thus repeated CSD without adding additional 
information. The fact that BA proportionally increased the use of this flexible and 
cheap type of publication in Y1, signifies an organisation particularly image-
concerned at the time.  
 
Figure 7.4 (see also Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix Ji) summarises the findings per 
theme of CSD. It appears that, in the year following the accident, the levels of 
disclosure increased for most of the CSR themes, with the marginal exception of the 
marketplace. Additionally: 
 
? H&S showed the greatest increase across all themes in Y1, followed by the 
environment 
? All disclosure themes decreased in Y2 and Y3 (with the exception of the 
‘other’ category) 
? Environment remained the most popular disclosure theme throughout the five 
year period 
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Figure 7.4 Theme of voluntary CSD 
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The considerable decrease in environmental disclosure in Y-1 is due to the fact that in 
Y-2 an environmental report rather than a social and environmental as in the 
subsequent years was published. It should be noted that in terms of proportions of 
CSD, H&S maintained an upward trend throughout the post-accident years to even 
equal, in the last examined year, environment’s proportion as the most popular 
disclosing theme, with a proportion double to Y-1. This can be further possibly 
interpreted as an organisational attempt to address the threatened legitimacy 
following the accident with regard to this area. The September 11th 2001 events with 
their dire effects on the industry as a whole (BA, 2002SER) and the appearance of 
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in these post-accident years, may 
have further threatened the legitimacy of the whole industry and subsequently 
contributed towards this H&S post-accident proportional increase.  
 
Propositions 3 and 4: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD and 
the level of negative CSD will show a notable increase 
 
The findings in terms of positive vs. negative CSD for the total and H&S disclosures 
are summarised next. As Figure 7.5 illustrates (see also Table 6 in Appendix Ji), 
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following a decrease in Y-1, both positive and negative disclosures increased in Y1 
before decreasing in the subsequent years, lending support to propositions 3 and 4.  
The positive and negative H&S disclosures increased at even higher rates than those 
for total CSD (almost three times as high). It is further interesting to note that, 
particularly for total CSD, the increases in positive and negative CSD were at a 
higher rate than the increase in total CSD and, therefore, this was at the expense of 
neutral CSD, which started decreasing even from Y1. In Y2 and Y3 both positive and 
negative, total and H&S CSD largely followed similar declining patters to that for 
total CSD, despite the aforementioned September 11th events and the appearance of 
SARS in this period, further indicating that the increase in Y1 could have been due to 
the legitimacy threat. 
Figure 7.5 Positive vs negative CSD
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Propositions 5 and 6: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD 
and the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figure 7.6 (see also Table 7 in Appendix Ji) presents the findings in terms of the 
substantive vs. symbolic CSD, for both total and H&S disclosures. Although the 
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evidence from both the total and the H&S CSD lends some support for proposition 5, 
since clearly substantive CSD increased in Y1, for proposition 6 the findings are 
inconclusive: in Y1 the symbolic total CSD declined, although the symbolic H&S 
CSD increased at a similar rate to the substantive. At first sight, this finding could 
signify an ethics-oriented organisation, primarily concentrated in addressing its 
stakeholders’ increased expectations in a substantive way; however, when seen in 
conjunction with the H&S related evidence, and it is also taken into account that both 
the H&S and total substantive CSD fell in the subsequent years, it could be 
tentatively suggested that, on the whole, the substantive vs. symbolic evidence 
indicated a rather image-oriented and pragmatic organisational stance towards CSR, 
where priority was given to defending legitimacy rather than opportunistically or 
ethically extending it.  
 
Figure 7.6 Substantive vs symbolic CSD
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7.2.4 The qualitative CA evidence  
 
The qualitative analysis of BA’s Annual and stand-alone reports, as reflected in 
Table 7.1, summarising the ‘pattern matching’ activity, reveals a ‘balanced’ 
organisational stance towards CSR which varies from stakeholder pragmatism to 
ethics pragmatism and opportunism. Although, e.g., BA stated that it supported the 
UK government’s interpretation of sustainable development as, “a better quality of 
life for everyone, now and for generations to come” (2000SER, p. 10), seemingly 
adopting an ethical stance, further on in the same report BA also appeared to be 
opportunistically driven, when on its code of conduct it specified that it would, 
“consider social, ethical and environmental implications of decisions which will 
promote shareholder value” (p. 4). It would appear however that, even within its 
opportunistic arguments, BA primarily pragmatically perceived managing its social 
and environmental impacts as a condition for maintaining economic success: 
 
While financial performance is the primary concern, our ability to sustain a 
thriving business depends also on consideration for the environment on a 
local and global scale, and on our relationships with those who are legitimate 
stakeholders in our business. Only if we pay due attention to these areas will 
aviation be able to prosper in a world which is maintained in a fit state for 
future generations… if we are to add value to our products and to our 
stakeholders we must be proactive in addressing the relevant and 
environmental issues (BA. 2000SER, p. 2). 
 
This pragmatic perception of CSR could also explain BA’s frequent attempts to 
question the industry’s contribution to climate change and to further emphasise its 
contribution to the economy over the potential negative environmental impacts, 
which were also evident in this period: 
 
there are still questions about the impact of aviation on the environment, in 
particular in relation to climate change … We also need to understand better 
the economic contribution that is made by the airline and aviation (BA, 2000, 
p.10)… But British Airways also makes a substantial contribution to 
economic and social progress in the UK and other countries where we 
operate. A comprehensive audit of our performance as a sustainable business 
needs to take into account all three dimensions – economic, social and 
environmental (BA, 2000SER, p.12). 
  
Table 7.1 Summary of the ‘pattern matching’ activity for BA  
 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
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Reference to 
commitment to 
sustainability, aiming to 
leave the natural and 
social environment in a 
better condition 
 
 
Continuing reference to 
commitment to sustainability; 
detailed references to commitment 
to citizenship and to open dialogue 
with stakeholders, including 
respect for local communities, 
cultures and environmental needs; 
references to integration of social 
and environmental factors into 
management systems 
 
 
Continuing reference to 
commitment to sustainability; 
reference to ethical 
responsibilities of business 
towards employees 
 
 
Continuing reference to 
sustainability; 
acknowledgment of the 
contribution of aviation to 
greenhouse effects and local 
air quality; reference to ethical 
responsibilities of business 
towards employees  
 
Continuing reference to 
sustainability;  reference to 
commitment to improving 
social and environmental 
performance 
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References to 
commitment to people 
 
 
 
 
 
Great emphasis on the importance 
of addressing stakeholder needs 
and environmental impacts to 
ensure viability; emphasis on 
questioning aviation’s contribution 
to climate change; particular 
emphasis on ensuring satisfied 
employees to add value; explicit 
reference of the importance to 
reputation of building a 
relationship of trust with 
stakeholders   
 
 
Explicit acknowledgment of 
prioritising the needs of 
shareholders and customers over 
employees; continued great 
emphasis on the importance of 
addressing stakeholder needs for 
viability; continuing emphasis 
on the importance of 
stakeholders to reputation and 
corporate value 
 
Acknowledgement that ethical 
standards are essential to 
viability; continuing emphasis 
on the importance of 
stakeholders to reputation and 
corporate value 
 
Explicit acknowledgment 
of the increasing 
importance of integrity 
and ethics to consumers; 
acknowledgment that 
maintaining focus on 
CSRes is challenging 
during difficult market 
conditions  
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Detailed attempts to 
present the creation of 
an additional terminal 
at Heathrow (T5) as 
socially and 
environmentally 
beneficial; reference to 
the importance for any 
environmental controls 
to be economically 
reasonable and not to 
distort competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference to the need to be 
proactive towards CSRes to add 
value to the products; continued 
attempts to present T5 as socially 
and environmentally beneficial; 
continuing reference to the need 
for environmental programmes to 
be economically reasonable and 
not distort competition; explicit 
attempt to pre-empt taxation on 
aviation fuel 
 
Declaration that it will consider 
CSRes implications of decisions 
that promote shareholder value; 
acknowledgment that it would 
support some noise initiatives if 
they bring economic benefits; 
great emphasis on presenting T5 
as essential to BA’s prosperity 
and UK’s wealth and job 
creation; continuing reference to 
the need for environmental 
programmes to be economically 
reasonable and not distort 
competition; continuing attempts 
to pre-empt taxation on aviation 
fuel 
 
Explicit acknowledgment that 
community involvement 
programmes are a means of 
reputation enhancement; 
continued emphasis on 
presenting T5 as more socially 
and environmentally 
beneficial than other potential 
new runaways; continuing 
reference to the need for 
environmental programmes to 
be economically reasonable 
and not distort competition 
 
Great emphasis on 
presenting T5 as more 
socially and 
environmentally beneficial 
than other potential new 
runaways;  
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[no reference] 
 
Emphasis on aviation’s economic 
contributions 
 
Explicit reference to how 
aviation, through creating 
wealth, contributes to 
sustainable societies; emphasis 
on the aviation’s importance to 
economic growth and job 
creation 
 
 
Great emphasis on the social 
and economic contributions of 
aviation;   
 
Continuing emphasis on 
the social and economic 
contributions of aviation; 
detailed reference to a 
community involvement 
programme which 
ultimately concerned only 
two people 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
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(Table 7.1 continued) 
 
 
  
 
In the post accident years BA’s CSR focus did not appear to change, despite that in 
addition to the grounding of Concorde a number of other adversities also incurred44: 
 
The morale factor is crucial in a service business and its importance became 
evident as we faced a range of adversities which disrupted operations at various 
times during the year: severe bad weather in the United Kingdom; the grounding 
of Concorde; and a serious computer systems failure. Furthermore, we had to 
contend with economic slowdown in some important markets, most notably the 
USA; the effects on travel and tourism to Britain of foot and mouth disease; and 
the alarming rise in the price of oil which increased our fuel costs, net of 
hedging, by £264 million. 
Its image-concentrated and clearly non ethical CSR orientation was perhaps mostly 
apparent when BA explicitly admitted that its production of the social and 
environmental report and its support in community and conservation programmes were 
all means of improving its reputation, following the advice of its independent assurors:  
 
Improve reputation enhancement: The Marketing and Communications 
Department is increasingly involved in relevant activities, including operation of 
this report, ‘Change for Good’ and the ‘Tourism for Tomorrow’ awards 
programme (BA, 2002SER, p. 7). 
 
As in the pre-accident period, BA at times appeared to employ CSR arguments in an 
opportunistic fashion in the reports following the accident, albeit less frequently than 
when it appeared to be pragmatically driven. Most often these opportunistic arguments 
were over the Heathrow Airport expansion, where its headquarters were and its business 
interests lied:    
 
Regions such as the West Midlands and Scottish Lowlands will require 
additional runway capacity over the study period to meet local demand – we 
support their view. Nevertheless, we do not consider that it is a viable alternative 
                                                 
44 These adversities had reached their climax by the third post-accident year following the September 11th 
events, the war in Iraq and the appearance of SARS. As BA (2003AR) notes, “a press article summed it up 
when it suggested that the aviation industry must feel it has been assailed by the Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse in recent years” (p.3). 
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for the regions to attempt to meet South East demand.  To do so would impose 
unnecessary, long and environmentally damaging surface journeys on travellers. 
We consider there are strong environmental arguments in favour of concentrating 
new capacity at existing airports – both in the regions and in the South East.  
Such concentration minimises the need for additional land take, reduces the 
spread of noise and provides greater potential for investment in surface transport 
links (BA, 2002SER, p. 25) 
 
Developing Heathrow through the addition of a third runway allows the UK to 
retain an internationally competitive hub airport and expand its network of air 
transport links to the global economy…Local employment would also benefit, 
helping areas such as Feltham to the south and Hounslow to the East – which are 
identified in the Mayor’s London plan and by the London Development Agency 
as needing to generate 45,000 new jobs in the next 10-15 years…A third runway 
would have a significant impact on local communities around Heathrow. 
Networks of neighbours, proximity to friends and relatives, links with churches, 
schools, shops, medical services, entertainment, support groups and other 
community activities are important (BA, 2003SER, p.16). 
 
Heathrow expansion appeared to be so critical for BA that it explicitly attempted to pre-
empt any governmental decision against it, by reminding how important its contribution 
was on UK’s wealth, customers and employees:  
 
Heathrow – our major international aviation hub – is a strategic national asset. It 
must be developed for the good of everyone … The proposed Air Transport 
White Paper will provide a policy framework for the future of aviation and 
airports in the UK for the next 30 years. We must make sure we get it right. We 
must get it right, not least because your company is a great company. As the 
UK’s sole global network carrier, British Airways is at the heart of the UK 
aviation industry. Employing an average 55,000 people in British Airways 
mainline, we carry 36 million passengers each year – that’s more international 
passengers than any other airline, with a global network spanning some 268 
destinations and 97 countries.  In short, British Airways is the UK’s major airline 
and a world renowned business.  As an Australian [Rod Eddington, CEO], I can 
see clearly that it is in Britain’s interest to stay that way (BA, 2001AR, p.6). 
 
Some of the arguments were on the verge of ethics pragmatism and opportunism. This is 
hardly surprising given that both perspectives maintain an image orientation towards 
CSR and principally relate it with profitability, either in terms of maintaining 
(pragmatists) or extending (opportunists) the latter. For example, when BA explained the 
potential ‘business reasons’ for adopting CSR: 
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 Apart from the fact that British Airways believes in social responsibility, 
including environmental care and concern for the communities we serve and in 
which we work, there are sound business reasons for this. Consumers will more 
and more judge a company on its integrity and ethics, as well as the value of its 
commercial products and services (BA, 2003AR, p. 3), 
 
it was not clear whether CSR was viewed as a necessary, ‘pragmatic’ activity to satisfy 
increased consumer expectations and maintain legitimacy and, consequently, 
profitability, or, rather, as a means of opportunistically “attracting ‘patient’ shareholders 
and enhancing the firm’s reputation and brand value” (Clikeman, 2004, p. 25) in order to 
“establish new markets, gain additional market share, and/or increase market size 
though… increased customer loyalty” (Dillard et al., 2005, p. 86).   
 
Nevertheless, in most of the arguments and (similarly to the pre-accident period) it was 
apparent that BA was primarily externally motivated towards CSR, projecting to its 
constituents that it was interested in balancing their requirements, as this rather 
pragmatic declaration of priorities also indicates: 
 
Our principal objectives in the current year, however, will be to achieve 
increased levels of value and quality for our customers around the world; the 
continued support of our employees; and increased profitability – all of which 
are expected to improve the level of return for shareholders (BA, 2001AR, p.4). 
  
In this period, as the quantitative evidence also suggests, increased emphasis on its H&S 
responsibilities seemed to be paid in a potential attempt to defend and restore legitimacy.  
For example, and despite that even in the pre-accident years BA had noted that, “safety 
is of absolute importance… we will never compromise safety for commercial reasons” 
(BA, 2000SER, p. 3), it was only in the first stand-alone report following the accident 
that the following clause on its Key Issues section on Air safety appeared (BA, 
2001SER, p.48), and which was then repeated in the next report (2002SER, p. 28): 
 
Air safety: this is of paramount importance and the matter is reviewed directly by 
a standing committee of the main corporate board. Risks are under constant 
review and are assessed within a culture of openness.  
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 The emphasis on H&S was accompanied by even more frequent references to the 
contribution of the aviation industry, that could be potentially perceived as a symbolic 
strategy to improve its threatened image or even as a substantive one to alter the 
definition of social legitimacy via attempting to change the perceptions of its 
constituents (Perrow, 1970; Lindblom, 1993). Although these arguments could have also 
been employed by an opportunistically-driven organisation (and even constitute the 
basis of Friedman’s, 1962, pristine capitalism’ arguments), given that the particular 
references were also present (though to a lesser extent) in the pre accident years, they 
more likely signified a pragmatic effort to defend legitimacy:  
 
What aviation can provide, in part, and facilitate as an essential component of the 
global communication network, is creation of wealth necessary for education, 
health and welfare, which, in turn, prime a virtuous cycle leading to an overall 
more sustainable society (BA, 2001SER, p. 4). The aviation industry also 
generates socio-political external benefits which are more difficult to measure 
empirically (2002a, p. 4).  
 
The increased emphasis on the contribution of the aviation industry was, however, not in 
conjunction with further attempts to question the industry’s contribution to the climate 
change as in the pre accident years. On the contrary, BA appeared to start 
acknowledging its environmental impacts without reservation. This shift could be 
potentially part of a substantive organisational attempt at ‘role performance’ through 
engagement with its stakeholders as well as a symbolic admission of guilt aiming for 
‘ceremonial’ conformity. Given, however, that it incurred following the accident, it 
could be interpreted as a further sign of a pragmatic attempt to defend and restore 
legitimacy:  
 
it has long been recognised that emissions from aircraft engines contribute to the 
build up of greenhouse gases. Aircraft and related ground operations also 
contribute to local air quality. The aviation industry is continually looking at 
initiatives to reduce these emissions through research, development and co-
operation. We must continue our innovative work in this area (BA, 2002SER, p. 
20). 
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7.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 summarise the findings from the quantitative CA and the ones in 
respect of the research questions, respectively.  
 
Both the evidence of the quantitative and the qualitative CA seem to provide support for 
the identified as an ethics pragmatism variant of the OL framework.  The quantitative 
findings lend some support to all propositions (arguably, with the exception of 
proposition 6). The levels of voluntary CSD, particularly H&S, in BA’s Annual and 
stand-alone reports increased notably in the post- accident year. As table 7.2 illustrates, 
this was also the case for BA’s positive and negative, and largely for the symbolic and 
substantive, CSD (although the quantitative evidence for proposition 6 was 
inconclusive). In the subsequent two years examined all types of disclosure decreased, 
tentatively indicating that the increase in Y1 could have possibly been an intentional 
organisational attempt to address the threat. 
 
Table 7.2 A summary of the quantitative findings: year-to-year change 
Pre-accident Post-accident 
CSD 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
TOTAL 2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
H&S (20%) 74% (26%) (34%) 
POSITIVE (9%) 14% (33%) (32%) 
NEGATIVE (7%) 37% (23%) (51%) 
H&S POSITIVE (5%) 39% (34%) 0% 
H&S NEGATIVE (7%) 111% (6%) (61%) 
SUBSTANTIVE (14%) 25% (22%) (47%) 
SYMBOLIC (39%) (8%) (41%) (24%) 
H&S SUBSTANTIVE (31%) 76% (13%) (53%) 
H&S SYMBOLIC 26% 68% (55%) 42% 
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It could be also tentatively argued that the findings from quantitative CA suggest BA 
acted as ethics pragmatists towards its CSR. This is particularly so, given the findings 
that BA proportionally increased the use of flexible and cheap supplementary data 
reporting in Y1, and that it considerably decreased all types of CSD in Y2 and Y3. This 
could be interpreted as a sign that the Y1 peak was to address the increased stakeholders’ 
concerns. It is, nevertheless, particularly, the qualitative analysis findings, which 
demonstrated that BA adopted a non-ethical and mostly pragmatic stance towards CSR, 
with emphasis on employing it as a means of improving its reputation, by e.g. 
emphasising the social and economic contributions of aviation and increasing its H&S 
assurances following the accident. BA explicitly acknowledged the need to satisfy its 
stakeholders’ needs and how this further contributed to its reputation, but often 
attempted to opportunistically employ social and environmental arguments to promote 
its own interests, particularly to the government, as in the case of Terminal 5. The 
evidence in BA’s case thus lends support to social contract theory and to reactive CSR 
arguments, although some proactive arguments were also identified.  
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Table 7.3 BA and the research questions 
What is the underlying 
CSRes position?  
The qualitative evidence supports the contention that 
BA’s underlying CSRes position was mostly ethics 
pragmatism, although BA also appeared at times to be 
opportunistically driven. 
Is CSR strategic or 
ethical? 
Some quantitative support that BA took a strategic 
stance. Predominantly image-focused qualitative 
evidence provides additional support.  
Is CSR reactive or 
proactive? 
Supportive quantitative evidence that BA reacted to the 
accident by increasing CSR. The qualitative evidence 
further included mostly reactive arguments of a 
pragmatic nature, although some proactive arguments 
were also noted. 
Can CSR be explained 
by social contract? 
Some quantitative support. Qualitative evidence further 
supportive, with, e.g. frequent references to the 
importance of meeting the expectations of a variety of 
stakeholders. 
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7.3 The case of Air France (AF) 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
AF was founded in 1933 following a merger of the major French airlines at the time 
(AF, 1999AR). Since then, AF has emerged as one of the world’s largest airlines. At the 
time of the Concorde accident, which is the ‘legitimacy threat’ that is the focus of this 
case, the company was in third place in the global rankings in terms of international 
passengers transported (AF, 2002AR) and by the end of 2003 had reached first place in 
Europe in terms of traffic (AF, 2003AR).    
 
In the years investigated prior to the accident, the privatisation process of AF was 
initiated (1999 - “a major step in the Company’s existence” [AF, 1999AR, p.2]) and the 
company also became a founding member of the SkyTeam global airline alliance (2000). 
Details of the Concorde accident are provided in section 7.2.2 in the preceding case 
study; thus the discussion can proceed directly to review the collected quantitative and 
the qualitative evidence. This is followed by the concluding section of the case study. 
 
7.3.2 The quantitative CA evidence 
 
Propositions 1 and 2: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD and 
particularly the level of H&S CSD will show a notable increase 
 
For the purposes of the quantitative analysis only the examined period’s ARs have been 
considered due to (un)availability of the stand-alone reports. Details on the type and 
number of pages of these excluded documents were obtained from 
CorporateRegister.Com and are provided in Table 7.4.  
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Table 7.4 AF stand-alone reporting in the period 1999-2003 
 
Year of 
publication 
Type of report No of pages  
1999 Environmental 35 
2000 (July) Social 45 
2000 Environmental 39 
2001  Environmental  51 
2002 Environmental NA 
2003 (Oct) Environmental 54 
         Source: CorporateRegister.Com  
 
Considering that: 
 
? The social report was published in the month of the accident; thus, if it had been 
available, it would have been recorded as published in the pre-accident period 
? As demonstrated in section 6.3, the levels of stand-alone disclosure per year 
exceed considerably those of AR disclosure,  
 
then, the total CSD (if the stand-alone information was available) would appear to drop 
in the year following the accident. However, since the social report was published at a 
time very close to the accident, it could still serve as a legitimation tool for AF (this was 
in fact the only such report that AF has ever published). In addition, as Table 7.4 further 
illustrates, the environmental reporting information kept rising in the years following the 
accident. It appears, therefore, that the sole examination on AF’s Annual Reporting may 
still be useful towards investigating the set propositions. Naturally, any inferences from 
AF’s quantitative analysis are subject to this limitation. 
 
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 (see also Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix Jii) summarise the findings for 
propositions 1 and 2. The findings lend some support to both propositions 1 and 2, since 
following the accident (Y1) the levels of total and H&S CSD in the AR increased 
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notably. With regards to total CSD, this increase ranges from 15% (proportion of AR) to 
42% (sentences), with the increase in pages reaching 39%. In addition: 
 
? Y2 represented a peak in total disclosure over the five-year period for most 
measurement units (with the marginal exception of sentences)  
? For all measures, the disclosure remained throughout the post-accident period in 
higher than Y-2 levels, indicating that the accident could have possibly triggered 
an incremental increase in the amount of CSD.   
 
 
Figure 7.7 Total CSD per measurement unit
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As Figure 7.8 illustrates (see also Table 2, in Appendix Jii), the tentative support for 
proposition 2 is comparatively stronger than for proposition 1. H&S disclosure’s 
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increase ranged from 350% (% of AR) to 400% (pages). The H&S disclosure largely 
followed the patterns of total CSD in that: 
 
? For all measurement units the H&S disclosure originally decreased in Y-1 to then 
increase for two years and reach a peak in Y2, before decreasing in Y3 
? For all measures, the disclosure remained throughout the post-accident period at 
higher than Y-2 levels 
 
 
Figure 7.8 H&S CSD per measurement unit
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
Years
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t
Sentences Narrative (pages) Pictorial (pages)
Pages (total) % of Annual Report
 
 
In Y2 the total CSD impressively increases by 145% and the H&S CSD (albeit 
increasing at a lower percentage than Y1) by 268%.  In Y2, AF started calling its AR 
‘Annual Report and Sustainable Development’ and introduced large dedicated sections 
to each main area of its CSR activities. The fact, though, that the disclosure substantially 
fell in Y3 (by 40% in pages) was not a supportive sign of an organisational genuine 
attempt to engage with sustainability. 
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 The further increase in disclosure in Y2 could be possibly perceived as a response to the 
major legitimacy threat that the whole industry faced following the September 11th 
attacks. It should be noted, however, that AF was not affected as much as most airlines 
by these events and still recorded profits in that year. AF mainly attributed this to the 
diversification of its product and to the fact that the African, Caribbean and Indian 
Ocean markets continued to perform well. From a resource point of view, this may have 
allowed AF to restructure its AR by giving it a stronger CSR focus, and further invest in 
improving its stand-alone reporting. 
 
An alternative explanation may be that AF did not have enough time to better prepare its 
response in Y1. The Y1 report covered the reporting period 1999-2000, and was thus 
most likely published at a time very close to the accident (July 2000). This proximity 
may have consequently led AF to postpone its CSR response. The fact that most of the 
H&S disclosure in the Y1 report primarily consisted of general safety assurance 
statements (in large typeface, - as discussed more extensively later) may also be seen as 
an indication of AF not having enough time for an immediate substantive response. In 
addition, since the release of its first social report also coincided with the accident, this 
may have deterred AF from disclosing additional information in Y1. 
 
The increased elapsed time from the accident may have allowed AF not only to increase 
the amount of the disclosed CSR information, but also improve its quality in both 
Annual and stand-alone reporting. As Figure 7.9 illustrates (see also Tables 3 and 4 in 
Appendix Jii) AF published annually two documents placed in a folder labelled AR: an 
‘overview’ of the year (which is referred in the graph as ‘Annual Report’) and a 
‘reference document’, which was strictly accounting focused and contained minimal 
CSD. In Y1 the increase in the levels of CSD for the AR document reached 69%, whilst 
the reference one had a decrease in disclosure of 8%. In Y2, however, both the 
documents considerably increased their levels of CSD. Following the complete 
restructuring of the reviewing document and its renaming as ‘Annual Report and 
Sustainable Development’, the increase in its levels of CSD reached 179%, whilst the 
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reference document CSD also increased by 49%. It should be noted, however, that the 
levels of CSD in the reference document remained for the rest of the period examined at 
lower levels than Y-2, potentially due to the increased disclosure in the AR. 
 
Figure 7.9 Source of CSD 
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AF apparently also improved the quality of its stand-alone reporting. As it notes: 
 
in 2002, and for the second consecutive year, the sixth Air France environmental 
report (2001-2002) was selected by the Council of French Chartered Accountants 
to represent France in the European Sustainability Reporting Awards (ESRA), 
designed to reward the best environmental or sustainable development report 
published by European companies” (AF, 2003ER, p.2),  
  
revealing that both the environmental reports following the Concorde crash were 
commended for their quality.  
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The increased quality regarding CSR disclosure in the first two post-accident years was 
also reflected in the way AF allocated disclosure in its AR at the time. As Figure 7.10 
illustrates (see also Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix Jii): 
 
? All disclosure themes increased in Y1, with H&S showing the greatest increase 
(400%) followed by the marketplace (64%) 
? Most disclosure themes further increased in Y2 (with the marginal exception of 
marketplace) and decreased in Y3 (with the exception of community) 
? Workplace remained the most popular disclosure theme throughout the five-year 
period 
 
Figure 7.10 Theme of CSD 
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The increase in Y1 for all CSR themes could be possibly interpreted as an organisational 
attempt to address more stakeholders and defend legitimacy. The marketplace disclosure 
in Y1 was mostly about expansions in the company’s flying network and for the first 
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time in the examined period AF made some disclosure pertaining to community and the 
environment in that year. Although during the same period AF was also publishing a 
stand-alone environmental report, interestingly in the first two ARs examined there was 
not even a reference to it. The Y2 increase in the levels of CSD reflected the change in 
the structure of its AR and the stronger CSR focus. Despite the decrease in Y3, the 
disclosure remained at a higher level than Y-2.  
 
It could be argued that AF’s probable attempt to address more comprehensively its 
stakeholders’ needs following the Concorde accident was also evident in the year-to-
year changes in thematic proportions. Prior to the accident AF was only reporting on 
three themes (workplace, marketplace and H&S) whereas in the subsequent years it 
disclosed in all 6 categories. The fact that workplace remained the more popular theme 
reflected the strong AF emphasis on industrial relations. This will be discussed more in 
the qualitative analysis section. The reports also had a strong focus on customer service, 
particularly in the years preceding the accident. The reason this was not reflected more 
emphatically in the disclosure, was that information such as its new cabins or larger 
menus and offers, was excluded from the analysis on the grounds of not being 
considered CSR. In Y2 following the AR reshaping, CSD appeared more proportionately 
balanced among themes. This was interestingly reflected also in the reference document, 
which in the last two years included discussions on the environment, community and 
creditors and a greater focus on H&S. Previously the latter solely pertained to fleet 
renewals and the CSD in the document was almost exclusively about consumer and 
employee topics. 
 
Propositions 3 and 4: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD and the 
level of negative CSD will show a notable increase 
 
The findings in terms of positive vs. negative CSD for the total and H&S disclosures are 
summarised in Figure 7.11 (see also Table 7 in Appendix Jii). Both positive and 
negative disclosures increased in Y1 (it seemed to be at the expense of neutral CSD), 
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lending some tentative support to propositions 3 and 4. All categories of disclosure 
further rose in Y2, following the restructuring of the AR, before decreasing in Y3. 
 
Figure 7.11 Positive vs negative CSD
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It should be noted, however, that for both H&S and total CSD the proportionate increase 
in positive disclosures in Y1 was greater than the average related increases in the period 
(i.e. 424% as opposed to 400%; and 85% as opposed to 39%, respectively). This was not 
the case for the Y2 CSD, where, particularly, the increase in total negative disclosures 
was considerably higher than the positive ones. This could be interpreted as an 
organisational attempt to disclose positive and suppress negative news to improve 
image. This argument is further strengthened when the evidence on the substantive vs. 
symbolic distinction is considered, as discussed next, 
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Propositions 5 and 6: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD and 
the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figure 7.12 presents the findings in terms of substantive vs. symbolic CSD for both total 
and H&S disclosures (see also Table 8 in Appendix Jii). It could be argued that the 
findings lend some support to both propositions 5 and 6, since in Y1 both substantive and 
symbolic CSD increased, for both H&S and total CSD. Both substantive and symbolic 
disclosures further increased in Y2, reflecting the rise in total CSD, before decreasing in 
Y3.   
 
Figure 7.12 Substantive vs symbolic CSD
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Importantly (particularly given the above findings as regards the greater increase in 
positive than negative CSD), AF increased its symbolic rather than the substantive CSD 
to a considerably greater extent, in respect of both H&S and the total. This was in 
contrast to the subsequent year, where the substantive disclosure increased in greater 
extent than the symbolic for both H&S and total CSD. It would appear that, possibly due 
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to the proximity to the accident, AF did not have enough time for an immediate 
substantive response and hence employed primarily cheap and flexible symbolic means 
to react to the threat. Particularly with regards to H&S, AF mainly appear to have done 
so by including, in a number of section subheadings, some assurances in large typeface – 
as detailed examples under the qualitative evidence section illustrate. 
 
7.3.3 The qualitative CA evidence 
 
The data unavailability and the restructuring of the AR in 2002 have also had an impact 
on the qualitative analysis, as reflected in the summary of the ‘pattern matching’ activity 
(Table 7.5). It could still be noted, though, that the majority of the supporting evidence 
pertained to ‘pragmatism’. It should be noted that for the purpose of the qualitative 
analysis, AF’s 2003 (Y3) Environmental Report was also considered (this was not 
considered in the quantitative analysis in order to enhance comparability of the results, 
since it was the only one available in the five-year-period) and contributed considerably 
to the discussion.  
 
In the first three years, the ARs were customer focused. AF often repeated that it 
consider “customer satisfaction the keystone” (2001AR, p.49). In that period, the 
company further emphasised the importance of achieving minimal labour disruptions, 
primarily for its customers’ benefit: 
 
Within the Company itself, this year should herald a period of social peace 
through new labour agreements. Avoiding conflicts which penalize us, striving 
towards quality and working to perpetuate stable labour relations and jobs, 
benefit our customers, investors and employees… The focus is of course on 
customer satisfaction: restoring punctuality, guaranteeing quality service, 
building on our products, and developing Paris-Charles de Gaulle into Europe’s 
most powerful hub” (AF, 1999AR, p.3). 
  
 Table 7.5 Summary of the ‘pattern matching’ activity for AF 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
S
t
a
k
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
m
 
 
 
 
[no reference] 
 
 
 
[no reference] [no reference] 
 
Acknowledgment of responsibility 
‘with respect to different 
environments’; explicit reference to 
awareness of duties to stakeholders; 
engagement with community 
involvement programmes; initiation 
of additional safety measures. 
 
 
Reference to integration of 
environmental policy in the 
production process, involving all 
staff; a few mentions of 
commitments to sustainable 
development, ethics and 
transparency; reference to 
commitment to cleaner technology 
even if more costly, despite the 
difficult times for the aviation 
industry 
 
E
t
h
i
c
s
 
p
r
a
g
m
a
t
i
s
m
 
 
Focus on achieving 
minimal labour 
disruptions 
 
Focus on achieving 
minimal labour 
disruptions and attempts 
to present this as 
benefiting customers, 
investors and employees 
 
 
Frequent symbolic 
references to 
commitment to H&S 
following the accident; 
provision of accounts in 
detail on safety 
procedures; frequent 
attempts to change its 
reports’ headings to 
reflect an H&S focus. 
 
Reference to employees as being 
important stakeholders; mention that 
responsibility and profit can be 
combined; reference to additional 
attempts to be responsive to Sep 11th 
re H&S. 
 
Explicit reference for CSRes 
contributing to image; significant 
emphasis on sustainability as 
involving balancing environmental 
with social and economic needs; 
frequent reference to the importance 
of dialogue with unions; reference to 
sustainability as public expectations’ 
driven; references to ‘trade-offs’ 
between sustainability criteria 
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(Table 7.5 continued) 
Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
E
t
h
i
c
s
 
O
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
m
  
Explicit reference to 
measures taken to 
anticipate regulatory 
developments regarding 
noise standards 
 
[no reference] [no reference] 
 
Explicit reference to agreements 
signed with trade unions to anticipate 
future EC regulations re CSRes; some 
attempts to question the efficiency of 
fuel tax (as distorting competition). 
 
 
Explicit references to CSRes as  
having a positive impact on image 
and on share price 
O
t
h
e
r
 
 
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
  
 
[no reference] 
 
 
[no reference] [no reference] 
 
Reference on addressing Sep 11th with 
a responsive, cohesive and responsible 
attitude 
 
 
Reference to its sustainable 
development approach as involving 
H&S and equal opportunities at 
work; significant emphasis on 
environmental policy being key 
component in AF’s growth strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 When AF attempted to justify its wage freezes (a major cause of disruption at the time), 
it explain in large typeface its wish to, “Be profitable for everyone’s benefit”:  
 
By accepting the salary/share exchange scheme on a voluntary and individual 
basis, as well as the wage freeze, 79% of the pilots committed themselves to a 
process of reducing costs and improving Company profitability… The new status 
of Air France, a company now quoted on the Stock Exchange, has led to a 
different approach in terms of attitude and operating methods (AF, 1999AR, 
p.36).   
 
In the reports after the accident, AF declared its commitment to its environmental policy 
in spite of the difficult times for the air transport industry: 
 
2002-03 was the most difficult year ever experienced by the air transport 
industry since World Ward II… Against this background, which led airlines to 
seek drastic reductions in costs, Air France did not drop its guard but pursued the 
development of its environmental policy. Furthermore, it protected the 
investments it had set aside for that purpose as, in spite of the current climate, 
this policy and the required investments are a key component of its growth 
strategy (AF, 2003ER, p.1). 
 
AF explained that its commitment to its environmental policy was part of a broader 
engagement with sustainability, transparency and humanitarian principles, implying it 
endorsed ‘stakeholder capitalism’ and its holistic accountability premise: 
 
Integration is the watchword. Environmental protection is not simply something 
we think about once our growth strategy is well under way. It is an integral part 
of the production process, whether we are talking about seats, freight or 
maintenance. It represents a collective commitment, reflected in the 
environmental action plans implemented since 2002. It involves all the 
Company’s staff and subsidiaries as well as suppliers and partners (AF, 2003AR, 
p.1). 
 
Our commitment goes even further. It is part of a broader concept of the 
Company’s place in society, which is to ensure sustainable development in every 
area. This includes the local and global environment dealt with in this report, 
relations with residents living close to the airport, with local authorities and the 
Group’s partners, and on a wider scale, the safeguarding of consensual labour 
relations and jobs at Air France in 2002-03, as in 2001-02. For us, sustainable 
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development also implies compliance with ethical and humanitarian intervention 
principles, as well as sincerity and transparency both in operations and in the 
accounts. This is how Air France intends to continue to be the responsible 
company it considers it should be (AF, 2003ER, p.1). 
 
By quoting some experts’ views (and thus implicitly endorsing them) AF appeared to be 
willing to forgo some profit to increase the environmental benefits:  
 
The aeronautical industry should continue its efforts to develop programs on 
cleaner technologies, even if further advances in aircraft technology are more 
costly and will produce smaller gains when compared to past decades (AF, 
2003ER, p.19). 
 
And indeed, following September 11th events, the company even seemed to be doing so, 
by initiating additional safety measures: 
 
Lastly, the Company’s responsiveness was demonstrated by the safety measures 
initiated immediately following September 11. The Company acted rapidly, 
going beyond new regulatory requirements. It initiated passenger counts on all 
flights, ground monitoring of aircraft, the presence of security guards on certain 
flights and controls of hold baggage using explosive detectors. The cost of these 
measures, partially reimbursed by the French government this year in the amount 
of EUR 24 million, continues to weigh on the Company’s accounts (AF, 
2002Ref, pp. 14-15). 
 
Despite that the above evidence could be perceived as stakeholder capitalism signs, AF’s 
CSR approach nevertheless seemed to be inclined to pragmatism when it implicitly 
endorsed an ‘expert’s’ view on sustainability as involving: “balancing environmental 
considerations with economic and social ones” (AF, 2003ER, p.5). This more 
‘pragmatic’ balance seemed to be central on its sustainability approach: 
 
Similarly to environmental and economic responsibility, our social responsibility 
covers all our activities and organizations. This cross-functional approach, 
symbolic of the interactions underpinning sustainable development, is at the 
heart of Project Major. It underlines the validity of a strategy which gives 
priority to the long term and is based on a single key factor: balance. It is this 
sense of balance which gives me confidence in the future and in our ability to 
adapt to new market conditions and operating methods. We are ready for the 
future (AF, 2003AR, p.3).  
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Balancing the economic benefits and environmental costs is crucial to the growth 
of commercial aviation. We are committed to the long-term health of the aviation 
industry. Our goal is safe, efficient, affordable airplanes with excellent 
environmental performance. That would allow all of us to breathe easier (AF, 
2003ER, p.27). 
 
In an attempt to downgrade aviation’s environmental impacts and potentially justify any 
negative CSRes results, AF further presented ‘pragmatic’ trade-off arguments: 
 
In view of the scientific uncertainties which remain regarding the effects and 
impact of air transport on the environment, a ‘trade-off’, carefully thought-out 
approach is essential. Efforts to reduce noise emissions, for example, may 
hamper those undertaken elsewhere to cut fuel consumption. Such trade-offs… 
are commonplace in the aviation industry (AF, 2003AR, p.23). 
 
Regardless of the solution [to green house gas emissions] chosen, it must satisfy 
a threefold objective. It must: not distort competition, be environmentally 
efficient, meet the collective travel of all citizens (AF, 2003AR, p.24) 
 
The company seemed to implicitly endorse the ‘expert’s’ view on sustainability, 
indicating that its sustainability attempts were expectations driven: 
 
the most important thing for aviation’s sustainable development, while 
contributing to the improvement of the world’s welfare, is to minimize the 
adverse effects of aviation on the environment in order to heed citizens’ concerns 
(AF, 2003ER, p.14). 
 
On a number of occasions AF noted how important it was for it to anticipate future 
regulations in respect of CSRes. This deviates from its proclaimed sustainable 
development, ethical and humanitarian-focused approach: 
 
Faced with an increasingly stringent regulatory environment limiting noise 
pollution generated by air traffic, the Company has taken a certain number of 
measures to anticipate regulatory developments. To that end, 91% of the Group’s 
subsonic aircraft already comply with the strictest noise pollution regulations 
promulgated by the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] (AF, 
1999Ref, p.20). 
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On June 25, 2001, Air France brought into force a Charter signed by all the trade 
unions… The Charter has mainly been drawn up to… anticipate on future EC 
regulations on a form of corporate social responsibility that takes social and 
environmental concerns into account, as laid out in the European Commission’s 
Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (AF, 2002AR, p.36). 
 
Additionally, AF’s Chairman acknowledged the benefits in image and share price by the 
company’s social responsibility strategy, in a clearer opportunistic, ‘win-win’ argument: 
 
As for our social responsibility, this is expressed through our long-term 
agreements, which provide a solid foundation for our social policy, important 
both for the employees and the Company itself. The latest agreement is the long-
term draft agreement which has just been approved by the pilots and which 
should form the basis for stable labour relations over the next three years. This 
obviously has a positive effect on the quality of our service to our passengers, on 
our share price and on our image compared to other transport players (AF, 
2003AR, p.3). 
 
Nevertheless, AF’s image-focused approach was perhaps most evident in its apparent 
attempts to change the headings in its Y1 report to better reflect its H&S focus. In this 
report, on five occasions (compared to one in Y-1’s report) it includes the term ‘safety’ in 
a heading. It is also particularly interesting to note how it changed the wording of these 
AR headings as Table 7.6 illustrates. 
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Y-1  Y1
 
Since it was founded, Air France has 
chosen to carry out its own aircraft 
maintenance, which gives it full 
control over safety, punctuality and 
costs. Two large divisions supply 
these services: the Maintenance 
Division and the Industrial 
Engineering Division (AF, 2000AR, 
p.26) 
 
  
Safety is a priority at Air France. Ever since 
it was founded, the Company has insisted on 
maintaining its own aircraft. And besides 
maintenance, this strategic choice has 
provided enhanced management of its 
aircraft and control over its operating costs. 
It also means it can add value to this activity 
(AF, 2001AR, p.36). 
 
Air France aims to implement a 
profitable strategy of growth. It 
intends to finance its development 
through cash flow from operations, 
restored profitability and a tight rein 
on costs (p.34) 
 
  
As it strives to offer the best possible 
service, an airline has to ensure its own 
profitability, thereby also guaranteeing 
passenger safety and comfort (p.46). 
 
A flight that arrives on time, discreet, 
attentive personnel, services that 
measure up to expectations, a quality 
welcome: in short everything a 
passenger might expect from a world-
class airline. This is what Air France 
has to deliver to win its customers 
(p.32). 
 
  
By safely flying its customers in the 
simplest, fastest, more comfortable way 
possible, regardless of their destination, Air 
France hopes to ensure that it becomes – and 
stays – its customers preferred airline (p.15). 
 
Table 7.6 AF changing the emphasis 
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7.3.4 Conclusion 
 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 summarise the findings from the quantitative CA and the ones in 
respect of the research questions, respectively. Despite its proclaimed commitment to 
sustainability and acknowledgment of wider accountabilities, both the quantitative and 
qualitative evidence suggests that AF did not seem to be ethics-motivated towards CSR.  
 
As Table 7.7 illustrates, in Y1 all examined types of CSD went up, lending tentative 
support to all the study’s propositions. This was followed by a further increase in Y2, 
reflecting the restructuring of the AR (although in the case of H&S notably in lower 
proportions). In Y3 all examined types of CSD decreased (although CSD remained at 
higher levels than Y-2), indicating that the Y1 and Y2 increase was not a sustained 
attempt for increase in CSR but possibly an attempt to address the threat.  
 
Table 7.7 Summary of the quantitative findings: year-to-year change 
Pre-accident Post-accident 
CSD 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
TOTAL 25% 39% 145% (40%) 
H&S (73%) 400% 268% (47%) 
POSITIVE 24% 85% 134% (39%) 
NEGATIVE 11% 24% 242% (56%) 
H&S POSITIVE (77%) 424% 277% (50%) 
H&S NEGATIVE (100%) ∞ 197% (43%) 
SUBSTANTIVE (22%) 23% 251% (35%) 
SYMBOLIC 162% 66% 78% (47%) 
H&S SUBSTANTIVE (64%) 222% 313% (36%) 
H&S SYMBOLIC (87%) 1,360% 208% (65%) 
 
It could perhaps be argued that these were signs of an image – as opposed to an ethics-
focused organisation. Particularly given that in Y3 all types of CSD decreased, AF 
seemed to be adopting a pragmatic stance, whereby it employed CSR in greater level in 
a potential attempt to address the legitimacy threat, and not an opportunistic one. It is, 
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nevertheless, particularly the qualitative findings, which suggest that AF was 
‘strategically’ engaging with CSR and CSRes to minimise labour disruptions and 
balance other social with environmental and economic needs to maintain its licence to 
operate.  
 
The study’s findings, therefore, indicate that AF’s CSR employment was a pragmatic 
attempt to heed citizens concerns and improve image and potentially profitability. It 
should be stressed, nevertheless, that these tentative conclusions are subject to the 
important limitation that only the company’s ARs of that period were included in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 7.8 AF and the Research questions 
What is the underlying 
CSRes position?  
Both quantitative and qualitative evidence support the 
contention that AF’s underlying CSRes position was 
‘ethics pragmatism’. 
Is CSR strategic or 
ethical? 
Some quantitative support that AF took a strategic 
stance. Predominantly image-focused qualitative 
evidence provides additional support.  
Is CSR reactive or 
proactive? 
Tentatively supportive quantitative evidence that AF 
reacted to the accident by using CSR. The qualitative 
evidence demonstrated mostly reactive arguments of a 
‘pragmatic’ nature.  
Can CSR be explained 
by social contract? 
Some quantitative support. Qualitative evidence further 
supportive, with references to the importance of 
meeting the expectations of stakeholders (mostly 
employees, customers and investors). 
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7.4 The case of American Airlines (AA) 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
AA is a US-based airline and the world’s largest in terms of passenger miles transported 
and passenger fleet size (also the second largest in number of aircraft operated and in 
operating revenues). AA was developed through mergers and acquisitions of 82 small 
airlines in 1930 and is a founding member of the Oneworld Alliance.  
 
Although the group have been involved in a number of accidents since its formation, 
2001 appears to be the most catastrophic year in the airline’s history: in that year two of 
AA’s aircrafts were involved in the September 11 attacks, one aircraft was involved in 
an attempted attack and the company also had a fatal accident. The next section 
introduces these legitimacy threats; the following one the quantitative evidence and the 
penultimate the qualitative. The concluding section summarises the findings.  
 
7.4.2 The incidents45
 
Two AA aircrafts were hijacked and crashed in the 11 September 2001 attacks. AA 
Flight 11, a Boeing 767, departed from Logan International Airport, serving Boston, at 
08:00 local time and was on a non-stop transcontinental service destined for Los 
Angeles, California, when hijacked by five suspected members of the infamous al-Qaida 
terrorist organisation. At 08:46 local time the plane crashed into the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center, a complex of buildings located on lower Manhattan Island that had 
for approximately three decades served as perhaps the most recognisable symbol of 
American economic power. Less than 20 minutes after the first strike, the hijacked 
United Airlines Flight 175, another Boeing 767, crashed into the south side of the South 
Tower of the building. Damaged by the force of the impact and by the subsequent fires, 
                                                 
45 It should be noted that the term ‘incidents’ (as opposed to the term ‘accidents’, that is used in the 
discussion of all the other cases) is preferred in this case, considering that these also include the September 
11th attacks. In the other chapters, however, the term ‘accidents’ is used when collective references to the 
investigated legitimacy threats are made, to avoid long and complicated arguments.   
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both Towers collapsed within two hours of the first strike. Among the 2,759 persons 
who perished in the attack were all 92 on board the AA aircraft (81 passengers and 11 
crew) and 343 members of the New York City Fire Department, whilst over 6,000 others 
on the ground suffered injuries (Gero, 2006).  
 
Coordinated with the attacks in New York was the hijacking of AA Flight 77, a Boeing 
757, which was intentionally crashed into the Pentagon. Following its departure from 
Dulles International Airport, serving Washington DC on a non-stop domestic flight to 
Los Angeles, California, the flight was hijacked by five al-Qaida terrorist suspects and 
crashed on the American Military symbolic building, located across the Potomac River 
from Washington. Including all of those aboard the aircraft (58 passengers and six 
crew), a total of 189 persons perished in the attack, while more than 100 others suffered 
injuries. Within a year of the attack, the damaged building was completely repaired and 
the Pentagon resumed its vital function, but with the new role of coordinating the war on 
terrorism (Gero, 2006).   
 
While AA was still recovering from the terrorist attacks of September 11th, AA flight 
587 crashed on 12 November 2001, shortly after take-off from John F Kennedy 
International Airport en route to Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic (AA, 
2002AR). The A300 crashed in a residential area approximately four miles south-west of 
the airport. In addition to the loss of all lives on board the aircraft (251 passengers and 
nine crew members), five others on the ground perished in the disaster. This was the 
worst aviation accident involving an American commercial aircraft on a scheduled 
international service and it was attributed by the US National Transportation Safety 
Board to the co-pilot’s overuse of rudder controls, which led AA to modify its pilot 
training programme.  
 
A further terrorist attempt occurred on AA Flight 63, which was en route to Miami, 
Florida from Paris, France, on 22 December 2001. During the flight one of the 
passengers, Richard Colvin Reid, a self-proclaimed al-Qaida operative, carried shoes 
that were packed with two types of explosives and attempted to detonate them, but was 
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however noticed by a flight attendant. Although Reid attempted to resist, he was 
eventually subdued by attendants and other passengers of the aircraft and was arrested 
on the ground. The failed bombing attempt has been since then known as ‘the 2001 shoe 
bomb plot’.   
 
As discussed in section 5.9.1.1, the September 11th attacks may be perceived as a 
‘macro’-legitimacy threat, pertaining to the legitimacy of the whole industry, and have 
been taken into consideration when interpreting the findings from all the examined cases 
in the study. However, considering that two AA planes were directly involved in the 
attacks (and also that, in that year, AA also suffered the Flight 587 crash and the ‘shoe-
bomb’ terrorist attempt took place in one of its aircrafts), it could be argued that these 
events posed an increased threat to the company’s legitimacy and ultimate survival.  
 
AA indeed (as the subsequent discussion of the qualitative findings reveals) only a year 
after these events, started considering the possibility of declaring bankruptcy. It’s share 
price at the end of the year fell by over 55%, it’s passenger revenues by 14% and the 
company reported USD 1.8 billion losses for 2001, as opposed to the USD 813 million 
generated profits in 2000 (AA, 2001AR). AA’s reported decline in profit and revenue 
following September 11th was considerably higher than the ones of the rest of the 
(competing to AA) airlines examined in this study (with AF in fact increasing its 
revenues in the first post September 11th year, as discussed in the preceding section). 
And although a year after the terrorist attacks, passengers numbers in Europe were, by 
and large, recovered, for AA (and, indeed, most of US carriers) this was not the case, 
due to the increased concerns over security and the additional inconvenience associated 
with the increased security checks, which considerably lengthened the journey times 
(Gahan, 2002). 
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7.4.3 The quantitative CA evidence 
 
Propositions 1 and 2: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD and 
particularly the level of H&S CSD will show a notable increase 
 
The number of legitimacy threats AA faced in 2001 (Y1) appear to have had an impact 
on both the total and the H&S disclosure in Y1 as Figures 7.13 and 7.14 illustrate, 
lending some support to propositions 1 and 2 (see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix Jiii).  
Figure 7.13 Total CSD per measurement unit
0.1
1
10
100
1000
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
Years
M
es
ur
em
en
t u
ni
t
Sentences Narrative (pages) Pictorial (pages)
Pages (total) % of Annual Report
 
With regard to the total CSD, it can be seen that: 
 
? Y1 represented a peak in the disclosure over the five-year period across all 
measurement units 
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? For all measures, the disclosure fell in Y-1 and in Y2, and returned to the Y-2 
levels in Y3, indicating that the  burst in disclosure was possibly to address the 
threat 
 
The striking 320% increase in the total disclosure was largely due to the 1,158% 
increase in narrative disclosure, as opposed to the 106% in pictorial; this was not 
however consistent with the evidence on the substantive vs. symbolic CSD distinction, 
as the later discussion reveals. The H&S disclosure increase in Y1 was even greater than 
the total uplift, reaching 557%, with more proportionate increases in the narrative and 
pictorial disclosure.  
 
Figure 7.14 H&S CSD per measurement unit
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As Figure 7.14 illustrates: 
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? Y1 represented a peak in H&S disclosure over the five year period for all 
measurement units  
? For all measures, the disclosure showed a rising trend until Y1 (note the 
considerably higher increase from Y-1 to Y1 as opposed to Y-2 to Y-1), and it 
declined in the last two years, to reach slightly lower levels than Y-1, a finding 
that, it could be argued, indicates that the Y1 peak was an attempt to defend and 
restore legitimacy 
 
As Figure 7.15 illustrates (see also Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix Jiii), disclosure increases 
dramatically in the subsequent to the incidents reports largely due to the inclusion in the 
analysis of the 2001 Environmental Report, the only stand-alone report considered. 
Although AA claimed that the latter was, “the third annual and environmental report 
presented by American … since … 1999” (AA, 2001ER, p.4), it is the only one which is 
available from the company’s website, with the next ones published in 2007 as also 
indicated by CorporateRegister.com (AA also confirmed the 2001-2007 CSR reporting 
gap in its 2007 environmental report). This indicates that AA gave greater publicity to its 
2001 report, comparing to its first reporting attempts, and it could be argued that this 
further suggests that it did so to address the legitimacy threat.   
 
AR disclosure further increased in the Y1 by 12%. Although the increase in the 
disclosure was even greater in Y2 (52%) this was largely due to the more detailed nature 
of Form 10-K Reports46 that were employed, and were the only ones published on AA’s 
website, in Y2 and Y3. In these reports, AA mainly discussed (and often repeated) issues 
such as litigation, pensions, stock options and efforts to reduce labour costs.  
 
                                                 
46 Form 10-K is an AR required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with a more 
technical, detailed and less glossy nature, focusing on issues such as risk factors, market and 
management’s discussion and analysis, in addition to exhaustively presenting the financial statements. The 
examined reports in Form 10-K, consequently, contained no images or graphs and the only pictorial 
information considered was in tabular form.  
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Figure 7.15 Source of CSD 
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Figure 7.16 (see also Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix Jiii) illustrates the findings per theme 
of CSD: 
 
? Y1 represented a peak in H&S disclosure over the five year period for all themes 
with the exception of marketplace 
? All themes of disclosure decreased in Y2 and generally stayed at the Y-2 and Y-1 
levels, with the exception of workplace 
? Workplace remained the most frequent theme throughout the period, followed by 
the marketplace (for the first two years) and the environment (for the remaining 
three). 
? For the first and only time in Y1 nearly four pages of community involvement 
information was provided. 
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Figure 7.16 Theme of CSD 
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The further decrease in Y1 of marketplace disclosure was largely due to the gradual shift 
in pictorial disclosure in the ARs, from portraying images of happy customers to 
depicting ones of employees on duty. The inclusion in the analysis in the last two years 
of Form 10-K reports, which predominantly contain employee-focused CSD, boosted 
the theme’s proportions in the period after the accident (81% in 2002 and 78% in 2003). 
 
Propositions 3 and 4: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD and the 
level of negative CSD will show a notable increase 
 
The findings in terms of positive vs. negative CSD for total and H&S disclosures are 
summarised in Figure 7.17 (see also Table 7 in Appendix Jiii). 
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Figure 7.17 Positive vs negative CSD
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It should be noted that: 
 
? All types of CSD increased and reached a peak in Y1 (with the exception of the 
neutral CSD), thus lending some support to propositions 3 and 4  
? The increase in positive (both total and H&S) CSD in Y1 was considerably 
higher that the other years; it then decreased dramatically in Y2 to remain 
considerably lower than the first two years 
? The negative CSD remained constant over the last two years. 
 
The employment of the Form 10-K report, which contained detailed information 
regarding, for example, the layoffs, compensations, pensions and ESOP’s was the main 
reason behind the increased levels of negative CSD in the last examined years. Positive 
CSD in Y1 included information such as environmental achievements, employee training 
and community involvement programmes; it could be argued that its dramatic decrease 
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in the post-accident years would further suggest that the Y1 increased CSD was part of 
an attempt to rapidly close the legitimacy gap by showing AA as acting responsibly.  
 
Propositions 5 and 6: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD and 
the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figure 7.18 (see also Table 8 in Appendix Jiii) presents the findings in terms of the 
substantive vs. symbolic CSD for total and H&S disclosures:  
Figure 7.18 Substantive vs symbolic CSD
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? All types of CSD increased and reached a peak in Y1, lending some support to 
propositions 5 and 6 
? Most types of CSD returned and remained at the pre-incident levels in the last 
two years, with the exception of substantive CSD, which remained at higher 
levels 
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? The symbolic total and H&S CSD increased in Y1 and dropped in Y2 in greater 
proportions than the symbolic total and H&S CSD. 
 
The latter finding gives the impression of an organisation employing symbolic and one-
off means to possibly increase its threatened image, as opposed to one committed to 
CSRes and CSR. Symbolic CSD in Y1 mainly included detailed discussions of the 
company’s environmental visions and general policies and procedures whilst the fact 
that substantive total CSD remained in high levels in the last two years could be 
attributed to the employment of the more ‘technical’ 10-K reports. 
 
7.4.4 The qualitative CA evidence 
 
Table 7.9 summarises the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for AA. It could be inferred from 
this table that there was evidence supportive of all three identified LT variants (and 
some other evidence that could support more than one variant); it, however, appears that 
the majority of evidence would suggest that AA adopted a strategic and image focused 
stance with regard to its CSRes and CSR, which primarily aimed at pragmatically 
satisfying critical stakeholders’ needs (although AA at times argued that its engagement 
with CSRes could also assist in improving profitability).  
 
AA on a number of occasions made clear reference to the pragmatic need to satisfy 
multiple stakeholders’ needs to ensure viability. And although in the years preceding the 
incidents it focused on employees and customers, following the incidents it appeared to 
acknowledge the importance of a greater number of stakeholders: 
  
 
 Table 7.9 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for AA 
 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
S
t
a
k
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
m
 
 
References to considering 
the interests of employees 
in every decision made 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuing references to 
considering the interests of 
employees in every decision 
made 
 
References to commitment 
to sustainability; vision 
statement supporting 
conservation; description of 
business ethics policy; some 
evidence of integration of 
environmental policies in 
practice, e.g. environmental 
training 
 
[no reference] [no reference] 
E
t
h
i
c
s
 
p
r
a
g
m
a
t
i
s
m
 
 
Frequent references to the 
importance of satisfying 
multiple stakeholders’ 
needs to ensure viability; 
emphasis on employee 
satisfaction to maintain 
quality of service and 
profitability 
 
 
Continuing emphasis on the 
importance of stakeholders’ 
satisfaction to viability; 
emphasis on criticality to 
consider the interests of 
employees at all times 
 
Great emphasis on the 
importance of employees in 
ensuring viability;  explicit 
acknowledgement of the 
critical role of a variety of 
stakeholders in surviving 
the crisis; focus on securing 
safe and convenient air 
travel  
 
 
Frequent reference to the 
need to negotiate cost 
savings with employees 
and lenders to avoid 
bankruptcy; explicit 
reference to the need to 
cooperate with union 
leaders 
 
Emphasis on greater 
cooperation with 
employees to ensure 
sustaining 
profitability; 
continued frequent 
reference to the need 
to negotiate cost 
savings with 
suppliers and 
employees  
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Et
h
i
c
s
 
O
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
m
 
 
Explicit reference to the 
dependence on employee 
satisfaction to create more 
value for shareholders 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuing reference to the 
dependence on employee 
satisfaction to increase 
shareholder value 
 
Continuing reference to the 
dependence on employee 
satisfaction to increase 
shareholder value  [no reference] [no reference] 
O
t
h
e
r
 
 
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
Reference to another 
accident, which claimed 
10 passengers and 1 crew 
members lives; general 
assurances for 
commitment on safety  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement of 
reducing the AR CSD to 
alternatively provide it on 
CD-ROM and on the 
internet 
 
Detailed accounts of its H&S 
programmes in place, a number 
of which were developed in 
2001; detailed accounts of the 
Code of Conduct and on policies 
on equal opportunity, 
discrimination, harassment and 
workplace violence; detailed 
accounts on diversity 
management and sustainability 
and conservation policies; very 
detailed accounts of corporate 
sponsorships; detailed 
description of its environmental 
awards; patriotic references to 
its American origin 
 
[no reference] [no reference] 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
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(Table 7.9 continued) 
 
 
 
 Despite all that’s happened, the six tenets of our Airline Leadership Plan – 
Safety, Service, Product, Network, Technology and Culture – remain our 
blueprint for industry leadership… That’s the goal we are determined to 
achieve. Underlying that goal is the need to establish and sustain strong 
relationships. Indeed, we could not have emerged from 2001 intact were it 
not for the support of the government, the communities we serve, our 
suppliers, our airline partners, the financial community and, most of all, the 
people of American Airlines and American Eagle (2001AR, pp. 3-4). 
 
More frequently, however, the company emphasised the importance to them of 
considering the interests of employees in every decision, in order to maintain 
employee satisfaction and, subsequently, quality of service and profitability: 
 
Technology is obviously an area of our business that has changed 
dramatically in recent years. But one part of our management challenge that 
hasn’t changed is the imperative to consider the interests of our employees in 
every decision we make (2000AR, p.2). 
 
As AA argued, maintaining employee satisfaction directly benefits operations and 
profitability: 
 
The increase in revenues was due primarily to a strong US economy… a 
favorable pricing climate… [and] a labor disruption at one of the Company’s 
competitors which positively impacted the Company’s revenues by 
approximately $80 to $100 million (2001AR, p.6).  
 
Indeed, in a pragmatic attempt to reduce costs and avoid the possibility of 
bankruptcy in the years subsequent to 2001, AA made frequent references to the 
need to negotiate cost savings with employees and lenders and to the need to 
cooperate with union leaders. This is how the need for pay cuts was justified: 
 
Because of, among other things, the continuing adverse economic climate, 
increased competition… the continuing threat of terrorist actions and the war 
in Iraq, the airline industry, including American, continues to be in severe 
distress. This has already caused… major carriers… to file for protection 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Through the Chapter 11 process… 
[they] reached permanent agreements with their unions changing the rates of 
pay, benefits, and work rules applicable to their unionized employees… 
Those changes give those carriers a significant cost advantage, as compared 
to American and other competitors. All of these factors make it crucial that 
American dramatically and quickly reduce its annual costs to remain 
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competitive… at least an additional $2 billion in cost reductions must occur 
and most of that must come from long-term labor cost reductions (2002AR, 
p.11). 
 
However, as AA further admitted, it was additionally interested in achieving 
employee satisfaction to create more value for its shareholders: 
 
Underlying every initiative is the philosophy that motivated and engaged 
employees deliver the quality of service and personal attention that creates 
satisfied customers whose repeat business naturally rewards shareholders. As 
we have worked to create value for…shareholders and to improve the 
customer experience, we have spent a lot of time, energy and resources in 
1999 to foster a people culture marked by trust, respect and appreciation for 
the 100,000 employees behind every American and American Eagle success 
(1999AR, p.15). 
 
Following September 11th, the company made some patriotic references to perhaps 
be granted more support by its constituents: 
 
Many would say it’s no coincidence that the word American ends in “I can.” 
For the cover of this year’s annual report, we felt it particularly appropriate to 
highlight those four letters that are also found in the name of our airline. We 
think they speak strongly to the indomitable spirit that has made our country 
great and to the spirit that helped pull our airline through an incredibly 
challenging year (2001AR, p.ii). 
 
In addition, following the extra security measures introduced in the airports, AA 
pragmatically focuses on reassuring customers that it can provide them with safe but 
also convenient travel: 
 
We are equally resolved to making travel on American Airlines as safe and 
secure as it can possibly be, while at the same time doing all we can with 
tools such as airport automation and premium queues at security checkpoints 
to help our customers get through the airport more quickly. We firmly believe 
that air travel can be both safe and convenient, and we are working actively 
with the Air Transport Association and the Transportation Security 
Administration to achieve that goal. Nothing we do is more important that 
ensuring the safety of air travel for our customers and our employees 
(2001AR, p.4).  
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With regard to the environment, particularly in the relevant 2001 environmental 
report, AA made frequent references to its commitment to sustainability, as the 
following extracts of the reports illustrate: 
 
By publishing available information for open review by interested parties, the 
Company is demonstrating its belief in the importance of open disclosure and 
dialogue regarding environmental issues. As an endorser of the CERES 
Principles, the Company confirms publicly… that corporations must not 
compromise the ability of future generations to sustain themselves (AA, 
2001ER, p.4, emphasis in original), 
 
 
(AA, loc. cit.) 
 
It took, however, the view of sustainability as also regarding maintaining 
profitability: 
 
We know that the decisions we make have daily impacts on the vitality of our 
Company, and, subsequently, the global environment. Although this report 
provides and overview of accomplishments to date, we face the challenges to 
addressing local and global issues while we work to return to sustained 
profitability … Just as environmental concerns continue to evolve, so do… 
[our] efforts to support a sustainable future (AA, 2001ER, p.1). 
 
7.4.5 Conclusion 
 
Table 7.10 and 7.11 summarise the findings of the case in respect of the propositions 
and the research questions, respectively. Both the quantitative and qualitative 
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evidence suggest that AA adopted a strategic and image-focused stance with regard 
to its CSRes and CSR, which focused on pragmatically satisfying its critical 
stakeholders. 
 
As Table 7.10 illustrates, the levels of CSD, and particularly H&S, disclosures 
increased considerably in Y1. Evidently, this was also the case for its positive and 
negative and the symbolic and substantive CSD. The findings, therefore, lend some 
support to all propositions. In the subsequent year almost all types of disclosure 
decreased and in most cases returned to the pre accident levels, further indicating that 
the Y1 increase was not a sustained attempt at increased CSR, but a probable attempt 
to address the threat.  
 
Table 7.10 Summary of the quantitative findings for AA: year-to-year change 
Pre-incident Post-incident 
CSD 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
TOTAL (36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
H&S (21%) 557% (75%) (27%) 
POSITIVE (48%) 636% (94%) 16% 
NEGATIVE (75%) 1,088% 1% (18%) 
H&S POSITIVE 68% 526% (98%) 16% 
H&S NEGATIVE (100%) ∞ (63%) (100%) 
SUBSTANTIVE (41%) 282% (50%) 8% 
SYMBOLIC (24%) 399% (88%) (14%) 
H&S SUBSTANTIVE 3% 391% (71%) (29%) 
H&S SYMBOLIC (100%) ∞  (84%) (17%) 
 
It could be suggested that the findings from the quantitative CA signify an image-
focused and externally driven organisation. This is particularly so since the 
disclosure increased considerably in Y1 but returned to the pre-incident levels in the 
last two years. Therefore, it appears that AA is adopting a pragmatic stance, whereby 
CSR was employed in an attempt to defend and restore legitimacy. The qualitative 
evidence further indicates that AA’s CSR was primarily an externally driven activity 
(i.e. by demand from critical stakeholders), although there is some supportive 
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evidence that it could also be internally driven (as an opportunity to improve image 
and profitability through increased stakeholder satisfaction).  
 
The study’s findings, therefore, indicate that AA’s CSR employment was a 
pragmatic attempt to maintain a positive image, address critical stakeholders’ needs 
and potentially improve profitability.  
 
Table 7.11 AA and the Research questions 
What is the underlying 
CSRes position?  
AA’s approach focused on pragmatically satisfying 
critical stakeholders needs, although AA also appeared at 
times to be opportunistically driven 
Is CSR strategic or 
ethical? 
Some quantitative support that AA took a strategic 
stance. Predominantly image-focused qualitative 
evidence provides additional support.  
Is CSR reactive or 
Proactive? 
Supportive quantitative evidence that AA reacted to the 
incidents by increasing CSR. Qualitative evidence mostly 
included reactive arguments of a pragmatic nature, 
although there was also identified some ‘proactive’ ones 
of opportunistic nature  
Can CSR be explained 
by social contract? 
Some quantitative support. Qualitative evidence further 
supportive, with frequent references to the importance of 
meeting the expectations of stakeholders (mostly 
employees). 
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7.5 The case of Singapore Airlines (SIA) 
7.5.1 Introduction 
 
Singapore Airlines (SIA) is the national airline of Singapore with a strong presence 
in South Asia, East Asia and the routes to and from Australia. The airline was 
founded in 1937 and since then has emerged as one of the world’s largest airlines: it 
ranks amongst the top 15 carriers worldwide in terms of revenue passenger 
kilometres, is the eleventh largest airline in Asia and ranked sixth in the world for 
international passengers carried (SIA, 2008AR).  
 
Over the years, SIA have build a strong brand name for innovation, service 
excellence and safety and the accident considered was the Airline’s first (and to date 
only) fatal accident (SIA, 2001AR). Firstly a review of the accident is provided.  
This is followed by discussions on the quantitative and the qualitative CA, 
respectively.  The concluding section of this chapter summarises its findings. 
 
7.5.2 The accident 
 
Designated as Flight 006, the wide-bodied Boeing 747 SIA jetliner crashed during 
taking off at the T’ai-pei International Airport in Taiwan on 31st October 2000 at 
23.20.  The disaster resulted in the death of 83 of the 179 persons aboard the aircraft, 
including four cabin attendants.  Among the survivors, 57 passengers and 13 crew 
members suffered injuries and 25 other persons escaped unscathed – the latter 
including two of the three flight crewmen (Gero, 2006).  
 
Authorised to use runway 05-Left, the aircraft inexplicably began its take-off on the 
adjacent 05-Right, which was partially closed due to work in progress.  Slightly more 
than half a minute after commencing its ground run, at a speed of approximately 150 
mph (250kmh), the 747 struck several barriers, some construction equipment, 
including a bulldozer, and a pile of metal reinforcement bars that were on the runway 
(Gero, 2006).  The aircraft then broke into several large pieces and caught fire.  The 
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accident occurred in darkness and adverse meteorological conditions associated with 
a typhoon located approximately 200 miles (320 km) to the south (Gero, 2006).  
 
The investigative report by the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council (ASC) concluded 
that the pilots, having ignored a number of visible signs, ‘lost situational awareness’ 
in entering and commencing take-off on the wrong runway, possibly affected by the 
poor weather and wet runway conditions. With regard to the survival issue, the ASC 
found that the airline’s emergency evacuation training, though generally meeting the 
industry standards, did not include methods of dealing with exposure to adverse 
meteorological elements, fire and smoke. The aircraft’s public address system also 
failed, and the airline did not seem to have a back-up plan for such a contingency 
(Gero, 2006). 
 
A Singaporean specialist team, however, claimed that the ASC report had presented 
an ‘unbalanced account’ of the accident, which minimised the significance of the 
many systemic factors they considered as contributory, including deficiencies in 
runway lighting, signage and markings at the airport.  They viewed the cause of the 
disaster as, ‘a failure of the aviation system’, emphasising the airport’s deficiencies 
rather than the crew’s errors.  Although SIA (2001) originally seemed to espouse this 
team’s views, it eventually had to comply with the ASC’s rules and ended up settling 
a number of lawsuits.  The pilot and a co-pilot of that flight were subsequently 
dismissed.   
 
The accident posed a considerable threat to the legitimacy of SIA, which at the time 
“experienced its darkest hour” (SIA, 2001AR, p. 6). Not only did it spoil the 
company’s prior record of zero fatalities; it also generated a lot of negative publicity 
over SIA’s ‘catalogue of failings’ (Perrin, 2000). At the centre of the public criticism 
was the pilot’s inexplicable decision to use the wrong runaway and the Company’s 
decision to proceed with taking off despite the severe weather conditions (Gero, 
2006). Survivors of the crash also stated that the members of staff were unable to 
help the passengers escape from the aircraft due to being frozen by fear and/or due to 
lack of competence in emergency procedures, with some flight attendants “failing to 
help passengers open emergency doors, fleeing the plane before all inside had been 
rescued” (Perrin, 2000). These failings led dozens of survivors and relatives of those 
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killed to file lawsuits against the airline (SIA, 2001AR); and the accident appeared to 
have an impact also on SIA’s share price, which (after reaching a peak for the 
financial year in October at $19.20) started dropping and by the end March had lost 
almost 30% of its market value, closing at £13.60, despite the increased of turnover 
(SIA, 2001AR). 
 
7.5.3 The quantitative CA evidence 
 
Propositions 1 and 2: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD and 
particularly the level of H&S CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Despite the disagreements regarding the causes of the accident, it would appear that 
it had an impact on SIA’s CSR, as Figures 7.19 and 7.20 illustrate (see also Tables 1 
and 2 in Appendix Jiv). With regard to the total CSD: 
 
? For all measures, the disclosure increased notably in Y1, lending some 
support to proposition 1. The increase ranged from 68% (proportion of report 
as the measurement unit) to 95% (pages). 
? For all measures, the disclosure further increased in Y2, although at a 
substantially decreased rate, ranging from 4% (proportion of report) to 21% 
(sentences).  
? Throughout the post-accident years the disclosure remained at higher levels 
than in the pre-accident period. 
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Figure 7.19 Total CSD per measurement unit
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It could be argued that the support for proposition 2 appears to be even greater: 
 
? For all measures, the disclosure increased notably in Y1. The increase ranged 
from 186% (proportion of report) to 231% (pages). 
? Y1 represented a peak in H&S disclosure for most measures (with the 
marginal exception of sentences) 
? Throughout the post-accident years the disclosure remained at higher levels 
that the pre-accident period, although it showed a declining trend in Y2 and 
Y3. 
 
264 
Figure 7.20 H&S CSD per measurement unit
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Arguably, the levels of increased total CSD in Y2 could be perceived as a response to 
the major legitimacy threat that the whole industry faced following the September 
11th terrorist attacks, which “shattered the confidence of the travelling public and 
plunged the aviation industry into its worst financial crisis” (SIA, 2002AR, p. 6). 
Considering that total CSD keeps rising in Y2 and Y3 (albeit at rates lower than Y1), 
it could be argued that the accident may have also triggered an incremental increase 
in the amount of CSD. This argument is also supported by the fact that SIA started 
publishing, in Y3 some environmental stand-alone information which has not been 
considered due to unavailability. This action may nevertheless also be interpreted as 
an isomorphic attempt to pick up the trend.  
 
Figure 7.21 (see also Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix Jiv) summarises the findings per 
theme of disclosure: 
 
? Most disclosure themes increased in Y1 (with the exception of workplace), 
with H&S showing the greatest increase (231%) followed by the marketplace 
(206%) 
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? In Y2 and Y3 some themes increased (marketplace, environment and 
workplace) and some decreased (H&S, community, other) in both years. 
? Workplace remained the most popular disclosure theme for most of the five-
year period (with the exception of Y1, where other disclosures achieved 
higher levels). 
 
Figure 7.21 Theme of CSD 
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The prevailing disclosure themes were thus firstly workplace and then marketplace, 
with environment appearing to be the most ‘neglected’ area of the AR’s disclosure. It 
should be noted, though, that SIA generally did seem to disclose larger quantities of 
information that could be considered of interest to its customers rather than its 
employees, such as information about food, seating, on-line booking systems and on-
board entertainment; however, most of this information was not perceived to be and 
recorded as CSR, in line with the adopted inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
 
As Figure 7.21 further illustrates, in Y1 most disclosure themes (with the exception 
of environment) were interestingly largely equally represented, with their proportions 
266 
to total CSD to vary from 17%  (community, marketplace and H&S) to 27% (other 
CSD).  This could be interpreted as a possible pragmatic organisational attempt to 
satisfy all potentially-affected constituents following the legitimacy threat. 
 
 
Propositions 3 and 4: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD and 
the level of negative CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figure 7.22 (see also Table 5 in Appendix Jiv) summarises the findings in terms of 
positive vs. negative CSD for both total and H&S disclosures.  
 
Figure 7.22 Positive vs negative CSD
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Both positive and negative disclosures largely followed the same pattern as total 
disclosure and strongly increased in Y1, thereby lending some support to the 
supportive-of-LT propositions 3 and 4.  Positive and negative H&S disclosures 
increased by 193% and 800% respectively in Y1, whereas total positive and negative 
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CSD increased by 101% and 114%, respectively.  Positive disclosures then 
decreased, whereas negative ones further increased, in the following year.  
 
During the two years prior to the accident the main issue of concern for SIA 
appeared to be the recovery from the Asian Economic crisis, which had, however, 
been “faster than expected” (SIA, 2001AR, p. 7). The main negative event, therefore, 
affecting its reporting in Y1 was the fatal accident, which resulted in both human and 
financial losses. The decrease in positive, and increase in negative, CSD in Y2 was 
most likely because this appeared to be, “the most difficult year in SIA’s history” 
(SIA, 2002AR, p. 5), following the September 11th attacks.  These accounted for the 
presence of a number of negative CSR disclosures, such as the level of cancelled 
orders, pay cuts, and decreases in staff strength and in value added to be reported.  
Although Y3 was still not perceived by SIA to be a good year (due to the Iraq war 
and SARS), the company increased its positive (by including value added statements 
and showing marginal increases in staff) and decreased its negative (this primarily 
concerned pay cuts and less routes/destinations) CSD.   
 
Propositions 5 and 6: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD 
and the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figure 7.23 (see also Table 6 in Appendix Jv) summarises the findings in terms of 
the substantive vs. symbolic CSD for both total and H&S disclosures. The findings 
appear to be supportive for propositions 5 and 6 since in Y1 both levels of substantive 
and symbolic CSD increased. Substantive and symbolic H&S disclosures increased 
by 187% and 425% respectively, whereas total substantive and symbolic CSD 
increased by 92% and 49%, respectively.  
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Figure 7.23 Substantive vs symbolic 
CSD
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As Figure 7.23 reveals, SIA increased its substantive CSD throughout the five year 
period (although it did so at a greater rate in Y1). Considering that, as discussed 
earlier, in Y3 SIA also started publishing some stand-alone environmental 
information, these findings could potentially be perceived as an on-going, ethically- 
motivated engagement with CSR, resulting in the latter increasing in both levels and 
substance.  
 
It is important, however, to emphasise that SIA increased its symbolic rather than its 
substantive H&S CSD to a particularly greater extent in Y1. It mainly did so, by 
considerably expanding the section devoted to fleet renewal in a largely symbolic 
manner, for example, by often repeating information concerning its orders, and 
describing these in a much greater than in the past detail. Similarly, a large part of its 
total substantive CSD increase was due to development of a dedicated one-and-a-half 
page award section in the report following the accident, listing all its accolades, 
whilst in the reports preceding the accident, SIA described these in just one sixth of a 
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page. It could be argued that these practices lend support to Savage et al’s. (2000, p. 
48) arguments for such symbolic approaches being, “more economical and flexible 
that substantive actions” and indicate an organisation which seemed more interested 
in being seen as acting legitimately as opposed to  actually being legitimate. Whether 
this engagement was pragmatically or opportunistically motivated remained 
uncertain, given the general upward trend of the disclosure in the post-accident 
period. 
 
7.5.4 The qualitative CA evidence 
 
Table 7.12 summarises the findings from the ‘pattern matching’ activity. The 
majority of the evidence would support SIA’s position towards CSR as being one of 
ethics pragmatism. SIA seemed to generally perceive its AR as a means to 
communicate with its constituents, and it seemed to change the focus of its reporting 
according to its needs as perceived at the time - as ethics pragmatists would be 
expected to do. Preceding the air crash, SIA’s focus was on reassuring the investors 
it had recovered from the Asian Economic crisis. Consequently, its main CSR 
disclosure regarded acknowledging the contribution of its employees to this 
recovery, such as:  
 
SIA’s workforce also responded positively to help protect the airline from the 
effects of the crisis.  Staff were active in minimising costs and improving 
efficiency and productivity during the year.  In addition, many staff members 
also decided to forgo their annual wage increments in a marvellous display of 
loyalty.  Such actions helped ease the pressures and allowed SIA to stay 
focused on its objective of delivering the best service to customers (SIA, 
1999AR, p. 5) 
 
The key to such recognition has been the skill and commitment of SIA 
employees. This has been the cornerstone of the Group’s impressive 
performance (SIA, 2000AR, p. 12). 
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Table 7.12 Summary of the ‘pattern matching’ activity for SIA  
Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
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Reference to commitment 
on community and local 
arts 
 
 
 
 
Reference to 
commitment on 
community and local 
arts 
 
Reference to being a good 
corporate citizen and giving 
back to communities 
 
Continued reference to 
being a good corporate 
citizen and giving back 
to communities 
 
Continued reference to being a 
good corporate citizen and 
giving back to communities 
E
t
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i
c
s
 
p
r
a
g
m
a
t
i
s
m
 
 
Explicit reference to the 
need for minimising staff 
costs to improve 
efficiency and deliver best 
service to customers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued reference to 
the need for minimising 
staff costs to improve 
efficiency and deliver 
best service to 
customers 
 
Detailed reference to fleet 
renewal programmes, with 
particular emphasis on safety; 
attempts to downgrade its role in 
the accident; reference to the 
potential negative impacts that 
the accident may have on image; 
detailed descriptions of its 
awards 
 
Continued reference to 
the contribution of 
minimising staff costs 
to ensure viability; 
detailed references to 
attempts to ensure 
safety of flights. 
 
Great emphasis on the need for 
minimising staff costs by 
introducing permanent pay cuts 
to ensure viability 
E
t
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i
c
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p
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t
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[no reference] 
 
 
 
[no reference] [no reference] [no reference] [no reference] 
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Emphasis on the 
workforce being the 
cornerstone of the 
company’s performance  
 
 
Continued emphasis on 
the contribution of 
workforce to 
performance 
 
Continued emphasis on the 
contribution of workforce to 
performance 
 
Continued emphasis on 
the contribution of 
workforce to 
performance 
 
Continued emphasis on the 
contribution of workforce and 
(for the first time) the unions to 
performance 
Following the accident, however, SIA seemed to become particularly concerned with 
minimising the potential negative impacts of this legitimacy threat, primarily to its 
customers.  As a result, it started expanding its sections in its report devoted to the 
description of awards and general customer services, but also simultaneously started 
particularly emphasising its fleet renewal programs. The 2001 Chairman’s Statement 
for the first time devoted a large section to discussing this last aspect and the 
following extract was in large typeface:  
 
SIA’s fleet renewal programme is one of its hallmarks… but even by SIA’s 
standards, it was a remarkable year for aircraft orders (SIA, 2001AR, p. 6).   
 
The way that the news of the accident was presented subsequently in the Chairman’s 
Statement also illustrates how particularly concerned SIA was to offset the potential 
negative impacts of the accident to its reputation (as opposed to admitting, to some 
extent, responsibility for it, as stakeholder capitalists would be expected to do):    
 
In October, SIA scaled new heights and experienced its darkest hour in the 
matter of a few weeks. For the first time, it was ranked as the world's most 
admired airline in Fortune magazine's prestigious annual survey. This was 
followed by an almost clean sweep of the Business Traveller Asia-Pacific 
2000 Annual Travel Awards, including 'Best International Airline'. But in the 
very last hour of October, according to Singapore time, the Airline's proud 
accident-free record came to an end on a closed runway in Taipei. SIA 
received praise and much goodwill for its handling of the crisis, and it has 
pledged to recover and emerge an even better and stronger airline, but 
memories of this horrific accident, and those who passed away, will always 
remain with us (SIA, 2001AR, p. 6). 
 
In the next year, following the September 11th attacks which affected the whole 
industry, focus turned back to reassuring investors that the new crisis was 
competently being managed, but at the same time SIA was assuring its customers 
that all safety and customer service standards were still in place, potentially 
considering that its image was still fragile, due to the previous year’s accident:  
 
The year ending 31 March 2002 will be remembered as the most difficult in 
the 30-year history of Singapore Airlines. It was a year when staff rose to the 
challenge of weathering the tough economic and security conditions and 
positioning the Airline to prosper during the recovery… All divisions and 
subsidiaries were directed to review their budget plans.  Non-essential 
projects were deferred or cancelled. Only those that were critical to 
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maintaining service and safety standards, or were key platforms for future 
growth, were allowed to proceed” (SIA, 2002AR, p. 13)  
 
What can be said is that SIA is doing as much as any major airline to ensure 
the safety of its passengers and crew (SIA, 2002AR, p. 19). 
 
In Y3 SIA seemed to particularly aim to convince its (potentially resistant) 
employees to permanent pay-cuts and it used its AR to demonstrate that need. In the 
Chairman’s statement, for the first time, the unions were mentioned and a detailed 
discussion was provided on how American and European airlines were also 
employing permanent pay-cuts to ensure survival.  The sole message in large 
typeface in the statement reads:  
 
It is, therefore, important for SIA management, staff and unions to embrace 
the realities of the new world, to change our mindsets, and to move forward 
and do the right things. Together I am confident we will overcome these 
adversities and emerge stronger (2003AR, p.6). 
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the clearest sign of the pragmatic approach that SIA adopted 
with regards to its CSR was that, although for some of its activities it attempted to 
show as acting as stakeholder capitalists: 
 
As one of the world's most successful international airlines, SIA has a special 
duty to be a responsible corporate citizen and give back to the communities 
where it operates (SIA, 2001AR, p.28), 
 
it seemed to accept that, with regard to the environment, it was externally driven: 
 
With these accomplishments, the air transport industry also accepts that its 
impact on the environment is a concern to air transport users and local 
communities, especially the people who live near airports (SIA, 2003AR, p. 
1). 
  
7.5.5 Conclusion 
 
Tables 7.13 and 7.14 summarise the findings of the case in respect of the 
propositions and the research questions, respectively. Both the quantitative and 
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qualitative evidence suggest that SIA adopted a strategic and image-focused stance 
with regard to its CSRes and CSR. 
 
Table 7.13 Summary of the quantitative findings: year-to-year change 
Pre-accident Post-accident 
CSD 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
TOTAL 26% 95% 13% 2% 
H&S 100% 231% (28%) (26%) 
POSITIVE 19% 101% (28%) 19% 
NEGATIVE 32% 114% 473% (70%) 
H&S POSITIVE 93% 193% (47%) 15% 
H&S NEGATIVE 50% 800% 19% (81%) 
SUBSTANTIVE 51% 92% 14% 11.5% 
SYMBOLIC (22%) 49% 15% (18%) 
H&S SUBSTANTIVE 117% 187% (11%) (14%) 
H&S SYMBOLIC 50% 425% (68%) (100%) 
 
As Table 7.13 illustrates, the quantitative CA evidence lends some support to all 
propositions. The levels of total and H&S CSD in SIA’s ARs increased considerably 
in the year following the accident.  This was also the case for its positive and 
negative and its symbolic and substantive CSD. Although the sustained increase in 
total disclosure in the post accident period could also be perceived as being ethics-
motivated, the discussion on the substantive vs. symbolic evidence, in particular, 
indicated that SIA’s LT stance was a rather image-focused position. The qualitative 
evidence also indicates that SIA was primarily externally motivated, perceiving the 
AR as a means to communicate with its constituents, and it seemed to change the 
focus of its reporting according to its perceived needs at the time.  
 
The study’s findings, therefore, indicate that SIA’s CSR employment was a 
pragmatic attempt to maintain a positive image and address critical stakeholders’ 
needs. 
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 Table 7.14 SIA and the Research questions 
 
What is the underlying 
CSRes position?  
Quantitative evidence suggested a probable image-focus 
stance whilst  the qualitative evidence suggested that 
SIA’s underlying CSRes position was ‘ethics 
pragmatism’ 
Is CSR strategic or 
ethical? 
Some quantitative support that SIA took a strategic 
stance. Predominantly image-focused qualitative 
evidence provided additional support.  
Is CSR reactive or 
proactive? 
Supportive quantitative evidence that SIA reacted to the 
accident; quantitative findings could also support 
proactive arguments. The qualitative evidence primarily 
included reactive arguments of a ‘pragmatic’ nature.  
Can CSR be explained 
by social contract? 
Some quantitative support. Qualitative evidence further 
supportive, with reference to the importance of meeting 
the expectations of stakeholders (mostly employees). 
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7.6 The case of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) 
7.6.1 Introduction 
 
SAS was founded on 1 August 1946, when the national air carriers of Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway formed a partnership.  SAS gradually acquired control of the 
domestic markets in all three countries by acquiring full or partial control of several 
local airlines. SAS has been one of the founding members of the global Star 
Alliance. Between 1999 and 2003 the group had averages of 32,467 employees and 
29,025,800 passengers flown and was Europe’s fifth largest airline group.  
 
The investigated accident incurred in 2001 in Milan, Italy and, up to recently47, it 
involved the highest number of SAS passenger fatalities. The next section introduces 
the accident; the following one the quantitative evidence and the penultimate the 
qualitative. The concluding section summarises the case’s findings. 
 
7.6.2 The accident 
 
On 8th October 2001 SAS flight SK686, an MD-87 plane carrying 110 people and 
heading to Copenhagen, Denmark,  collided with a Cessna at Milan’s Linate airport. 
The plane had just received clearance for take-off from the air traffic control tower 
when a German-registered Cessna Citation taxied towards the runway. The SAS 
MD-87 collided with the Cessna and slid sideways into an airport building. A total of 
118 people died, comprising all 110 people (104 passengers and 6 staff) on board the 
SAS flight. Four people died in the Cessna, and four people who worked in the 
airport building also lost their lives (SAS, 2001AR).  
 
To a world still reeling from September 11th, the fiery collision of the two planes at 
Milan's airport looked at first like a terrorist attack, particularly since it occurred the 
day after the US invasion of Afghanistan. This possibility was, however, ruled out by 
the investigations that followed (Gero, 2006). Linate Airport was operating without a 
                                                 
47 One of SAS’ subsidiary airlines, Spanair, was involved in an accident on 20th August 2008, in 
Madrid’s Barajas airport, with only 18 of the 172 people on board surviving. 
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functioning ground radar system at the time and the guidance signs along the 
taxiways were later found to not meet the appropriate regulations. Consequently, 
after mistakenly turning onto the R6 taxiway that led to the runway, there were no 
signs by which the Cessna pilots could recognize where they were. On 16th April 
2004, the airport’s director, air-traffic controller, former head of the air traffic 
controllers’ agency and former head of the airport, were all found guilty for the 
disaster by an Italian Court and were sentenced to spend between 6-8 years in prison. 
 
The airline was exonerated of any responsibility: the SAS crew was, in fact, 
commended for showing professional performance in its efforts to maintain control 
of the damaged plane after the collision, and in preventing a greater disaster by 
avoiding the main airport building and a nearby parked aircraft (Gero, 2006). 
However, considering that this was Italy's worst aviation disaster (surpassing a 1972 
accident in which 115 people died when an Alitalia DC-8 crashed into a mountain 
near Palermo, Sicily); and the fact that this was the company’s first fatal accident, it 
attracted a lot of publicity and posed a considerable threat to the legitimacy of SAS. 
This was also reflected in the approximately 10% decrease of the Company’s share 
price (on top of the approximately 35% decrease following the September 11th 
attacks) in the first week after the accident, at a time where the industry’s average 
share performance had started recovering following the terrorist attacks’ initial shock 
(SAS, 2001AR). 
 
It appears that the potential detrimental effect to the Company’s reputation was, 
however, quickly realised. Indeed, SAS’s corporate communications department, 
which had been recently trained and had its responsibilities re-defined, played an 
instrumental role in successfully defending the Company’s reputation (Bailey, 2004). 
And as the following sections indicate, SAS appears to have considered CSR as 
contributing in defending the Company’s threatened legitimacy. 
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7.6.3 The quantitative CA evidence 
 
It should be noted that, since the accident only happened a few weeks after the 
September 11th disaster, these events may have had a compound effect on the level of 
CSD on the coincident subsequent Annual and stand-alone reports. In addition, in the 
same year SAS was heftily fined by the European Commission for violating the EU 
competition rules; and several cases of Legionnaire’s disease, including some fatal, 
incurred in one of its Radisson SAS Hotels. These events may have posed additional 
legitimacy threats to SAS.  
 
Propositions 1 and 2: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD and 
particularly the level of H&S CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Given the fact that SAS had a number of potential legitimacy threats in the year, it 
was hardly surprising to identify a considerable increase in disclosure in Y1, for both 
total and H&S disclosure, thus lending some support to both propositions 1 and 2. As 
Figure 7.24 (see also Table 1 in Appendix Jv) illustrates for total CSD: 
 
? Y1 represented a peak in total disclosure over the five-year period for most 
measurement units (with the marginal exception of % of AR) 
? For all measures, the disclosure decreased in Y2, and in Y3 either returned to 
Y-2 levels (sentences) or remained at higher (% of AR) or lower (pages) 
levels. 
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Figure 7.24 Total CSD per measurement unit
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The increase in Y1 ranged from 52% (pages) to 107% (sentences). The increase 
appeared even more impressive when considering the large amount of CSD in Y-1, 
where SAS published Annual, environmental and (for the only time in the examined 
period) supplementary reports. The dramatic decrease in the Y2 (76%), mainly due to 
the business no longer producing stand-alone reports after Y2, further gave the 
impression of the legitimacy threats being  a probable underlying cause behind the 
Y1 disclosure zenith.  
 
It could be argued that, as Figure 7.25 shows (see also Table 2 in Appendix Jv), the 
support for proposition 2 was greater than for proposition 1: 
 
? Y1 represented a peak in H&S disclosure over the five-year period for all 
measurement units  
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? For all measures, H&S disclosure decreased in Y2 and increased in Y3, 
remaining at higher levels than Y-2. 
 
Figure 7.25 H&S CSD per measurement unit
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The H&S CSD increase in Y1 ranged from 51% (sentences) to 91% (pages), whilst 
the dramatic decrease in Y2 ranged from 54% (% of AR) to 77% (pages), thereby 
lending further support to proposition 2. It is interesting to note the striking increase 
in the level of pictorial H&S CSD in Y1 (205% as opposed to 53% for the narrative 
equivalent), which was further reflected in the substantive vs. symbolic H&S CSD, 
as the later discussion reveals.    
 
Figure 7.26 (see also Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix Jv) presents the findings in terms of 
type of reporting. Up to Y1 the main sources of CSD were the stand-alone reports, 
accounting for 74% to 82% of the total. In Y2 and Y3, however, stand-alone reporting 
stopped and the main source of CSR was the AR. As SAS (2002AR, p.106) 
explained,  
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We have chosen to reduce the costs of external reporting of our 
environmental performance. For this reason, this year’s environmental report 
is not as comprehensive as the one we produced last year. Much of the 
information provided in the internet-based environmental report from 2001 is 
of general nature and remains up-to-date, and this is available on the Group’s 
website 
 
Figure 7.26 Source of CSD 
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As SAS further noted for one of its subsidiaries, in Y2 its “main focus was on a 
reorganization process which meant that environmental work did not have top 
priority” (SAS, loc. cit.). In addition to thus explicitly admitting that CSR was, for it, 
a secondary activity, by not immediately reducing its CSR in Y1 but doing that 
instead in Y2, SAS appeared to be image, as opposed to ethics, driven.  
 
Figure 7.27 (see also Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix Jv) summarises the findings per 
theme of CSD: 
 
? All disclosure themes increased in Y1, with H&S showing one of the greatest 
increases (91%), second only to community (175%) 
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? All disclosure themes decreased in Y2 and most increased in Y3 (with the 
exception of environment) 
? Environment remained the most popular disclosure theme throughout the 
five-year period, with H&S second most popular in Y1. 
 
Figure 7.27 Theme of CSD 
9.58
11.38
68.51
46.83
39.00
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
Years
Pa
ge
s
Health & Safety Marketplace Workplace
Community Environment Other
 
 
Since SAS produced, in the first three periods examined, environmental as opposed 
to social/environmental reports, it was natural for environment to be the most 
frequent theme, accounting for 70% of total CSD in Y1. Despite community showing 
the highest increase in Y1, it remained at considerably low proportionate levels 
throughout the five-year period; this was particularly surprising, given the 
Scandinavian roots, and the proclaimed inherited labour, and overall people, focus 
(SAS, 2001ER, p. 222) of the Company. 
 
Although the accident and other identified legitimacy threats in that year did not have 
any significant direct environmental impacts, the relevant disclosure went up in Y1 
by over 46%. In Y1 SAS, for the first time, expanded its AR title to include the sub-
282 
title: “& Summary of Environmental Report”, albeit in lower case (which it also 
employed in subsequent years). Although in doing so SAS was allegedly 
demonstrating the “ambition to intensify our dialogue with important stakeholders 
such as employees, shareholders, financial analysts, customers, politicians, the 
general public” (SAS, 2001ER, p.1), the fact that it discontinued the publication of 
stand-alone reports, and further decreased the environmental disclosure in its (now) 
sole disclosure medium (i.e. AR), does not appear to justify such a claim. The 
findings rather lend support to the Gray et al’s (1996) argument that environmental 
CSD is often employed to distract attention from the issues of concern.  
 
Propositions 3 and 4: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD and 
the level of negative CSD will show a notable increase 
 
The findings in terms of positive vs. negative CSD for total and H&S disclosures are 
summarised next. As Figure 7.28 illustrates (see also Table 7 in Appendix Jv), both 
positive and negative disclosures increased in Y1 before considerably dropping in Y2, 
thereby lending some support to propositions 3 and 4. Positive and negative H&S 
disclosures increased at even higher rates than total CSD, although one should be 
careful when attempting to interpret trends in so small a number of pages: for 
example, negative H&S CSD rose from 1.22 to 3.37 pages (176%) as opposed to a 
68% increase in the positive, following the accident. Interestingly, nevertheless, SAS 
increased its negative H&S CSD in Y1 proportionately more than the positive, which 
could be partly attributed to the poor H&S performance (including the accident) of 
the period, but could also be perceived, given SAS’ apparent image-oriented CSR 
stance, as an attempt to diffuse the situation by creating the impression of honesty 
(Savage et al, 2000, p. 50).  
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Figure 7.28 Positive vs negative CSD
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Propositions 5 and 6: Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD 
and the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable increase 
 
Figure 7.29 (see also Table 8 in Appendix Jv) presents the findings in terms of the 
substantive vs. symbolic CSD for both total and H&S disclosures. The findings lend 
some support for propositions 5 and 6, since levels of both substantive and symbolic 
CSD increased in Y1. Substantive and symbolic H&S disclosures increased by 42% 
and 171% respectively, whereas total substantive and symbolic CSD increased by 
60% and 29%, respectively.  
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Figure 7.29 Substantive vs symbolic CSD
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It is important to emphasise that SAS increased to a particularly greater extent, its 
symbolic rather than its substantive H&S CSD in Y1. It mainly did so by introducing 
pictorial means such as Figure 7.30, which in Y2’s AR took approximately half a 
page of space. In the Y1 AR, however, similar images took the space of two full 
pages. The symbolic total CSD also increased; this included, among others, general 
aviation principles, narratives on the contribution of aviation and detailed accounts of 
the company’s environmental procedures, further giving the impression that SAS 
probably employed such economic and flexible legitimation means to distract 
attention from the issue of concern and improve its threatened image.   
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Table 7.15 summarises the ‘pattern-matching’ activity. SAS had a clear perception of 
environmental and sustainability work as a means of satisfying external demands and 
gaining financial benefits, by mainly focusing on cost savings, legislation avoidance 
and image improvements. For SAS, environmental and overall sustainability work 
was clearly both an externally driven activity (demand from critical stakeholders) 
and an internally driven one (opportunity to increase profitability) as Figure 7.31 
illustrates: 
7.6.4 The qualitative CA evidence 
 
 
Figure 7.30 Extract from SAS (2002AR, p.45).  
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 Table 7.15 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for SAS 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
S
t
a
k
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
m
 
 
Reference to integration of 
environmental work in all 
decisions; mention of 
commitment to 
environmentally sustainable 
development of society. 
 
 
Reference to commitment on 
considering environmental 
consequences of every 
decision 
 
A few mentions of its 
commitment to considering 
all environmental aspects of 
operations 
 
Again, a  few mentions of its 
commitment to considering 
all environmental aspects of 
operations 
 
Some references to 
endorsing sustainability and 
create a stable social and 
environmental foundation 
for all the group’s activities 
E
t
h
i
c
s
 
p
r
a
g
m
a
t
i
s
m
 
 
Frequent reference to the 
link of environmental 
charges to competitiveness; 
combined environmental and 
financial advantages; 
explicit reference on 
importance of improving 
environmental image; 
questioning aviation’s 
impact on climate change. 
 
 
Significant emphasis on the 
links of environmental 
performance with business 
risks, partly from negative 
media coverage; 
acknowledgment of stringent 
regulation in the future as a 
business risk; explicit 
acknowledgement that CSR 
is becoming a financial 
imperative. 
 
 
Very detailed explanation of 
how CSR is a growing 
expectation by various 
stakeholders, including 
customers and suppliers, and 
also an international trend; 
continuing emphasis on the 
positive contribution of CSR 
to image, particularly 
following Sep 11th; 
reference to CSR as a means 
of regulation compliance; 
emphasis on questioning 
aviation’ impact on climate 
change. 
 
 
Continued great emphasis on 
how CSR is a growing 
expectation by various 
stakeholders, primarily 
customers and suppliers; 
continued emphasis on the 
positive contribution to 
image.  
 
Continued emphasis on CSR 
being a new demand led by 
globalization and an explicit 
demand by customers and 
suppliers; admission of its 
importance even on the 
competition of employees; 
continued emphasis on the 
positive contribution to 
image. 
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Et
h
i
c
s
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
s
m
 
 
Frequent reference to 
environmental work on 
reducing charges and 
gaining financial 
advantages; significant 
emphasis on legislation 
avoidance as motivation for 
environmental efforts; 
admission of attempting to 
influence regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emphasis on the 
contribution of 
environmental work on 
image and market value; 
explicit reference that it can 
get a competitive advantage 
by anticipating legal or tax-
related requirements and 
managing environmental 
impacts. Explicit reference 
to environmental work as an 
added gain, to the primary 
aim of increasing 
competitiveness; explicit 
admission that 
environmental work 
provides opportunities for 
business development and 
reduces fuel and 
management costs. 
 
 
Continued significant 
emphasis on the ‘win-win’ 
view of environmental work; 
explicit link of 
environmental work to share 
price performance; 
significant emphasis on 
legislation avoidance as a 
means of competitive 
advantage; continuing 
emphasis on environmental 
work contributing to 
legislation avoidance. 
 
 
Continued emphasis on 
linking environmental work 
with opportunities for 
business development; 
continuing emphasis on 
environmental work 
contributing to legislation 
avoidance 
 
 
Great emphasis on relating 
sustainability with financial 
growth and shareholder 
value; explicit reference that 
sustainability work enhances 
brand value; continued 
emphasis on legislation 
avoidance as means of 
competitive advantage 
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
 
Great emphasis on ‘the 
polluter pays’ principle 
 
Frequent reference to the 
costs of other transportation 
means; continued emphasis 
on the polluter pays 
principle 
 
 
Continued emphasis on the 
‘polluter pays’ principle 
 
More emphasis on 
employees, warnings for 
stricter times ahead. Focus 
on lowering costs/prices, 
increase competitiveness  
 
Frequent references to 
redundancies; less frequent 
reference to the ‘polluter-
pays’ principle 
  Pre-accident Post-accident 
 Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
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(Table 7.15 continued) 
 
 
  
Figure 7.31 Extract from SAS (2000ER, p. 29) 
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SAS thus seemed to be on the verge of ‘pragmatism’ and ‘opportunism’ – what could 
perhaps be called an ‘informed’ opportunism: it constantly looked for business 
opportunities whilst it was also continually aware of the potential risks arising from 
not meeting critical stakeholders’ expectations. And a number of its identified 
opportunities and threats stem from the effect, significant to them, that CSR work 
had on its image and consequent brand value. SAS interestingly further noted that 
this was particularly important in the turbulent times following September 11th: 
 
SAS’s environmental undertakings enhance the company’s environmental 
and overall images and, in a longer perspective, also its market 
value…Measures to improve SAS’s environmental image include both better 
environmental communication in this environmental report and distribution 
of additional environmental information through other channels such as the 
seat back pockets on the aircraft and the internet (SAS, 2000ER, pp 28, 30) 
 
The dramatic events of autumn 2001 show the importance of a strong brand. 
A survey conducted at the end of 2001 showed that SAS’s customers 
regarded the airline’s image as twice as important as they did one year ego. 
According to customers, image is the most important factor when choosing 
an airline. Strong brands create preference and loyalty and sell again and 
again (SAS, 2001AR, p.10) 
 
SAS explicitly admitted that CSRes was not a top priority, but one whose potential 
financial gains were always welcome: As its Chairman stressed (SAS, 2000ER): 
 
Over the past three years we have undertaken the most ambitions investment 
program in SAS’s history…The new longhaul fleet of ten Airbus A33os and 
A340s will have a significantly higher capacity that our old Boeing 767 fleet. 
And since the new aircraft are more fuel-efficient, they will provide a 10-20% 
reduction in emissions per seat and passenger kilometre. However, I want to 
underline that these investments have been made primarily to improve SAS’s 
competitiveness and exploit the potential of this growing market. The 
environmental gains are an added, and very valuable, bonus that I believe will 
enhance our image and highlight our role in the Scandinavian tradition of 
conserving nature (p.6). 
 
He further went on to admit that environmental work was becoming a financial 
imperative: 
 
Liberalization and sharper competition, greater diversity and a wide range of 
alternatives have both threatened the airlines’ profitability and created a 
growing need for profiling through soft values such as environmental, ethical 
and social accountability. For SAS, it is urgent to pursue these soft values and 
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set a good example… For me, environmental issues are a natural priority with 
enormous strategic importance for the future (p.7) 
 
Most often SAS admitted that the increased expectations were coming primarily 
from the customers: 
 
The number of customers wanting to know how great an impact air cargo or 
their employees’ air travel have on the environment has increased greatly in 
recent years, in pace with the fact that more and more companies are 
introducing the environmental management system ISO 14001….Consumers 
are increasingly expected not only to look at the product itself, but also what 
the company behind it stands for (SAS, 2001ER, pp. 24-26). 
 
An often-commented distinct reason for CSR work appeared to be legislation 
avoidance:  
 
By ensuring the best possible environmental technology, SAS minimizes the 
risk for future emissions-related restrictions. This is a key motive (SAS, 
1999ER, p.21), 
  
and SAS even admitted using a number of ‘environmental profiling’ means, 
including the environmental report, to achieve a more favourable regulatory 
framework: 
 
Strategic target groups for SAS’ environmental communication include 
customers, suppliers, the general public, the mass media and public 
authorities… SAS maintains an active environmental dialogue with the mass 
media and public authorities, and also distributes its own environmental 
information in the form of the environmental report…, advertisements and 
brochures… SAS has thus been able to influence the regulatory framework, 
air its views and achieve a more positive environmental image (1999ER, p. 
29). 
 
As it admitted, such proactive activities in respect of legislation avoidance could be a 
source of competitive advantage: 
 
Well planned and proactive environmental activities reduce the risk of 
violating environmental regulations, which can lead to negative publicity as 
well as direct costs in the form of fines and damages claims. Offensive 
environmental activities also reduce the risk of being caught off guard by new 
and more stringent environmental requirements from the market or the 
authorities. SAS can gain a competitive advantage by anticipating legal or 
tax-related requirements (SAS, 2001ER, p.158). 
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SAS further often related environmental (and later, sustainability) work with 
shareholder value: 
 
An important reason that we are presenting a summary of our environmental 
report in the annual report is our wish to provide investors and other capital 
market players with the environmental information they need. All this is to 
help them to better understand how the proactive and effective environmental 
work in the SAS Group can contribute to a positive trend of the shareholder 
value (SAS, 2001AR, p.103). 
 
But these gains were achieved by firstly ensuring that the fluctuating social 
expectations were met. As the CEO comments:  
 
The international trend is also to make ‘sustainability’ reports, i.e. reports 
describing the company’s performance with respect to the three important 
sustainable development: economy, environment and social responsibility. 
The SAS Group will also gradually go in this direction. We have an impact 
on both the global and the local community. Consequently, we are required to 
demonstrate social responsibility, which I believe is a totally legitimate 
demand (SAS, 2001ER, p.17) 
 
At a later stage, SAS went on to admit that in fact: 
 
Sustainable development for the SAS Group will be attained through a 
simultaneous focus on financial growth, environmental improvements and 
social responsibility…. The SAS Group’s aim is also to create long-term 
growth in shareholder value. This will be accomplished by optimizing use of 
resources and systematically choosing green solutions…Sustainable 
development enhances brand value (SAS, 2003AR, pp. 8,20). 
 
SAS seemed, therefore, to adopt a mixed opportunistic and pragmatic approach: a 
business case approach that, however, was focused on simultaneously satisfying the 
social expectations. As its Hotels subsidiary CEO summarised it: 
 
Environmental awareness is increasing… Therefore the hotel industry is 
experiencing greater pressure to report on its performance with respect to the 
environment and social responsibility…In many countries, issues concerning 
safety, the environment and social responsibility are still quite new. Investing 
in the environment and social responsibility can give the hotel and travel 
industry a competitive advantage in these countries. In other markets, such as 
the Northern European and Scandinavian markets, environmental issues and 
corporate responsibility have become a critical factor for success (SAS, 
2001ER, pp. 226-27).  
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7.6.5 Conclusion 
 
Tables 7.16 and 7.17 summarise the findings of the case in respect of the 
propositions and the research questions, respectively. It appears that SAS adopted a 
strategic and image focused stance, on the verge of opportunism and pragmatism (an 
‘informed opportunism’) with regard to its CSRes and CSR.  
 
As Table 7.16 illustrates, the quantitative evidence provided some support for all OL 
propositions. The levels of CSD, and particularly H&S disclosures, increased 
considerably in Y1. This was also the case for SAS’ positive and negative, and 
symbolic and substantive CSD. The fact that in Y2 all types of disclosure decreased 
and in Y3 remained at lower than Y-2 levels, further indicates that the Y1 increase was 
a probable attempt to address the threat.  
 
Table 7.16 A summary of the quantitative findings: year-to-year change 
Pre-accident Post-accident 
CSD 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
TOTAL 23% 52% (76%) 23% 
H&S 123% 91% (77%) 21% 
POSITIVE 0% 47% (73%) 29% 
NEGATIVE 22% 47% (85%) 54% 
H&S POSITIVE 126% 68% (72%) 11% 
H&S NEGATIVE 58% 176% (90%) 100% 
SUBSTANTIVE 4% 60% (79%) 36% 
SYMBOLIC 19% 29% (74%) 47% 
H&S SUBSTANTIVE 112% 42% (74%) 48% 
H&S SYMBOLIC 76% 171% (78%) 10% 
 
It could be suggested that the findings from the quantitative CA thus signify an 
image-focused and externally-driven organisation. Given the symbolic way SAS 
employed H&S CSD, the company seemed to be adopting a pragmatic stance, 
whereby it employed CSR only to improve its image and defend its legitimacy. And 
as the qualitative evidence revealed, SAS had a perception of environmental and 
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sustainability work as a means of satisfying external demands and additionally 
gaining financial benefits, by mainly focusing on cost savings, legislation avoidance 
and image improvements.  
 
Table 7.17 SAS and the research questions 
 
What is the underlying 
CSRes position?  
SAS’s approach focused on pragmatically satisfying 
critical stakeholders’ needs to then later opportunistically 
benefit profitability 
Is CSR strategic or 
ethical? 
Some quantitative support that SAS took a strategic 
stance. Predominantly image-focused qualitative 
evidence provides additional support.  
Is CSR reactive or 
Proactive? 
Supportive quantitative evidence that AA reacted to the 
accidents by disclosing more CSR information. 
Qualitative evidence presented a balance between 
reactive arguments of ‘pragmatic’ nature and proactive 
ones of opportunistic nature.  
Can CSR be explained 
by social contract? 
Some quantitative support. Qualitative evidence further 
supportive, with frequent references to the importance of 
meeting the expectations of a variety of stakeholders.  
 
The study’s findings, therefore, indicate that SAS employment of CSR was both an 
externally driven activity (demand from critical stakeholders) and an internally 
driven one (opportunity to increase profitability). 
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7.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presented the findings of each case. For each case, brief introductions to 
the company and the threat were provided, before reviewing the quantitative and 
qualitative evidence and make inferences to the propositions and research questions 
of the study.  
 
The discussion indicated that the case studies have a number of similarities and 
differences in respect of its CSR behaviour. The aim of the next chapter is to 
synthesise these findings, by providing a cross-case analysis and discussion of the 
findings in respect of the propositions, research questions and developed framework.  
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Chapter 8 
Cross case analysis, discussion and implications of the 
findings 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise the findings from the individual case studies 
(presented in Chapter 7) by conducting a cross-case analysis; further to provide a 
discussion and suggest implications of these findings vis-à-vis the relevant CSR 
literature. The chapter thus aims not at generalising the findings to a larger universe of 
organisations (what Yin, 2009, describes as statistical generalisation) but, rather, relates 
the findings to the theoretical framework developed in chapter 4 (Yin’s analytic 
generalisation).  
 
The cross-case analysis and discussion of the findings is presented in three main 
sections. First, the findings per proposition are provided. These are followed by the 
findings per research question. Then, the implications of the findings for the theoretical 
framework are considered and some ways forward for CSR are suggested. Finally a brief 
summary of the chapter is provided. 
 
8.2 The findings per proposition 
 
This section is divided into three parts. First, the findings for propositions 1 and 2 are 
provided. These discuss the changes in total and H&S CSD with additional reference to 
the reporting media and the themes of the disclosure. Then, the findings for the positive 
vs. negative and the substantive vs. symbolic propositions, are discussed. 
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8.2.1 Propositions 1 and 2 
 
Section 4.5 outlined the first proposition to be addressed as follows: 
 
1. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD will show a notable 
increase 
 
As the discussion of the individual case studies in Chapter 7 has indicated (sections 
7.2.3, 7.3.2, 7.4.3, 7.5.3 and 7.6.3), the quantitative CA findings lend some support to 
proposition 1 since total CSD showed a notable increase in Y1 for all examined cases, 
ranging from 8% for BA (which was not directly involved in an accident in the period) 
to 320% for AA (which was directly involved in a number of incidents in the period). In 
addition:  
 
? Y1 represented a peak in disclosure over the five year period for three cases (BA, 
AA and SAS) – for AF the disclosure reached a peak in Y2 and for SIA in Y3 
? For most cases (with the exception of SIA) disclosure declined in the last two 
years and in Y3 it either returned to the Y-2 levels (AA), remained at considerably 
higher than Y-2 levels (AF) or was almost halved (BA and SAS). 
 
As the discussion in sections 7.3 and 7.5 indicated, there are a number of explanations 
for why AF and SIA reached a peak in disclosure in Y2 and Y3, respectively. The Y2 
peak in AF’s disclosure could be perceived as a delayed response to the legitimacy 
threat posed by the accident, due to the proximity of the latter to the publication of the 
Y1 accounts. This Y2 increase could have also partly been a response to the industry 
threat posed by the September 11th attacks. SIA’s increase in the disclosure (albeit at a 
lower rate than in Y1) in the last two years, could be due to the accident triggering an 
incremental increase in the amount of CSD (as in Cho, 2009) and/or it could be a 
response to the September 11th industry threat (which also happened in Y2). In two other 
cases, the accident happened in the same year as September 11th (SAS and AA, with the 
latter being directly involved) and was followed by increased disclosure. But despite that 
in BA’s case the terrorist attacks happened in Y2, the company’s disclosure showed a 
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considerable decrease. The evidence is therefore inconclusive on whether this industry 
threat had an effect on the organisations’ CSR and if so, the extent of the latter, although 
there would appear to be some evidence of impact.  
 
The findings are in agreement with the literature investigating reactions of specific 
companies to legitimacy threats (i.e. Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000; 
Woodward et al., 2008; Cho, 2009), which all report an increase in the environmental or 
CSD information in Y1. The 100% plus average48 increase is, however, considerably 
higher than the literature (reviewed in section 4.4.5) suggests. Most studies report 
increases of less than 50% on average (the only exception being Cho’s [2009] 400%, 
which however concerned a single company). This may be attributed to the aviation 
industry’s wide public visibility, with air crashes having great impacts on organisational 
reputations and posing immense legitimacy threats. The possibility that the findings 
were augmented by the September 11th attacks should also be acknowledged.   
 
Considering the generally low agreement on the direction of change (increase/decrease) 
of 60% among all three recording units (sentences, pages and percentage of AR) as 
discussed in section 6.4, the agreement on the direction of the year-to-year change for all 
cases and for both total and H&S CSD was calculated. The findings shown in Table 8.1 
also provide some support to proposition 1, since the three recording units agreed on the 
(positive) direction of the change following the accident in all cases. As the table 
reveals, this was the only year-to-year change that the recording units agreed upon in all 
cases, thus indicating the substantial size of the change and lending some further support 
to proposition 1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 It should be noted that the averages assist in the comparability of the findings but they are rather ‘crude’ 
estimates, since, e.g. in this case only five yearly changes are taken into consideration and the average is 
influenced by the considerable change in AA’s CSD. Additionally, as is seen later, the averages naturally 
exclude cases of infinite increases, when e.g. companies produce a specific type of report for the first time. 
Even so, the average change is preferred to e.g. the aggregate change figures, since the latter would be 
heavily influenced by the most prolific disclosers.  
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 Table 8.1 Agreement on the direction of change in total CSD among the three recording 
units  
Year-to-year change 
 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA     
AF     
AA     
SIA 
    
SAS     
 
Section 4.5 outlined the second proposition to be addressed as follows: 
 
2. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of H&S CSD will show a notable 
increase 
 
As the discussion of the aforementioned relevant sections in Chapter 7 has indicated, the 
findings lend some support to proposition 2 since H&S CSD increased considerably in 
Y1 for all examined cases, ranging from 74% for BA to 557% for AA. Additionally: 
 
? Y1 represented a peak in disclosure over the five year period for all but AF, as 
was the case for total CSD, and 
? For all except AF, disclosure declined in the last two years  
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The fact that H&S disclosure remained at higher levels than in Y-2 throughout the post-
accident period, could be because the accident (and potentially also the September 11th 
events) triggered an incremental increase in the amount of relevant disclosure. Notably, 
the increase at Y1 for H&S CSD was considerably greater than for the total CSD in all 
cases. The findings are consistent with Deegan et al. (2000) and Woodward et al. 
(2008), who also report greater H&S than total CSD increases, and it could be argued 
that the organisations were particularly interested in restoring their legitimacy in respect 
of this ‘threatened’ area. The average 271% increase for H&S disclosure was, 
nevertheless, considerably higher than Deegan et al. (2000) and Woodward et al. (2008), 
as was also the case for proposition 1.  
  
The findings displayed in Table 8.2 provide some further support to proposition 2, as the 
three recording units agreed on the positive direction of the change following the 
accident in all cases. As above, this was the only instance where the recording units 
agreed in all cases, lending some further support to proposition 2. 
 
Table 8.2 Agreement on the direction of change in H&S CSD among the three recording 
units 
Year-to-year change 
 
Y-2→Y-1 Y-1→Y1 Y1→Y2 Y2→Y3
BA     
AF 
    
AA     
SIA 
    
SAS 
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 Having reviewed the findings as regards the change in total and H&S CSD, the findings 
for the three main types of reporting media examined (AR, social and environmental 
reports and supplementary data) can be discussed. As the discussion in Chapter 7 has 
also indicated, following the accident, the disclosure increased for almost all reviewed 
documents, with a notable exception being the SAS decision to discontinue the 
publication of supplementary data and incorporate the relevant information in their 
environmental report. 
 
Interestingly, in Y2 and Y3 all information provided in stand-alone reports 
(social/environmental and supplementary data) decreased whilst the majority of 
information in AR increased. This also applied to the companies that were publishing 
stand-alone information in the pre-accident period (BA, SAS), where the increase in AR 
was greater than that in stand-alone reporting. This general shift to AR disclosure could 
be attributed to an isomorphic industry trend (although the evidence from a number of 
surveys, such as KPMG, 2008, supports that stand-alone reporting in the last decade has 
kept rising). It might also be due to organisational attempts, “to reduce the costs of 
external reporting” (SAS, 2002AR, p.106) of their CSRes performance (as discussed 
earlier in section 7.6.3), by disclosing additional information on the AR and on the 
Internet. The latter CSR medium was not considered in this study.  
 
It could be argued that the argument that organisations increased the disclosed 
information in Y1 to address the threat appears, however, more convincing. And 
following the discussion in chapter 6, a complementary explanation for the identified 
shift in disclosure media in Y2 and Y3 may be that the organisations, in those years, 
focused on ensuring they maintain communication with their most critical stakeholders, 
such as customers and employees (in addition to shareholders), which they primarily 
seem to contact through the AR. In difficult times, the organisations seemed to focus on 
moving information firstly to the main ‘appendix’ of the AR (the main stand-alone 
report, as SAS have done), and then to the AR, their main communication source, to 
better address their most important stakeholders concerns. Nevertheless, in Y3 the 
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disclosure in the AR either decreased or stabilised (with the exception of SAS, which 
nevertheless showed a decline in disclosure in Y2), lending some further support to the 
argument that the increase in disclosure in Y1 was to address the threat. 
 
When the findings per case in respect of the source of CSD in proportions are 
considered, they lend some further support to the above arguments. Thus, following the 
accident most organisations proportionately increased the CSR discussion in their ARs. 
The only exception was AA, which published a single stand-alone report over the period 
in the year following the accident and then discontinued its publication until 2007 (as 
discussed in section 7.4.3). 
 
Factors such as size and particularly country of origin may also assist in explaining the 
absolute levels of CSD, as studies by e.g. Gray et al. (1995a) and Adams et al. (1998) 
show. It could be argued that, in this case, the CSD levels were heavily influenced by 
whether the companies published stand-alone information or not, as the discussion of the 
findings so far indicates. Although all organisations are of a considerable size, the larger 
ones engaged with publishing stand-alone CSR information on an annual basis (e.g. BA 
and AF – despite that for the latter these were not available) and, on the whole, disclosed 
more than the smaller companies, for which stand-alone reporting was either sporadic 
(SAS) or non existent (SIA). This does not explain however why AA, the largest of the 
five organisations at the time, only published one stand-alone report over the period. 
Thus the country of origin seems a more suitable interpretive factor in this case: 
companies from countries with a longer tradition of stand-alone reporting such as the 
UK, France and (some) Scandinavian countries, disclosed more than companies from 
Asia (other than Japan) and the US (KPMG, 2003, 2005, 2008 – although it should be 
noted that US companies have shown a considerable increase in publishing stand-alone 
information in recent years, as KPMG, 2008 reveals).  
 
These factors may also assist, to some extent, in explaining the degree of change in the 
levels of CSD, since this also depends on the absolute levels: i.e. a few sentences’ 
additional disclosure for SIA will show a greater proportionate increase than for BA that 
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publishes considerably more CSD. The arguments pertaining to size can thus be 
expressed reversely, since smaller companies which did not publish stand-alone reports 
showed higher increases in Y1. Yet again, the largest company (AA) by its ad hoc 
publication of a stand-alone report in 2001, showed the greatest increase. Likewise, 
organisations from the UK, France and Scandinavia that published more CSD at the 
absolute level, showed less proportionate increase in Y1 than organisations from US and 
Asia, which did not publish as much stand-alone information. Naturally, any inferences 
from these findings to other organisations can only be very tentative, particularly given 
the small sample size.   
 
The findings for the themes of disclosure in terms of absolute and proportionate year-to-
year change can now be discussed. As the discussion in Chapter 7 indicates (sections 
7.2.3, 7.3.2, 7.4.3, 7.5.3 and 7.6.3), all disclosure themes showed a considerable increase 
on average in their absolute levels of disclosure in Y1, in what may be perceived as 
organisational attempts to address all stakeholders’ information needs following the 
legitimacy threats.  In addition: 
 
? H&S showed the greatest increase across all themes in Y1 for most organisations 
(with the exception of AA), followed by the environment 
? Organisational stances vary in Y2 and Y3. Most of the themes decreased, with 
H&S showing the greatest decrease and environment the least. 
 
I could be argued that the striking increase in H&S disclosure in Y1 across all cases can 
be interpreted as an organisational attempt to address the legitimacy threat particularly 
pertaining to this area. The considerable increase in environmental disclosure, though 
throughout the post- accident period (a theme not directly related to the accidents) lends 
some support to the Gray et al. (1996) argument that environmental CSD is often 
employed to distract attention from the issue(s) of concern. As discussed in section 
7.6.3, this is particularly evident in SAS’s case, where following the accident it even 
expanded its AR title to include the sub-title: “& Summary of Environmental Report”. 
The relatively smaller increase in Y1 for workplace and marketplace could be because 
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these categories have generally higher absolute levels of disclosure, particularly in the 
pre-accident period. 
 
The findings are consistent with Deegan et al. (2000), who also report variations per 
disclosure theme. Interestingly, their theme with the greatest increase was also H&S 
(108%), followed by the environment (77%), community (46%) and workplace (9%), 
although their examined accidents mainly involved oil spills. It should be noted that, 
unlike this study, disclosure kept rising throughout their examined period for most of the 
themes. Nevertheless, both their study and the present one find that following the 
accident, organisations attempt to proportionately address more stakeholders. As the 
discussion of the findings per case and per theme of CSD (in proportional change) in 
Chapter 7 (aforementioned sections) indicates:  
 
? All organisations increased the proportion of H&S to total disclosure in Y1  
? All organisations also either increased, or maintained, their proportions to total 
disclosure of community and environment (the most popular post-accident 
theme) in Y1 
? All organisations decreased the proportion of workplace to total CSD, which, 
prior to the accident, was on average (i.e. from all considered cases) the most 
popular theme (the exceptions being BA and SAS which were the only 
companies to publish stand-alone reports in that period) 
? Organisational approaches differed in respect of the marketplace, which showed 
a slight decrease on average. 
 
These findings contrast with those of Hackston and Milne (1996), who find that 
companies disclose more on workplace than environmental issues (and, arguably, also in 
contrast to Owen et al., 2005, who reveals that managers rank employees higher than 
environmental pressure groups in terms of stakeholder importance). Hackston and 
Milne’s (1996) finding can be because they only consider ARs, which predominantly 
focus on customers and employees (as argued in section 6.5.2 and as also evident in 
Gray et al., 1995b). The environmental consequences of aviation nevertheless are an 
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issue of general concern and, as discussed in Chapter 7, organisations address them 
either by admitting to it (e.g. SIA) or by attempting to question it (e.g. BA, AF), which 
in either case is followed by some course of (substantive or symbolic) action. Hence, it 
could be argued that in addition to swaying attention away from the social issue of 
concern (as particularly AA’s stance suggests), the organisational efforts to 
proportionately increase their environmental CSD in the post-accident period, may also 
be perceived as an attempt to pre-empt stakeholder attention to their environmental 
impacts. Nevertheless, the relative proportions per theme of CSD are also highly 
susceptible to factors such as industry and country as Adams et al. (1998) demonstrate, 
and the review in section 2.3.3 has further indicated. 
  
8.2.2 Propositions 3 and 4 
 
Section 4.5 outlined the third and fourth propositions to be addressed as follows: 
 
3. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD will show a notable 
increase 
4. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of negative CSD will show a notable 
increase 
 
As the discussion in Chapter 7 has indicated (sections 7.2.3, 7.3.2, 7.4.3, 7.5.3 and 
7.6.3), the findings lend some support to propositions 3 and 4, since, following the 
threat, the levels of both positive and negative total CSD showed notable increases.  In 
addition: 
 
? almost all companies in Y1 increased their negative rather than positive 
disclosure to a greater extent (with the exception of AF)  
? this trend was also largely evident in Y2. Companies (with the exception of SAS) 
either increased their negative rather than positive disclosure to a greater extent 
(AF, AA, SIA) or decreased  their negative rather than the positive disclosure to 
a lower extent (BA)  
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 Even though the higher absolute levels of negative CSD when compared to the literature 
can be attributed to the strict decision rules of the study (as discussed in section 6.5.3), 
this can only partly explain this increasingly negative trend in disclosure in Y1. This is 
particularly the case since, despite as discussed above in Y2 (i.e. organisations employ 
increasingly ARs, and which, as seen in section 6.5.3, contain information of a mostly 
positive nature), and despite the average decrease in total disclosure, the negative 
disclosure keeps rising. The findings are in contrast to most of the literature predicting 
(Whetten, 1980; Milne and Gray, 2007), and finding (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; 
Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1996) that organisations suppress 
negative news, but are consistent with the findings of Woodward et al. (2008). 
 
Although the evidence could be interpreted as an attempt to improve image by, for 
example, offering apologies and admitting guilt to create the impression of honesty (as is  
more likely the case in Woodward et al., given the low absolute levels of negative CSD 
they established), it is unlikely that organisations would do so to this extent. It rather 
seems that the probable organisational attempts to decrease costs in the first two post-
accident (and September 11th) years were not restricted to reducing external reporting, 
but also possibly resulted in neglecting their CSRes impacts, as reflected in the 
increasingly negative disclosure. As BA acknowledge for that period: 
 
one key challenge has been ensuring that we do not lose sight of important long-
term priorities because of difficult market conditions. This includes maintaining 
the focus on our wider social and environmental responsibilities (BA, 2003SER, 
p.1). 
 
The findings for H&S CSD in respect of the positive vs. negative distinction are largely 
consistent with the ones for total, as the findings in Chapter 7 (in the aforementioned 
relevant sections) also reveal. In Y1 both positive and negative disclosures increased 
notably for all case studies, and at greater rates than the increases in total CSD at the 
time. All companies increased to a greater extent their negative rather than positive H&S 
CSD in Y1 and this pattern was generally evident in Y2. These findings are consistent 
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with Woodward et al. (2008) and (although to some extent the negative disclosure 
pertains to information regarding the accidents) could also be attributed to organisational 
attempts to reduce costs. 
 
8.2.3 Propositions 5 and 6 
 
Having reviewed the findings for positive vs. negative CSD, those for substantive vs. 
symbolic can be considered. Section 4.5 outlined the fifth and sixth propositions to be 
addressed as follows: 
 
5. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD will show a notable 
increase 
6. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable 
increase 
 
As the discussion in the relevant sections in Chapter 7 indicates (sections 7.2.3, 7.3.2, 
7.4.3, 7.5.3 and 7.6.3), the findings lend some support to propositions 5 and 6, since in 
Y1 the levels of both substantive and symbolic total CSD showed notable increases in all 
cases (with the sole exception of BA’s 8% decrease in symbolic CSD). Additionally,  
 
? Most companies increased their substantive CSD in a greater extent that their 
symbolic in Y1, with the exceptions being AF (who delayed their substantive 
response until the next year) and AA (that published an ad hoc 
social/environmental report at the time – a document largely symbolic as the 
findings in section 6.5.3 suggest) 
? This trend was also largely evident in Y2, with companies either increasing to a 
greater extent, or decreasing to a lower extent their, substantive rather than the 
symbolic disclosure, with the marginal exception of SIA and SAS.  
 
These findings do not come as a surprise, given the findings in respect of the negative 
vs. positive CSD in both Y1 and Y2 and the findings from section 6.5.4 (negative CSD is 
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highly correlated with substantive CSD). The generally higher increases in substantive, 
rather than the symbolic CSD, in both Y1 and Y2 could be explained as organisational 
attempts to substantively address the threats. This could be attributed to the considerable 
magnitude of the threats (compounded by the events of September 11th), which as 
discussed in section 8.2.1, were also possibly behind the generally higher increase than 
that established in earlier studies.  Nevertheless, it appears that only in SIA’s case was 
there some evidence (the continuous increase in the substantive disclosure throughout 
the post-accident period) that the accident could have possibly caused an incremental 
change and a shift towards more substantive attention to their social and environmental 
impacts. An additional supporting sign was that in Y3 SIA also started publishing stand-
alone information (not considered here due to its unavailability). 
 
The findings for total CSD in respect of the substantive vs. symbolic distinction are, 
however, not entirely consistent with the ones for H&S CSD, as the discussion in 
Chapter 7 also revealed. It appears that: 
 
? Both substantive and symbolic H&S CSD increased considerably across all cases 
in Y1 
? The relevant increases in H&S CSD were higher than the ones in total CSD at 
the time (the only exception being SAS’s substantive CSD as Table 8.11 
indicates) 
? In Y1 most organisations increased their symbolic than the substantive H&S CSD 
to a considerably higher extent (with the exception of the more balanced BA 
approach)  
? In Y2 organisations either decreased their substantive than the symbolic 
disclosure to a lower extent (BA, AA, SIA, SAS) or increased their substantive 
than the symbolic disclosure to a greater extent (AF).  
 
As in section 8.2.1, the higher increases in H&S compared to total disclosure in Y1, 
across all cases, could be interpreted as organisational attempts to address the legitimacy 
threats pertaining to this area.  Also, the general preference for substantive H&S CSD in 
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Y2 was in line with the preference for negative H&S CSD in both Y1 and Y2 (as the high 
correlation between substantive and negative disclosure, identified in section 6.5.3, 
would suggest). However, the preference for symbolic H&S CSD in Y1 contradicts the 
latter findings and, further, is not consistent with the general preference for substantive 
total CSD at the time.  
 
The preference for symbolic H&S CSD in Y1 is, nevertheless, consistent with Gray et 
al’s (1995a) finding that, “health and safety disclosure appears to be a strong illustration 
of Lindblom’s second legitimation strategy – ‘changing perceptions’” (p.66): 
organisations, following the threat, and not being able to address their relevant impacts 
substantively, employ H&S CSD in a way that, “add[s] to the image of a competent and 
concerned organization which took its responsibilities in this field seriously” (loc. cit.). 
As the discussion in Chapter 7 has demonstrated, they did so by, for example, expanding 
their relevant awards sections (SIA), using two page images in the AR of personnel 
conducting security checks (SAS), changing the wording in their AR headings to 
emphasise their commitment to safety (AF), or expressing their commitment to safety in 
large typeface (BA). These are all signs of an image (as opposed to ethics) oriented 
organisational stance towards CSR and CSRes, as the following section considering the 
research questions of the study also finds.  
 
8.3 The findings per research question 
 
Following the cross-case consideration of the findings per proposition, which was based 
on quantitative CA evidence, the discussion now turns to the cross-case findings per 
research question, which will be based on the qualitative CA evidence. As discussed in 
chapters 1 and 3, the research questions have a subsidiary role in the study and assist, 
inter alia, in identifying similarities and differences with regard to the main theoretical 
explanations for CSR. The detailed consideration of the findings in respect of the 
research questions, and of the qualitative CA evidence, can give further insights into 
organisational motivations for CSR, the main aim of this study. The consideration of 
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these findings will also inform (along with the findings from the quantitative CA) the 
discussion on the implications for the framework of the study (as presented in chapter 4) 
and for CSR practice, which is presented in the next section.  
 
8.3.1 Research Question 1 
 
Section 1.3 outlined the first research question to be addressed as follows: 
 
? What are the object companies’ positions towards CSRes? 
 
Considering that, “CSR[es] and CSR reporting cannot be understood in isolation of each 
other” (Adams, 2008, p.365) and that CSR is often perceived as a manifestation of 
CSRes (Gray et al., 1996; O’Dwyer, 1999), understanding the motivation(s) for CSRes 
practice will give insights into the motivations for CSR. It is in this section that the 
cross-case evidence from the qualitative analysis is considered and is reported in respect 
of the three organisational variants identified in chapter 2 that are expected to engage 
with CSRes. To further look into the potential influences of the relevant accident, a 
distinction regarding evidence ‘before’ and ‘after’ the threat is also made. This will give 
further insights into whether the accidents had an influence on organisational CSRes 
practices and how these are reported.   
 
The next section discusses the arguments that could be perceived as supportive of 
stakeholder capitalism. These are followed by the evidence relating to ethics pragmatism 
to the ethics opportunism. In each section, summary tables of the ‘pattern-matching’ 
activity, making distinctions between the cross-case supporting information for each 
variant before and after the accident, are made. This was expected to reveal how each 
organisation changes its relevant references following the accident.  
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 8.3.1.1 Stakeholder Capitalism 
 
Table 8.3 summarises the evidence from the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for stakeholder 
capitalism. The organisational references are diverse in respect to both the content, and 
how they are affected by the accident. 
 
Table 8.3 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for stakeholder capitalism 
Case  Before the accident After the accident 
BA 
 
References to commitment to sustainability 
as leaving natural and social environment in 
better condition; detailed references to 
commitment to citizenship and open 
dialogue with stakeholders; references to 
integration of social and environmental 
factors into management systems. 
 
 
Continuing references to sustainability, 
acknowledgement of contribution of 
aviation to greenhouse effect; references to 
ethical responsibilities of business towards 
employees; reference to commitment to 
improving social and environmental 
performance. 
AF  [No reference] 
 
Acknowledgment of responsibility ‘to 
different environments’ and to several 
stakeholders; initiation of additional safety 
measures; reference to integration of 
environmental policy into the production 
process; few mentions of commitment to 
sustainable development, ethics and 
transparency and to cleaner technology, 
even if more costly and despite the difficult 
times for aviation. 
 
AA 
 
References to considering the interests of 
employees in every decision made. 
 
References to commitment to sustainability; 
references to conservation and description 
of business ethics policy; some evidence of 
integration of environmental policies in 
practice through, e.g. training. 
 
SIA 
 
References to commitment to community 
and local arts. 
 
Frequent references to corporate citizenship 
and giving back to communities.  
 
SAS 
 
References to integration of environmental 
work to all decisions and to considering all 
environmental aspects of operations; few 
mentions of commitment to sustainability. 
 
Continuing reference to integration of 
environmental work to all decisions and to 
considering all environmental aspects of 
operations; few references to endorsing 
sustainability. 
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Most organisations (with the exception of SIA) declare their commitment to 
sustainability. However, as the discussion in Chapter 7 has illustrated (sections 7.2.4, 
7.3.3, 7.4.4, 7.5.4 and 7.6.4), these definitions vary considerably across companies (e.g. 
for AF, sustainability, at least allegedly, primarily involves compliance with ethical 
principles whilst for SAS, this also pertains to sustaining shareholder value); within the 
same company across years (e.g. AA in 2001 appeared to consider sustainability as 
regards future generations, whilst in 2003 as regards their profitability); and, to some 
extent, even across pages of the same report (e.g. in BA, 2002SER, on p. 10 the 
importance of sustainability for future generations is emphasised, whilst on p. 12, it is 
stressed that the economic ‘dimension’ should also be taken into consideration).  
 
These diverse definitions indicate that organisations tend to interpret sustainability to 
their own benefit, and as ultimately entailing sustainable profits and image. In that, they 
seem to have been advised by the organisation offering assurance to their stand-alone 
reports. SAS report that their auditors suggested it increases its efforts to highlight the 
link between the Group’s environmental work and its financial performance (2001ER, 
p.61); and BA seemed to have also been advised by its auditors to do so, as the 
following extract from its 2000 Social and Environmental Report’s Assurance statement 
reveals (the assurance organisation is SustainAbility and it is signed by John Elkington): 
 
In assessing corporate positioning in relation to the triple bottom line of 
sustainable development, we use the simple metaphor of a 5-speed gearbox… As 
for the fifth gear, the challenge is to link improvements in TBL performance both 
with customer appeal and the value of a company’s brand… Tomorrow’s 
economy will be about increasing returns, where we learn to exploit virtuous 
cycles rather than manage vicious ones (BA, 2000SER, p. 11). 
 
Owen (2007) also notes this, “more strategic, ‘value added’ approach to assurance … 
which focuses centrally on the usefulness of the report for stakeholders, and is explicitly 
concerned with driving future performance” (p. 172). Although this is still far from a 
reporting approach based on the interpretation of sustainability as in Brundtland Report 
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(UNWCED, 1987 - a reporting approach which however, Milne and Gray argue that is 
“extremely difficult and no (corporate) organization would want to do” [2007, p. 195]), 
it appears that it can serve as a mean of persuading companies to engage with 
stakeholders. However, “this still begs the question as to how stakeholders can use the 
assurance findings in any way that might influence organizational decision-making” 
(Owen, 2007, p. 179).  
 
As Table 8.3 indicates, the accident had an effect on the amount and nature of the 
supporting references to ethical motivations for CSR for most organisations (with the 
notable exception of SAS, which, as discussed in chapter 7, appears to be the company 
closest to opportunism). The organisations responded in different ways. AF and AA 
started making references to their commitment to sustainability, ethics and transparency, 
as discussed above, and substantially increased their relevant arguments (particularly, 
AF had no such references in the pre accident period). BA, despite questioning the 
contribution of aviation to climate change throughout the pre-accident period, following 
the accident they started acknowledging it; whereas SIA, started making frequent 
references to corporate citizenship. 
 
It appears, therefore, that even by solely considering the (initially) identified arguments 
that could be supportive of an ethically motivated organisational stance towards CSRes 
and CSR, it still seems that organisations are not ethically motivated. Indeed, as the 
evidence from the case studies in chapter 7 has indicated (see aforementioned relevant 
qualitative analysis sections), most organisations offer pragmatic arguments as 
motivations. The next section reviews these arguments.   
 
8.3.1.2 Ethics Pragmatism 
 
Table 8.4 summarises the evidence of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for ethics 
pragmatism.  
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Table 8.4 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for ethics pragmatism 
Case  Before the accident After the accident 
BA 
 
Great emphasis on the importance of 
addressing stakeholder needs and 
environmental impacts to ensure viability; 
emphasis on questioning aviation’s 
contribution to climate change; particular 
emphasis on ensuring satisfied employees to 
add value; explicit reference to the 
importance of building a relationship of 
trust with stakeholders to reputation. 
 
 
Explicit acknowledgment of prioritising the 
needs of shareholders and customers over 
employees; continued great emphasis on the 
importance of addressing stakeholder needs 
for viability; continuing emphasis on the 
importance of stakeholders to reputation and 
corporate value; explicit acknowledgment 
of the increasing importance of integrity and 
ethics to consumers; acknowledgment that 
maintaining focus on CSRes is challenging 
during difficult market conditions. 
 
AF 
 
Focus on achieving minimal labour 
disruptions and attempts to present this as 
benefiting customers, investors and 
employees 
 
 
Frequent symbolic references to 
commitment to H&S following the accident; 
provision of accounts in detail on safety 
procedures; frequent attempts to change 
their AR’s headings to reflect an H&S 
focus; explicit reference of CSRes 
contributing to image; significant emphasis 
on sustainability as involving balancing 
environmental with social and economic 
needs; frequent reference to the importance 
of dialogue with unions; reference to 
sustainability as public expectations’ driven; 
references to ‘trade-offs’ between 
sustainability criteria. 
 
AA 
 
Frequent references to the importance of 
satisfying multiple stakeholders’ needs to 
ensure viability; emphasis on employee 
satisfaction to maintain quality of service 
and profitability. 
 
 
Great emphasis on the importance of 
employees in ensuring viability; frequent 
reference to the need to negotiate cost 
savings with employees and lenders to 
avoid bankruptcy; explicit 
acknowledgement of the critical role of a 
variety of stakeholders in surviving the 
crisis; focus on securing safe and 
convenient air travel.   
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(Table 8.4 continued) 
Case  Before the accident After the accident 
SIA 
 
Emphasis on the need for minimising staff 
costs to improve efficiency and deliver best 
service to customers 
  
 
Detailed reference to fleet renewal 
programs, with particular emphasis on 
safety; attempts to downgrade their role in 
the accident; reference to the potential 
negative impacts that the accident may have 
on image; detailed descriptions of their 
awards; great emphasis on the need for 
minimising staff costs by introducing 
permanent pay cuts to ensure viability. 
 
SAS 
 
Significant emphasis on the links of 
environmental performance with business 
risks, partly from negative media coverage; 
acknowledgment of stringent regulation in 
the future as a business risk; explicit 
acknowledgement that CSR is becoming a 
financial imperative and to the importance 
of improving environmental image; 
emphasis on questioning aviation’s 
contribution to climate change. 
 
 
Very detailed (and frequently cited) 
explanation of how CSR is a growing 
expectation by various stakeholders, 
primarily customers and suppliers, and also 
an international trend; continuing emphasis 
on the positive contribution of CSR to 
image, particularly following Sep 11th; 
admission of its importance even on the 
competition of employees; reference to CSR 
as a means of regulation compliance; 
continued emphasis on questioning 
aviation’s contribution to climate change. 
 
 
It appears that the organisational references are, again, diverse in respect to both the 
content and as to how the businesses are affected by the accident. It however seems that 
they considerably exceed in extent and breadth the supporting evidence for stakeholder 
capitalism in Table 8.3. It could be argued that, as the table indicates, most often the 
‘pragmatic’ arguments pertain to the importance of stakeholders to the organisations’ 
viability. At times, organisations appear to prioritise their stakeholders, with most 
frequent references to shareholders, customers and employees, followed by references to 
the society and at times the government (AA) and the suppliers (BA). Among their 
stakeholder (other than shareholders) groups, organisations frequently appear to refer to 
the need to maintain employee satisfaction. As the discussion in Chapter 7 indicates, 
achieving minimal labour disruptions appears to be of upmost importance to most 
examined organisations (AF, AA, SIA).  
 
 315
SAS, by conducting a risk-benefit analysis, identify further pragmatic reasons to engage 
with (and report on) CSRes, including criticism from the market and media, competition 
regarding soft values, customers and suppliers’ need, new environmental standards, and 
international trends (section 7.6.4). Another strand of pragmatic arguments, however, 
concerns attempts to manage public expectations, by questioning aviation’s contribution 
to climate change and emphasising its economic and social benefits. This is particularly 
evident in BA and AF. These arguments can be interpreted as attempts to anticipate, and 
prevent or forestall, potential challenges to legitimacy, usually occurring when 
companies operate in a ‘maintaining legitimacy’ mode. 
 
Following the accidents and Sep 11th, all organisations make frequent references to their 
commitment to air-safety, which is said to be of ‘paramount importance’ (BA, 2001SER, 
p.48) and where there are no budget restrains (AF, AA). However, following the 
accident, most organisations also acknowledge the link of social and environmental 
performance with image. Organisations express their concern over the consequences that 
the accident would have on their image (SIA, SAS) and some explicitly acknowledge 
that their environmental (SAS) and community (BA) programmes (including their CSR) 
serve as a means to improve that image. 
 
Organisations, therefore, appear to acknowledge being pragmatically motivated towards 
CSRes (and often also CSR) activities. Principal motivations include satisfying an array 
of stakeholders’ needs and particularly employees, but also customers, media and 
suppliers; competition on soft values; compliance to international trends and increasing 
regulation; and direct benefits to the image.   
 
In addition to pragmatic motivations, the discussion of the findings per case also 
revealed that organisations at times appear to be opportunistically driven. The next 
section reviews these arguments.  
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8.3.1.3 Ethics Opportunism 
 
Table 8.5 summarises the evidence of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for ethics 
opportunism.  
 
As the table reveals, the organisational references are, once more, diverse as regards 
their content, although they do not appear to have been particularly affected by the 
accident. There appear to be three main types of opportunistic arguments: these involve 
influencing legislation, improving brand image and increasing shareholder value.  
 
A large proportion of the identified opportunistic arguments pertain to influencing 
regulation. These may involve anticipating future regulations in respect of CSRes (AF) 
but also using CSR to influence the regulatory framework (SAS). Additionally, as the 
discussion in Chapter 7 has indicated (sections 7.2.4, 7.3.3, 7.4.4, 7.5.4 and 7.6.4), often 
organisations attempt to pre-empt environmental taxation on aviation fuel (BA, AF). 
And it is particularly BA, which seems to attempt pre-empting any governmental 
decision against the development of Heathrow’s Terminal 5 throughout the five year 
period, by reminding how important their contribution is on UK’s wealth, customers and 
employees (section 7.2.4).  
 
Notably, SAS also appear to link anticipating regulation with competitive advantage. A 
potential reason for this organisational focus on anticipating regulation is the high cost 
that organisations bear when new regulations (particularly with regard to noise) are put 
in place. On such occasions, organisations are called to withdraw and replace aircrafts 
from their fleet, which is particularly expensive in the capital-intensive aviation industry. 
And it appears to be, indeed, quite common for aviation companies to provide details 
(usually in tabular form) in their ARs of how the fleet complies with noise standards 
(SAS, BA, AF, AA). 
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Table 8.5 Summary of the ‘pattern-matching’ activity for ethics opportunism 
Case  Before the accident After the accident 
BA 
 
Frequent reference to the need to be 
proactive towards CSRes to add value to the 
products; continued attempts to present 
Terminal 5 as socially and environmentally 
beneficial; frequent reference to the need for 
environmental programmes to be 
economically reasonable and not distort 
competition; explicit attempt to pre-empt 
environmental taxation on aviation fuel 
 
 
Declaration that they will consider CSRes 
implications of decisions that promote 
shareholder value; acknowledgment that 
they would support some noise initiatives if 
they bring economic benefits; continuing 
emphasis on presenting Terminal 5 as 
essential to BA’s prosperity and UK’s 
wealth and job creation; continuing 
reference to the need for environmental 
programmes to be economically reasonable 
and not distort competition; continuing 
attempts to pre-empt environmental taxation 
on aviation fuel; explicit acknowledgment 
that community involvement programmes 
are means of reputation enhancement 
 
AF 
 
Explicit reference to measures taken to 
anticipate regulatory developments 
regarding noise standards 
 
 
Explicit reference to agreements signed with 
trade unions to anticipate future EC 
regulations re CSRes; some attempts to 
question the efficiency of fuel tax (as 
distorting competition); explicit references 
for CSRes as  having a positive impact on 
image and on share price 
 
AA 
 
Frequent reference to the dependence on 
employee satisfaction to increase 
shareholder value 
 
Continued frequent reference to the 
dependence on employee satisfaction to 
increase shareholder value 
 
SIA [no reference] [no reference] 
SAS 
 
Emphasis on the contribution of 
environmental work on image and market 
value; explicit reference that they can get a 
competitive advantage by anticipating legal 
or tax-related requirements and managing 
environmental impacts; explicit reference to 
environmental work as an added gain, to the 
primary aim of increasing competitiveness; 
explicit admission that environmental work 
provides opportunities for business 
development and reduces fuel and 
management costs 
 
 
Continued significant emphasis on the ‘win-
win’ view of environmental work; explicit 
link of environmental work to share price 
performance; significant emphasis on 
legislation avoidance as a means of 
competitive advantage; continuing emphasis 
on environmental work contributing to 
legislation avoidance; explicit reference that 
sustainability work enhances brand value 
 
 
 
 318
As the discussion in Chapter 7 further indicates (see aforementioned relevant sections), 
organisations seem to be addressing their shareholders when they emphasise that their 
positive CSRes activities are an ‘added gain’, but their prime focus remains maintaining 
competitiveness (SAS, AF). Indeed, increasing shareholder value has been cited as a 
motivation for CSRes for most organisations (BA, AA, SAS), with AA and SAS 
explicitly noting that, ultimately, every business decision is taken with an interest in 
increasing shareholder wealth. It could also be argued that, considering that most often 
there references appear in the AR, this signifies that organisations may want to signal to 
their shareholders that CSRes activities, despite their potential costs, will ultimately 
benefit profitability.   
 
In conclusion, the review of the qualitative evidence revealed that, despite the 
differences in the way each organisation references these arguments, the motivations 
behind CSRes appear to be predominantly strategic, despite the proclaimed espousal of 
ethical principles by all organisations. These motivations primarily include from an 
ethics pragmatism perspective, satisfying stakeholders’ needs (including investors, 
employees, customers, media and suppliers), competition on soft values, compliance to 
international trends and increasing regulation, and direct benefits to the image; and from 
an ethics opportunist perspective, influencing legislation, improving brand image and 
increasing shareholder value. 
 
These findings will inform the discussion on the second research question, which 
follows. 
 
8.3.2 Research Question 2 
 
Section 1.3 outlined the second research question to be addressed, as follows: 
 
? Is CSR a strategically or ethically motivated activity? 
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The combination of the evidence from quantitative and qualitative CA in this, and the 
preceding, chapter clearly indicate that CSR is strategically motivated. As the findings in 
chapter 7 indicate, in all cases there is some quantitative and qualitative support that 
organisations take a strategic stance. 
 
The cross-case findings of the quantitative CA further indicated that the organisations 
were not ethically motivated towards CSR. As the discussion in chapter 4 has indicated 
(see Table 4.3), stakeholder capitalists are expected to disclose a large amount of CSR 
information, primarily use substantive and both positive and negative CSR, and show 
across time a significant and steady increase in disclosure. Such an organisation was not 
identified.  
 
The cross-case findings of the qualitative CA presented provided further support for the 
strategic, image-focused variants but not for the normative variant. As the discussion on 
the organisational approaches to sustainability (section 8.3.1.1) has indicated, the very 
definitions organisations employ for sustainability, and the way they appear to 
pragmatically interpret them (section 8.3.1.2), support Milne and Gray’s (2007) 
suggestions for corporate ‘sustainability’ reporting as having, “a very particular range of 
likely purposes and interests to be served by” (p.186) it, far from recognitions of 
sustainability as “a systems concept and not an organizational concept”. Likewise, the 
findings support their arguments for ‘sustainability’ reporting providing, “some sort of a 
(largely favourable) account for (some of) their impacts on the environment and 
society”49 (p. 194), with a potential aim, “to legitimate existing corporate behaviours” 
and, are further, far from “a complete and transparent statement about the extent to 
which the organisation had contributed to – or, more likely, diminished – the 
sustainability of the planet” (p. 195).  
 
As section 5.9.2.2 has discussed, the study has adapted the Savage et al. (2000) 
distinction of substantive vs. symbolic legitimation strategies. These also incorporate 
                                                 
49 It should be noted nevertheless that stand-alone reports contain proportionately more negative 
information than the ARs, albeit less substantive, as the findings from section 6.5.3 indicate.  
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those suggested by Perrow (1970), Lindblom (1993) and O’Donovan (2002a). However, 
as outlined in section 6.5.4, the research did not primarily aim to qualitatively map the 
array of different strategies employed, but assessed them quantitatively. This was 
because it was realised that the evidence could not effectively assist in investigating the 
applicability of the developed theoretical framework and its supporting theories, since 
the identified substantive and symbolic strategies could be employed to some extent by 
all identified OL variants. 
 
Examples from the employment of this strategy are provided in Appendix D(iii). As the 
findings in section 6.5.4 indicate, the ‘coercive isomorphism’ and the ‘altering 
institutionalised practices’ strategies, were quite difficult to detect. This was because it 
was difficult to determine what the existing institutionalised practice was. Thus, the 
findings on the substantive vs. symbolic distinction presented above (section 8.2.3) 
primarily refer to the substantive strategy of role performance and the symbolic one of 
improving image. As the findings suggest, organisations increasingly employ both 
strategies following the accident, with variations on the proportionate increases in 
disclosure.   
 
Nevertheless, as Table 6.10 indicates (section 6.5.4), some evidence on the altering 
institutionalised practice strategy was identified and measured. This pertained to 
attempts to influence regulation, such as the ones described above (section 8.3.1.3). 
Quite often also, some similarities across the organisational arguments were identified 
which could, arguably, be considered signs of the coercive isomorphism strategy. The 
most representative of those is how organisations addressed employees through the ARs 
to argue the necessity for pay cuts following September 11th, which as the discussion in 
Chapter 7 indicates, was a common argument across all reviewed case studies. BA and 
AF also addressed the discussion about the introduction of fuel-tax in a very similar 
way, indicating a widely-accepted industry approach. It is uncertain, however, whether 
the driving force behind these disclosures was coercive isomorphism or for example, 
common external expectations.  
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8.3.3 Research Question 3  
 
Section 1.3 outlined the third research question to be addressed as follows: 
 
? Is CSR a product of a reactive or proactive corporate stance? 
 
Generally, as chapter 3 (see summary section 3.8) has indicated, this distinction is not 
particularly useful in investigating motivations for CSR, especially when considered on 
its own. This is because proactive stances may denote both strategic attempts to increase 
profitability but also ethical perspectives. Likewise, reactive disclosures may be a sign 
of sensitive and responsive corporate stances, interested in stakeholder expectations, but 
also a sign of a strategically motivated stance, interested in survival. As Gray et al. 
(1995a) note, they “accept Arnold’s [1990] point that Guthrie and Parker’s (1990) 
attempt to classify CSR as simply reactive or proactive is too simple” (p.67). 
 
It should be noted that, since the framework is based on social contract, it is by its very 
nature a reactive one. Organisations thus were expected to be constantly monitoring their 
critical constituents’ expectations to maintain legitimacy and the licence to operate. 
However, the framework predicted that, having ensured legitimacy for their operations, 
some organisations would also employ CSR in an opportunistic way to extend 
legitimacy and increase profitability. Thus, from the outset, the framework could 
incorporate both reactive and proactive arguments.  
 
As the discussion of the examined cases in Chapter 7 indicates, it could be argued that 
all organisations reacted to the accident by showing notable increases in their CSR, as 
the cross-case analysis in section 8.2, also indicated. As further discussed above 
(sections 8.3.1.2, 8.3.1.3), and despite the majority of the qualitative analysis evidence 
suggesting reactive stances, some proactive arguments were also identified (including 
influencing legislation, competitive advantage and improving image). It would be 
interesting, thus, to investigate the framework in a longitudinal research but without 
considering a threat to investigate the relevant influences of these arguments. 
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Figure 8.1 graphically represents the findings from the research questions considered 
thus far. The strategic vs. ethical dimension was based on the findings from question 1 
(the closer to opportunism organisations are, the more strategic they are considered to 
be). Thus, in a ranking of ‘ethicality’ based on how they appear to perceive their CSRes, 
all companies are found to be strategically driven, with SIA, however, being the least, 
and SAS being the most, strategically motivated.  
 
 
 
SAS
AA 
BA 
SIA 
AF 
Reactive Proactive 
Ethical 
Figure 8.1 The reactive vs. proactive and ethical vs. strategic dimensions 
Strategic  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deciding on the proactive vs. reactive dimension has been more challenging since it 
could be argued that all organisations reacted to the accident. Nevertheless, the relative 
standings were based on the overall disclosure patterns displayed over the five-year 
period. Hence, SIA, that increased their disclosure throughout the period) appear to be 
more proactive than BA, which at the same time only twice increased their disclosure. It 
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should be noted, though, that as discussed in section 7.5, SIA may have increased their 
disclosure at the time because they were possibly attempting to pick up on the CSR trend 
(since, e.g. in 2003 they published their first stand-alone report) or even because the 
accident posed a greater threat to them. This may have caused an incremental change 
and a shift towards more substantive attention to their social and environmental impacts, 
and which thereby reveals some of the major limitations of this simple distinction.  
 
8.3.4 Research Question 4 
 
Section 1.3 outlined the fourth research question to be addressed as follows: 
 
? Can CSR be explained on the basis of a contractual relationship between 
organisations and society? 
 
Social contract is the basic tenet of the framework. It could be argued that the combined 
evidence from the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this, and the preceding, chapter 
provides some support for this case. All cases reviewed in chapter 7 provided some 
support for the argument that CSR can be explained by the social contract. The 
quantitative analysis, consideration of the study’s propositions in section 8.2, and the 
qualitative analysis of the pragmatic evidence in section 8.3.1.2, provide some additional 
support for this argument. 
 
It should be noted that, since social contract theory is also the basic tenet of the 
‘traditional’ LT arguments (which focus on the pragmatic variant of the framework) 
these have also been granted some support from the review of the findings. 
Nevertheless, the main benefit of the study’s framework is that it can also incorporate a 
number of proactive arguments, such as the ones discussed above (section 8.3.1.3), and 
even some normative arguments, despite the lack of supporting evidence. Thus, it offers 
a fuller explanation than the ‘traditional’ LT lens on the identified evidence.  
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8.4 Implications of the findings 
 
Having reviewed the quantitative and qualitative analysis findings in respect of the 
propositions and research questions, the discussion now turns to the implications of the 
findings. First the implications of the findings for the developed theoretical framework 
are considered, followed by the implications for CSR practice.  
 
8.4.1 Implications for the framework 
 
Table 8.6 consolidates the findings for both CSRes and CSR, by drawing on both the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis evidence. In respect of the qualitative analysis, to 
get some indication of the support for theoretical explanations incorporated in the 
study’s framework (chapter 4), each argument receives a ‘tick’ for being referenced as a 
motivation for CSRes and/or CSR at least once in each of the five reporting periods; this 
is regardless of the frequency of the reference within that period, therefore there is a 
maximum of five ‘ticks’ for each theory. ‘Ticks’ in lower font size denote support for 
CSRes and in larger font size for CSR. Descriptions in bold denote support from the 
quantitative analysis (all in respect of CSR). The theoretical interpretations are grouped 
according to the variant of the framework they support (section 4.3) and strategic 
arguments that can take both pragmatic and opportunistic interpretations are presented at 
the bottom of the table.  
 
Thus, in respect of motivations for CSR, as Table 8.6 demonstrates there appears to be 
no support from either the quantitative or the qualitative analysis for the ethical 
arguments under the stakeholder capitalism variant. As section 8.3.1.1 indicated, some 
arguments from the qualitative CA that could be considered as supporting ethical 
motivations for CSRes (and, in extension, possibly also for CSR) were originally 
identified (and are included in Table 8.6). These particularly pertained to proclaimed 
commitments to sustainability (but also transparency, and expressed ethical, social and 
environmental concerns).  
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Table 8.6 Summary of the findings 
Theoretical arguments BA AF AA SIA SAS 
Business ethics theory √√ √ √√ √√√  
Accountability theory 
(holistic) √     
Stakeholder theory (moral) √ √ √√√ √  
Social environmental 
concerns / sustainability √√√√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√√√√ 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r c
ap
ita
lis
m
 
Transparency  √    
MAST     √ 
Public pressure  √√   √√ 
Institutional theory / trend     √√ 
Pressure from markets  / 
Competition √√√√ √    √√√ Eth
ic
s p
ra
gm
at
is
m
  
Stakeholder theory 
(strategic) √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√√√ √√√ 
Positive accounting theory      
Competitive advantage √√√√√    √√√√ 
PE4      
Decision usefulness theory √√ √√√ √√  √√√√ 
Improving staff moral / 
satisfaction  √√√√ √√√   E
th
ic
s o
pp
or
tu
ni
sm
  
Influencing regulation √√√ √√√ √  √√√√√
Social contract theory √√  √√√√ √√√ √√√ 
Agency theory      
Accountability theory 
(strategic)      
Signalling theory      O
th
er
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
Marketing (image) theory √√√√√ √√√√ √√ √ √√√√√
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However, as the discussion revealed (see also section 8.3.2), these potentially supportive 
for the ethical variant arguments appeared to be strategically interpreted and were far 
from a reporting approach based on the interpretation of sustainability as in the 
Brundtland Report (UNWCED, 1987) and from acknowledging that all the company’s 
stakeholders have a right to information and CSR is “a key mechanism for social, 
environmental and economic sustainability” (Unerman, 2007, p. 89). Nevertheless, an 
inclusion of a normative variant in any framework attempting to explain CSR practice is 
necessary, if not in the hope that organisations may adopt such perceptions in the future, 
at least to acknowledge that some organisations may be (fully or at least partly) ethically 
driven. 
 
It could be argued that most of the remaining strategic theories in the CSR framework 
find some empirical support by either qualitative CA (institutional theory/trend, pressure 
for markets/competition, competitive advantage, decision usefulness theory, influencing 
regulation) or quantitative CA (public pressure, stakeholder theory [strategic variant], 
social contract theory, accountability theory [strategic variant]), with marketing (with 
particular reference to image) theory appearing to be the only one to be supported by 
both quantitative (chapter 7 and section 8.2) and qualitative (section 8.3.1) analysis. The 
findings lend some support to both pragmatic (section 8.3.1.2) and opportunistic (section 
8.3.1.3) image perceptions. These findings are consistent with arguments considering 
image as common in practitioner discourse (Unerman, 2008) as particularly reflected in 
the findings of the latest KPMG survey (2008), whereby 55% of their 2,200 surveyed 
corporations around the world (compared to 27% in 2005) considered improving brand 
and reputation as a prime motivation for CSR:  
 
This could indicate that companies are taking proactive steps to adjust to the 
social and economic challenges of our time. Brand and reputation are difficult to 
quantify or decipher, but these results seem to indicate that companies have 
determined that mishandling or avoiding their social and environmental 
responsibilities could be detrimental to their brand worth (p.19).  
 
The findings also lend some support to social contract theory and to a number of 
pragmatic arguments. As discussed above (section 8.3.4), the combination of the 
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evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this and the preceding 
chapter provides some support for the case that CSR can be explained on the basis of a 
‘contractual’ relationship between organisations and society. Although organisations did 
not make a reference to public pressure pertaining to their CSR activities, these 
arguments are to a large extent overlapping with social contract theory and can thus be 
considered to have also been empirically supported by the findings. Qualitative analysis 
lent some support to both international trend and competition on the soft-values 
arguments. Particularly the argument that organisations engage with CSR to pick up on a 
trend can be considered to be supportive of institutional theory, along with the evidence 
provided in section 8.3.2 pointing out the similarities in the discourse among 
organisations.  
 
It could be argued that the strategic variants of stakeholder theory and accountability 
theory were also empirically supported. Although the organisations did not make any 
reference to accountability theory (and hence there is no direct support for it from the 
qualitative CA), its strategic variant may also be considered to be empirically supported 
by the findings, since both the quantitative and the qualitative evidence indicate that 
CSR is used to maximise the organisational economic prosperity. Both qualitative and 
quantitative CA evidence also provides some support for stakeholder theory, with regard 
to both CSR and CSRes. Although stakeholder theory can take both pragmatic and 
opportunistic interpretations, in Table 8.6 it is presented in the pragmatic group of 
theories because most often organisations refer to the criticality of addressing multiple 
stakeholder needs, as opposed to the potential benefits from ‘capturing’ these needs.  
 
In respect of the opportunistic arguments, the qualitative analysis lent some support to 
the competitive advantage, decision usefulness and influencing legislation 
interpretations (section 8.3.1.3). As the discussion in section 8.3.1.3 indicated, a large 
proportion of the opportunistic arguments pertain to influencing regulation, most often 
in respect of CSRes but also of CSR. It should be noted though that with regard to 
decision usefulness arguments, the support from the findings deviates to some extent 
from the way they were discussed in chapter 3 and are more frequently interpreted in the 
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literature. Most often the qualitative analysis evidence supported arguments for CSR as a 
means to increase shareholder value, as opposed to addressing shareholders’ information 
needs (although some arguments for the latter were also evident in SAS’ case). 
Particularly the qualitative analysis findings, therefore, extend Unerman’s (2008) 
argument over disclosures about corporate reputations 
 
disclosures in the annual report about a corporation’s reputation (including its 
ranking in various reputation indices) may be aimed more at building economic 
reputation amongst investors than addressing the social and environmental 
expectations of a broad range of stakeholders (p. 363) 
 
and would suggest that CSR is ultimately employed and at times explicitly presented by 
organisations as a means to ensure their shareholders interests, by maintaining or 
expanding profitability. These arguments are consistent with Owen et al.’s (2005) 
findings that managers considered shareholders to be the most important group of 
stakeholders in CSR. The arguments are also consistent with the findings from section 
8.2.1, indicating that in the post-accident years organisations appeared to ‘shift’ 
information from the standalone reports to the ARs to focus on addressing their most 
important stakeholders concerns. It should be acknowledged, nevertheless, that since 
organisations’ overarching aim is profit maximisation, almost any activity undertaken by 
(particularly larger) organisations “must be, virtually by definition, in the interests of the 
organisation and its financial participants” (Spence and Gray, 2007, p. 17).  
 
As Table 8.6 also indicates, qualitative CA lent some support to a couple of arguments 
as motivations for CSRes but there was a lack of relevant supporting evidence for CSR. 
These include MAST and improving staff moral/satisfaction. In respect of increasing 
employee satisfaction, it could be argued that the references in the reports also 
contribute towards this aim and this could thus also be considered as motivation for 
CSR. Similarly, considering that the qualitative CA evidence provides some support for 
a MAST motivation for CSRes it could be argued that organisations would need to 
report on their CSRes to address the public concerns, as reflected or shaped by the 
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media, and thus the support for MAST as motivation for CSRes could also be extended 
to CSR.   
 
Finally, some arguments of the framework were not considered as being supported by 
either the qualitative or the quantitative evidence, primarily because, by nature, they are 
difficult to be investigated. These include PE4, agency theory, signalling theory and 
positive accounting theory. With regard to PE4, to some extent all strategic arguments 
and relevant supporting evidence could be also considered as lending some support to 
this view. Positive accounting theory also entails that CSR is used in a strategic manner, 
and it has been argued that it is largely compatible with LT (Deegan, 2000), although its 
basic premise that managers would employ CSR to minimise reporting earnings, would 
appear to be in contrast to the findings of the study suggesting that CSR is employed to 
maintain or extend profitability. Signalling theory may also be considered as a lens to 
interpret the empirical evidence, although, as the discussions in section 3.4.2 indicates, 
to some extent all CSR activity could be considered by nature to be a ‘signal’ to target 
groups. Lastly, as regards agency theory, there was no evidence from the findings that 
managers and shareholders interests were in conflict – in contrast, as explained above, 
there was some supporting evidence that managers employ CSR as a means to maximise 
profitability and thus their interests coincide with those of the shareholders. 
Nevertheless, more research needs to be conducted to clarify how and to which extent 
these theories could serve as interpretations of CSR practice. 
 
Hence, it could be argued that the findings provided some support for the framework. 
The quantitative findings lent some support to the social contract theory, the basic tenet 
of the framework. In addition, the findings lent some support to both pragmatist and 
opportunist variants and for most of the underlying theoretical arguments, although the 
support for the normative variant was limited. The possibility that some other 
explanations were behind the organisations CSR at the time, should nevertheless be 
acknowledged.  
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It should also be acknowledged, though, that a number of limitations of the framework 
became evident when conducting the analysis. It is at times difficult to determine 
whether some arguments and specific organisational actions are opportunistically or 
pragmatically motivated and e.g. references to influencing or anticipating legislation 
have been considered as opportunistic arguments, although to some extent they also 
relate to legislation compliance. Further, the stakeholder capitalism variant comprises a 
number of theoretical explanations, which, despite that they all appear to have a 
normative orientation, are quite diverse.  Although these limitations pertain to some 
extent to all frameworks synthesising multiple theories, it is acknowledged that more 
research is needed to clarify the relationships of the theoretical arguments. 
 
8.4.2 Implications for CSR practice  
 
Having considered the implications of the findings for the framework developed in 
chapter 4, the implications of the findings for CSR practice can be considered. As 
Adams et al. (1998) note: 
 
an understanding of the factors which influence the corporate social disclosure 
decision is important to those of us who wish to see improvements in the 
relevance, completeness and objectivity of such information. A greater 
understanding of these influential factors will inform debates on how such 
improvements might be made (p. 13) 
 
Based on the findings, three prime drivers for CSR could be identified: opportunism, 
external pressures and regulation. Opportunistic arguments, most commonly referred as 
the business case for CSR appear to be at the forefront, in respect of both research 
(Spence and Gray, 2007; Unerman, 2007) and organisational practice (KPMG, 2008). 
As KPMG (2008) notes, citing Goyder (founding director, Tomorrow’s Company): 
 
In a nutshell, “Yesterday’s societal concerns are today’s consumer concerns and 
tomorrow’s shareholder returns”. To be a successful business in the future you 
need to redefine success – to ‘future proof’ your business it is crucial you align 
your strategy with the needs of society (p. 106). 
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Unerman (2007), citing Spence (2005), argues that the “’win-win’ business case has 
achieved such a dominant position in business thinking and discourse about CSR, that it 
effectively suppresses many arguments which may highlight the environmental damage 
caused by many business activities, thus facilitating the continued unsustainability of 
business” (p. 90). In addition, if organisations as in this study engage with CSR to gain 
competitive advantage or influence regulation, it is unlikely that the phenomenon will 
considerably improve in relevance, completeness and objectivity, since opportunistic 
arguments are by nature sporadic and not sustainable. Thus, supporting business case 
“would be undesirable from stakeholder accountability and social justice perspective” 
(O’Dwyer, Unerman and Hession, 2005, p. 35).  
 
As the findings suggest, CSR can be explained on the basis of a contractual relationship 
between organisations and society and is thus externally driven. There is however little 
research engaging with various groups of stakeholders, such as trade unions and 
consumer groups and more research “needs to examine how these stakeholders believe 
we could move towards greater participative democracy through CSD and help to raise 
public awareness of corporate impacts, thereby challenging … public apathy” 
(O’Dwyer, Unerman and Bradley, 2005, p. 36).  As O’Dwyer, Unerman and Bradley 
(2005) suggest:   
 
recent evidence of consumer concern (as a potentially economically powerful 
stakeholder group) with CSR will need to be harnessed in order to force 
companies to improve voluntary disclosures by raising issues surrounding their 
social and environmental impacts in the wider political arena… This is also the 
most likely means by which some form of widespread demand for mandated 
reporting will emerge in this context (p. 35). 
 
The third driver of CSR that could be identified is regulation. As the findings of the 
study suggest, the proportion of mandatory CSD in BA’s reports was small (section 
6.5.5). However, as Tricker (1983) has noted, “to be able to demand accountability 
presupposes the potential to exercise power – whether it is based on legitimate authority 
or the wielding of some other sanction” (p. 33). Considering that the law, which sets 
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“the rules of the game in which the organisation chooses to play” (Gray et al., 1988, p. 
13) in the case of CSR is largely absent; and that, as documented above, employees, 
customers and other parties affected by corporate operations, are all increasingly 
perceived by modern, increasingly powerful, capitalist organisations as a means to 
secure profits (Jones, 1996, see also e.g. Friedman, 1962; 1970; Drucker, 1969; 1984), it 
seems reasonable to give credit to Puxty’s (1986) early arguments for communication 
being systematically distorted (see also Habermas, 1973). In fact, as Puxty further noted, 
“the multiplicity of accounting methods and reporting alternatives means that there is no 
touchstone on which the communication can rely” (1986, p. 99), signifying the 
importance of the development of regulated “social, ethical and environmentally 
responsible reporting frameworks that engage with all organisational stakeholders” 
(Turner et al., 2006, p. 2).  
 
It appears that particularly SMEs tend to view direct legislative action as the only way to 
ensure that businesses change their orientation towards environmental issues (Tilley, 
2000; Revell and Blackburn, 2007):  
 
Regulation is often reported as the most widespread stimulus for making 
environmental improvements amongst SMEs (Baylis et al., 1998; Hillary, 1995). 
Owner-managers typically feel that it is up to the government to take the lead on 
environmental issues by creating a ‘level playing field’ via regulation. This 
perception of parity helps business owners to feel they are safeguarded against 
‘free riders’, who might avoid costly environmental measures and thus gain 
competitive advantage. Hunt (2000) found that small firms see regulation as 
providing a clear signal of what are their environmental responsibilities. In fact, 
if it is not regulated, then owner-managers often assume that there is no 
environmental problem (Revell and Blackburn, 2007, p.408) 
 
As Milne and Gray (2007) note,  
 
It is our hope – what we anticipate on optimistic days – that substantive 
legislation will be recognized as essential and that a combination of 
organizational reporting on un-sustainability, full accountability and a complete 
change in the focus of power and decision-making to that of the ecosystems in a 
wider systems conception will empower the demos to take back control over 
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what it is to be human and find a new patch towards a ‘right living’ within a 
sensible harmony and understanding of ecology (p. 200). 
 
However, it would appear that “The evidence in many countries is that [regulated 
reporting] may well be (currently) a naïve hope” (Milne and Gray, 2007, fn 15, p. 202).  
 
In respect of the findings and the foregoing discussion, the future of CSR, therefore, 
appears gloomy. Despite that CSR has improved substantially in the last decades, 
worryingly, these improvements are mostly correlated with raised public concerns, 
(primarily) arising from environmental catastrophes. The more harm humans do to their 
environment, the more (ultimately, through increased public expectations) CSR 
information is disclosed. On a positive, nevertheless note, as Milne and Gray (2007) 
conclude: 
 
In the end it is up to each and every one of us to do what we can. To take choices 
– about ourselves as individuals, about our networks, families and friends, about 
our personal and public activities and especially about our contextual, 
professional, involvements and to try and do what we believe is the right thing to 
do – not simply what others tell us can be done…. we have to learn to dissent, to 
argue with things taken for granted or foisted upon us, and just because the odds 
are against us it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try. We are each terribly limited 
creatures individually but collectively we can achieve enormous amounts. After 
all, look what we have done to the planet – and that was without even trying! (p. 
200) 
 
8.5 Summary 
 
The chapter presented the cross-case findings of the study. The findings lent support for 
all propositions of the study. In respect of the research questions, the qualitative analysis 
findings indicated that organisations mostly adopted strategic, externally driven 
positions regarding their CSRes, despite their proclaimed espousal of ethical principles. 
The discussion on the proactive vs. reactive distinction indicated that this is not 
particularly useful in investigating motivations for CSR. Finally the findings from both 
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the qualitative and quantitative analysis confirmed that CSR can be explained on the 
basis of a ‘contractual’ relationship between organisations and society.  
 
The findings provided support to the framework and to particular arguments such as 
public pressure, institutional theory, decision usefulness theory, competitive advantage, 
legislation avoidance, image and the strategic variants of accountability and stakeholder 
theories. Based on the findings, it was suggested that there are three prime drivers for 
CSR: external pressures, opportunism and regulation, and their implications from these 
findings for the CSR practice were discussed. 
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 PART V CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
…Wise as you have become,                           
so full of experience, 
you must already have understood by then                        
what Ithacas mean. 
K P Kavafis (1863-1933)
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It firstly reconsiders the principal aims and 
subsidiary research questions and summarises the research approach. This is followed by 
a reiteration of the main findings of the study. These are viewed to see how, and to what 
extent, the research questions have been addressed. The next section discusses the 
contributions made to the CSR literature, in respect of both theory and methodology. It 
then discusses the limitations and boundaries of the research and identifies some areas 
for future research. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided.  
 
9.2 The research questions and approach revisited 
 
The study adds to the literature engaged in attempts to explain CSR practice. Its main 
aims have been (a) to investigate motivations for CSR, and introduce a framework to 
model the relationships and synthesise most of the theoretical explanations for CSR; and 
(b) to review the use of CA in CSR research, with a focus on CA decisions regarding 
sampling, recording and context. Considering that, “explaining CSR reporting is a long 
way from ‘normal science’” (Bebbington et al., 2008b, p. 373) and the many gaps in the 
relevant literature encountered during the research process, the research has engaged 
with both theory and methods’ development and offers contributions and findings in 
respect of both areas.  
 
The overarching research questions were: 
 
? How do organisations respond to a threat to their legitimacy? 
 
? Which are the most suitable context and recording units in CA? 
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 In addition, subsidiary questions that emerged from the initial literature reviews and later 
assisted in investigating the theoretical aims of the study were: 
  
? What are the object companies’ positions towards CSRes? 
  
? Is CSR a strategically or ethically motivated activity? 
   
? Is CSR a product of a reactive or proactive corporate stance?  
 
? Can CSR be explained on the basis of a contractual relationship between 
organisations and society? 
 
Following a review of the literature in respect of how these questions have been 
answered (chapter 3), a theoretical framework was developed, whereby the research 
questions served as dimensions (chapter 4). The framework was based on LT and its 
basic tenet, social contract theory. However, the framework reconsidered the 
‘traditional’ approaches to LT found in the literature, advocating that LT, by its nature, 
can only incorporate reactive arguments, and suggested that theory should incorporate 
reactive as well as proactive arguments. The framework is depicted in Figure 9.1. 
 
As the figure illustrates, the framework originally made a distinction between legitimacy 
pertaining to organisations (OL), individuals or the system. After clarifying that the 
focus of this research is OL, it was explained that a resource-based view was adopted, 
whereby the legitimacy is a resource upon which organisations are dependent for 
survival. Within the OL spectrum, therefore, three further spectra were identified with 
regard to their relationship with CSR50. In the ‘profit’ circle, strongly profit-oriented 
organisations were included, that ensure legitimacy for their operations without having 
to engage with CSR (‘pristine capitalists’); whereas, in the ‘ethics’ circle, principally 
ethics-oriented organisations were included, that employ CSR to satisfy the 
informational needs of all their identified stakeholders and discharge their holistic 
                                                 
50 Note that because of this tri-nature of OL, its circle is in dotted lines.  
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accountabilities (‘stakeholder capitalists’). In the third circle, some, primarily profit-
oriented, organisations were included, which strategically engage with CSR, to meet 
their most powerful stakeholders’ needs (‘ethics pragmatists’) and/or transform their 
legitimacy requirements into business opportunities and support their economic position 
(‘ethics opportunists’). Considering that these organisations do not primarily employ 
CSR to be legitimate (in ethical terms) but to show they are acting legitimately, this 
profit in disguise area was described as the ‘image’ circle. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Types of legitimacy 
 
The relationship of the four identified OL variants to most of the theoretical explanations 
for CSR (reviewed in chapter 3) was pointed out. It was suggested that the stakeholder 
capitalism variant incorporates theoretical explanations for CSR such as business ethics 
theory, transparency, social and environmental concerns and the ‘moral’ approaches to 
stakeholder and accountability theories. On the other hand the variants in the image 
circle (in addition to image theory) both incorporate the ‘strategic’ approaches to 
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stakeholder and accountability theories. The ethics pragmatism variant also incorporates 
the ‘traditional’ LT arguments and CSR interpretations, such as institutional theory, 
MAST, public pressure theory, and market pressure drivers; whereas the opportunistic 
variant includes decision usefulness theory, competitive advantage, positive accounting 
theory, influence regulation, and Buhr’s (1998) approach to PE. 
 
How organisations manage their legitimacy was also discussed and a number of 
legitimation strategies were identified in the literature. The discussion indicated that OL 
arguments are most frequently empirically investigated by examining reactions to 
legitimacy threats. Hence, for the purposes of this research, corporate disclosure 
reactions to some major legitimacy threats in the form of aviation accidents have been 
investigated and the below propositions were constructed: 
 
1. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of total CSD will show a notable increase 
2. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of H&S CSD will show a notable increase 
3. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of positive CSD will show a notable increase 
4. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of negative CSD will show a notable 
increase 
5. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of substantive CSD will show a notable 
increase 
6. Following a legitimacy threat, the level of symbolic CSD will show a notable 
increase. 
 
Following the presentation of the propositions, it was suggested that, focusing on 
identifying the changes in the levels of CSR between prior to and following the accident 
would be useful towards examining whether CSR is part of the requirements of an 
implicit social contract; however, it was acknowledged that such a focus did not appear 
to be particularly useful towards identifying which specific (out of the four identified) 
approaches towards CSR the organisations would adopt. Consequently, the need to 
consider alternative research approaches that would focus less on the quantity, and more 
on the quality, was revealed.  
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 To address this concern, a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods was employed 
to investigate motivations for CSR. This approach was based on the belief that there is 
no one best way to undertake research, and that all methods can be useful, subject to the 
specific research questions of the study, which is consistent with Laughlin’s ‘middle-
range thinking’ philosophical stance. Thus, the study’s methods have involved a 
longitudinal adaptation of Yin’s (2009) multi-case study, explanatory research design, 
with Annual and stand-alone reports as data, and both quantitative and qualitative CA as 
data analysis methods. The focus of the discussion on the methods, nevertheless, was on 
quantitative CA, considering the methodological aims of the study and the fact that the 
nature of the research and its propositions requires measuring the levels of CSR. 
 
To inform, thus, the CA decisions and address the methodological objectives, a quasi-
systematic review on the employment of CA in the CSR literature was conducted 
(chapter 5), focusing on issues regarding the choice of sampling, recording and context 
units. With regard to the sampling units, the choices on the industry (aviation), the time 
scale of the research (five years) and the companies to be investigated (BA, AF, AA, 
SIA and SAS) were justified. The fact that the September 11th attacks occurred in that 
period was noted as a potential additional threat and was taken into consideration when 
interpreting the findings. As regards the recording units, the review demonstrated that, 
among those considered (words, sentences, proportion of page, page size), the page size 
data approach employed by Hackston and Milne (1996) appeared to be superior. The 
study, nevertheless, developed the latter approach, and additionally considered sentences 
and proportions of AR as recording units to increase the validity of the inferences. 
 
With regard to the context units, two ‘categorical’ distinctions have been adopted 
throughout the study: the positive vs. negative (regarding the type of CSD); and the 
substantive vs. symbolic (regarding the quality of same), to investigate the related 
propositions. The former distinction is often employed in CSR studies; however the 
review indicated that the latter distinction is rooted in LT and could thus assist in 
identifying latent characteristics of the data. The legitimacy strategies suggested by 
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Savage et al. (2000) were customised to reflect the research questions. Considering that 
a sole focus on quantitative CA could not contribute significantly towards identifying 
the corporate position regarding CSR, a qualitative approach to CA was also adopted, 
involving a number of Yin’s (2009) recommended analysis techniques for case-study 
research (i.e. pattern matching, explanation building, time series, and cross-case 
analysis). 
 
9.3 Findings 
 
Having provided a review of the study’s aims and approach, the findings of the study 
can be discussed in respect of both theory and methodology. Following the order they 
emerged and were presented in the thesis, the methodological findings are summarised 
first.  
 
9.3.1 Methodological findings 
 
These methodological findings particularly relate to the employment of CA in the study, 
with a focus on CA decisions regarding sampling, recording and context. As regards the 
sampling unit, it was initially found that CSR in the AR may account for as little as 7% 
(for BA) of total CSR disclosure, confirming the literature suggestion for the need for 
studies to consider CSR sources additional to the AR.  
 
As regards the recording units, high correlations among all three approaches employed 
were identified, which could confirm that part of the literature suggesting that there are 
negligible inconsistencies across the findings of each recording unit. However, a more 
detailed consideration of the findings revealed that the three recording units used 
(sentences, pages and proportion of AR) only agreed in 60% of the year-to-year changes 
(regarding the upward or downward direction of the change). This was possibly due to 
the finding that pictorial information (including tables, graphs and images) may account 
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for as much as 46% (in ARs) of total CSR, indicating the need for future studies to 
consider a variety of recording units.  
 
With regard to the context units, the multitude of reliability assessments made, in 
addition to demonstrating that the analysis was reliable, also showed almost no 
difference in their findings, thereby indicating that these assessments could be employed 
interchangeably in most CA studies.  
 
A number of emergent theoretical findings, which, however, also relate to the context 
and sampling units, can be presented here, to allow for the next section to focus on 
discussing the findings regarding the theoretical research aims, questions and 
propositions of the study.  
 
The theme of the disclosure and the mandatory vs. voluntary distinction, despite making 
less significant contributions to the research, were found to be more reliable than the 
(potentially more useful) positive vs. negative and the substantive vs. symbolic 
distinctions, confirming that literature suggesting that there is an interplay between 
validity and reliability in respect of these distinctions. The findings on the substantive 
vs. symbolic distinction indicated that the greater the power of the constituent (i.e. 
customers and employees could be perceived as more ‘critical’ stakeholders to the 
company that the community), the more likely management is to offer substantive than 
symbolic accounts, lending support to the resource dependence theory. The additional 
consideration of the findings on the positive vs. negative distinction, supported 
arguments of symbolic legitimation primarily involving (implicitly positive) attempts to 
appear consistent with social values and for organisations selectively releasing positive 
information, and only disclosing the negative when the latter cannot be concealed (thus 
implicitly being substantive). It was also demonstrated that the mandatory vs. voluntary 
distinction is not particularly useful, especially in studies focusing on the year-to-year 
change, since it was found that total CSD follows almost identical change patterns with 
the voluntary one, owing to the small proportion of mandatory CSD.  
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The discussion on the findings regarding context (and sampling) units concluded that 
organisations appear to adopt a ‘pecking order’ disclosure approach with regard to their 
reporting media. Thus, organisations report their substantive positive CSR news via the 
AR to specific groups (i.e. the most ‘critical stakeholders’), whilst disclosing their 
substantive negative CSR news in the more ‘ephemeral’ stand-alone reports, which 
potentially have smaller audience. Additionally, the organisations attempt to 
communicate with their (perhaps, less ‘critical’) groups via these ‘ephemeral’ documents 
in an increasingly symbolic way, confirming the literature suggesting that organisations 
employ different media for different purposes. 
  
9.3.2 Theoretical findings 
 
Following the discussion on the methodological findings, the theoretical findings can 
now be discussed. The findings from all cases provide some support for all propositions 
of the study, although as acknowledged in section 6.3, this support can only be tentative 
considering the nature of the collected evidence and the interpretive character of the 
study. The findings revealed that the organisations considerably increased their levels of 
total and H&S CSD (propositions 1 and 2) following the accident and are in agreement 
with the literature investigating reactions of specific companies to legitimacy threats. It 
was argued that the considerably higher increase in disclosure than the increases found 
by all other identified studies investigating legitimacy threats (section 4.4.5) could be 
attributed to the aviation industry’s wide public visibility.  
 
It appears that following the threat, organisations increased their disclosure in the ARs to 
a greater extent than in the stand-alone reports, suggesting that they focused on ensuring 
they maintain communication with their most ‘critical’ stakeholders. Further, from the 
findings per theme of disclosure it could be inferred that organisations proportionately 
addressed a greater number of stakeholders, with H&S nevertheless being the theme 
with the highest proportional increase. When it was attempted to explain the differences 
in the absolute levels of disclosure, the country of origin appeared to be more suitable 
interpretive factor than the size.  
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 It was additionally empirically demonstrated that organisations considerably increased 
both positive and negative disclosure following the accident (propositions 3 and 4). The 
increase in the negative disclosure was higher than the positive for both total and H&S 
CSD, in contrast to the majority of the literature. Although this could be partly 
interpreted as an organisational attempt to improve image by admitting guilt so as to 
create the impression of honesty, the interpretation that organisational attempts to reduce 
costs in the post-accident (and September 11th) period instead resulted in a neglect and 
deterioration of their CSRes impacts, was found more convincing.  
 
Organisations also appear to have increased both their substantive and symbolic total 
disclosure following the accident. The increase in substantive total disclosure was higher 
than the symbolic in most cases, and could be explained as organisational attempts to 
substantively address the threats’ (because of their possibly, in some cases, being 
compounded by September 11th) considerable magnitude. Both substantive and symbolic 
H&S disclosure also increased following the threat; however the increase in the 
symbolic disclosure was higher than the substantive in most cases, indicating that 
organisations, following the threat, were particularly interested in changing their 
constituents’ perceptions of their relevant impacts and improving their threatened image.    
 
In respect of the research questions, the qualitative analysis findings indicate that 
organisations mostly adopted strategic, externally driven positions regarding their 
CSRes, despite their proclaimed espousal of ethical principles. The pragmatic 
motivations primarily include satisfying stakeholders’ needs (including shareholders, 
employees, customers, media and suppliers), competition on soft values, compliance 
with international trends and increasing regulation, and maintaining a positive image. 
Some strategic, internally driven arguments for CSRes, were also identified. The 
opportunistic motivations include influencing legislation, improving brand image and 
increasing shareholder value. In adopting more strategic approaches (particularly 
towards reporting their CSRes), the organisations seem to have been aided by the advice 
offered by the assurance providers of their stand-alone reports. The discussion on the 
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proactive vs. reactive distinction indicated that this is not particularly useful in 
investigating motivations for CSR. Finally, the findings from both the qualitative and 
quantitative analyses confirmed that CSR can be explained on the basis of a contractual 
relationship between organisations and society.  
 
The findings, thus, provide support for the framework. Both the qualitative and the 
quantitative CA findings provide some support for social contract theory, the basic tenet 
of the framework. In addition, the findings support both pragmatist and opportunist 
variants, although the support for the normative variant was limited. With regard to the 
pragmatic variant, the findings support arguments for public pressure, institutional and 
traditional LT. Regarding the opportunistic variant, the findings lent support to decision 
usefulness theory, competitive advantage and legislation avoidance theories. Further the 
findings also supported image theory and the strategic variants of accountability and 
stakeholder theory. Based on the findings, it was suggested that there are three prime 
drivers for CSR: external pressures, opportunism and regulation. Drawing on the 
literature, the merits and limitations of each case were discussed. 
 
9.4 Contributions  
 
This study has made some significant contributions to the CSR literature, in respect of 
both theory and methods. As regards the theoretical contribution, the study added to the 
academic body of knowledge investigating motivations for CSR in several important 
areas by: 
 
? Providing a model to synthesise some popular theoretical explanations for CSR 
? Taking into consideration corporate attitudes towards CSRes when interpreting 
CSR practice 
? Considering image theory as a motivation for disclosure and particularly relating 
it to LT 
? Comprehensively examining corporate disclosure reactions to legitimacy threats  
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The study offers a framework to model the relationships, and synthesise most of the 
theoretical explanations for CSR, and has thus addressed a significant gap in the CSR 
literature, identified by a number of studies (Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Ullmann, 
1985; Gray et al., 1995a; O’Dwyer, 1999; Tilt, 2003; Parker, 2005). As discussed above 
(section 9.2), the framework incorporates a number of theoretical explanations for CSR, 
by primarily using social contract theory as a base and making the distinction among 
ethical, pragmatic, and opportunistic arguments. The empirical analysis (both 
quantitative and qualitative) has demonstrated the robustness of the framework (section 
9.3.2). 
 
The study also contributes to the literature by taking into consideration corporate 
attitudes towards CSRes when interpreting CSR practice (O’Dwyer, 1999). Considering 
that CSR is often perceived as a manifestation of CSRes (Gray et al., 1996; O’Dwyer, 
1999), “CSR[es] and CSR reporting cannot be understood in isolation of each other” 
(Adams, 2008, p.365). To this end, a literature review focusing on the development of 
CSRes was conducted (chapter 2) and the four distinct corporate positions regarding 
CSRes identified also informed the development and provided a ‘dimension’ for the 
framework (section 9.2). The consideration of the organisational attitudes towards 
CSRes, being one of the research questions of the study, was also found particularly 
useful in the qualitative analysis, as the discussion of the findings demonstrates (chapters 
7, 8, see also summary in section 9.3.2) 
 
This study additionally extends the existing literature on legitimacy theory by 
demonstrating that it could incorporate image arguments. A number of studies have 
suggested that there are many gaps in LT (Hybels, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 2002, 
2007) and that corporate reputation management should be considered as a motivation 
for disclosure (Unerman, 2008). It has also recently been suggested that explanations 
focusing on Image Theory could be compatible with LT interpretations (Bebbington et 
al., 2008a,b). As discussed above (section 9.2), image arguments are central to the 
development of the framework That is, it was contended that pragmatists and 
opportunists will use CSR to portray to their external constituents that they act according 
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to expectations to maintain legitimacy, or they even exceed these expectations to extend 
legitimacy, respectively. Empirical evidence, particularly from the qualitative analysis 
(section 8.3.1), confirmed these suggestions for both the pragmatist and opportunist 
variants.   
 
The study has also given new insights into the research enquiries of corporate disclosure 
reactions to legitimacy threats. There was an absence of a study considering sources 
other than ARs, and utilising analysis approaches other than quantitative CA, to 
investigate these reactions (only Cho, 2009, has employed stand-alone reports, but his 
collected qualitative evidence did not relate to both prior to, and following, the 
accident). There was also limited evidence from investigating accidents pertaining to the 
aviation industry. Indeed, the comparisons of the qualitative analysis evidence prior to, 
and following, the accident have given insights into the corporate motivations for 
disclosure. And, as the findings from the quantitative analysis demonstrate (section 
8.2.1), a considerably higher increase in disclosure than that typically found in the 
literature was identified, which could be attributed to the industry’s wide public 
visibility.   
 
In addition to the theoretical contributions, the study has also made a number of 
methodological contributions to the CSR literature by: 
 
? Conducting a systematic review on the employment of CA in the CSR literature 
? Revisiting and developing a CA measuring approach 
? Offering alternative approaches to defining the CA units 
 
There seems to be a lack of studies offering systematic reviews of the CSR literature, 
despite the significant contributions that such studies carry to the validity of the 
inferences (Egger et al., 2001; Glasziou et al., 2001; Jefferson et al., 2003; Price et al., 
2004). The review comprehensively discussed a number of CSR debates pertaining to 
CA (chapter 5), including the frequently-cited one regarding the measurement units 
(where Milne and Adler, 1999, suggest different measurement units from Unerman, 
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2000) and also offered some ex post empirical evidence to further support these 
arguments (chapter 6). By considering the findings of both the ex ante review and the ex 
post evidence, the study made a number of recommendations regarding: the sampling 
units (suggesting that the exclusive focus on ARs significantly limits the validity of the 
findings); the recording units (suggesting that, in theory, the page size approach is 
superior to the alternatives, but that in practice more than one recording unit should be 
considered); and the context units (empirically demonstrating the interplay between 
validity and reliability as regards the CA distinctions), as section 9.3.1 discusses  in 
more detail.   
 
In addition to revisiting the debate on the measurement units and recommending that the 
page size approach (particularly as employed by Hackston and Milne, 1996) is superior, 
the study also contributed to the CSR literature by further developing the page size 
approach. Hackston and Milne’s (1996) method only considered narrative information. 
However, as empirical evidence indicates, pictorial information may account for as 
much as half of the total CSR (section 9.3.1). Thus, the study refined Hackston and 
Milne’s method by utilising plastic and electronic page size grids and increasing the 
measurement detail. This allowed for additional measurement units to be considered 
(sentences and proportions of AR) and thus addressed the concerns expressed in section 
9.3.1 over the potential threats to validity by exclusively considering single recording 
units.  As the findings in section 6.5.1 demonstrate, the measuring approach developed 
was considerably reliable in respect of both stability and reproducibility.    
 
Finally, the study also offered alternative approaches to defining the CA units (i.e. 
context units).  Few studies in the CSR literature offer alternative approaches to defining 
the CA units and largely employ normatively-rooted CA distinctions, despite the 
expressed need for such alternative studies (Erusalimsky et al., 2006). The study 
reviewed the employment of a number of such distinctions in the CSR literature; 
originally employing three context distinctions (mandatory vs. voluntary; substantive vs. 
symbolic; and positive vs. negative); but then customised the protocols and decision 
rules of the substantive vs. symbolic approach to the study’s needs; and also made a 
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number of observations ex post to the analysis as regards their employment. This refers 
to both the utility (e.g. mandatory vs. voluntary distinction not being particularly useful) 
and the interrelationships (e.g. negative disclosure being highly correlated with 
substantive and the symbolic being highly correlated with positive) nature of these 
approaches (section 9.3.1).  
 
9.5 Limitations 
 
Since the research has engaged with both theory and methods’ development, some 
limitations in respect of both areas can be identified. These can be largely considered 
and presented as concerning the validity of the inferences made and the generalisability 
of the research findings.  
 
In respect of the validity of inferences, the study cannot make any claims to have 
analysed all the CSR content of the five organisations, as it concentrated on CSR 
through Annual and standalone reports. However, it is almost impossible to identify all 
corporate communications that could possibly contain CSR information (O’Dwyer, 
1999; Guthrie et al., 2004) and it was thus impossible to identify all the CSR activities 
of the organisations surveyed. Consequently, a limit was set to the range of documents 
included so as to avoid being overwhelmed by the number of documents and ensure 
completeness of data (Unerman, 2000). Thus, Annual and standalone reports were 
considered, as these are (most often) publicly available and it was expected would 
contain the bulk of the disclosed CSR information. Nevertheless, the study still 
considered a wider array of sources than most of the literature investigating corporate 
disclosure reactions to legitimacy threats, which exclusively employs ARs, and thus 
allowed the research questions to be answered. 
 
Despite focusing on the Annual and standalone reports, data unavailability was still an 
issue of concern. All standalone reports that AF published at the time, and SIA’s first 
environmental report, were not considered as they proved to be unavailable and the 
findings (particularly from the quantitative CA) are thus subject to this limitation.  
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 The lack of comparative data, to use as a form of control in order to exclude the 
possibility that the identified increase in the disclosure was a result of, e.g. a general 
upward trend in the industry at the time, is also a limitation. Nevertheless, the extended 
(five-year) span of the analysis increased the comparability of the year-to-year findings 
and addresses to some extent this concern. Given the considerable increases identified 
following the accident for most organisations, it could be argued that it is unlikely that 
these trends would not exceed the industry’s average.  
 
The validity of the inferences made from the qualitative analysis may also be a 
limitation. Despite the ‘pattern matching’ activity being primarily intended to identify 
evidence pertaining to the four identified OL variants, and the organisational 
motivations behind CSR, most of the collected evidence concerned motivations behind 
CSRes. Although such motivations have also given insights into the motivations behind 
CSR, this potential limitation is acknowledged. 
 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that, considering that a case study approach (even 
with multiple cases) was employed, this does not facilitate generalisation to a larger 
universe of organisations employing CSR. This particularly refers to the theoretical 
findings, considering that the methodological findings were firstly generated based on a 
systematic review of the CSR literature and then based on a comprehensive number of 
Annual and standalone reports analysed. Nevertheless, the theoretical aim of the study 
has been to ‘introduce a framework to model the relationships and synthesise most of the 
theoretical explanations for CSR’ and thus to generalise a particular set of results to a 
broader theory instead of a larger universe. For that purpose, the case study approach is 
considered by the literature to be superior to any other research design. Indeed, the 
multiple case study approach was very useful, since it allowed for an in-depth study of 
the cases and, as a consequence, for a comprehensive explanation of the ‘causal links’ in 
the investigated phenomena to be generated and for the research questions to be 
answered. 
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The limitations identified in this section indicate a need for further enquiry, as is 
suggested next. 
  
9.6 Suggestions for further research  
 
Following discussion of the findings and limitations, a number of avenues for future 
research could be identified. Considering the issue of generalisation to a wider 
population issue, the theoretical propositions, and the findings from the analysis, could 
be used as the basis for the development of a survey or a structured/semi-structured 
interview questionnaire, investigating managerial attitudes towards CSRes and CSR. It 
could additionally be useful to investigate the applicability of the framework in ‘non-
threat’ settings, to particularly look into influences on the disclosure from pragmatically- 
or opportunistically-motivated organisations, and thereby identify ‘principal’ 
motivations.   
 
Since, in this study, an attempt to generate a framework to synthesise theoretical 
explanations of CSR was made, the research took a broad scope. However, more 
focused research on specific aspects of the framework would also be of interest. This 
could investigate inter alia the relationship of ‘proactive’ arguments to PE; relationship 
between OL and systemic or individual legitimacy arguments; relationships among the 
normative arguments; and the relationship between motivations for CSR and CSRes.  
 
Future studies investigating corporate disclosure reactions to legitimacy threats could 
benefit by considering the perspectives of stakeholders. Thus, an approximation to 
‘community concern’ could be generated, quantified and related to the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative CA. Such an approximation could also consider the extent of 
the (favourable or not) media coverage of the issues pertaining to the organisations 
under scrutiny for that period, such as the one developed by Deegan et al. (2002).   
 
Three fruitful avenues for further research on CA may also be identified. Firstly, a 
review focusing on the qualitative approaches subscribing to a broader CA view, 
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including the distinct systematic ones, such as grounded theory and discourse analysis, 
could assist in clarifying their relationships and their potential contribution to CSR. 
Secondly, a review of contemporary CA studies in other fields and consideration of their 
potential applicability to CSR practice, as in e.g. the cases of Lasswell et al. (1949), 
Stone et al. (1966) and Gerbner et al. (1969), could save the field from reinventing 
wheels. Thirdly, a similar review of computer software (such as NUD*IST, as presented 
by Beattie et al, 2004) applications in CA would be also of particular interest. 
 
9.7 Summary 
 
This has been the concluding chapter of the thesis. It, firstly, revisited the principal aims 
and subsidiary research questions of the study and summarised the theoretical and 
methodological approach. Then the findings of the study in respect of theory and 
methodology were considered. The next section discussed the theoretical and 
methodological contributions made to the CSR literature. Finally, some limitations and 
boundaries of the research were presented in respect of their validity and generalisability 
and potentially additional fruitful areas for investigation were highlighted.   
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Appendix A. The analytic hierarchy 
(adapted from Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p. 212) 
A depiction of the stages and processes involved in qualitative analysis 
 Seeking applications to 
wider theory/ 
policy strategies 
  
 Developing explanations 
(answering how and why 
questions) 
 EXPLANATORY 
 ACCOUNTS 
 Detecting Patterns 
(associative analysis and 
identification of clustering) 
 
 Establishing  
typologies 
 
 Identifying elements and 
dimensions, refining 
categories, classifying data 
 DESCRIPTIVE 
 ACCOUNTS 
 Summarising or 
synthesising data 
 
 Sorting data by 
theme or concept 
(in cross-sectional 
analysis) 
 
 Labelling or tagging data 
by concept or theme 
 DATA  
 MANAGEMENT 
 Identifying initial themes 
or concepts 
 
Iterative process 
throughout analysis 
 
Assigning data to 
refined concepts to 
portray meaning              
         ↕ 
Refining and distilling 
more abstract concepts 
         ↕ 
Assigning data to 
themes/concepts to 
portray meaning 
         ↕ 
Assigning meaning 
         ↕ 
Generalising themes and  
Concepts 
 RAW DATA   
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Appendix B. The categories and decision rules used for 
CA (theme of disclosure) 
 
A. Health and Safety 
 
1. Health and safety at the workplace 
 
- Any reference/compliance to health and safety law 
- Information to employees, training on health and safety 
- Accidents, with reference to the employees 
-  Receiving safety awards 
- Conducting research to improve work safety 
- Standard injury, lost day and absentee rates and number of work-related fatalities 
- Description of policies or programmes on specific diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS) 
- Providing information on industrial action related to health and safety 
- Incidents of air rage (0.5) 
- Reference to aircraft age (0.5), when not linked with noise (3) or emissions (14) or 
energy (15)  
 
2. Health and safety at the marketplace  
 
- Health and safety of the product 
- Accidents, with reference to the customers 
- Description of policy for preserving customer health and safety during use of products 
and services 
- Extent to which these policies are visibly stated and applied 
- Monitoring systems and results of monitoring of these policies 
- Incidents of air rage (0.5) 
- Reference to aircraft age (0.5), when not linked with noise (3) or emissions (14) or 
energy (15) 
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 3. Health and safety of community  
 
- Description of policies to manage health and safety impacts on communities affected 
by organisational activities 
- Extent to which these policies are visibly stated and applied 
- Monitoring systems and results of monitoring these policies  
- Disclosures regarding noise: infringements, fines, plane night movements 
- Reference to aircraft age when linked with noise 
- Reference to Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) and departures on track 
 
4. Health and safety – other  
 
- Other general issues regarding health and safety 
 
B. Marketplace 
 
5. Consumers 
 
- Consumer complaints and related awards  
- Congestion, when linked with customer delays but not additional fuel (15)  
- Specific customer relations (over and beyond ‘our duty to the customer’) 
- Provision for disabled, aged, etc. customers 
- Provision for difficult to reach customers 
- Training employees in customer service (0.5) 
- Consumer privacy policy, procedures/management systems and compliance 
mechanisms 
- Expansions in the route network (but NOT information on their first class offers or 
dietary offers/ other ‘new services’) 
- Consultation with consumers (frequency, information generated, use of information) 
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6. Creditors 
 
- Specific creditor relations  
- Policies with regards to creditors 
- Consultation with creditors (frequency, information generated, use of information) 
 
C. Workplace  
 
7. Employee and pension data 
 
- Statutory average numbers employed by category and wages (including pension and 
social security costs) and geographic area 
- Statutory numerical analysis of employees> £30,000 
- Statutory disclosures of directors’ emoluments (but not their bios) 
- Thanks to employees  
- Donations ditto by/ through employees (0.5) 
- Statutory particulars for commitments for pensions, whether or not provided 
- Pensions and benefits beyond coverage of statutory material  
- Any other employee information, not covered in the below categories, including 
reference to social audits  
 
8. Equal opportunities and employee development – training  
 
- Training above health and safety 
- Training employees in customer service (0.5) 
- Training employees in environmental issues (0.5) 
- Average hours of training per year per employee by category of employee 
- General employee development  
- Description of equal opportunity policies or programmes (racial, sexual equality, 
parental leave, etc.) and policies on harassment and bullying 
- Statutory reference to the employment of disabled persons (including retraining) 
 416 
 
- Monitoring systems to ensure compliance – results of monitoring 
- Indicators of diversity as culturally appropriate (e.g. female/male ration in senior 
management and corporate governance bodies) 
- Policies/references to bribery and corruption in the marketplace 
 
9. Human rights  
 
- Policies, guidelines, corporate structure and procedures to deal with all aspects of 
human rights relevant to operations, including immigration/ asylum seekers’ cases 
- Consideration of human rights within the supply chain and on selection of suppliers/ 
contractors, excluding collective bargaining/ references to industrial relations  
- Description of policy excluding child labour as defined by the ILO Convention 138 
- Description of policy to prevent forced and compulsory labour and extent to which this 
policy is visibly stated and applied 
- Any reference to policies regarding prevention of sexual or other harassment 
- Monitoring systems of the above policies and results of monitoring  
 
10. Consultation with employees 
 
- Statutory action with respect to informing employees on matters of concern, consulting 
employees or representatives, encouraging (and engaging in) employee participation 
- Statutory increasing employee financial and economic awareness  
- Reference to industrial relations, strike action or talks with unions 
- Employee opinion surveys and individual advice and counselling 
 
11. Share ownership  
 
- Statutory encouragement and participation of employees in share schemes, profit 
sharing, ESOPs, where employees does not mean directors 
- Schemes/ reference must be to employees (exclude if reference is to executive or 
directors only)  
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- Loans for this purpose but not directors 
- SAYE options  
 
D. Community 
 
12. Community involvement  
 
- Any reference to community and/ or social involvement outside the labour force 
- Sponsoring/ funding schools, arts, sports, medical research, development of local 
communities/ industries and activities  
- Particular reference to bribery and corruption in communities 
- Consultation with community (frequency, information generated, use of information) 
- Excluding charities  
 
13. Charities  
 
- Statutory donations in monetary form or in kind to registered charities within the 
Company Act 
- Donations ditto by/ through employees (e.g. GAYE schemes) (0.5) 
- Include statutory references and amounts of political donations (as they fall within the 
same Company Act requirement)  
 
E. Environment 
 
14. Environmental pollution  
 
- Air, Water (including consumption), emissions, visual quality, fuel jettison (0.5) and 
pollution plus any attempt to identify, improve or prevent 
- Environmental audits and charges pertaining to emissions, pollution  
- Conservation of natural resources, waste and recycling including improvements in 
products 
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- Statements indicating that the company’s operations are in compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations; recognition of the need to comply with society 
standards and regulations  
- Involvements with schemes (E.g. Business in the Environment, Business in 
Community, ACBE, etc.) 
- Except in so far as its part of the business (e.g. waste disposal or environmental 
technology) 
- Environmental Awards won or external praise for environmental work 
- Reference to aircraft age when linked to emissions 
 
15. Energy 
 
- Energy saving and conservation  
- Fuel (i.e. oil, gas) and electricity consumption, fuel jettison (0.5) and charges 
pertaining to energy 
- Use/ development/ exploration of new sources, efficiency, insulation, etc. 
- Except in so far as it is part of the business (e.g. oil exploration companies) 
- Utilising waste materials for energy production 
- Disclosing energy savings resulting from product recycling 
- Discussing the company’s efforts to reduce energy consumption  
- Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
- Receiving awards for energy conservation programmes 
- Disclosing the company’s energy policies  
- Reference to aircraft age when linked to energy savings 
- Reference to congestion when linked to additional fuel 
 
16. Aesthetics  
 
- Designing facilities harmonious with the environment 
- Contributions in the terms of case or art/sculptures to beautify the environment 
- Restoring historical buildings/structures  
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- General environmental activities linked with tourism 
 
17. Environment – other  
 
- Undertaking environmental impact studies to monitor the company’s impact on the 
environment, conducting reviews of performance, employing specialist consultants  
- Wildlife conservation, environmental newsletters and biodiversity 
- Training employees in environmental issues (0.5)  
 
F. Other 
 
18. Value added statement 
 
- Any reference to the creation and distribution of value added 
- Any statement headed valued added or added value 
- Any statement with ‘distribution’ to employees and state (not including shareholders)  
 
19. Other CSR information  
 
- E.g. general CSR objectives and mission statements; ethics; political statements; value 
of company to nation, economy; assurance statements; general references to 
stakeholders and competitors and to sustainability  
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Appendix B (i). The checklist for code 5: Consumers 
 
TYPE OF INFORMATION INCLUSION/NOT 
Air-fleet information: 
  If related to customer service 
  If related to congestion 
  If related to emissions/env. impacts 
  If about renewals and not related to   
anything else 
  If related to cost savings 
  If only showing the no/type of aircrafts, 
related to capacity, traffic 
 
No 
Yes 
Yes, codes 14, 17 
Yes, codes 1,2 
 
No 
No 
Alliances and other partnership information To the extent this affects their network 
Cabin factors No 
Civil aviation policies To the extent they convey social or 
environmental impacts 
Competition issues No 
Congestion When linked with customer delays but 
not additional fuel (code 15) or if not 
linked to anything (0.5) 
Customer complaints, related awards Yes 
Customer services surveys/indices  Yes 
Distribution channels  No 
EMU, introduction of Euro impacts not 
related to e.g. community events 
No 
Expansion (or not) strategies When explicitly linked to new (or 
suspended) routes or fleet 
Fuel info related to the prices No 
Infrastructure, general information No 
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ISO certification of the activities Yes 
IT (WAP, internet booking etc.) info No 
Legal proceedings (other than competition) Yes 
Market-share information No 
New products/services No 
Offers (bonuses, miles points, first class, 
dietary) 
No 
Pictorial info on geographic position No 
Quality targets (e.g. punctuality, regularity) Yes 
Traffic trends No 
Training employees in customer service (0.5) 
Vision, objectives re customers No 
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Appendix C. Classification of positive and negative CSD  
 
Positive disclosures 
 
1. Noise infringements: decreasing trends (0.5) 
2. Noise fines: decreasing trends (0.5) 
3. Fuel consumption: decreasing trends (0.5) 
4. Emissions: decreasing trends (0.5) 
5. Accidents: decreasing trends (0.5) 
6. Continuous Descent Approach (DCA): increasing trends or maintaining trends or 
decreasing trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or 100% of flights (1.0) 
7. Departures on Track: increasing trends or maintaining trends or decreasing 
trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or 100% of flights (1.0) 
8. Decreasing trend refers to the last two years in comparison, even if the previous 
years in a table or a graph indicate an increasing trend 
9. Recycling of materials 
10. Decrease of average aircraft age 
11. Usage of environmentally sensitive management techniques 
12. Compliance with government environmental reports and standards 
13. Pollution or waste control in the manufacturing process 
14. Merits of the company’s environmental position 
15. Maintenance or implementation of a strategy to protect the environment 
16. Rehabilitation of mining sites 
17. Tree replanting schemes implemented 
18. Positive outcomes for the firm in response to governmental inquiries or public 
concern regarding their environmental activities 
19. Voluntary adoption of safe environmental practices 
20. Introduction of environmental audits 
21. Statement of company aim or mission to protect the environment 
22. Energy-saving measures, but not solely in an efficiently context 
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23. Research into, or support of, environmentally safe products and practices 
24. Usage of environmental safe products in manufacturing  
25. Undertaking of environmental impact or assessment studies 
26. Evidence of public support/approval of the company’s environmental activities 
27. Sponsor or recipient of environmental achievement awards 
28. Company in harmony with the environment 
29. Monitoring of the environment as part of the production process 
30. Establishment of wildlife preservations areas 
31. Improvements in environmental standards/facilities 
32. Review of environmental performance equipment 
 
Negative disclosures 
 
1. Noise infringements: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) 
or decreasing trends (0.5) 
2. Noise fines: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or 
decreasing trends (0.5) 
3. Fuel consumption: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or 
decreasing trends (0.5) 
4. Emissions: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or 
decreasing trends (0.5) 
5. Accidents: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or 
decreasing trends (0.5) 
6. Continuous Descent Approach (DCA): Increasing trends (but not 100%) or 
maintaining trends or decreasing trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or 
reported absence (0% - 1.0) 
7. Departures on track: Increasing trends (but not 100%) or maintaining trends or 
decreasing trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or reported absence (0% - 1.0) 
8. Increasing or maintaining trend refers to the last two years in comparison, even if 
the previous years in a table or a graph indicate a decreasing trend 
9. Company in conflict with the government view on its environmental activities 
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10. Admission of causing environmental, including health-related, problems for 
residents through the company’s environmental activities 
11. Increase of average aircraft age 
12. Explicit admission of excessive pollutive emissions 
13. Company encountering waste disposal problems 
14. Government investigation into, and court action concerning, the company’s 
environmental activities 
15. Acknowledgment of detrimental effects of activities on the land 
16. Admission of environmentally-based community or media sensitivity to the 
industry or firm 
17. Non-compliance with regulations 
18. Admission of past problems with the company’s environmental activities 
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Appendix D. Classification of substantive and symbolic 
CSD  
D(I): The substantive and symbolic strategies employed in the 
Savage et al. (2000) study 
 
Substantive strategies 
1. Role performance. This is perceived by Savage et al. as “the most obvious 
attempt at legitimation” (p. 48) and is where the organisation adapts its goals, 
methods or operation, and/or its output to conform to the performance 
expectations of the members of society on whom it depends for critical resources 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). These organisations would thus be expected to 
disclose more frequently quantitative and also at times negative CSD. 
2. Coercive isomorphism. This is the basic tenet of institutional theory. 
Organisations employ substantive legitimation to become isomorphic with their 
cultural environment, by employing substantive strategies or by shifting from 
symbolic strategies to substantive over time. 
3. Altering socially institutionalised practices. Organisations could attempt, through 
communication, to alter the societal definition of legitimacy, so that the amended 
definition reflects the organisation’s activities (Lindblom, 1994): the most 
difficult strategy to successfully implement (Savage et al., 2000).  
 
Symbolic strategies 
4. Espousing socially acceptable goals. Organisations may do so while pursuing 
less acceptable ones. They may e.g. disclose ethical policies but fail to 
implement procedure to monitor compliance.  
5. Denial and Concealment. Organisations may do so for activities that may 
undermine legitimacy (see e.g. Sutton and Calahan, 1987). 
6. Identification with symbols, values or institutions. The organisation could 
attempt to become identified with symbols, values or institutions with a strong 
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established base of social legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 
1994). 
7. Offering accounts. Organisations may offer explanations, including excuses and 
justifications or putting the blame to someone else (Paterson and Woodward, 
2006). This is still an attempt to shape perceptions of the organisation 
(O’Donovan, 2002). 
8. Offering apologies. By apologising, organisations may show some expression of 
remorse for a negative event (Savage et al., 2000). 
9. Ceremonial conformity. Highly visible and salient practices that are consistent 
with social expectations may be adopted, while leaving the formal structure of 
the organisation intact. E.g. organisations may form a task force to study the 
environmental impacts of activities; this may provide the appearance of action 
without the substance (ibid.). 
10. Admission of guilt. Organisations may acknowledge partial responsibility to 
create the impression and/or reality of honesty. Should be followed by increased 
negative CSD. 
11. Misrepresentation or open to misinterpretation. The organisation may 
intentionally or unintentionally give a false impression or account or supply 
ambiguous information that could be misleading or open to misinterpretation 
(ibid.)  
12. Avoiding, trivialising or skirting around the issue. The organisation may offer a 
partial explanation, trivialise of fail to directly address an issue. The information 
may not be clearly conveyed or may simply be implied (ibid., O’Donovan, 
2002). 
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 D(II): The substantive and symbolic strategies employed in this 
study 
 
Substantive strategies 
1. Role performance [act as expected]: as above Savage et al. strategy 1 
2. Coercive isomorphism [act as everybody does]: as above strategy 2 
3. Altering socially institutionalised practices [change what is expected]: as above 
strategy 3] 
 
Symbolic strategies [show acting as expected] 
4. Espousing goals and symbols [change (improve) overall image]: as above 
strategy 4, but including above strategies 6 and 9 
5. Denial, concealment/avoidance and trivialisation of potential detrimental issues 
[downgrade detrimental activities]: as above strategies 5, 11 and 12 
6. Offering accounts and apologies [downgrade organisational role towards 
detrimental activities]: as above strategies 7, 8 and 10. 
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D(III): The substantive and symbolic strategies employed in this 
study: some examples 
 
Substantive strategies 
1. Role performance [Act as expected]. This mostly includes quantitative CSD and 
factual information, such as companies supporting diversity initiatives (BA, 
2003Sup, p. 22), receiving awards, conducting surveys. E.g. “Environment 
Newsletter-distributed to some 300 environmental champions” (BA, 2000SE, p. 
8). “Information and training: all managers and key staff within SAS are given 
environmental training, since environmental competency is one of the 
cornerstones of the company’s basic training and expertise development. SAS is 
developing its own web-based environmental training program that will be 
launched on the intranet during 2001. In time, all employees will participate, but 
the short-term goal is for 15% of the personnel to have completed the program 
by the end of 2001” (SAS, 2000ER, p. 17).   
2. Coercive isomorphism [act as everybody does]. This is the basic tenet of 
institutional theory. Organisations employ substantive legitimation to become 
isomorphic with their cultural environment, by employing substantive strategies 
or by shifting from symbolic strategies to substantive over time. This strategy 
however is quite difficult to detect, particularly when examining Annual Reports 
of a company per se. Although 6 companies from the same industry were 
examined, and a number of similarities in reporting were detected (e.g. on the 
way they were asking from their employees to make sacrifices following Sep 
11th, as in SAS: “In my many meetings with SAS employees I have felt that most 
of them have the motivation to make this happen. But change will require 
concessions and sacrifices and we will be forced to abandon many deep-rooted 
routines in order to find better working methods” [2001AR, p. 5], also similar to 
BA, SIA), it was decided to avoid applying this strategy to increase objectivity of 
the results.  
3. Altering socially institutionalised practices [Change what is expected]. 
Organisations could attempt, through communication, to alter the societal 
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definition of legitimacy, so that the amended definition reflects the organisation’s 
activities (Lindblom, 1994). This is the most difficult strategy for organisations 
to implement (Savage et al., 2000) and is thus, similarly to coercive 
isomorphism, a quite difficult one to detect. Organisations at times question and 
offer alternatives for existing legislation that financially worsen them off, as in 
SAS (2002AR, p.5): “Although security at airports is important, there is also a 
cost dimension to consider. Unfortunately, the signals are pointing to a 
development where aviation is being singled out with unfair policies. What we 
are protesting against, of course, is not the high levels of security, but the fact 
that the costs are entirely being passed on to the industry, even on to passengers”. 
 
Symbolic strategies [show acting as expected] 
4. Espousing goals and symbols [change (improve) overall image]. Neither the 
organisational performance nor the societal expectations change. Instead, the 
corporations attempt to associate themselves with symbols having high 
legitimate status and ultimately improve their image. This would mostly include 
pictorial (if not e.g. charts) and other non-factual information, as in BA 
(2003Sup, p. 22): “We recognise that it is important to seek the views of our own 
people”, or in AA (2001SE, p. 3): “Corporate Environmental’s role is to assist all 
officers, stations, departments, and employees in achieving and promoting 
environmental compliance and sustainability. Corporate Environmental is 
committed to supporting the above responsibilities and processes”.   
5. Denial, concealment/avoidance and trivialisation of potential detrimental issues 
[downgrade detrimental activities]. Examples may be “Climate change is 
undoubtedly one of the major global issues of our time and, while aviation’s 
contribution is small, it is important that we work constructively with other 
groups to resolve uncertainties and to develop mechanisms which will allow 
aviation to continue to play its essential role in world communication systems” 
(BA, 2000SE, p.2), or “Although aviation’s share of global carbon dioxide 
emissions is only 3%, it is still attracting considerable attention” (SAS, 2002AR, 
p.109), or “Generally, however, the Group’s most significant environmental 
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impact is the consumption of non-renewable energy, primarily fossil fuels. Their 
combustion increases atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, assumed to contribute 
to global climate change” (SAS, 2003AR, p.99), or “Subsidiaries of AMR have 
been notified of potential liability with regard to several environmental cleanup 
sites and certain airport locations…AMR’s alleged volumetric contributions at 
these sites are minimal compared to others. AMR does not expect these matters, 
individually or collectively, to have a material impact on its results of operations, 
financial position or liquidity” (AA, 2001AR, p.10). 
6. Offering accounts and apologies [downgrade organisational role towards 
detrimental activities]. For example, “In setting out to include social issues in 
this year’s report, we recognise that this area is at an earlier stage of development 
than our environmental reporting. This report is designed to identify areas for 
improvement and to acknowledge successes. In the social area in particular it is 
not comprehensive [admission of inconclusiveness]” (BA, 2000SE, p.8), or 
“Despite the fact that SAS Airline has modernised its fleet in recent years, 
constantly investing in aircraft with the best environmental performance, with 
fuel efficiency thereby being the prime criterion for choosing aircrafts and 
engines, SAS Airline has higher fuel consumption that is competitors [admission 
of guilt]. This does not mean the SAS Airline is a worse environmental 
performer that its competitors, but reflects the fact that SAS’s route pattern 
differs from theirs [providing explanations]” (SAS, 2001AR, p.109). Or “Air 
France’s punctuality rate was four points less than the average of AEA member 
airlines [admission of underperformance]. This discrepancy was largely due to 
causes beyond Air France’s control – air traffic control, saturated airport 
facilities, security checks, customs, etc. accounting for 52% of delays [putting 
the blame to somebody else]. By summer 2000, Air France has set itself the 
target of regaining 100,000 lost minutes per month, or 6 minutes for each 
delayed flight, with the stated aim of being in the top three AEA airlines in terms 
of punctuality [offering assurances/ espousing socially acceptable goals]” (Air 
France, 1999Ref, pp. 22-23).  
 
 431 
 
Appendix E. CSR required by legislation and 
professional guidance in the UK 
 
AREA OF 
DISCLOSURE 
INFORMATION TO BE DISCLOSED 
RELEVANT 
LEGISLATION 
(a) (b) (c) 
HEALTH AND 
SAFETY  
Particulars of significant changes in the fixed 
assets and important events affecting the 
company which have occurred in or since the 
end of the financial year [to the extent that these 
events and changes are related to CSR] 
(Directors’ Report) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part 
I, Sect. 16, §1);  
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part I, §1,2,6) 
 
Arrangements for securing the health and safety 
at work of employees and others in connection 
with the activities at work (over 250 employees, 
Directors’ Report) 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part IV, §10), not 
activated (Gray et al., 
1995b) 
WORKPLACE 
Aggregate emoluments and other benefits of 
chairman, current and past directors (Notes to 
the Accounts)  
Companies Act 1967 (Part 
I, Sect. 6, §1-7); 
 Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
5, Part V, §22-34) 
 
Particulars for commitments for pensions, 
whether or not provided for (Notes to the 
Accounts) 
Companies Act 1981 (Sch. 
1, §54); Companies Act 
1985 (Sch. 4, §50) 
 
Average numbers employed by category and 
wages (CA 1967 – Directors’ Report) and social 
security costs (CA 1985 - Information 
supplementing P&L Account) and by 
geographic area (DoT/OECD, 1976 – Notes to 
the Accounts) 
 
DoT/OECD Guideline, 
1976; Companies Act 1967 
(Part I, Sect. 18, §1-7); 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
4, Part III, §56, 94; Sch. 10, 
§5-8) 
 
Numerical analysis of employees with 
emoluments exceeding £10,000 (CA 1967) or 
£30, 000 (CA 1985, Notes to the Accounts) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part 
I, Sect. 8, §1-5); 
 Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
5, Part VI, §35-37)  
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(a) (b) (c) 
 
Reference to policies for full and fair 
consideration to applications for employment by 
disabled and training, career development and 
promotion of disabled employees (over 250 
employees, Directors’ Report) 
Statutory Instrument 
1980/1160;  
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part III, §9) 
 
Action to provide employees with information 
on matters of concern to them as employees 
(over 250 employees, Directors’ Report) 
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part V, §11) 
 
Employees’ or representatives’ consultation in 
making decisions which affect their interests 
(over 250 employees, Directors’ Report) 
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part V, §11) 
 
Encouragement of the involvement of 
employees in the company’s performance 
through an employee’s share scheme or other 
means (over 250 employees, Directors’ report) 
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part V, §11) 
 
Employee awareness of financial and economic 
factors affecting the performance of the 
company (over 250 employees, Directors 
Report)   
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part V, §11) 
 
Statement of publicly available report submitted 
to DoT regarding employment practices in South 
Africa before official end of Apartheid (1990, 
Annual Report) 
Code of Conduct 1978 
(Cmnd 7233) 
COMMUNITY 
References and amounts of donations to 
charities exceeding £50 (CA 1967) or £200 (CA 
1985, Directors’ Report) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part 
I, Sect. 19, §1-5);  
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part I, §3-5) 
 
References and amounts of political donations 
exceeding £50 (CA 1967) or £200 (CA 1985, 
Directors’ Report ) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part 
I, Sect. 19, §1-5); 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
7, Part I, §3-5) 
 
NOTE: references to the Code of Conduct 1978, Statutory Instrument 1980 and 
Companies Act 1981 have been drawn from Gray et al. (1995b); references to the 
Employment Act 1982 from Day and Woodward (2004). 
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Appendix F. CA recording information 
 
Reviewed 
reports per case 
study 
Whole page 
size 
(cells) 
Actual page 
size (cells) 
Average 
sentences per 
page 
Pages per 
Annual Report 
(a) (b) (c) (d)  
BA     
AR1999 25x35=875 21x30=630 28 72 
AR2000 25x35=875 22x29=638 40 64 
AR2001 25x35=875 22x28=616 43 64 
AR2002 25x35=875 21x30=630 42 64 
AR2003 25x35=875 21x30=630 44 68 
     
ER1999 25x35=875 18x27=486 27  
SE2000 22.5x32=720 18x30=540 27  
SE2001 29x36=1,044 24x30=720 30  
SE2002 25x35=875 21x31=651 47  
SE2003 25x35=875 21x28=588 30  
     
SUP1999 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2000 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2001 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2002 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
SUP2003 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
     
AF     
Ref1999 4x10=40 3x10=30 27 136 
AR2000 4x10=40 4x7=28 22 43 
Ref2000 4x10=40 3x9=27 27 98 
AR2001 4x10=40 3x10=30 22 59 
Ref2001 4x10=40 4x8=32 25 112 
AR2002 4x10=40 3x7=21 17 70 
Ref2002 4x10=40 3x7=21 23 123 
AR2003 4x10=40 4x9=36 28 95 
Ref2003 4x10=40 3x9=27 29 129 
     
SIA      
AR1999 4x10=40 4x8=32 25 90 
AR2000 25x35=875 21x28=588 25 92 
AR2001 25x35=875 20x30=600 20 106 
AR2002 25x35=875 20x30=600 25 116 
AR2003 25x35=875 20x30=300 23 122 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
SAS     
AR1999 25x35=875 18x28=504 37 116 
AR2000 25x35=875 18x28=504 40 109 
AR2001 25x35=875 18x28=504 40 119 
AR2002 25x35=875 20x29=580 46 122 
AR2003 25x35=875 20x30=600 50 118 
     
ER1999 25x35=875 18x28=504 35  
ER2000 25x35=875 18x28=504 35  
ER2001 27x20=540 18x28=504 35  
     
SUP2000 25x35=875 23x30=690 -  
     
AA     
AR1999 25x33=825 21x28=588 20 66 
AR2000 25.5x33=841.5 23x29=667 24 42 
AR2001 25.5x33=841.5 20x29=580 35 46 
AR2002 25.5x33=841.5 22x28=616 34 105 
AR2003 25.5x33=841.5 22x29=638 25 103 
     
ER2001 25.5x33=841.5 20x28=560 19  
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Appendix G. CA coding sheet 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 1.  
 
 
H&S  
 
 
WORKPLACE SYMB1 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 2. 
 
 
H&S  
 
 
M/PLACE SYMB1  
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 3.  
 
 
H&S 
 
 
COMMUNITY 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 4.  
 
 
H&S 
 
 
OTHER SYMB1  
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 5. 
 
 
M/PLACE 
 
 
CONSUMERS 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 6.  
 
 
M/PLACE 
 
 
CREDITORS 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
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SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 7. 
 
 
WORKPLACE 
 
 
EMPLOYEE/ 
PENSION 
DATA 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 8. 
 
 
WORKPLACE 
 
 
EQUAL OPP & 
TRAINING SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 9. 
 
 
WORKPLACE 
 
 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 10. 
 
 
WORKPLACE 
 
 
CONS/TION SYMB1 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 11. 
 
 
WORKPLACE 
 
 
SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
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SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 12. 
 
 
COMMUNITY 
 
 
COMMUNITY 
INVOLVMNT 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 13. 
 
 
COMMUNITY 
 
 
CHARITIES 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 14. 
 
 
ENVIRONMNT 
 
 
ENV/NTAL 
POLLUTION 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 15. 
 
 
ENVIRONMNT 
 
 
ENERGY 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
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SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 16. 
 
 
ENVIRONMNT 
 
 
AESTHETICS 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 17. 
 
 
ENVIRONMNT 
 
 
OTHER 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 18.  
 
OTHER 
 
VAS 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
SUB3 POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEG NEUTR SUB1 SUB2 19. 
 
 
OTHER 
 
 
OTHER CSR 
INFO. 
SYMB1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SYMB2 SYMB3 OTHER MAND 
VOL 
 
 
 439 
 
Appendix H Reliability (stability and reproducibility) 
tests 
 
Hi) Stability 
 
Total CSD 
 
Pearson Correlation 
  Total1 Total2
Total1 Pearson Correlation 1 .995(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N 208 208
Total2 Pearson Correlation .995(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
  N 520 520
**  Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.997 2
 
 
 
 
Theme of disclosure 
 
Pearson Correlation 
  Theme1 Theme2 
Theme1 Pearson Correlation 1 .997(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N 52 52
Theme2 Pearson Correlation .997(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
  N 156 156
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.998 2
 
 
 
 
Positive vs. Negative disclosure 
 
Pearson Correlation 
 Pos1 Pos2
Pos1 Pearson Correlation 1 .993(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N 52 52
Pos2 Pearson Correlation .993(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
  N 156 156
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.997 2
 
 
 
 440 
 
 
Substantive vs. Symbolic disclosure  
 
 
Pearson Correlation 
   Sub1 Sub2 
Sub1 Pearson Correlation 1 .989(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N 52 52
Sub2 Pearson Correlation .989(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
  N 156 156
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.994 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory vs. Voluntary disclosure 
 
Pearson Correlation 
  Man1 Man2 
Man1 Pearson Correlation 1 .998(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N 52 52
Man2 Pearson Correlation .998(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
  N 52 52
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.999 2 
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 Hii) Reproducibility (inter-coder reliability) 
 
Reliability tests for the 6 coders 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
File size N Cases (rows) N Coders (cols) N Decisions 
7592 bytes 584 6 3504 
 
 
 
 
Average Pairwise Percent Agreement 
Average 
pairwise 
percent 
agr.
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 2 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 5 
96% 96.747% 97.603% 97.26% 96.062% 97.774% 94.692% 95.377% 
 
 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 5 & 6 
98.801% 94.863% 93.322% 94.178% 95.719% 94.521% 95.205% 97.432% 
 
 
 
 
Fleiss' Kappa 
Fleiss' 
Kappa
Observed 
Agreement 
Expected 
Agreement 
0.941 0.96 0.317 
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Average Pairwise Cohen's Kappa (and Scott’s Pi) 
Average 
pairwise 
CK, SP
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 1 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 1 & 2 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 2 & 5 
0.941 0.953 0.965 0.96 0.942 0.968 0.923 0.933 
 
 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 3 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 3 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 3 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 4 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK, SP 
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 5 & 6 
0.983 0.925 0.902 0.914 0.937 0.92 0.93 0.962 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha 
Krippendorff's Alpha N Decisions Σcocc*** Σcnc(nc - 1)*** 
0.941 3504 3362.8 3883292 
 
 
Theme of disclosure 
 
Descriptives 
File size N Cases (rows) N Coders (cols) N Decisions 
1898 bytes 146 6 876 
 
 
Average Pairwise Percent Agreement 
Average 
pairwise 
percent agr.
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise pct. 
agr.  
cols 1 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 2 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 5 
98.4% 98.63% 100% 99.315% 97.26% 100% 98.63% 100% 
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Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 5 & 6 
99.315% 97.26% 95.89% 97.26% 96.575% 97.945% 99.315% 98.63% 
 
Fleiss' Kappa 
Fleiss' 
Kappa
Observed 
Agreement 
Expected 
Agreement 
0.979 0.984 0.246 
 
Average Pairwise Cohen's Kappa (and Scott’s Pi) 
Average 
pairwise 
CK, SP
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 1 & 5
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 1 & 4
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 1 & 3
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 1 & 2
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 2 & 5
0.979 0.982 1 0.991 0.964 1 0.982 1 
 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 3 & 6
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 3 & 5
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 3 & 4
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 4 & 6
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK, SP  
cols 5 & 6
0.991 0.964 0.945 0.964 0.955 0.973 0.991 0.982 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha 
Krippendorff's Alpha N Decisions Σcocc*** Σcnc(nc - 1)*** 
0.979 876 862 188044 
 
 
 
Positive vs. Negative disclosure 
 
 
Descriptives 
File size N Cases (rows) N Coders (cols) N Decisions 
1898 bytes 146 6 876 
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Average Pairwise Percent Agreement 
Average 
pairwise 
percent 
agr.
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 4
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 2
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 5 
94.6% 93.151% 95.205% 97.26% 96.575% 97.26% 90.411% 92.466% 
 
 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 5 & 6 
100% 96.575% 90.411% 92.466% 96.575% 90.411% 92.466% 97.945% 
 
Fleiss' Kappa 
Fleiss' 
Kappa
Observed 
Agreement 
Expected 
Agreement 
0.84 0.946 0.662 
 
Average Pairwise Cohen's Kappa (and Scott’s Pi) 
Average 
pairwise 
CK, SP
Pairwise 
CK (SP)  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP)  
cols 1 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP)  
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 2 
Pairwise 
CK (SP)  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP)  
cols 2 & 5 
0.842 0.812(1) 0.863(2) 0.917 0.89 0.917 0.732 0.781(0.78)
 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP)  
cols 4 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 5 & 6 
1 0.888 0.719(7) 0.768(7) 0.888 0.732 0.781(0.78) 0.945 
 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha 
Krippendorff's Alpha N Decisions Σcocc*** Σcnc(nc - 1)*** 
0.841 876 828.8 507500 
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Substantive vs. Symbolic disclosure 
 
Descriptives 
File size N Cases (rows) N Coders (cols) N Decisions 
1912 bytes 146 6 876 
 
 
Average Pairwise Percent Agreement 
Average 
pairwise 
percent 
agr.
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 4
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 2 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 5 
91.8% 91.781% 89.041% 95.89% 86.301% 93.836% 97.26% 95.205% 
 
 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 6
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 5
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 4
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 6
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 5 & 6 
92.466% 91.096% 89.726% 87.671% 90.411% 91.781% 89.041% 95.205% 
 
Fleiss' Kappa 
Fleiss' 
Kappa
Observed 
Agreement 
Expected 
Agreement 
0.738 0.918 0.687 
 
 
Average Pairwise Cohen's Kappa (and Scott’s Pi) 
Average 
pairwise 
CK (and 
SP)
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 5
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 4
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 3
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 2
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 5
0.729(6) 0.771(0.77) 0.678(5) 0.889 0.564(53) 0.833(2) 0.916 0.843 
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Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 6
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 5
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 4
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 4 & 6
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 5 & 6 
0.778 0.676(2) 0.609(5) 0.486(2) 0.657(2) 0.75 0.644(3) 0.837(6) 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha 
Krippendorff's Alpha N Decisions Σcocc*** Σcnc(nc - 1)*** 
0.738 876 804 525974 
 
 
Mandatory vs. Voluntary disclosure 
 
 
Descriptives 
File size N Cases (rows) N Coders (cols) N Decisions 
1912 bytes 146 6 876 
 
 
Average Pairwise Percent Agreement 
Average 
pairwise 
percent 
agr.
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 5
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 4
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 1 & 2
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 5
99.1% 97.945% 100% 100% 99.315% 100% 97.945% 100% 
 
 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 6
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 5
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 3 & 4
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 6
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
pct. agr.  
cols 5 & 6 
100% 99.315% 97.26% 99.315% 99.315% 97.945% 100% 97.945% 
 
 
 
Fleiss' Kappa 
Fleiss' 
Kappa
Observed 
Agreement 
Expected 
Agreement 
0.966 0.991 0.728 
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Average Pairwise Cohen's Kappa (and Scott’s Pi) 
Average 
pairwise 
CK, SP
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 1 & 2 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 5 
0.967 0.926 1 1 0.975 1 0.926 1 
 
 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 2 & 3 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 3 & 4 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 4 & 6 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 4 & 5 
Pairwise 
CK (SP) 
cols 5 & 6 
1 0.975 0.904(3) 0.975 0.975 0.926 1 0.926 
 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha 
Krippendorff's Alpha N Decisions Σcocc*** Σcnc(nc - 1)*** 
0.966 876 868 558044 
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Appendix I. Thematic analysis: an example from SAS 
 
STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM 
 
SAS ER1999 
Their environmental vision also shows rather ethics-focused: 
p. 35: SAS’s environmental vision: SAS will develop profitability in free competition, 
with optimal utilisation of resources and minimum environmental impact, in order to 
promote environmentally sustainable development of society. (‘Sustainable 
development’ means that when humanity satisfies its needs today, it does so without 
limiting the opportunities for future generations to satisfy theirs.) – identical approach in 
SAS ER2000, p. 15, though rather than calling it ‘environmental vision, they call it 
environmental policy. 
 
SAS AR2003 
Some further references to endorsing sustainability: 
p.95: In recent years the SAS Group has begun gradually to approach the concept of 
sustainable development in its organization. A sustainability policy adopted in 2002 is 
now being implemented in all operations, and in June 2003, the SAS Group joined the 
UN Global Compact, a corporate responsibility initiative led by UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan. The SAS Group is thereby committed to act to promote the sustainable 
development of its business and to create a stable social and environmental foundation 
for all of the Group’s activities. 
 
PRAGMATISM 
 
SAS ER2000 
Again on legislation avoidance: apparently regulation is explicitly considered by SAS an 
environmentally related business risk: as they note, air, soil and water emissions and 
noise could lead to: 
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p. 29: business risks: more stringent emissions and noise regulations in the future; 
investments required to meet tighter emissions and noise regulations. As they further 
down note, with regards to the environmentally related investments, Business 
opportunities: SAS can get a competitive advantage by anticipating legal or tax-related 
requirements. And with regards to the compliance with laws and regulations: Business 
risks: violation of environmentally related laws and regulations that govern operations 
increases the risk for criticism from the market and media, as well as the risk for damage 
claims; Business opportunities: credible information about the company’s ability to 
comply with laws and regulations enhances the market position and image.  
And again on how the environmental activities contribute in a better image: 
p. 28, 30: SAS’s environmental undertakings enhance the company’s environmental and 
overall images and, in a longer perspective, also its market value. The goal of this 
statistic is to illustrate to what extent SAS’s environmental activities have enhanced 
SAS’s image. Measurement of SAS’s image incorporates seven sub-factors – high 
safety, professional, successful, customer-driven, active, environmentally aware and 
positive contribution to the Scandinavian image. Diagram 1 shows that the 
environmental image has outpaced SAS’s overall image over time, indicating that SAS’s 
environmental activities made a positive contribution to SAS’s overall image… 
Measures to improve SAS’s environmental image include both better environmental 
communication in this environmental report and distribution of additional environmental 
information through other channels such as the seat back pockets on the aircraft and the 
internet.  
2 main comments from this: 1. Clearly safety and environmental awareness are two 
factors SAS considers as being critical to their image [note that safety goes first…]. 2. 
Any environmental communication, including the reports and info on the internet, is also 
perceived to positively contribute towards improving their image. 
And a very clear statement by the chairman to prioritise financial competitiveness: 
p.6: Over the past three years we have undertaken the most ambitions investment 
program in SAS’s history…The new longhaul fleet of ten Airbus A33os and A340s will 
have a significantly higher capacity that our old Boeing 767 fleet. And since the new 
aircraft are more fuel-efficient, they will provide a 10-20% reduction in emissions per 
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seat and passenger kilometre. However, I want to underline that these investments have 
been made primarily to improve SAS’s competitiveness and exploit the potential of this 
growing market. The environmental gains are an added, and very valuable, bonus that I 
believe will enhance our image and highlight our role in the Scandinavian tradition of 
conserving nature.  – kind of wondering if the Scandinavians are proud to read this… 
Also further down the President expands on this… 
p.7: Air travel is a vital aspect of our infrastructure, today and in the future. It has 
become a means of transportation for everyone, not just business travellers and the 
wealthy. Liberalization and sharper competition, greater diversity and a wide range of 
alternatives have both threatened the airlines’ profitability and created a growing need 
for profiling through soft values such as environmental, ethical and social accountability. 
For SAS, it is urgent to pursue these soft values and set a good example. For 
example, we are playing an active role in international and national organizations and 
forums to reduce environmental impact in the aviation industry… For me, 
environmental issues are a natural priority with enormous strategic importance for the 
future. -  And that says it all! 
 
SAS ER2001 
 
A very carefully expressed view, that is seemingly ethical but tactfully also questioning 
their contribution to climate change. Also in line with Henderson’s ‘win-win’ view of 
CSRes: 
p.24: Everything concerning the climate issue is thus of key importance to SAS. True, 
the connection between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change is the subject of 
scientific debate, but SAS has chosen to follow a precautionary line by assuming that 
carbon dioxide emissions do have an impact on global climate. Since there is a direct 
correlation between reducing carbon dioxide emissions from aircraft engines and 
aircrafts fuel consumption, SAS’s effort – for economic reasons – to keep fuel 
consumption low coincides with the environmental aim of minimizing carbon dioxide 
emissions.  
One more explicit admission that CSR  is a growing expectation:  
pp. 24-26: [Heading: Demands and Expectations]  
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In pace with deregulation and economic globalization, there is a growing demand for 
major companies in particular to shoulder greater social responsibility. One argument is 
that among the world’s 100 largest economies there are 51 corporations and 49 
countries. Another argument is that it is primarily multinational corporations that are the 
winners from globalisation because they can benefit from the system and locate 
operations in countries or regions with cheap labour and favourable tax policies. At the 
same time, there is mistrust among a growing number of people as to the sincere 
willingness of business and industry to bear greater social responsibility. New national 
and international organisations have been founded that are highly critical of the 
globalised economy and multinational corporations  
[do you believe that a) by accepting you are driven by these expectations, b) by 
admitting rather cynically, as in AR2000, p50, that you are only sponsoring community 
activities just to give your brand a human face, and c) by further explicitly stressing that 
you expect increased environmental performance to give you a competitive advantage 
(2000ER, p.6) you actually don’t contribute in this mistrust??] 
 
OPPORTUNISM 
SAS AR2000 
A rather cynical presentation of their sponsoring/community involvement programmes: 
p.50: During the year SAS mainly supported cultural, sporting and ‘good citizen’ 
activities…SAS continues its cooperation with four Nordic opera houses and a number 
of museums. SAS was also one of the main sponsors of City of Culture Bergen 2000. 
The cooperation with Save the Children has been extended. These activities further 
strengthen SAS’ position and gave the brand a human face. 
 
SAS ER2001 
Some more opportunistic signs: 
p.118: Strategic target groups for SAS Airlines environmental communication include 
customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, other financial actors, the general public, 
mass media and the authorities. SAS Airlines therefore participates in seminars and 
debates and holds lectures at universities and colleges. The motive for these activities is 
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the conviction that a well-developed environmental dimension in its brand maximises its 
commercial potential and provides the company with new opportunities for business 
development.  
 
A clearer one: 
p.149: SAS’ environmental work has two overall objectives: Besides ensuring that the 
group’s operations are in compliance with environmental laws and regulations, such 
activities should contribute to an efficient utilisation of resources. Environmental 
activities should also enhance the value of the SAS brand. 
And a nice link of legislation avoidance with competitive advantage: 
p.158: Well planned and proactive environmental activities reduce the risk of violating 
environmental regulations, which can lead to negative publicity as well as direct costs in 
the form of fines and damages claims. Offensive environmental activities also reduce the 
risk of being caught off guard by new and more stringent environmental requirements 
from the market or the authorities. SAS can gain a competitive advantage by anticipating 
legal or tax-related requirements. 
 
SAS AR2003 
And a bit more modest acknowledgment of a link between sustainable development and 
brand value: 
p.20: Strong brands create preferences and loyalty, laying the groundwork for securing 
future revenue growth. Brand building is a corporate management tool and has high 
priority in the entire SAS Group…Sustainable development enhances brand value. 
Work on sustainability issues has an indirect impact on the value of the brand. For 
example, ongoing surveys have shown that green policies and practices are making a 
positive contribution to the development of Scandinavian Airlines’ image and brand. 
How the Group handles sustainability issues will take on ever-greater importance for the 
evaluation and public perception of the SAS brand.  
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Appendix J. Findings 
J(i): BA 
Table 1 Total voluntary CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change 
(negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
1,027 1,056 951 544 
Sentences 
721 
42% 3% (10%) (43%) 
36.83 33.78 20.61 16.27 
Narrative  
26.54 
39% (8%) (39%) (21%) 
25.12 32.81 26.42 11.64 
Pictorial  
34.05 
(26%) 31% (20%) (56%) 
61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
60.59 
2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
4.3% 5.5% 5.7% 5.3% 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
pe
r 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
7.8% 
(45%) 30% 4% (7%) 
 
Table 2 H&S voluntary CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change 
(negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
134 202 161 140 
Sentences  
97 
38% 51% (20%) (13%) 
4.79 6.49 3.51 4.23 
Narrative 
3.57 
34% 35% (46%) 21% 
4.19 9.15 8.04 3.40 
Pictorial  
7.69 
(46%) 118% (12%) (58%) 
8.98 15.64 11.55 7.63 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
11.26 
(20%) 74% (26%) (34%) 
0.5% 0.9% 1.2% 1.6% 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
1.5% 
(67%) 80% 33% 33% 
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Table 3 Source of voluntary CSD (in pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
5.64 2.76 3.53 3.62 3.63 
Annual Report  
9% 4% 5% 8% 13% 
36.11 40.29 39.41 21.41 15.66 Sustainability 
Report 60% 65% 59% 46% 56% 
18.84 18.90 23.65 22.00 8.62 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Supplementary 
Data 31% 31% 36% 46% 31% 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
 Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
 
Table 4 Source of voluntary CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
2.76 3.53 3.62 3.63 
Annual Report  
5.64 
(51%) 28% 3% - 
40.29 39.41 21.41 15.66 Sustainability 
Report 
36.11 
12% (2%) (46%) (27%) 
18.90 23.65 22.00 8.62 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Supplementary 
Data 
18.84 
- 25% (7%) (61%) 
61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
 Total 
60.59 
2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
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Table 5 Theme of voluntary CSD (pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
11.26 8.98 15.64 11.55 7.63 
Health & Safety 
19% 14% 24% 24% 27% 
6.35 8.91 8.77 6.90 1.19 
Marketplace 
10% 14% 13% 15% 4% 
4.72 6.53 6.94 4.56 4.23 
Workplace 
8% 11% 10% 10% 15% 
1.36 4.56 4.63 2.85 2.19 
Community 
2% 7% 7% 6% 8% 
30.03 19.84 21.99 17.79 7.59 
Environment 
50% 32% 33% 38% 27% 
6.87 13.13 8.62 3.38 5.08 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
11% 21% 13% 7% 18% 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
 Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 6 Theme of CSD (pages) and year to year change (negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
8.98 15.64 11.55 7.63 
Health & Safety 
11.26 
(20%) 74% (26%) (34%) 
8.91 8.77 6.90 1.19 
Marketplace 
6.35 
40% (2%) (22%) (83%) 
6.53 6.94 4.56 4.23 
Workplace 
4.72 
38% 6% (34%) (7%) 
4.56 4.63 2.85 2.19 
Community 
1.36 
235% 2% (38%) (23%) 
19.84 21.99 17.79 7.59 
Environment 
30.03 
(34%) 11% (19%) (57%) 
13.13 8.62 3.38 5.08 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
6.87 
91% (34%) (61%) 50% 
61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91  Total 
60.59 
2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
 456 
 
 
 
Table 6 Positive vs. negative CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
4.91 6.83 4.51 4.50 
Positive   
5.18 
(5%) 39% (34%) - 
3.14 6.61 6.19 2.40 
Negative  
3.36 
(7%) 111% (6%) (61%) 
1.17 2.59 1.01 0.82 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Neutral   
3.03 
(61%) 121% (61%) (19%) 
32.15 36.75 24.57 16.81 
Positive   
35.28 
(9%) 14% (33%) (32%) 
18.23 24.92 19.20 9.47 
Negative  
19.66 
(7%) 37% (23%) (51%) 
13.34 7.19 5.50 4.41 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Neutral   
7.52 
77% (46%) (24%) (20%) 
63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
 Total  
62.46 
2% 8% (28%) (38%) 
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 Table 7 Substantive vs. symbolic CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
6.23 10.96 9.56 4.54 
Substantive  
8.99 
(31%) 76% (13%) (53%) 
2.59 4.34 1.95 2.77 
Symbolic  
2.05 
26% 68% (55%) 42% 
0.41 0.73 0.20 0.41 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Other     
0.52 
(21%) 78% (73%) 105% 
36.86 46.09 35.79 18.87 
Substantive  
42.82 
(14%) 25% (22%) (47%) 
21.51 19.88 11.66 8.82 
Symbolic  
15.53 
39% (8%) (41%) (24%) 
5.35 2.89 1.82 3.00 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other      
4.11 
30% (46%) (37%) 65% 
63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
 Total      
62.46 
2% 8% (28%) (38%) 
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J(ii): AF 
Table 1 Total CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
102 145 402 419 
Sentences 
150 
(32%) 42% 177% 4% 
4.29 6.27 22.19 14.81 
Narrative  
5.56 
(23%) 46% 254% (33%) 
6.26 8.39 13.80 6.86 
Pictorial  
2.88 
117% 34% 64% (50%) 
10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
8.44 
25% 39% 145% (40%) 
7.5% 8.6% 18.6% 9.7% 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
pe
r 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
6.2% 
21% 15% 116% (48%) 
 
 
Table 2 H&S CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
8 37 92 88 
Sentences  
32 
(75%) 363% 149% 4% 
0.32 1.60 5.03 3.11 
Narrative 
1.19 
(73%) 400% 214% (38%) 
0 0 0.86 0 
Pictorial  
0 
- - ∞  (100%) 
0.32 1.60 5.89 3.11 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
1.19 
(73%) 400% 268% 47% 
0.2% 0.9% 3.1% 1.4% 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
0.9% 
(77%) 350% 244% (55%) 
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 Table 3 Source of CSD (in pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
NA 6.43 10.86 30.34 14.86 
Annual Report 
- 61% 74% 84% 69% 
8.44 4.12 3.80 5.65 6.81 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Reference 
Report 100% 39% 26% 16% 31% 
8.44 10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67 
 Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
 
 
Table 4 Source of CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative figures in 
brackets) 
  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
6.43 10.86 30.34 14.86 
Annual Report 
NA 
∞ 69% 179% (51%) 
4.12 3.80 5.65 6.81 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Reference 
Report 
8.44 
(51%) (8%) 49% 21% 
10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67 
 Total 
8.44 
25% 39% 145% (40%) 
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Table 5 Theme of CSD (pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
1.19 0.32 1.60 5.89 3.11 
Health & Safety 
14% 3% 11% 16% 14% 
0.81 3.59 5.89 5.65 2.13 
Marketplace 
10% 34% 40% 16% 10% 
6.32 6.64 6.84 15.09 10.94 
Workplace 
75% 63% 47% 42% 50% 
0 0 0.14 1.21 1.50 
Community 
0% 0% 1% 3% 7% 
0.11 0 0.21 5.56 3.37 
Environment 
1% 0% 1% 15% 16% 
0 0 0 2.59 0.60 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
0% 0% 0% 7% 3% 
8.44 10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67  Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 6 Theme of CSD (pages) and year to year change (negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.32 1.60 5.89 3.11 
Health & Safety 
1.19 
(73%) 400% 268% (47%) 
3.59 5.89 5.65 2.13 
Marketplace 
0.81 
343% 64% (4%) (62%) 
6.64 6.84 15.09 10.94 
Workplace 
6.32 
5% 3% 121% (28%) 
0 0.14 1.21 1.50 
Community 
0 
- ∞ 764% 24% 
0 0.21 5.56 3.37 
Environment 
0.11 
(100%) ∞ 2,548% (39%) 
0 0 2.59 0.60 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
0 
- - ∞ (77%) 
10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67  Total 
8.44 
25% 39% 145% (40%) 
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Table 7 Positive vs. negative CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.25 1.31 4.94 2.45 
Positive   
1.07 
(77%) 424% 277% (50%) 
0 0.29 0.86 0.49 
Negative  
0.07 
(100%) ∞ 197% (43%) 
0.07 0 0.09 0.17 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Neutral   
0.04 
75% (100%) ∞ 89% 
7.14 13.21 30.91 18.74 
Positive   
5.75 
24% 85% 134% (39%) 
0.70 0.87 2.98 1.31 
Negative  
0.63 
11% 24% 242% (56%) 
2.70 0.59 2.10 1.61 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Neutral   
2.06 
31% (78%) 256% (23%) 
10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67 
 Total  
8.44 
25% 39% 145% (40%) 
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Table 8 Substantive vs. symbolic CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.27 0.87 3.59 2.29 
Substantive  
0.74 
(64%) 222% 313% (36%) 
0.05 0.73 2.25 0.78 
Symbolic  
0.41 
(87%) 1,360% 208% (65%) 
0 0 0.04 0.03 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Other     
0.04 
(100%) - ∞ (25%) 
4.42 5.43 19.06 12.42 
Substantive  
5.69 
(22%) 23% 251% (35%) 
5.42 9.02 16.07 8.52 
Symbolic  
2.07 
162% 66% 78% (47%) 
0.70 0.21 0.86 0.72 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other      
0.67 
4% (70%) 310% (16%) 
10.55 14.66 35.99 21.67 
 Total      
8.44 
25% 39% 145% (40%) 
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J(iii): AA 
Table 1 Total CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
38 406 144 106 
Sentences 
105 
(64%) 968% (65%) (26%) 
1.58 19.88 4.24 3.93 
Narrative  
5.25 
(70%) 1,158% (79%) (7%) 
6.17 12.68 8.85 9.77 
Pictorial  
6.86 
(10%) 106% (30%) 10% 
7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
12.11 
(36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
18.5% 18.9% 12.5% 13.3% 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
pe
r 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
18.3% 
1% 2% (34%) 6% 
 
Table 2 H&S CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
10 65 21 7 
Sentences  
7 
43% 550% (68%) (67%) 
0.42 3.08 0.62 0.26 
Narrative 
0.35 
20% 633% (80%) (58%) 
0.25 1.32 0.50 0.56 
Pictorial  
0.50 
(50%) 428% (62%) 12% 
0.67 4.40 1.12 0.82 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
0.85 
(21%) 557% (75%) (27%) 
1.6% 3% 1.1% 0.8% 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
1.3% 
23% 88% (63%) (27%) 
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 Table 3 Source of CSD (in pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
12.11 7.75 8.68 13.09 13.70 
Annual Report 
100% 100% 27% 100% 100% 
- - 23.88 - - 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Sustainability 
Report - - 73% - - 
12.11 7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
 Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  
 
 
Table 4 Source of CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative figures in 
brackets) 
  
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
7.75 8.68 13.09 13.70 
Annual Report 
12.11 
(36%) 12% 51% 5% 
- 23.88 - - 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Sustainability 
Report 
- 
- ∞ (100%) - 
7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
 Total 
12.11 
(36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
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Table 5 Theme of CSD (pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.85 0.67 4.40 1.12 0.82 
Health & Safety 
7% 9% 14% 9% 6% 
3.04 1.81 0.44 0.29 0.44 
Marketplace 
25% 23% 1% 2% 3% 
7.47 4.69 12.35 10.60 10.68 
Workplace 
62% 61% 38% 81% 78% 
0 0 3.86 0 0 
Community 
0% 0% 12% 0% 0% 
0.75 0.50 9.71 1.07 1.75 
Environment 
6% 6% 30% 8% 13% 
0 0.08 1.79 0 0 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
0% 1% 5% 0% 0% 
12.11 7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
 Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 6 Theme of CSD (pages) and year to year change (negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.67 4.40 1.12 0.82 
Health & Safety 
0.85 
(21%) 557% (75%) (27%) 
1.81 0.44 0.29 0.44 
Marketplace 
3.04 
(40%) (76%) (34%) 52% 
4.69 12.35 10.60 10.68 
Workplace 
7.47 
(37%) 163% (14%) 1% 
0 3.86 0 0 
Community 
0 
- ∞ (100%) - 
0.50 9.71 1.07 1.75 
Environment 
0.75 
(33%) 1,842% (89%) 64% 
0.08 1.79 0 0 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
0 
∞ 2,138% (100%) - 
7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
 Total 
12.11 
(36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
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 Table 7 Positive vs. negative CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.42 2.63 0.06 0.07 
Positive   
0.25 
68% 526% (98%) 16% 
0 0.78 0.29 0 
Negative  
0.10 
(100%) ∞ (63%) (100%) 
0.25 1.00 0.76 0.75 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Neutral   
0.50 
(50%) 300% (24%) (1%) 
3.17 23.34 1.29 1.49 
Positive   
6.14 
(48%) 636% (94%) 16% 
0.25 2.97 2.99 2.45 
Negative  
1.02 
(75%) 1,088% 1% (18%) 
4.33 6.24 8.81 9.76 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Neutral   
4.95 
(13%) 44% 41% 11% 
7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
 Total  
12.11 
(36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
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 Table 8 Substantive vs. symbolic CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.67 3.29 0.94 0.67 
Substantive  
0.65 
3% 391% (71%) (29%) 
0 1.11 0.18 0.15 
Symbolic  
0.20 
(100%) ∞  (84%) (17%) 
0 0 0 0 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Other     
0 
- - - - 
5.29 20.19 10.13 10.90 
Substantive  
8.96 
(41%) 282% (50%) 8% 
2.38 11.88 1.47 1.26 
Symbolic  
3.15 
(24%) 399% (88%) (14%) 
0.08 0.49 1.49 1.53 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other      
0 
∞ 513% 204% 3% 
7.75 32.56 13.09 13.70 
 Total      
12.11 
(36%) 320% (60%) 5% 
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J(iv): SIA 
Table 1 Total CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
86 157 190 148 
Sentences 
77 
12% 83% 21% (22%) 
3.44 7.85 7.60 6.43 
Narrative  
3.08 
12% 128% (3%) (15%) 
2.77 4.28 6.07 7.45 
Pictorial  
1.83 
51% 55% 42% 23% 
6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
4.91 
26% 95% 13% 2% 
6.8% 11.4% 11.8% 11.4% 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
pe
r 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
Proportion of 
report  
5.5% 
24% 68% 4% (4%) 
  
Table 2 H&S CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
12 36 38 22 
Sentences  
8 
50% 200% 6% (42%) 
0.48 1.80 1.52 0.96 
Narrative 
0.32 
50% 275% 16% 37% 
0.16 0.32 0 0.17 
Pictorial  
0 
∞ 100% (100%) ∞ 
0.64 2.12 1.52 1.13 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
0.32 
100% 231% (28%) (26%) 
0.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.9% 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
Proportion of 
report  
0.4% 
75% 186% (35%) (31%) 
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Table 3 Theme of disclosure (pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.32 0.64 2.12 1.52 1.13 
Health & Safety 
7% 11% 17% 12% 8% 
0.56 0.66 2.02 2.87 3.50 
Marketplace 
11% 11% 17% 21% 25% 
2.16 2.79 2.44 5.49 6.26 
Workplace 
44% 45% 20% 40% 45% 
0.54 0.72 2.09 0.44 0.35 
Community 
11% 12% 17% 3% 3% 
0.28 0.08 0.23 0.33 0.56 
Environment 
6% 2% 2% 2% 4% 
1.05 1.16 3.23 3.02 2.10 
T
yp
e 
of
 D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
21% 19% 27% 22% 15% 
 Total 4.91 6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
 
Table 4 Theme of CSD (pages) and year to year change (negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.64 2.12 1.52 1.13 
Health & Safety 
0.32 
100% 231% (28%) (26%) 
0.66 2.02 2.87 3.50 
Marketplace 
0.56 
18% 206% 42% 22% 
2.79 2.44 5.49 6.26 
Workplace 
2.16 
29% (13%) 125% 14% 
0.72 2.09 0.44 0.35 
Community 
0.54 
33% 190% (79%) (20%) 
0.08 0.23 0.33 0.56 
Environment 
0.28 
(71%) 188% 43% 70% 
1.16 3.23 3.02 2.10 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
1.05 
10% 178% (7%) (30%) 
6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88  Total 
4.91 
26% 95% 3% 2% 
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 Table 5 Positive vs. negative CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.54 1.58 0.84 0.97 
Positive  
0.28 
93% 193% (47%) 15% 
0.06 0.54 0.64 0.12 
Negative  
0.04 
50% 800% 19% (81%) 
0.04 0 0.04 0.04 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Neutral   
0 
∞ (100%) ∞ - 
5.40 10.84 7.76 9.25 
Positive  
4.55 
19% 101% (28%) 19% 
0.37 0.79 4.53 1.38 
Negative 
0.28 
32% 114% 473% (70%) 
0.44 0.50 1.38 3.25 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Neutral  
0.08 
450% 14% 176% 136% 
6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
 Total  
4.91 
26% 95% 13% 2% 
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Table 6 Substantive vs. symbolic CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
0.52 1.49 1.32 1.13 
Substantive  
0.24 
117% 187% (11%) (14%) 
0.12 0.63 0.20 0 
Symbolic  
0.08 
50% 425% (68%) (100%) 
0 0 0 0 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Other    
0 
- - - - 
4.97 9.53 10.90 12.15 
Substantive  
3.29 
51% 92% 14% 11.5% 
1.24 1.85 2.13 1.74 
Symbolic  
1.58 
(22%) 49% 15% (18%) 
0 0.75 0.64 0 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other   
0.04 
(100%) ∞ (15%) (100%) 
6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
 Total     
4.91 
26% 95% 13% 2% 
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J(v): SAS 
Table 1 Total CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
858 1,777 646 880 
Sentences 
872 
(2%) 107% (64%) 36% 
23.56 48.89 14.04 17.60 
Narrative  
24.50 
(4%) 108% (71%) 25% 
41.2 49.37 9.24 11.00 
Pictorial  
27.99 
47% 20% (81%) 19% 
64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
52.49 
23% 52% (76%) 23% 
10.7% 21.4% 19.1% 24.2% 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
pe
r 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
% of Annual 
Report 
10.6% 
1% 100% (11%) 27% 
 
 
Table 2 H&S CSD per measurement unit and % of year to year change (negative figures 
in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
185 279 80 115 
Sentences  
208% 
60 
51% (71%) 44% 
4.95 7.55 1.74 2.30 
Narrative 
1.66 
198% 53% (77%) 32% 
1.64 5.01 1.12 1.17 
Pictorial  
1.30 
26% 205% (78%) 4% 
6.59 12.56 2.86 3.47 
Pa
ge
s 
Total  
2.96 
123% 91% (77%) 21% 
2.8% 5.0% 2.3% 2.9% 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t u
ni
t 
87% 
% of Annual 
Report 
1.5% 
79% (54%) 26% 
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Table 3 Source of CSD (in pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
12.31 11.65 25.44 23.28 28.60 
Annual Report  
23% (18%) 26% 100% 100% 
40.18 40.88 72.82 - - Sustainability 
Report 77% 63% 74% - - 
- 12.23 - - - 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
- 19% 
Supplementary 
Data - - - 
52.49 64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60 
 
100% 100% 
Total 
100% 100% 100% 
  
 
Table 4 Source of CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative figures in 
brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
11.65 25.44 23.28 28.60 
Annual Report  
12.31 
(5%) 118% (8%) 23% 
40.88 72.82 - - Sustainability 
Report 
40.18 
2% 78% (100%) - 
12.23 - - - 
T
yp
e 
of
 R
ep
or
t 
Supplementary 
Data 
- 
∞ (100%) - - 
64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60 
 Total 
52.49 
23% 52% (76%) 23% 
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Table 5 Theme of CSD (pages) in proportions 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
2.96 6.59 12.56 2.86 3.47 
Health & Safety 
6% 10% 13% 12% 12% 
4.01 2.76 3.75 1.77 3.44 
Marketplace 
8% 4% 4% 8% 12% 
4.95 5.09 6.9 5.35 6.79 
Workplace 
9% 8% 7% 23% 24% 
0.05 0.16 0.44 0.23 0.62 
Community 
- - - 1% 2% 
39.00 46.83 68.51 11.38 9.58 
Environment 
74% 73% 70% 49% 33% 
1.52 3.33 6.11 1.69 4.70 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
3% 5% 6% 7% 17% 
52.49 64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60  Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 6 Theme of CSD (pages) and year to year change (negative figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
6.59 12.56 2.86 3.47 
Health & Safety 
2.96 
123% 91% (79%) 21% 
2.76 3.75 1.77 3.44 
Marketplace 
4.01 
(31%) 36% (53%) 94% 
5.09 6.90 5.35 6.79 
Workplace 
4.95 
3% 36% (22%) 30% 
0.16 0.44 0.23 0.62 
Community 
0.05 
220% 175% (48%) 170% 
46.83 68.51 11.38 9.58 
Environment 
39.00 
20% 46% (83%) (16%) 
3.33 6.11 1.69 4.70 
Ty
pe
 o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other 
1.52 
119% 83% (72%) 178% 
64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60  Total 
52.49 
23% 52% (76%) 23% 
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Table 7 Positive vs. negative CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
3.89 6.55 1.86 2.06 
Positive   
1.72 
126% 68% (72%) 11% 
1.22 3.37 0.35 0.70 
Negative  
0.77 
58% 176% (90%) 100% 
1.48 2.64 0.65 0.71 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Neutral   
0.47 
214% 78% (75%) 9% 
35.40 51.91 14.11 18.25 
Positive   
35.39 
- 47% (73%) 29% 
14.71 21.66 3.27 5.05 
Negative  
12.04 
22% 47% (85%) 54% 
14.65 24.69 5.90 5.30 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Neutral   
5.06 
190% 69% 76% (10%) 
64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60 
 Total  
52.49 
23% 52% (76%) 23% 
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 Table 8 Substantive vs. symbolic CSD in pages and % of year to year change (negative 
figures in brackets) 
Pre-accident Post-accident  
Y-2 Y-1 Y1 Y2 Y3
3.82 5.42 1.40 2.07 
Substantive  
1.80 
112% 42% (74%) 48% 
1.90 5.14 1.11 1.22 
Symbolic  
1.08 
76% 171% (78%) 10% 
0.87 2.00 0.35 0.18 
H
&
S 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
Other     
0.08 
988% 130% (83%) (49%) 
30.64 48.95 10.52 14.32 
Substantive  
29.36 
4% 60% (79%) 36% 
23.63 30.48 7.96 11.71 
Symbolic  
19.78 
19% 29% (74%) 47% 
10.49 18.83 4.80 2.57 
T
ot
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Other      
3.35 
213% 80% (75%) (46%) 
64.76 98.26 23.28 28.60 
 Total      
52.49 
23% 52% (76%) 23% 
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Waiting for the Barbarians 
 
What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum? 
 
The barbarians are to arrive today. 
 
Why such inaction in the Senate? 
Why do the Senators sit and pass no laws? 
 
Because the barbarians are to arrive today. 
What laws can the Senators pass any more? 
When the barbarians come they will make the laws. 
 
Why did our emperor wake up so early, 
and sits at the greatest gate of the city, 
on the throne, solemn, wearing the crown? 
 
Because the barbarians are to arrive today. 
And the emperor waits to receive 
their chief. Indeed he has prepared 
to give him a scroll. Therein he inscribed 
many titles and names of honor. 
 
Why have our two consuls and the praetors come out 
today in their red, embroidered togas; 
why do they wear amethyst-studded bracelets, 
and rings with brilliant, glittering emeralds; 
why are they carrying costly canes today, 
wonderfully carved with silver and gold? 
 
Because the barbarians are to arrive today, 
and such things dazzle the barbarians. 
 
Why don't the worthy orators come as always 
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to make their speeches, to have their say? 
 
Because the barbarians are to arrive today; 
and they get bored with eloquence and orations. 
 
Why all of a sudden this unrest 
and confusion. (How solemn the faces have become). 
Why are the streets and squares clearing quickly, 
and all return to their homes, so deep in thought? 
 
Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. 
And some people arrived from the borders, 
and said that there are no longer any barbarians. 
 
And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? 
They were some kind of solution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                              K P Kavafis (1863-1933)
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